Ajit Randeniya

The failed plot to oust the democratically elected Iranian President Mohamed Ahmadinejad provides features of an extremely interesting ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”experiment’ being tried out by the US agents and neocons. Its analysis may be useful due to the potential for future deployment of similar conspiracies in Sri Lanka by the unhappy imperialists.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The attempted plot by the West to topple the democratically elected government of Iran showed signs of significant differences from the other campaigns in Georgia and Ukraine in that it was pre-planned, technology-based and was remotely controlled to an unprecedented degree. The operatives behind the plot include a collective of the Iranian Diaspora in California (who were forced out of Iran together with the Shah during the 1979 revolution), the CIA, NGO fronts of the CIA, and American wires Associated Press (AP) and Agency France Press (AFP). The BBC of course was at its usual, disgraceful worst.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ An analysis of the sequence of events, its media coverage and the sense of cautious anticipation of ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”results’ from the White House, the State Department and other Western capitals clearly showed the level of preparation that had gone in to this sinister attempt to undermine democracy. The experimental nature of the plot dictated that they quietly monitor developments and act gradually, rather than expressing open, aggressive support to their agents due to the fear that the mainstream Iranians would be turned away by US support.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The first, striking feature of the events was the speed with which the so-called “protestors” flooded the streets of Tehran. The crowds started to flow in, literally only moments after President Ahmadinejad declared victory, clearly suggesting that the result had been anticipated (naturally!) and the reaction had been pre-planned: this is where the new technology comes in.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The “agents provocateur” had used the latest digital technology such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and photo-sharing site Flickr, at various stages, to mobilise the westernised urban middle-class hedonists of Tehran by spreading word of an upcoming protest in the streets. Information Technology experts note that there is no definitive way to verify the authenticity or accuracy of any of the reports. Facebook was used to organise them before the election, and after it was blocked, they turned to Twitter.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The operators behind the conspiracy were monitoring the “bite rate” in Tehran and were issuing commentary cautiously: the anti-Iranian Diaspora leader Trita Parsi, president of the Shah family-funded “National Iranian American Council”, gleefully observed to CBS News that “people are asking themselves, what’s going on. What does the candidate want us to do”? He answered rhetorically: “Well, you go to Facebook and you check what is the latest status line of your candidate, and from there they could find out what was actually taking place.”

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The Associated Press, in an apparent boast about the level of their infiltration of the Iranian westernised youth population, quoted a Twitter user who identifies himself as “hamednz” and communicated with AP through e-mail: “when I’m not connected to Twitter it means that I’m disconnected from the world because the state TV doesn’t report many things!”

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The next comment came from a Robin Gross, executive director of “IP Justice”, described as “a San Francisco-based digital rights group” (clearly a CIA front). In an apparent assessment of the efficiency of operation, Gross noted that: ” [the Iranian government] can only censor in a patchwork way, and censorship by its nature has to be all or nothing.” The tone of the remark was self-congratulatory!

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ All the Western media outlets were thrilled by the success of the Twitter experiment and were rejoicing that the “coverage of the Iranian election protests has taken on a global life as a result of the involvement in coverage on Twitter”.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The so-called “news” by the BBC reporter in Tehran, Jon Leyne was a clear give-away of the identity of the real forces behind this “protest movement”: he reported that the Guardian Council had made an offer to recount in areas contested by the losing candidates. Now one would reasonably assume that this offer would have addressed their “grievance”: but Leyne had full foreknowledge that the “protestors” will not accept the offer! In a clear move to guide the “protesters” (agents followed by some misguided Iranian youth), Leyne ventured to interpret the announcement as “just a political ruse to try and wrong-foot the opposition”: the BBC certainly does not seem to want a resolution of their baseless “complaint”.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The reason behind the conspiracy was to somehow get a transfer of power, not through an election process they couldn’t win, but through a campaign of ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”people power’ (by a small minority) because Mir Hossein Mousavi is West’s dream of a developing country convert; reformers do not spring like wild flowers in the land of Islamic Republic of Iran!

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Mousavi’s career history and personal circumstances shows that he has been cultivated by the Western intelligence agencies over the last two decades: he served as prime minister of Iran from 1981 to 1989, presiding over the Iraqi war. He was no reformer then, and his government is known to have tolerated little dissent with allegations of massacre of political prisoners levelled against him.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ His changeover to a “reformer” arises from several key factors: firstly, he seems to resent the abolishing of the prime minister’s post that led to his premature retirement from active politics; secondly, his wife Zahra Rahnavard who is described as a “liberal academic” belongs to a particular ethnic minority in Iran, remotely controlled from New York; and he has been cultivated by the CIA through his contacts with the New York-based art dealer networks through whom he is known to sell his paintings for considerable sums.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Mousavi demonstrates the clear signs of indoctrination through Western propaganda: he calls for greater social freedoms, economic liberalisation and significantly, “constructive engagement with the West”. He was running for Presidency because Mr Ahmadinejad’s presidency was a “danger” to the country. He accuses President Ahmadinejad of “exhibitionism” and “sensationalism” in foreign affairs and “reducing an Iranian passports to the value of Somalia’s”. Such claims, copied directly from Western media propaganda, become vacuous in view of the fact that his support base did not extend beyond 10 kms from Central Tehran!

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Despite these disgraceful, underhand activities, the West will not succeed in ousting President Ahmadijenad. This effort was remarkably similar to their attempt to subvert China through the so-called uprising at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, in 1989: the 20th “anniversary” of that particular event just passed without registering a blip in the radar screen!

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ What they will use these kind of events is for myth making. Until recently, the Western propaganda was trying to cultivate the myth that there was a “massacre” of university students at Tiananmen Square. But the reputed investigative journalist Philip Knightly debunked this myth, not long after the 1989 events. From next week on, there will be some reference point built around the Tehran uprising!

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Sri Lanka needs to take precautions to prevent similar events taking place on its soil. There are several factors that expose Sri Lanka to the risk. Firstly, just like following Sri Lanka’s lead in forming the Non Aligned Movement and the campaign to make the Indian Ocean a Peace Zone, they are unhappy with Sri Lanka’s successful annihilation of the Tigers. Secondly, there is a convert in the form of Ranil Wickremesinghe, and a few others who could easily be manipulated to achieve such ends. Thirdly we also have a western-educated, mobile telephone and computer using younger generation who could be approached and influenced electronically, bypassing the traditional means of communication.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ National security against these kind of attacks require IT knowledge and expertise combined with preparedness of the telecommunication operators and regulators so that any attempt could be “nipped in the bud”, just like dealing with a computer virus.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ They should not be allowed to succeed!