Paramilitaries Crucial to Face Future Terror Threats
Posted on September 4th, 2010

– Kumar Moses ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ 

The use of paramilitary forces by governments has been controversial; in fact very controversial. However, it is a strategy that worked successfully in Sri Lanka. Not once or twice but it worked many times and still remains the most potent force multiplier – a factor that enhances the effectiveness of an army – in counter terror warfare. Their success speaks for itself. Use of paramilitaries became prominent in handling JVP terror in the late 1980s. Half a dozen paramilitary groups were set up to wear down the JVP. It was an extremely successful strategy.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Since early 1980s government sponsored paramilitary groups operated in the North of the country harassing the LTTE and other pro-LTTE groups. They played a pivotal role in eradicating the LTTE threat in areas under government control. The turning point of the war came when a new, more potent paramilitary group was formed with the help of the former LTTE military genius Karuna Amman defected. All in all, paramilitaries were present in all major wars Sri Lanka succeeded in recent times. Para-militants are like parasites feeding upon terrorists; draining their strength, depleting their numbers to a manageable level and constraining and concentrating them so that the regular army can get them.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Judging Future Terror Threats by the LTTE is Foolhardy

Many commit the mistake of over-confidence in Sri LankaƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s ability to beat terrorists over the annihilation of the LTTE. Little that they realize, the LTTE was far from a traditional terrorist outfit in the last three years of war. During this time LTTE engaged much more in conventional warfare than terrorism! Of course their conventional warfare was a cross between traditional conventional tactics and guerilla tactics, but it was even further away from terrorist warfare. LTTE had to defend its ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”de facto separate administrationƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢. It had to defend its ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”capitalƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ and their other administrative infrastructures. Honour of holding on to it played a very big part in LTTEƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s final war. This is not how terrorists operate!

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Ultimately the LTTE was reduced to a hive of bees desperately trying to save their ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”queenƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ from ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”maraudingƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ hornets. It had to hold ground and fight. In other words they abandoned their game and tried to play the game Sri Lankan security forces had mastered over two decades. It not just costed the LTTE its existence, but also its ability to stage a guerilla war. The conventional war tied all its cadres to face the advancing army that it had too few cadres to use in a subsequent guerilla war.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ LTTE didnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t fight this way when it ascended the ladder of power. It stubbornly followed traditional and proven terrorist tactics until the fat aging commanders gave it away.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Any new terrorist threat will not start from where the LTTE ended (conventional warfare), but from where it started. A future terror group will at all cost avoid committing the grave mistake committed by the LTTE.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Sri Lanka army was very successful in taking on the LTTE in the conventional front, but was less effective in handling them in guerilla warfare. The fact that unconventional tactics were used in the conventional war is a different issue.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The Four Battle Zones and the Fabian Strategy

Elam War – 4 had four battle zones. Lankan troops employed four different tactics for these areas. These include – Vanni, the East, Jaffna peninsula and other parts of the country. As explained above, it was more or less conventional warfare in Vanni. There was a clear FDL (forward defence line). All moves to breach the FDL resulted in LTTE resistance. Sure the tactics of Sri Lankan troops were not old fashioned but in broad terms the confrontations were still mostly along FDLs and conventional.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ It was not so in the East. In the East there were no clearly demarcated FDLs as in Vanni. Terrorists freely intermingled with the people not just in areas under the LTTE but outside as well. It was a Herculean task to rid the LTTE in the East. All previous attempts failed. The long coastline and LTTEƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s seafaring abilities meant the danger was constant. The huge landmass of jungles on one side and densely populated areas on the other offered Sri Lankan forces a very difficult challenge. LTTE also had the support of many locals and most LTTE cadres were from the vicinity making them have the terrain advantage. All these were overcome by the extensive and effective use of the new paramilitary group that came up in the East following the defection of Karuna. In addition to taking out LTTE infiltrators, the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”Karuna groupƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ engaged in direct battles with the LTTE. Army offensive divisions need not be moved to the East and they could have their services still available in the North while keep winning in the East.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Fabian strategy, named after the Roman dictator, is a strategy that wears down the enemy than directly confronting it. TodayƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s paramilitaries are well equipped to do this and they did a silent but good job of it.ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ 

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Jaffna peninsula under government control was no better than the East as many LTTE infiltrators who knew the terrain and people well planned havoc. Maintaining law and order in such a grave situation called for the expertise of another paramilitary group knowing the area well. EPDP mastered the art of taking out LTTE infiltrators by being part of the society. ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ 

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Other areas faced the threat of LTTE sleeper cells, etc. – a threat that was defused to a great extent with the help of many quarters including paramilitaries.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Realities of War and the Political Fallout

War is not pleasant business. Terror threats have to be handled with equally brutal tactics that work. A disciplined army would not do certain things that are still legitimate and justified in war. Armed groups fighting against terrorist groups have successfully routed them using various strategies that work including the use of paramilitaries. Political expediency is another benefit of using paramilitary groups. There is an inevitable political fallout over fighting terrorism. Terrorists are not aliens; they have families, friends and well wishers. Bankrupt political forces also rely on terrorists to get what they couldnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t get by legitimate means. All this means there is a huge campaign against the government not to go to war. Certain military strategies that are highly effective in modern terror warfare are unfortunately extremely unpopular in the community that has a soft corner for terrorists. All terrorist groups have certain amount of community backing. Otherwise they would not survive. Certain effective maneuvers are best carried out by paramilitaries than by regular troops. This way the political fallout can be cushioned.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Needless to say it saves so many other unpleasant issues as well.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Meeting the Future Terror Threat

Sri Lanka may disarm paramilitary groups; but the ability to raise paramilitary groups must remain intact. They donƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t work for money and favours alone; they have their own political requirements. Aligning national political requirements with their requirements as much as possible is the best way to engage them. Creating conflicting political aspirations between the terrorist group and the paramilitaries is the only sustainable way to maintain a continuing conflict between otherwise colluding parties.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Morality is not the sole guiding force of national security; it should not be a barrier when in comes to national security. This was how ancient kings and successful handlers of terror and subversives more recently managed to overcome the threat. Even the most devout kings had to overcome teachings of non-violence when it was time to defend the nation. However, their ultimate goal justified all action taken.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Future terror threats will involve more blurred demarcation of who is a terrorist and who is a civilian. In order to reduce civilian casualties and minimize the political fallout, unconventional military strategies must be followed. They need unconventional skills. As a rule of thumb 3 troopers per terrorist is required to meet the conventional terror challenge while 22 troopers per terrorist is needed to meet the threat of guerilla warfare.ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚  All this happens while security forces have other regular challenging roles to play including all island security, administrative functions, etc. It is imperative to use unconventional tactics that may be considered controversial by laymen. After all anything is justified for national security; well, almost anything.

3 Responses to “Paramilitaries Crucial to Face Future Terror Threats”

  1. PRIYAN WIJEYERATNE Says:

    There is much to learn from this article. It has well theorised and described the conflicting elements of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, conventional warfare, good and governance. It is clear to anyone with a reasonable mind that tamils will continue to try it again. It is up to us to keep a good-eye on what is happening around us. We do not wish for another praba!!

  2. PRIYAN WIJEYERATNE Says:

    There is much to learn from this article. It has well theorised and described the conflicting elements of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, conventional warfare, and good governance. It is clear to anyone with a reasonable mind that tamils will continue to try it again. It is up to us to keep a good-eye on what is happening around us. We do not wish for another praba!!

  3. Kit Athul Says:

    Kumar Moses always brings out very interesting subjects. What he forgot here is the INDIAN RAW! Why are so many INDIANS visiting SL now? Rao cow was here last week. Few months ago INDIAN Navy chief was here. Indian Army chief is here today. Then Hari Krishan is to come in November. In December M.K. Nayanan (alias Andare, a direct descendent of Andare) will be here for what? Why is INDIA establishing INDIAN cosulates in Hambantotta, Kandy and Jaffna? Next will be Katharagama and Galle. It’s time for Sri lankan’s to stop buying INDIAN made goods and start a fund to buy land next to the Indian consulate and donate it to the Pakistan goverment to build Pakistani consulates. I do not think any one will concur for the following: Tamil Nadu Tamils will start a rebellion in 2012 and will start the break up of India as South and North. Two separate Republics. As soon the Tamil Nadu rebellion starts they will attack and capture SL’s Northern Province. Is the Armed forces ready for this this event when it occurs?

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