STORY UNTOLD ON CFA
Posted on August 29th, 2011
By Gomin Dayasiri
An extraordinary story was unearthed placing the Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002 (CFA) in a frame hitherto unknown, when Sunday IslandƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s investigative journalist Shamindra Ferdinando interviewed diplomat John Gooneratne, associated with the Peace Secretariat (2002 to 2006). ItƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s a point of departure from which social scientists can research for conclusions on the CFA.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ According to popular belief,ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Norwegians on the instigation of the LTTE rammed the CFA, down the throat of Ranil Wickremasinghe. It was presumed, administration was hardly given preferences by the Norwegians, at a time, militarily was depicted frail against the LTTE and the ground conditions were deemed insecure and unstable.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ It was held out, options were virtually non-existent; peace was a paramount, available at a price. It was marketed as an instrument of peace. Defense Forces were aghast of the contents in the CFA. Expectation of no explosions and assassinations were attractive: CFA was lauded and denigrated.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ During the pause, the guns were silenced and the public made secure, for a while. Furtively, LTTE utilized the provisions in the CFA to further their goal of achieving their objectives. They provoked the UNP and UPFA governments to retaliate by provocative acts: both maintained remarkable restraint not to stray from the peace zone.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ With the LTTE exploiting the CFA to their vantage, the benefits conferred on the TigersƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ were unmasked. The defenders of the CFA, for its many lapses, tendered excuses. It occurred because the Norwegians did not give adequate time, even to get the PresidentƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s consent, as they rushed the agreement. LTTE were adamant in sticking to obnoxious provisions: the best was extracted for the sake of peace. Constraints imposed prevented introducing the required safeguards.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚
Do these assertions appear to be true, after John GooneratneƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s revelations? Does it expose the enormity of our stupidity?
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ We signed with our eyes open. So implies the official of the Peace Secretariat reliable and respected Gooneratne: ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ…-CFA went through several drafting stagesƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”š‚¦ the Peace Secretariat presented its view, reactions and suggestions to the SL chief negotiator Prof G.L. PeirisƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”š‚¦ and as the process continued, the CFA was gradually completedƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”š‚. ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Those words stand uncontested.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Here is the narration of John Gooneratne appearing in the Sunday Island:
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Q: When did you first see a copy of the CFA? Did the Government of Sri Lanka receive an opportunity to discuss the CFA before finalizing it?
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ JG: The CFA went through several drafting stages, when the Peace Secretariat presented its views, reactions and suggestions to the SL Chief negotiator, Pro. G.L. Peiris, what you can call the political level. And as the process continued, the CFA was gradually completed. The timing and completion of any unsettled issues would have been done at the political level, when the final document was signed by the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe. The government would naturally have had an opportunity to see and approve what the final document would contain. [Sunday Island 29.5.2011]
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ CFA is a homemade cake with local ingredients from a supermarket, baked by the cooks that went to market. It shows the extent of servility to the LTTE and the lack of intellectual dimension to surmise a crisis in the making. GooneratneƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s most telling observation is ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ…-The government would naturally have had opportunity to see and approve what the final document would containƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”š‚. No doubt, much of the artwork had its origin in Killinochchi. Conceding is as faulty as colluding and concealing. ItƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s a three-in-one.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Deceptive hostilities were undertaken by the LTTE under the cover of the CFA to gain facilities. Finally LTTE took to arms again with such devastating intensity to make the CFA the most deceitful piece of writing of our times. LTTE committed 5461 violations of the CFA on a Scandinavian scorecard.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The UNP has to carry responsibility with their two principle players in the peace process Wickremasinghe and Pieris having reviewed the several drafts before it reached its final stage and seeing and approving the final document.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ According to Gooneratne, Peace Secretariat presented their opinion on the CFA to the chief negotiator. Possibly G.L.Peiris approved, being submissive to his then masterƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s instructions and yielded lamely to provisions that events proved to be damaging to national security?ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ This said in PeirisƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ defense, leaves Wickremasinghe more exposed as Prime Minister. Otherwise, the present Foreign Minister is collectively culpable. Leave it to history.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ In fairness it takes the heat off the Norwegians as it was alleged (including self mistakenly) that they compelled to enter into a compiled agreement. ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Norwegians have been wronged beyond their due share by incorrect interpretations being placed due to the paucity of hard evidence, to the contrary. Their loyalty and partiality to the LTTE is legendary yet Norwegians did not embarrass the UNP Government on the allegations made against them. They could have shifted the fault line but maintained stoic silence as facilitators.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ It was signed voluntarily after study and are more at fault than the Norwegians since obliged to safeguard our own interests. Naturally ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”interestsƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ means – present and foreseeable future. It reflects poorly on the draftsmenƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s lack of foresight. It could be contended, as a requisite of the times, to usher peace at any price travelling on the friendship road; Mahinda Rajapakse too continued with the CFA until the Mavil Aru episode.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ After a regime change to abrogate an agreement, by a successor government would have brought a barrage of hostile reactions from the international community. It was revoked at a charmed moment when the Scandinavian monitors deserted their posts after an ultimatum to leave was delivered by the Tigers and the LTTE provided a dream opening by depriving the community of the basic right to water. ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Circumstances left the International Community without a justifiable counter to estop the abrogation of the CFA.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Yet, there were previous incidents that the Rajapakse regime could have asserted to revoke the CFA, after the attempted assassinations on the Defense Secretary and the Army Commander? They did not and allowed it to linger long.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ UNP has to carry the rap in entering into a lop-sided CFA, knowingly and willingly with the LTTE. There appears no infinite duress, compulsion, haste or arm-twisting. They took their time over several drafts at the described political level, John Gooneratne is bold to name. The masterpiece of 5461 accounted and still more un-accounted misdemeanors was signed covertly with the knowledge of a few. Gooneratne has unlocked a treasure trove for researchers to probe.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The UNP held CFA was beneficial and continued to place faith on it. Their show -piece exhibits are the defection of the Karuna Group and the war weariness the peace exercise supposedly created among the LTTE cadres. Neither was Karuna Group utilized nor war weariness exploited to the advantage of the UNP government. They slept on it.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Wickremasinghe and Peiris campaigned on the Presidential election trail extolling the virtues of the CFA and importance of maintaining a peace accord with the LTTE.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ In keeping with his known integrity and being tenacious Wickremasinghe stands by his decision. He has made many fatal decisions but taking responsibility for decisions is admirable. Peiris remains silent on the CFA but presently expresses passionate patriotic opinions on the aftermath of the war, in keeping with the office he acquired after shifting positions belatedly.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ ItƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s for future historians to interpret CFAƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s total impact on Sri Lanka. If not for Sunday Island revealing salient facts the truth would have remained buried forever. It has opened a window for social scientists to survey and unfold the story behind a perfidious agreement.
ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ To me it is an act of folly due to lack of prudence by small minds. On the flip side peace was reached though short-lived, fault being LTTEƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s unreliability. It is more prudent to leave conclusions to historians to determine after a searching evaluation.
August 29th, 2011 at 12:19 am
Why cannot RM find better person than Pro. G.L. Peiris as Foreign Minister who failed as Vice Chancellor at Universtity of Colomobo and all previous positions as a Minister. Whatever it is ONLY CK gave him a good recomendation as a failed Law Professor who came to teach her law.
August 29th, 2011 at 3:47 am
Agreeing to the CFA shows the enormous stupidity of some and those that remained silent. No wonder Ponnabalam wanted 50 -50, one Tamil equal three Sinhalese.
August 29th, 2011 at 1:18 pm
The professor is an academic, a great thinker no doubt – a Gandhian, a “gentleman”. But is he the right Foreign Minister at a time like now? We are being tormented by a bunch of international liars and bullies, ably manipulated and financed by international terrorists; can a gentleman outfox our tormentors?
The British didn’t give up India because of Gandhi’s “non-violence”; on the contrary, they feared the potential “violence” behind Gandhi’s “non-violence”- supported by Hitler and Japan. In fact, the British assassinated (a plane crash!) Sobhas Chadra Bose, a prominent leader of the Indian independence movement against the British in India, while flying with a Japanese general to meet Hitler.
The same is true of Martin Luther King of USA – a “non-violence” Ghandian. It was the violence unleashed following King’s assassination that made the “apartheid” US free Black Americans – Not the “non-violence”. The same was true in South Africa; the cash rich, anti-colonial revolutionary, Muamar Gadafi was the benefactor of Nelson Mandela’s ANC.
This is not saying that tiny Sri Lanka can threaten violence against our tormentors. The lesson is we cannot get anywhere playing the “Gandhian-gentleman”. We need a go-getter who can find “true friends” internationally.
August 29th, 2011 at 1:30 pm
Well said hela puwath. We have to stop the rot before it is too late. Unfortunately there are still many Sinhalese who blindly follow Indian passive systems that even Indians do not follow any more. Force has to be met with superior force.
August 29th, 2011 at 7:09 pm
Mr. Gomin Dayasiri, if ypu have a copy of the CFA please publish it so that we all can read what is on it. Why isn’t Sunday Island publishing this document? When Rathnasiri Wickramanayake was the prime minister, he said in the Parliament that the government did not have a copy of it!
August 29th, 2011 at 8:20 pm
There are few copies but they all varies on some content… Ranil got the original and he will never release it since it is a illegal document that can bring in legal sanctions against him.
What a mess that these suppose to be guardians of the nation has created? I wish some one get this original so that this traitor Ranil should answer to the public about his treasons act.
August 30th, 2011 at 2:51 am
In my view Hela puwath appear to understand the real world. In the real world, it is survival of te fittest and we have to struggle, just to survive. Unfirtunately, the mind of some Sinhalese are affected by the religion mind virus, they suffer from bias and do not see the real world. If MR followed passive nature, we would be still under Tamil terrorism. We still have to face external treats and we have to be prepared to defend ourselves. We have to remove bias and learn critical thinking. Some Sinhalese are living in an era 500 years BC without evolving to face the modern world.
August 30th, 2011 at 3:35 am
Sinhalese have the solution at hand. I mentioned it many time ago. Come up with five good Sinhalese probably in Canada who will be able to spend their time at least 10 hours a day. Why wasting time?. If you can’t do it by yourself ask Sl govt to do it. Embassies are there to do this kind of work. And it is SL government duties too. Originally, I thought may be it will need at least 100 Sinhalese representing certain major capitals in North America and Europe, but no, you can do it with five Sinhalese and rest done by lawyers. Remember! One lion equal to 1000 sheep.
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Second, Sl govt can contribute small amount-$10 million this five-man organization to start with. That’s it. The rest of funding and other jobs can be taken care by this organization. This move should have done long time ago. This is long overdue.
Any body reply to this please.
August 30th, 2011 at 11:10 am
Fully agree with jayt, it can be and should be done. We just don’t have the leadership, even the president recently called for dedicated Sri Lankans overseas to wake up to the challenge. We have the capability, but we lack leadership that is necessary to keep these individuals and groups motivated and focused on the challenge.
There has been, and there are, groups and individuals who have done such work in the past, but there are problems and distractions – pettiness, bickering, and personal rivalry! No doubt it is human nature to seek recognition, but how do we not lose sight of ‘the goal’ – Mother Lanka? That’s why we need the leadership to keep us focused.
Jayt says, “Embassies are there to do this kind of work. And it is SL government duties too.” How true. But our embassies especially in Western capitals cannot do this, not because the heads of missions are not dedicated, but they have to deal with bureaucracy, protocols and even staff’s party-political-loyalties. Sadly, a great many (not all) of our foreign service staffs in Western capitals are simply going through the motions, distracted and often more dedicated to their personal and family well-being in those host countries.
In essence, what we need is help from our government in the form of leadership, guidance and focus – we have the talent and the dedication. In this age of the Internet, its not diffecult.
August 30th, 2011 at 11:29 am
Sirih, if you have access to a copy please publish it on the Lankaweb. Regardless what version it is or where you got it from, so we all know where to start reading it. Right now no one has a clue what this document is; like Gomini Dayasiri. That may be the reason why Gomini dayasiri was reliant on SUNDAY LEADER article.
August 30th, 2011 at 4:48 pm
I am happy that hela puwath discovered this. You are telling what exactly I want to tell. Your second paragraph describes some of many negative traits Sinhalese have and these products of no leaders to take care of Sinhalese society.
All most all embassy people have come for personal gain and have parties. Second, We can’t blame them. The reason for this is it is SL govt job to choose right people to work for SL. However, We can’t expect them to do a whole lot except for example, organizing a simple meeting in Dubai or elsewhere by calling those caring SL expats EU, US, Canada and Australia.
I am hopping that sl embassies will or at least can help in certain area.
August 30th, 2011 at 5:22 pm
I do not know where this hela puwath office is located , but will contact SL associations by email as usual.
August 30th, 2011 at 7:14 pm
I had a document in Norwegian and need to find where I file it..
This is the short version.
Ceasefire Agreement
Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic og Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
Preamble
The overall objective of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereinafter referred to as the LTTE) is to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.
The GOSL and the LTTE (hereinafter referred to as the Parties) recognize the importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living conditions for all inhabitants affected by the conflict. Bringing an end to the hostilities is also seen by the Parties as a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken.
The Parties further recognize that groups that are not directly party to the conflict are also suffering the consequences of it. This is particularly the case as regards the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this Agreement regarding the security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants.
With reference to the above, the Parties have agreed to enter into a ceasefire, refrain from conduct that could undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit of this Agreement and implement confidence-building measures as indicated in the articles below.
Article 1: Modalities of a ceasefire
The Parties have agreed to implement a ceasefire between their armed forces as follows:
1.1 A jointly agreed ceasefire between the GOSL and the LTTE shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in accordance with Article 4.2, hereinafter referred to as D-day.
Military operations
1.2 Neither Party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited
to, such acts as: a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units;
b) Aerial bombardment;
c) Offensive naval operations.
1.3 The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE.
Separation of forces
1.4 Where forward defence localities have been established, the GOSL’s armed forces and the LTTE’s fighting formations shall hold their ground positions, maintaining a zone of separation of a minimum of six hundred (600) metres. However, each Party reserves the right of movement within one hundred (100) metres of its own defence localities, keeping an absolute minimum distance of four hundred (400) metres between them. Where existing positions are closer than four hundred (400) metres, no such right of movement applies and the Parties agree to ensure the maximum possible distance between their personnel.
1.5 In areas where localities have not been clearly established, the status quo as regards the areas controlled by the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively, on 24 December 2001 shall continue to apply pending such demarcation as is provided in article 1.6.
1.6 The Parties shall provide information to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) regarding defence localities in all areas of contention, cf. Article 3. The monitoring mission shall assist the Parties in drawing up demarcation lines at the latest by D-day + 30.
1.7 The Parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into the area controlled by the other Party.
1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.
Freedom of movement
1.9 The Parties’ forces shall initially stay in the areas under their respective control, as provided in Article 1.4 and Article 1.5.
1.10 Unarmed GOSL troops shall, as of D- day + 60, be permitted unlimited passage between Jaffna and Vavunyia using the Jaffna-Kandy road (A9). The modalities are to be worked out by the Parties with the assistance of the SLMM.
1.11 The Parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, on the recommendation of their area commander, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit family and friends residing in areas under the control of the other Party. Such visits shall be limited to six days every second month, not including the time of travel by the shortest applicable route. The LTTE shall facilitate the use of the Jaffna-Kandy road for this purpose. The Parties reserve the right to deny entry to specified military areas.
1.12 The Parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, notwithstanding the two-month restriction, be permitted, unarmed and in plain clothes, to visit immediate family (i.e. spouses, children, grandparents, parents and siblings) in connection with weddings or funerals. The right to deny entry to specified military areas applies.
1.13 Fifty (50) unarmed LTTE members shall as of D-day + 30, for the purpose of political work, be permitted freedom of movement in the areas of the North and the East dominated by the GOSL. Additional 100 unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement as of D-day + 60. As of D- day + 90, all unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement in the North and the East. The LTTE members shall carry identity papers. The right of the GOSL to deny entry to specified military areas applies.
Article 2: Measures to restore normalcy
The Parties shall undertake the following confidence-building measures with the aim of restoring normalcy for all inhabitants of Sri Lanka:
2.1 The Parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.
2.2 The Parties shall refrain from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that could offend cultural or religious sensitivities. Places of worship (temples, churches, mosques and other holy sites, etc.) currently held by the forces of either of the Parties shall be vacated by D-day + 30 and made accessible to the public. Places of worship which are situated in “high security zones” shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public.
2.3 Beginning on the date on which this Agreement enters into force, school buildings occupied by either Party shall be vacated and returned to their intended use. This activity shall be completed by D-day + 160 at the latest.
2.4 A schedule indicating the return of all other public buildings to their intended use shall be drawn up by the Parties and published at the latest by D- day + 30.
2.5 The Parties shall review the security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems that will prevent harassment of the civilian population. Such systems shall be in place from D-day + 60. 2.6 The Parties agree to ensure the unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and from the LTTE-dominated areas with the exception of certain items as shown in Annex A. Quantities shall be determined by market demand. The GOSL shall regularly review the matter with the aim of gradually removing any remaining restrictions on non-military goods.
2.7 In order to facilitate the flow of goods and the movement of civilians, the Parties agree to establish checkpoints on their line of control at such locations as are specified in Annex B.
2.8 The Parties shall take steps to ensure that the Trincomalee-Habarana road remains open on a 24-hour basis for passenger traffic with effect from D-day + 10.
2.9 The Parties shall facilitate the extension of the rail service on the Batticaloa-line to Welikanda. Repairs and maintenance shall be carried out by the GOSL in order to extend the service up to Batticaloa.
2.10 The Parties shall open the Kandy-Jaffna road (A9) to non-military traffic of goods and passengers. Specific modalities shall be worked out by the Parties with the assistance of the Royal Norwegian Government by D-day + 30 at the latest.
2.11 A gradual easing of the fishing restrictions shall take place starting from D-day. As of D-day + 90, all restrictions on day and night fishing shall be removed, subject to the following exceptions: (i) fishing will not be permitted within an area of 1 nautical mile on either side along the coast and 2 nautical miles seawards from all security forces camps on the coast; (ii) fishing will not be permitted in harbours or approaches to harbours, bays and estuaries along the coast.
2.12 The Parties agree that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act shall not take place. Arrests shall be conducted under due process of law in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.
2.13 The Parties agree to provide family members of detainees access to the detainees within D-day + 30.
Article 3: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
The Parties have agreed to set up an international monitoring mission to enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Both Parties shall fully cooperate to rectify any matter of conflict caused by their respective sides. The mission shall conduct international verification through on-site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commitments entered into in this Agreement as follows:
3.1 The name of the monitoring mission shall be the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (hereinafter referred to as the SLMM).
3.2 Subject to acceptance by the Parties, the Royal Norwegian Government (hereinafter referred to as the RNG) shall appoint the Head of the SLMM (hereinafter referred to as the HoM), who shall be the final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement.
3.3 The SLMM shall liaise with the Parties and report to the RNG.
3.4 The HoM shall decide the date for the commencement of the SLMM’s operations.
3.5 The SLMM shall be composed of representatives from Nordic countries.
3.6 The SLMM shall establish a headquarters in such place as the HoM finds appropriate. An office shall be established in Colombo and in Vanni in order to liaise with the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively. The SLMM will maintain a presence in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.
3.7 A local monitoring committee shall be established in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai. Each committee shall consist of five members, two appointed by the GOSL, two by the LTTE and one international monitor appointed by the HoM. The international monitor shall chair the committee. The GOSL and the LTTE appointees may be selected from among retired judges, public servants, religious leaders or similar leading citizens.
3.8 The committees shall serve the SLMM in an advisory capacity and discuss issues relating to the implementation of this Agreement in their respective districts, with a view to establishing a common understanding of such issues. In particular, they will seek to resolve any dispute concerning the implementation of this Agreement at the lowest possible level.
3.9 The Parties shall be responsible for the appropriate protection of and security arrangements for all SLMM members.
3.10 The Parties agree to ensure the freedom of movement of the SLMM members in performing their tasks. The members of the SLMM shall be given immediate access to areas where violations of the Agreement are alleged to have taken place. The Parties also agree to facilitate the widest possible access to such areas for the local members of the six above-mentioned
committees, cf. Article 3.7.
3.11 It shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate action on any complaints made by either Party to the Agreement, and to enquire into and assist the Parties in the settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with such complaints.
3.12 With the aim of resolving disputes at the lowest possible level, communication shall be established between commanders of the GOSL armed forces and the LTTE area leaders to enable them to resolve problems in the conflict zones.
3.13 Guidelines for the operations of the SLMM shall be established in a separate document.
Article 4: Entry into force, amendments and termination of the Agreement
4.1 Each Party shall notify its consent to be bound by this Agreement through a letter to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on behalf of the GOSL and by leader Velupillai Pirabaharan on behalf of the LTTE, respectively. The Agreement shall be initialled by each Party and enclosed in the above-mentioned letter.
4.2 The Agreement shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4.3 This Agreement may be amended and modified by mutual agreement of both Parties. Such amendments shall be notified in writing to the RNG.
4.4 This Agreement shall remain in force until notice of termination is given by either Party to the RNG. Such notice shall be given fourteen (14) days in advance of the effective date of termination.
ANNEX A
The Parties agree to ensure the flow of non- military goods to and from LTTE dominated areas of the Northern and Eastern Province, as well as unimpeded flow of such goods to the civilian population in these areas. Non military goods not covered by article 2.6 in the Agreement are listed below:
– Non military arms/ammunition – Explosives – Remote control devices – Barbed wire – Binoculars/Telescopes – Compasses – Penlight batteries
Diesel, petrol, cement and iron rods will be restricted in accordance with the following procedures and quantities:
Diesel and petrol The Government Agents (GA) will register available vehicles; tractors and motorcycles in the LTTE controlled areas. The GA will calculate the required weekly amount of diesel and petrol based on the following estimate:
Trucks/Buses 250 litre/week 4 wheels tractor 310 litre/week 2 wheel tractor 40 litre/week Petrol vehicle 30 litre/week Motorcycles 7 litre/week Fishing vessels 400 litre/week
Cement Cement required for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Government property; registeret co-operatives; or approved housing projects implemented by the GOSL and international NGOs and more affluent members of the society; will be brought in directly by relevant institutions under licenses issued by Government Agents. The GA shall stipulate the monthly quantities permitted for such project based upon planned and reported progress.
Cement required for indvidual shops/constructions/house owners/rehabilitation-initiatives will be made available through the co- operations on a commercial basis. The monthly import for this purpose wil be limited to 5000 bags during the first month and thereafter 10 000 bags/month. Individual sales by the co-operatives will be registered and limited to 25 bags per household.
Iron rods Iron rods for building constructions will be brought in to the LTTE controlled areas under licenses issued by the GA.
A monthly reassessment will be made to assess the possibilites of removal of the above restrictions.
ANNEX B
Checkpoints agreed in § 2.7 are as follows:
– Mandur – Paddirupur – Kaludaveli Ferry Point – Anbalantivu Ferry Point – Mamunai Ferry Point – Vanvunateevu – Santhiveli Boat Point – Black Bridge – Sitandy Boat Point – Kiran bridge – Kinniyadi Boat Point – Valachenai – Makerni – Mahindapura – Muttur – Ugilankulam – Omanthai
August 30th, 2011 at 7:17 pm
Mission Statement
Mission Mandate
THE SLMM WAS MANDATED BY THE PARTIES THROUGH THE CFA, HOWEVER WITHOUT A SPECIFIED MANDATE
The SLMM was mandated through the CFA, on which the legitimacy of the mission and the authority of the HOM rested. Although not including an explicit mandate formulation or mission statement, the Agreement had to be interpreted as the very foundation for planning and executing the SLMM operation.
Through the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), the Parties defined the mission purpose and outlined the main tasks of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), establishing its basic framework. From the commencement of operation, Article 3 of the CFA was commonly considered to comprise the SLMM mandate. The Arti- cle describes the general idea, the formal platform, the principal monitoring and verification areas, as well as geographical stipula- tions and a number of specific tasks. However, it does not state an explicit mandate formulation or express a designated mission statement for the venture; neither does Article 3 contain the term ‘mandate’ within the agreed paragraphs.
Albeit lacking an explicit mandate, the CFA (supplemented by the State of Mission Agreement, SOMA) included a number of requirements for the SLMM – as well as commitments by the Parties. Parts of the CFA were not unambiguous, and the Parties inscribed into the document that the Head of Mission (HOM) was to be ‘the final authority’ regarding its interpretation.
See also ‘Mission Structure’, pages 47–52
ThE InTErPrETATIon
––––––––––––––––––––––– The CFA partly established the SLMM, partly instructed it, and partly indicated its mission and tasks. The document contains certain specified tasks, whereas others are implied in the intention of the Agreement, to be found in the spirit rather than in the letter.
CFA sIGnATUrEs: The Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the PM of Sri Lanka, Ranil Wikramasinghe, and the LTTE leader, Vellupillai Prabakharan, respectively. The CFA constituted the mandate of the SLMM, albeit implicitly.
The HOM was not issued any formal operational order or direc- tions other than those of the CFA. In order to design the organisa- tion and plan for the operation, he had to interpret the Agreement specifically and assess the situation generally. The core of the CFA – with regards mandating the SLMM – was considered to be the prescription in Article 3: “conduct international verifica- tion through on-site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commit- ments as stated in the CFA”. Hence, this was inscribed into the SLMM’s Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) as the mandate of the mission.
In effect, the HOM, in conformity with the authority accorded him by the Parties through the CFA, concluded on an implied mandate on which he directed the operation, and which was generally accepted by the Facilitator and the Parties. Thereby, the SLMM was given the legitimacy to operate, and the HOM the authorisa- tion to act in accordance with the inferred intention of the CFA.
Choosing the appropriate operational concept and organisational model, the HOM analysed the CFA and identified prerequisites and tasks. The analysis was combined with an assessment of the setting, including factors influencing the options, such as geographical distribution, physical infrastructure, and available resources – as a complete foundation for decision.
With no governing structure, there was no formal space for instructing or guiding the HOM as to how the CFA should be implemented and the operation conducted, neither initially nor during the development of the operation the following years. This gave the HOM ample and essential room to manoeuvre and direct the operation according to the prevailing situation, as well as an implied obligation to continuously assess the operational surroundings and initiate necessary adjustments at his own dis- cretion, based on his general interpretation of the CFA.
Thus, as the only operational guideline, the CFA was continu- ously scrutinised. The intent and implications of the Agreement were discussed among the stakeholders, within the Sri Lankan general public, as well as internally in the mission. The HOM interpreted the CFA in view of directing the mission and assist- ing the Parties. At all times and in any situation, the HOM had
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MIssIon MAndATE –– ThE sLMM rEPorT
MonITorInG MAndATE: The CFA did not include an explicit mandate, leaving it to the HOM to interpret it, even stating that the HOM “shall be the final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement”. SLMM’s first two HOM’s (from the right), Trond Furuhovde and Tryggve Tellefsen, together with LTTE leaders Anton Balasingham and Suppayya P. Tamilselvan, Kilinochchi, 2003.
to consider his options and issue his directions in view of the intrinsic understanding of the spirit, as well as the letter, of the Agreement. The succeeding HOM’s hardly interpreted the CFA and the mandate as such differently. Rather, to the extent, they developed diverging operational courses of action, this was based on analysis of the actual situation, less on any diverging understanding of the function and tasks accorded the SLMM.
The CFA was never subject to renegotiation, nor was it revised. Consequently, the mandate of the SLMM was never amended or renewed, as is the normal procedure in operations with a United Nations (UN) mandate. However, at the 6th round of peace talks, held in Hakone in March 2003, the Parties agreed to a modification, in accordance with para 4.3, aiming to strengthen the mandate and capacity of the SLMM, “for the mission to undertake preventive measures to avoid serious incidents at sea and on land”. However, with the peace talks halting this was never implemented.
A concerted effort to reinterpret the mandate and restate the mission for the SLMM, in order to redirect the operation, was carried out in late 2006, initiating a strategy process contemplat-
“The intent and implications of the Agreement were discussed among the stakeholders.
ing the future of the SLMM in light of preceding the disturbing developments and possible scenarios – adapting the mission to the radically altered ground situation. The CFA itself – and its implied mandate – remained the same; despite the radi- cally changing situation it was supposed to be applied to. The operational environment of the SLMM gradually changed into conditions that were congruent neither with the intention of the mandate nor the design of the mission.
ThE IMPLICATIons
––––––––––––––––––––––– The CFA specified a number of tasks for the SLMM, and implied others. In view of the great span of tasks, the extensive geographical presence prescribed, and the deteriorating operational situation, seen in connection with the resources available, the HOM had to make certain operational priorities – identifying essential tasks – in order to best fulfil the mission.
A number of specified tasks were accorded the SLMM through the CFA directly, whereas a set of implied tasks were deducted in order to fulfil the intentions of the Agreement. During the course of operation, some additional tasks were added. Despite some adjustments, most of the tasks remained the same throughout the operational period, with the exception of some rendered irrelevant.
See overview of tasks in ‘Mission Concept’, pages 38–46
ThE sLMM rEPorT –– MIssIon MAndATE
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August 30th, 2011 at 8:04 pm
Most grateful to you. one now has a baseline to work on. Again thanks a million. KIT ATHUL, Florida, USA