KAMALIKA PIERIS

Sri Lanka’s armed forces were praised and admired long before the Eelam victory of 2009. The US Pacific Command team which evaluated the Sri Lanka army in 2002 said the soldiers were well motivated and were confident as a team.  They were well trained, knew their weapons, and were proficient in the skills expected of them. ‘Maneuvers in close proximity to automatic weapons fire were rapid,’ they noted. Soldiers had a good understanding of LTTE warfare and knew how to defeat the LTTE. They had maintained a fighting spirit amidst tremendous hardships and it was this spirit that had prevented more drastic defeats.  The army would have succeeded better if the entire system were committed to that end, they concluded. 

The deputy head of the Naval Monitoring team of the SLMM, Lars Bleymann was on board Pearl Cruiser II” when it was attacked by the LTTE in 2006. He wrote to the Navy high command   thanking the navy, from the bottom of his heart, for saving his life. He said that the officer in charge and his crew behaved in exemplary manner. The OIC was calm, collected, never wavered, and never lost coolness.   His crew carried out his orders. They are a credit to the navy and the Sri Lanka Navy is in very good shape, he said.

On another occasion, the head of the International Committee of Red Cross had written to Rajiva Wijesinha ‘Your men either at sea or on land, carried out their tasks in an exemplary manner. Whether it be to protect the state and its citizens or the care of the sick and wounded they displayed a strict discipline and respect for rules of engagement and at the same time a very respectful and kind attitude to help those in need.’

Geneva Convention (Additional Protocol II, 1977) is the only regulation that is of any use to a government engaged in civil war. This Protocol supports the right of governments to preserve national unity, protect territory, and maintain law and order in a civil war situation. This Protocol prohibits others from meddling in the war or interfering with any actions the government chooses to take on the matter.  Sri Lanka has not signed this Protocol and therefore cannot make use of these valuable clauses.  When asked why Sri Lanka did not do so, officials have no answer.  Observers ask, was it deliberate? The present trumped up ‘war crimes’ charges are due to this omission.  The Ottawa landmine treaty prohibits the use production and stockpiling of anti personnel mines. We have not signed that either.

 The armed forces faced many obstacles when fighting this war, including sabotage. When the government negotiated to buy RM 70 multiple rocket launchers from Czechoslovakia, there was an attempt to scuttle the deal and the Czech manufacturers had to retain lawyers to proceed with the sale. The purchase was made but the plane carrying the launchers vanished after leaving Czechoslovakia. It was found in a former soviet republic. Sri Lanka made representation and the plane was allowed to take off. When the plane arrived in Sri Lanka, the Czech technicians in Colombo found that wires had been cut in both machines. They repaired the launchers with the help of SLAF technicians. The second aircraft carrying two more launchers was intercepted by fighter aircraft of a Middle Eastern country and forced to land in a military airport. It was held there for three weeks. An East European country had to make representation on behalf of Sri Lanka to secure the aircraft’s release. These rocket launchers were urgently needed by the army. LTTE fighting strength came primarily from their rocket launchers.

Some sections of the media helped the LTTE by publicizing arms purchases.  Specifications of the newly acquired fire finding equipment were published. Sensitive combat information was made public.  Navy said they could have targeted another LTTE vessel in addition to the ones they hit in 2003 if the media had not announced navy operations in advance. They charged that they could have destroyed at least four more LTTE ships in 2003 and 2006 if the media had not published sensitive information.

Military experts from UK, USA and India, three countries which opposed the war, were given an inside look at our armed forces. US Pacific Command invited by Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe,  carried out a comprehensive study of the armed forces, to see whether the government could defeat the LTTE.  They assured, in their top secret report that this would not happen. The army did not have the necessary equipment.  Air force    did not have a comprehensive air operational plan  and lacked the equipment needed for surveillance and reconnaissance. They should acquire cluster bombs. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was invited to advise on Sri Lanka’s intelligence. They  used this to sit in on intelligence briefings.  Lt Gen Nambiar and Vice Admiral Jacob (India) were invited to advice on Jaffna high security zone and a special sea route for LTTE. ( 2003) General Rose (UK) came to advise on military reform.

When it became clear that the government was going to win the war, the western powers wanted President Rajapakse to stop the war. When Kilinochchi fell in January 2009 USA, UK, Norway and France followed by India and Japan tried to force this. These countries were trying to save the badly cornered LTTE. The pressure exerted on President Rajapakse was enormous. Representatives of UN, UNDP, ICRC together with the ambassadors for USA, India and European Union met the Foreign Minister. USA threatened to withhold the promised 9 million loan unless a ceasefire was declared and foreign intervention was allowed. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon sent his chief of staff, Nambiar to meet the President. UN wanted an immediate ceasefire.  USA wanted a meeting between the UN representative and Prabhakaran as well.

In the first three Eelam wars, Sri Lanka succumbed to international pressure   and the military offensive was stopped when the army was about to win.  The Rajapakse government refused to do this. President Rajapakse firmly stated that he was not going to stop the war. They were going to fight to the finish.  Nothing short of unconditional surrender could save the LTTE.  The UN was not needed. LTTE could contact the President through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

USA had also wanted President Rajapakse to offer a general amnesty to the LTTE. This coincided with the unilateral ceasefire declared by the LTTE when they found they were losing. President Rajapakse refused. The government could not offer an amnesty, he said. Even if the top leaders surrendered the government would go ahead with legal proceedings against them for crimes committed. It was also too late for the LTTE to negotiate a deal with the government.   President said that he would not accept Prabhakaran as party to any future settlement. Nothing could be more ridiculous than allowing LTTE to take part in negotiations when it had lost it fighting capability.

About two months before the final battle at Nanthikadal lagoon, USA had offered to evacuate the top LTTE leaders and their families. There were secret negotiations to take away Prabhakaran, Sea tiger wing leader, Soosai, intelligence wing leader Pottu Amman and their families, numbering over 100.  US wanted them to surrender to a third party. Sri Lanka insisted that LTTE must surrender to Sri Lanka and not to a third party.  Weerawansa said the west had asked Prabhakaran to lay down arms to a third party because if he was arrested he would tell the government how the west had helped him with the war. ( continued)