CLASSIFIED | POLITICS | TERRORISM | OPINION | VIEWS

The truth about the LTTE that a vacillant leadership finds hard to stomach.

R Chandrasoma

There are instances, both in daily life and in the larger sphere of politics, where the truth is so unpalatable that the common impulse is to turn away and feign ignorance of what is actually happening. Nothing illustrates this failing with greater force than the purblindness of successive governments in assessing the true motives of the LTTE. It is clear to even those endowed with the humblest of political skills that ;

(1) Prabhakaran appeared as a gun-wielding thug and will certainly die as one.

(2) The notion that he can be persuaded to head a 'federal' North-East respecting democratic norms is utter baloney.

(3) All his 'political' moves are mere feints to serve his ineradicable ambition to establish a despotic Eelam in the North-East with his dear self as the Absolute Leader.

(4) This Eelam will certainly exclude all symbols and memorials of the old Sri Lanka. The Port of Trincomalee will be the prize capture from the 'enemy' and any bases left in this region will fly Prabhakaran's Tiger-head flag. It will be a long farewell for the forces of the 'central' government.

(5) If all goes well, a racially sanitized North-East, armed to the teeth and with White-Skinned Foreigners as advisors and financiers will jostle aggressively the weakened rump-state of Sri Lanka.

It is not suggested that all this will come to pass. However, it is the 'roadmap' of the man who is the greatest threat to the peace and stability of our besieged nation. To ignore this reality and to talk glibly about an irrevocable commitment to peace may pass as a wonderful Gandhian riposte but is stark lunacy in this new age of terrorism.

What is the sane way of responding to this deadly threat? It is to know the man and his murderous aims and to act accordingly. This is not to say that an all-out war should be launched to eradicate the menace. Sri Lanka is now a client state and the declaration of war is no longer a sovereign option. However, even a diminished state can act skillfully and cautiously to contain the enemy and blunt his capacity for a pre-emptive strike. Among the tactics that could be adopted, a foremost place must be given to commando operations in the enemy's heartland. Large-scale field operations and trench-warfare are things of the past. Intelligence gathering and the recruitment of disaffected Tamils as undercover agents can turn tables on the aggressor. One of the greatest strengths of the Eelamist movement is its success in recruiting powerful friends and agents among the Sinhala elite. It must be admitted with great sadness that included in this coterie of southern spies and agents are a few very senior members of the Armed Services. The war against Prabhakaran can never be won if our fighting men have such unworthy characters in positions of leadership. It follows from all this that the war against the Northern insurgents must be waged on two fronts - the highly visible arena in the North and a less visible but no less important campaign to rid the capital city of that network of supporters and agents that have made the metropolis so vulnerable to Prabhakaran's bombers. Deprived of this hidden force in the Sinhala heartland, it is only futile warfare in the North - and, to a lesser extent in the East - that is within the ambit of a guerilla-force headquartered in the remote hinterland.

Let us turn to naval operations and its strategic role in the defence of our Island. It can be stated without equivocation that naval power is the key to success against an enemy that can only survive by establishing links with collaborators overseas. The development of an effective Coast Guard constituted of fast and well-armed boats has been stymied through the stupidity of successive governments. Billions have been squandered on showy naval fossils palmed off by crafty foreigners while operational basics remain neglected. We shall not add to this misery by stating facts about the Air Force - or Air Farce.

There is an important lesson here. While the New President has an Economic Advisor, he has no Military Advisor. It can be argued that heads of the Armed Services function as military advisers and adding to this number is pointless. This argument is wrong. History shows us that the Military bosses defend the interests of their speciality and have scant concern for the overall effectiveness of the measures canvassed. In Sri Lanka, this weakness (among numerous others) has resulted in massive overspending and a catastrophic decline in overall effectiveness. What is needed is not a retired fighting man but an expert in operations research and logistics. Such an advisor will provide a perspective to the President (and the Defense Minister) that stands apart from the tunnel vision of the Service Commanders. Sadly, politicians have played this evaluative role and brought untold misery to the people of this tormented country.

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