By Bandu de Silva

 There has been no overall response in Sri Lanka to India’s stand this time over the voting on the US sponsored Draft Resolution (D/R) at UNHRC session in Geneva despite President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s spontaneous response to release the Indian fishermen in custody and a thank you letter since despatched to the Indian Prime Minister.  There have been much discussion on what brought about India’s change of mind at the last moment to abstain from voting after making a powerful explanation of reasons why the Draft was not acceptable to India because of its intrusive nature. The Island newspaper editorially asked why India stopped at that if she was so convinced. Others raised similar question.

In my last article published in the Asian Tribune on March 21 2014, commenting on Sathya Moorthy’s article ““Why India should not vote against Sri Lanka at UNHCR ”, (Ceylon Today, March,13 2014), I argued the reasons why  India could not cast a vote against Sri Lanka at the UNCHR sessions in Geneva if a rational foreign policy was followed but concluded that Sathya Moorthy’s and my expectations might not come through. That was considering the negative record of history of Indo-Sri Lanka bi-lateral relations during the whole period since independence except for the duration of the time of Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka and that of Prime Ministers Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi of India with both of whom the Sri Lankan Prime Minister maintained very cordial personal and official relations.

The way India responded negatively this time  to the US sponsored D/R, my final assertion proved wrong but the reasons I used to argue why India cannot take a negative position towards Sri Lanka if there was rational thinking remain valid. This is now substantiated by the explanation offered by India’s representative at UNCHR in Geneva, Ambassador Dilip Singh, just prior to the vote taking. That explanation, in my view, points to the final triumph of the people behind the scene in Indian policy making in the South Blok. It is not that there had been no rational thinking on the part of India when it came to relations with the close neighbor Sri Lanka, but during the last few years, the South Block’s views on how the neighbourhood policy should be guided had been side-tracked by forces different from those which guided Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to treat Sri Lanka like plantation  colony . What dominated Indian thinking in recent times was not even self-interest but short term electoral -political compulsions like remaining in power. The vote bank in Tamil Nadu and Pudihchery in the south for the Congress party was very much in view.

Centre-Tamil Nadu Conflicts

Recent events in New Delhi-Tamil Nadu relations have brought to light the danger of permitting Tamil Nadu to override India’s long term interests as regards both internal cohesion of the Union as well as its interests as a country aspiring for a greater international role. The former reached a crescendo with Chief Minister, Jeyram Jayalalitha  of Tamil Nadu ordering the release of the convicts who were in jail for the murder of the former Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. The latter has manifested itself in Tamil Nadu’s adversarial policy towards neighbouring Sri Lanka, not just as a simple case of bringing pressure on the issue of Sri Lankan Tamils, but raising issues of bi-lateral dimensions like fishing and sovereignty over Kachchativu which matters had been settled between the two countries through bi-lateral agreements , and taking a very hostile attitude towards Sri Lanka all round like interference on matters of training Sri Lankan Armed forces personnel in India, promoting attacks on pilgrims from the island and stopping sports events. Some of these extraneous incidents have interfered with New Delhi maintaining healthy bi-lateral relations with Sri Lanka.

It was then time for the Centre to think of a course correction in the policy towards Sri Lanka being overtly dominated by electoral politics, not just to mend somewhat soured relations with the close neighbor but in India’s own long term interest of ensuring that the Centre’s decision making powers were not allowed to erode. That had to be stopped before it deteriorated further so as to offer a threatening prospect to India’s Union as it did once during the administration of Premier Jawaharlal Nehru because of the rise of Tamil Nadu’s ethnic spirit. 

Why New Delhi had allowed affairs to deteriorate to the present extent could be understood in a way if one considers that there was no parallel situation of trust building coming from the part of the Sri Lankan government today in contrast to  what it was as during the time of Mrs.Bandaranaike, for India to be pleased with the island government over areas of interest to her.

  Consequently, it was not the present day political realities of relations between the two countries that brought about a change India’s perspective on the Geneva Resolution this time, but as I argued, India’s long term interest of building up her image as a moral force in the world on which her ambitions to play a greater role in international affairs rests. That idea of moral force being very much India’s pre-independence legacy rather than the creation of post independent India, more had to be done be done to reinforce it.

South Block’s Triumph   

The realization today of  the true implications of the US initiative by the Indian government could be summed up not only as pointing to the ultimate triumph of a view point that has always been present in the past too in a strong section of the South Block but which failed to convince the government that in the long run, if India wanted to stand as a state  aspiring to play a key role in international politics, it had to adhere strongly to uphold the cultural and moral image of the country rather than expose its weakness as a country whose policy decisions are swayed by temporary short term advantages. It was also important that in image building, India had to demonstrate that she was capable of good neighborly relations in the region than she has demonstrated so far.

For the new course correction which took place with Geneva this time, the credit, as I conceived, has to go to the Indian bureaucracy for successfully influencing the Indian decision making. One could even see the hand of the present Indian External Minister, Salman Kurshid, in this whole affair as a person who could do some clear and bold thinking as he has demonstrated so far. It is not that he too does not come under the spell of  local geo-politics as his response in Lok Sabha in reply to a question raised by DMK leader Baalu in the Assembly, suggesting prospects of a Chinese involvement in the Kachchativu island. Minister Kurshid’s reply that India was keeping a close watch on Chinese infrastructure building in the neighbourhood countries may sound as if he was speaking against the spirit of emerging new dimensions introduced in Sino-Indian relations when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed seven bi-lateral agreements with China and invited the Chinese to take part in India’s three trillion dollar infrastructural development project. Such responses as attributed to Mr.Kurshid have to be understood in the given context rather than as a policy change .

If my argument is accepted, it is the deep-rooted perceptions as now emerged setting parochialism aside, like those arising from India’s local political stakes, which was often touted these days as the Tamil Nadu factor, because of the big vote bank that Tamil Nadu accounted for in central Indian politics, which has guided India’s decision not to vote with US this time. 

It is then, not so much why India this time did not go along with the US sponsored D/R against Sri Lanka, nor why her delegation chose to abstain on the vote, seemingly, though at the last minute, which  is important for consideration, but the explanation of India’s decision not to vote for it offered by Ambassador Dilip Singh.

Further Explanations by New Delhi

If one may attach importance to the reference to in India’s further explanations offered in New Delhi over her opposition to the Resolution , on the prospects of building on the holding of NPC elections, and establishment of the Provincial Council, over which there was a question mark for a long time, one might even surmise if there was an expectation that, in view of the concern of the Sri Lankan government over the pressure being exerted in Geneva, there could be prospects of further developments on the part of the Sri Lankan government  to make the devolution process more acceptable to the Sri Lankan Tamils as much as for India.

The holding of NPC elections itself came as a surprise to those in Sri Lanka who were strongly advocating the abolition of the 13^th Amendment over which the President himself seemed inclined once. As such, what is in the minds of politicians for whom retaining political power is a first priority over others cannot be easily predicted.

A hand to the Congress

The way the Sri Lankan President reacted immediately to India’s abstention and the explanation of the vote, by ordering the release of all Indian fishermen in custody with their boats was not the last thing he did, need not be taken as a full appreciation of India’s stance this time on the vote, but its spontaneity is very characteristic of the Sri Lankan President sends an important message all round. The Sri Lankan Navy reportedly, not only now allowing Indian fishermen to fish freely in the island’s territorial waters around Kachchativu but even offering sweets and soft drinks to Indian fishermen, makes it even more spectacular.

This is all politics. Anything done to diffuse the fisheries issue especially at this time on the eve of election one could even perceive President Rajapaksa wanting to lend a helping  hand to the Congress coalition which is much beleaguered in Tamil Nadu, with even its ally, the DMK, parting ways over Sri Lankan issues. That also takes the sails off both Jayalaitha’s AIDMK and Karunanidhi’s DMK on the Sri Lankan issue and to that extent, help the Congress. That is the type of political gesture which only politicians understand.  

Self-interest not excluded

If I may add a caveat over the Indian decision on The Geneva vote this time, indubitably, once again, India might have had her own self-interest in mind in judging the effect of the D/R, not just on Sri Lanka, but on herself one day, as much as on other UN member states.  This is resulting from what I had pointed out nearly three years ago as that of the UNCHR trying to assert for itself a role that only the UN Security Council has been empowered to wield. That is to empower UNHCR by devious means to assert for it the way for ordering   international investigations into the affairs of a member state of the UN in situations involving human rights and humanitarian law.  As the head of the Indian delegation pointed out this time in his pre-Resolution intervention, the US sponsored D/R was “intrusive” and ignored that “every country [had] the means of addressing human rights violations through robust national mechanisms.” That “intrusive” element has been present also earlier in 2012 and 2013, though for its own reasons, New Delhi had decided to support the US Draft Resolution in those years.  

India’s hand in the Draft

Looking back into the Geneva Draft,  a reference to the implementation of the 13^th Amendment was incorporated into the D/R this time, along with other references to making it fully effective, which can be seen as resulting from the Indian interests during the negotiating process, (it has also been so concluded by others) but an explanation is needed as to why India, at that stage, did not press the points it did later in her last minute explanation of the opposition it expressed to “intrusive’ nature of the D/R. Why did not India seek a modification of the operative paragraph at that stage? Did she try and fail but something kept under wrap because of the insistence by all Tamil Nadu politicians (even Congress politicians from TN like Chidambaram and KG Vasan to call for a an international investigation on Sri Lanka, ?

This way of looking at India’s motives might seem to vitiate the arguments used by India in opposing the Resolution but given the reality of the way India responded in the past, it could very well be explained that for the same reasons as before, India may have had the intention of going along with the US Draft but as discussed above, the South Block’s views prevailed finally. The public expression of disappointment by US over India opposing the intrusive nature of the D/R goes to show that India had been supportive of the D/R earlier but a change occurred only at the last minute.     

Fall back on ancient relationship 

I also note that a point I made in my last article and repeated many times previously, that India’s relationship with Sri Lanka is not just a geo-physical one. It was a relationship which both countries could not escape, a far more fundamental one based on millennia’s of close cultural links, which has come to be elevated from being confined to ceremonial occasions, and found some recognition in Ambassador Dilip Singh’s explanation. That is then something outside the other arguments but an appeal for an added reason for India to follow a good neighbor policy.

By way of a digression, I wish if the Indian Ambassador did not confine the relationship as going back to a thousand years, -that brings the memory of Cola imperialism – but went back to millennia old relationship with the island nation which even transformed its entire cultural pattern and stands to this day as permanent link between the two countries to this day with India being looked at by average Sri Lankan with reverential admiration and respect. That arises above all post-independent treatment extended to Sri Lanka except during the immediate post Nehru period under Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi on the Indian side and Sirima Bandaranaike on Sri Lankan side.

New Delhi’s further explanations

So far, I have described this sudden change of India’s stance as the result of South Block’s influence finally prevailing over earlier political (electoral) priorities. However, New Delhi’s further explanations  which concentrate not on the theoretical aspects (and morality aspects too as I see) raised by its representative in Geneva but on the fact that the India’s stance of abstaining on the vote was for the “betterment of  Tamils,” might give the impression of the South Block bureaucracy too veering round to give a pro-political explanation. For example, Foreign Secretary, Sujatha Singh’s statement confirming that India’s decision to abstain on the vote would be beneficial to Tamils and that it would also help resolve the problems of fishermen from Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, address the political reality closer home than India’s explanation of the principled standing on the vote offered to the Geneva audience.

At a political level, this explanation has been further articulated by others like the Union Minister of State for Industries and Commerce E.M. Sudarsana Natchiappan who defended India’s abstention arguing that it was aimed at neutralising the influence of China, which he said, was looking for a toehold in this part of the world. This is, of course, politically loaded explanations trying to neutralise opposition from other Congress stalwarts like Chidambaram. The China bogey is a very live subject among Indian law makers.

US had no pressure point to exert influence on India

On the other hand, it was a realization by India that her new security relationship and nuclear partnership in the use of advanced nuclear technology for civilian purposes  entered with US were important, they were not exactly beneficial for India alone but was a mutually advantageous equation. Consequently, there was no way that the US could use the security partnership with India, or even cooperation in the high nuclear energy field as a pressure point to persuade India to side with her on the D/R against Sri Lanka, as it did with countries like South Korea which depend on US military support which it gained to support the D/R and Philippines which it was able to neutralise into abstention. Though Japan also depends on US military support, there is a binding link between Japan and Sri Lanka which Japan has not overlooked so far. This old memory which goes back to the time of the Japanese Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco keeps on coming up always. US exerting pressure points on these countries of the Pacific which could have looked at Sri Lanka with greater empathy was overwhelmed by the China bogey which Hilary Clinton dexterously aroused during her South Asian tours.  

Besides, recent events in the diplomatic field like the insulting  cavity search of a senior female Indian diplomat by the border Police in New York, and also being subject to a Court case, and not un-similar humiliating treatment of the former Indian President, Abdul Kalam during a visit to the US, had caused more than mere irritation in India even leading to diplomatic retaliation, could not have helped US to maintain a demanding partnership with India.

Even though I took up the position earlier that these incidents may not have soured India’s overall bilateral relations with the US to affect an issue like the UNHCR vote on Sri Lanka, it would now seem that the cumulative effects of these incidents could have added up to India taking a close look this time rather than be seen as a camp follower of US on the vote issue.  Under a Prime Minister like Indira Gandhi one could have expected much harsher response from India to any insult to India’s honour, whether in the personal insult or other form. We recall, how Sri Lankan Presidential aspirant J R Jayewardene’s remarks to her and her son during the Indian General Election campaign, brought about some disastrous consequences to Sri  Lanka.        

Will there be a paradigm shift in India Foreign Policy?

This is the most important question that the Geneva vote raises this time. That India was unable to vote against the Draft Resolution despite all the sound and fury of arguments brought up by Ambassador Dilip Singh over the intrusive nature of the Resolution and other matters, and  further explanations given in New Delhi, expressing prospects of further improvement towards devolution, i.e., that India’s stance was advantageous to Sri Lankan Tamils, whether or not it will lead to a paradigm shift in India’s way of taking foreign policy decisions is a moot question. We are witnessing a situation of a General Election where the indications are fortunes may not remain as they were so far. A dicey electoral situation which gives Tamil Nadu even greater manoeuverabilty could result in a fall back to pre-Geneva electoral politics as the guide to relations with Sri Lanka.

Despite whatever cause that led India to take a half way stand, the new turn of events at Geneva as far as India was concerned, could be satisfying to India’s neighbours as well as India’s other well-wishers elsewhere. That is if India could sustain the trend and will not fall back on local electoral politics as the guiding principle in foreign policy decision making.

Sathya Moorthy put it succinctly when he said that India could not escape her neighbours. Though not on the same paradigm as India’s security and other relationship with US, which has now become a major consideration for India, cordial and strong bi-lateral relations with immediate neighbours is a factor which demands an equally, if not a more  important  niche in India’s foreign policy structure. That is very important for India’s image building as a country wanting to play a major international role.

Looking at it even historically, it was on a good neighborly relationship with Asian countries that Indian foreign policy started after independence, rather than with good relations with US or the West, until the border clash with China changed India’s perception and India began to look for US strategic relationship to continue the border war with China but which was not forthcoming.  It was only then that the former Soviet union stepped in and changed India’s nascent perception towards US and put china on the list of a permanent adversary. In the case of Sri Lanka, the bi-lateral relations become even more important because on India’s own perception, the island is very much within India’s shore defence scheme.

China factor 

Minister Natchappan’s remark quoted earlier shows how sensitive the China factor is, among Indian law makers. Even earlier, External Affairs Minister Salman Kurshid’s remark in Lok Sabha that India was keeping an eye on Chinese infrastructure building in the neighbourhood was prompted by a question by Minister Baalu about a Chinese involvement in the Kachchativu affair. Despite all such manifestations, it would not benefit Indian foreign policy to continue forever, with the adversarial policy towards China, which resulted from the border war, which again, learned observers, both on India side and outside have attributed to Nehru’s mishandling of the border security issue by following imperialist claims and strategies. Both China and India have marched a long way since and are on the threshold of  becoming emerging economic giants in Asia and global powers. Much has happened towards amelioration of relations between the two countries in recent times.

There is then much more to be gained by India by developing an alternative foreign policy paradigm through improved bi-lateral with China. This was outlined by Premier Manmohan Singh in his speech in the Great Hall of Beijing when he invited China to participate in India’s three trillion infrastructure programme. Such improved bi-lateral relations between the two countries is a situation which could be satisfying to not only to India’s South Asian neighbours but also to many others. Only a spoiler like the US which wishes to see the world and countries divided which as one saw during Hillary Clinton’s visits to Asia when she was setting up Asian countries against China, would oppose a a thaw in relationship between the two emerging Asian giants.

Future of Indo-Sri Lankan Relations

It is just as well if the present tempo demonstrated by India’s opposition to the D/R against Sri Lanka which was adopted with a sharp division is maintained and Indian foreign policy decisions continue to follow the reasoned  criteria which were used by India, which as I said point to the stamp of  India’s well honed South Block’s influence. If that were the situation, the neighbourhood  countries in South Asia (SAARC) could find it easy and privileged to rally round India in her aspiration for higher international role and leadership role in the region. For example, Sri Lanka which had positively declared herself in support of India’s bid to a permanent seat in the UN Security in Council, could be seen in the role of a banner holder towards that end. 

The official response from the Sri Lankan government has been swift and well meaning. President Rajapaksa ordering the expediting of the legal process to release the Indian fishermen custody and the Sri Lankan Navy not obstructing since Indian fishermen to fish near Kachchativu and in the Mannar Sea received warm media reception in India. As already  remarked earlier, it has removed the sails off DMK and AIDMK over this issue. That gives the Congress coalition the edge over the Tamil Nadu parties at the forthcoming elections.

The President’s move following India’s decision on the vote this time, therefore, has brought about prospects of reaping political benefits to both sides. This gives a new opening to recommence the somewhat disturbed bi-lateral relations between the two countries and bring it back to the days when Premier Sirima Bandaranaike held the reins of government. Mrs Bandaranaike’s international stature was such that even when she did not see eye to eye with India in certain issues like the border with China and over the civil war in former East Pakistan, her views were not contested by India but respected. 

Response to the Geneva Resolution

The Indian response to US Resolution and Sri Lanka’s response to India so far cannot be discussed fully without a discussion of the US sponsored resolution itself. However, space does not permit a full discussion of it here. Sri Lanka’s response so far to the Geneva Resolution which was adopted with a marked division has been to reject it outright at political level.

Whether the official position will remain the same, i.e., a head-on clash with the OUNCHR will continue at official level, or like before, there would be cooperation with it in the end, is difficult to predict at this stage. If Sri Lanka choses the hard option, it makes it reasonable that she should have India on her side which would make her position strong. Likewise, it is time to invoke the NAM spirit if Sri Lanka intends to contest OUNCHR’s position, (that means the Resolution itself) at other international for a like the UNGA. (See Neville Ladduwahetty’s article in The Island of April  1 2014).

  One problem with regard to continuing Sri Lanka’s positive response to India, as I remarked earlier, is that the new prospects have emerged at a wrong time when India is going for a General Election. Whichever party emerges successful, Sri Lanka should now prepare itself for a close dialogue on issues with the new government over issues that India is interested in. The Sri Lankan government should not hesitate to explain to India the extent to which the devolution can be extended despite the 13^th Amendment for reasons the majority in the country consider valid, including security considerations. It is imperative that India too should understand these compulsions and should not hold the 13^th Amendment she brokered (read imposed) like the Sword of Damocles over Sri Lanka’s head and should take the overall local political context into consideration.  Even in India, a number of Constitutional provisions still remain dead letters without the necessary legislation being passed and some implemented  only through Prime Ministerial directive.

As Salman Haider writing in the Statesman (April 1, 2014) observed :

“….India has to be persuasive with SLG and find common ground. Adopting the kind of minatory approach embodied in the recent resolution does not serve a useful purpose and there is no advantage in following others in that course. India and Sri Lanka have been partners in the long struggle at the UN to maintain the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. This should remain the guiding purpose of their policy so that they continue to collaborate in this task and remain partners in the task of maintaining the security of the Indian Ocean littoral, whether from internal or external threat.”

Apart from the new opening which is presented to the two countries with India’s change of mind on the Geneva Resolution, it is also time for both countries to examine if the old cooperation between the two countries on keeping the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace which Salman Haider refers here, could be renewed. Such consideration falls into place with the renewal of the lease of Diego Garcia atolls to build the US maritime base is coming up for revision, an issue over which India and Sri Lanka were both concerned much once. While it is time that Sri Lanka should take an initiative in this respect, the prospects of India joining forces with Sri Lanka for a common stand would also be a real test in which direction Indian foreign policy is ultimately moving.