The wings of the dove
Prof.
Rajiva Wijesinha
Courtesy The Daily News
Recently Prabhakaran has described the late Thamilselvan as his Peace
Dove. There have been several claims to the contrary in recent articles
even in newspapers critical of the Government but, assuming we ignore
those and, with the indulgence due to any deceased, accept Prabhakaran's
characterization, we must then wonder at the intransigence which made
him clip so firmly the wings of his dove.
The fact is, the appointed political leader of the LTTE was not allowed
over the last year to function in a political capacity at all. One Sunday
newspaper after his death referred to his being 'seen in military fatigues
last year when the LTTE attempted to penetrate Muhumalai' and another
noted that of late he had abandoned his 'black and white attire...preferred
military clothes and reverted to wearing the side arm again.'
Sad fate of other doves
The first of these accounts indeed suggested how history repeats itself,
except that this dove did not resist, and therefore stayed tied to his
post. Contrariwise his elder brother Moorthy, it was pointed out, had
been close to Prabhakaran's former deputy Mahattaya and had 'participated
in discussions with the Government when Ranasinghe Premadasa was President'.
It was because Mahattaya had been serious about those discussions, it
seems, that Prabhakaran got rid of him so cruelly. Moorthy it seems
'was detained..released after a long period of incarceration...is now
a low rung cadre engaged in clerical work for the LTTE.'
The dove escaped the fate of his brother, and of Prabhakaran's previous
deputy, by wholly subordinating his purported peaceful nature to his
leader's will. Anton Balasingham, who had been prepared to compromise
on the cry for Eelam by accepting federalism, also escaped Mahattaya's
fate, though he too was sidelined, and might have ended up as a low
rung cadre had he not died.
What the fate of all these people makes clear is that Prabhakaran himself
is really not interested at all in negotiations or in compromise. That
indeed was clear enough from what happened after 2002.
Even whilst, naively or otherwise, the then Government prepared for
peace talks, permitted massive funding to be given directly and indirectly
to the LTTE, provided it with sophisticated equipment and paid duty
for its acquisitions as required, the LTTE made it quite clear that
war was its sole purpose.
The war strategy of the LTTE during peace talks
There were four clear indications of this. First was the massive amount
of weaponry that was brought in, as most obviously proven when a Norwegian
monitor found weapons on board a ship that was then blown up by its
crew, the poor man being given just enough time to leap into the sea
to save himself.
Second was the concerted construction of military positions for offensives,
ranging from the emplacements at Sampur that threatened Trincomalee
harbour to the airstrip at Iranamadu that has the potential for such
destruction if defences are not put in place.
Third was the relentless killing of political opponents, though during
this period the Sinhalese were exempt.
It was Tamils opposed to the LTTE, members of PLOTE and the EPDP as
their leaders have made clear, who were killed, to say nothing of obvious
symbols of pluralism such as Lakshman Kadirgamar and Kethesh Loganathan.
And of course there were the servicemen and informers, Tamils as well
as Muslims, whose names the LTTE obtained after the infamous raid at
Athurugiriya.
Fourth was the continuing relentless recruitment of more armed fodder.
The Scandinavian monitors, in the period between February 01, 2002 and
December 31, 2005, ruled the LTTE guilty of 1794 cases of child recruitment
(Government of Sri Lanka none), 32 cases of force recruitment of adults
(GoSL none), 587 cases of abduction of adults (GoSL 3), 197 cases of
abduction of children (GoSL none), 18 cases of assassinations (GoSL
none - there were 143 allegations against the LTTE and 13 against GoSL),
13 cases of torture (GoSL none).
The list is endless, amounting to 3471 violations by the LTTE as ruled
by the Monitors, as against just 162 by GoSL (out of 6751 allegations
against the LTTE, 1313 against GoSL).
Despite all this, so brilliant is LTTE propaganda, so credulous the
world, that it is claimed that the government is responsible for the
breakdown of peace talks. It is forgotten that the LTTE withdrew from
talks in April 2003, when the Wickremesinghe government was doing its
best to keep them happy.
And they stayed away even though President Kumaratunga, who had taken
over the reins of Government, also agreed to much of what they wanted,
from paying duty for them on expensive vehicles to granting them almost
absolute authority in certain areas under Post-tsunami reconstruction.
2006 - the increasing intensity of LTTE attacks
It was only after President Rajapaksa was elected, almost at the end
of 2005 that, while escalating their small scale attacks, they came
back to talks in February 2006. After that they tried to kill the Army
Commander, in April.
Before that, in March, they - in fact Thamilselvan himself - had insisted
to the Norwegian ambassador when he went to Kilinochchi on March 16
along with the Head of the SLMM that 'the issue of child recruitment
does not fall with the parameters of the CFA, and should not be part
of the agenda at the next round of talks'.
To quote from the aide-memoire on the Ambassador's debriefing, and
to give the Norwegians their due, 'Bratskar has pointed out that the
CFA does mention of the abductions. Since a child cannot voluntarily
join the LTTE military force, all recruitment will have to be treated
as abduction.
He had also argued that looking at the history of the six rounds of
talks, there is an acknowledgement that recruitment should not be continued,
and that continued recruitment was extremely damaging to the image of
the LTTE at international level'.
The insistence even of the Norwegians on this aspect may explain why
the LTTE, having gone to Norway in June, surprised their hosts by refusing,
on the very morning of the talks, to participate. And then, over the
next couple of months, they launched two massive attacks, going far
beyond the isolated incidents of claymore bombs and sniping that they
had increasingly engaged in over the previous year.
Those attacks, on Mutur and Muhumalai, seem to have been intended to
deal crippling blows to the Sri Lankan Forces. The first, if successful,
would have virtually put the Port of Trincomalee out of action.
That, together with success for the Tigers at Muhumalai may well have
led to the fall of Jaffna. The strategy might now seem obvious, but
far too little appreciation has been expressed in such a context of
the efforts of the Forces in repulsing these attacks.
Unfortunately the SLMM then made its worst blunder in failing to register
the enormity of the two unprovoked attacks as violations of the Ceasefire.
Instead General Henricsson, whom the Norwegian facilitator now tells
me he cannot trace, engaged in a vicious attack replete with falsehoods
on both the Sri Lankan Forces and the Sri Lankan Government.
His thoroughly unprofessional report on the killing of 17 ACF workers
is widely quoted as gospel, and he was even given prominence by ACF
at a commemoration meeting in Paris, though subsequently they informed
our ambassador that he had invited himself there, in total violation
of his contract.
Leaving aside the obloquy that continues to be attached to Sri Lanka
because of his pronouncement, his failure to comment satisfactorily
on the planned double whammy, as it were, allowed the world to ignore
the qualitative difference of the LTTE resumption of war at that period
- which involved even, as mentioned above, the head of its political
wing, the supposed dove of peace.
The manifest need for the Sri Lankan forces to respond in a manner
that ensured that such unprovoked attacks could not be attempted again
should have been established by mature reporting about what had occurred.
Instead Gen Henricsson issued a ruling that seems at best a hysterical
outburst about undoubtedly a serious incident, but one that should have
been placed in context.
The final refusal to talk?
As a result, the admirable conduct of the Sri Lankan forces in conducting
its clearing up operations in the East, conduct admired positively by
the SLMM in private and negatively in its reports which do not record
any violations in the course of operations - except with regard to Kathiravelli
which I have discussed elsewhere - has been ignored by the world.
Meanwhile the LTTE returned to negotiations in October, negotiations
that might have led to a cessation of operations had the LTTE been sincere.
Instead poor Thamilselvam was withdrawn after just one day by what the
British have described as a simple telephone call from Kilinochchi.
The dove of peace was then rendered flightless by his master except
for that brief flutter in Geneva in October 2006. He had instead to
resume his military role, and not only in Muhumalai. His posthumous
promotion to the rank of 'Brigadier' will soon be seen as an attempt
by his Commanding Officer to vindicate his decision to force him out
of his role in the peace process, as negotiator and political leader.
I now understand why, when I asked the Norwegian ambassador last June
to inquire from political forces in Kilinochchi what they felt about
an electoral system for Sri Lanka, what they would propose with regard
to a second chamber that would empower regions at the centre, I was
told that this was not something the LTTE was concerned with. In short,
Thamilselvam was not permitted to engage in politics.
He has been replaced now by the former Sri Lanka police constable,
P Nadesan, who is said to be the Tiger 'police' chief. On the one hand
this may be seen as Prabhakaran's determination to draw no distinction
between political and security issues. Yet, paradoxically, this may
suggest some hope for the future, in terms of the need for the LTTE
to recognize the need to negotiate.
Thamilselvam, Prabhakaran's dove, was never in a position to contradict
his leader. Nadesan, an older man with more experience, may be able
to propose that a political solution may be preferable to the chimaera
of military domination. Where Thamilselvam was not in a position to
argue against a military strategy, Nadesan may be more inclined to try
to save lives.
I realise there is not much room for optimism. Given the intransigence
of the LTTE leadership when peace at almost any price seemed the policy
of the Sri Lankan Government, a change is not likely when genuine compromise
is necessary.
However, where Thamilselvam was not in a position to give his leader
the hard political advice that was essential, and sacrificed both his
position and the Peace Secretariat that worked under him to the intransigence
at the top, his successor may have both the understanding and the ability
to initiate change.
The writer is Secretary General, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace
Process
http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/11/09/fea01.asp
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