War on terror revisited:The Aturugiriya Affair
Posted on June 3rd, 2012

By Shamindra Ferdinando Courtesy The Island

June 3, 2012, 7:27 pm

In the run-up to the Dec 5, 2001 parliamentary polls, UNP leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe alleged that the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was planning to assassinate him. He claimed that the DMI was training Tamil terrorists at the Panaluwa Army Testing Range to mount an attack on his campaign bus, as well as his political rallies. The unprecedented allegation triggered hostilities between the ruling PeopleƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s Alliance (PA) and the UNP, with the army placed in an extremely embarrassing position.

On the instructions of Wickremesinghe, UNP Chairman Charitha Ratwatte and Deputy Chairman Daya Palpola wrote a hard-hitting letter to Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle warning that he would be held responsible ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”in the event of an unfortunate incidentƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢. The UNP duo accused the Army chief of training personnel to engage in a destabilisation campaign against the UNP.

Having consulted the political leadership, an irate Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Balagalle addressed a letter to Ratwatte and Palpola dismissing their accusations. The Island, in a front-page exclusive captioned ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”Army chief says no truth in UNP claims,ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ in its Nov 11, 2001 issue revealed the exchange between army headquarters and te UNP headquarters, Sirikotha. The report was based on what Lt. Gen. Balagalle had told this writer the previous evening. The army chief, himself a one-time head of the DMI, said that there was absolutely no basis for the UNP allegation that a hit squad was undergoing training in the use of high explosives and thermobaric weapons.

The UNP ignored the army chiefƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s letter. The allegation was repeated throughout the campaign.

The UNP-led United National Front (UNF) emerged victorious with 109 seats, while the defeated PA managed to retain 77. The remaining seats were shared by the JVP (16), the TNA (15), the SLMC (5), the EPDP (2) and the DPLF (1). It was one of the bloodiest elections with the five-week campaign claiming the lives of almost 50 people, with the Dec. 5 massacre of a group of SLMC supporters at Udathalawinna being the single worst incident. This massacre, allegedly carried out by troops attached to the Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR) caused a vindictive UNP leadership to order a raid on a safe house used by the DMI situated at Millennium City, Aturugiriya, on Jan. 2002, which changed the course of the conflict. The UNF cited intelligence reports that Anuruddha RatwatteƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s sons wanted in connection with the Udathalawinna massacre were taking refuge at Aturugiriya.

Although the UNP subsequently played down the incident, it turned out to be one of the major turning points in the conflict. It contributed to a deterioration of the security situation and thereby helped the CBK-JVP combine undermine the UNF government. President Kumaratunga took over three key ministries in Nov. 2003.

Had the UNP leadership been a little cautious, it would never have publicly accused the army of an assassination plot, Gen. Balagalle told The Island last Thursday.

Operating hit squads behind enemy lines had been a key element in the armyƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s strategy, Lt. Gen. Balagalle said, alleging the then Opposition had failed to grasp what was going on. He said: “Had they quietly raised the issue with us and sought a clarification without playing politics with national security, the Aturugiriya fiasco could have been averted. Even ex-LTTE cadres were brought in for operations along with a valuable input from civilian informants. We were successful due to many reasons such as training from Pakistani instructors. We also accommodated troops from other fighting battalions to engage in operations behind the enemy lines, though the Special Forces and Army Commandos spearheaded the campaign.” At the time troops were undergoing training in Pakistan, he had functioned as Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, he said.

The Aturugiriya raid ruptured relations between the UNP and the Army. It caused irreparable damage to national security and giving the PA an opportunity to undermine the UNF government.

At the behest of the UNP, a section of the media, including the Colombo-based correspondents working for international news agencies, highlighted the Aturugiriya raid speculating the armyƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s alleged involvement in anti-government activities. Investigating officers alleged that those based at Aturugiriya had been involved in the alleged attempt to assassinate Wickremesinghe in the run-up to the Dec 5 polls. Subsequently, they were accused of planning attacks in the city and suburbs to sabotage the Norwegian-led peace process.

The UNP allegations had the desired impact in the wake of state television showing recovered items, which included 66 sets of LTTE uniforms, four thermobaric weapons, seven claymore mines each weighing 10 kgs, 10 claymore mines, each weighing one kg each, three T-56 assault rifles along with 400 rounds of ammunition, 10 anti-tank weapons, detonators, cyanide capsules, exploders, remote controlled devices and wire rolls. While a section of the media lashed out at the army, in a front-page exclusive captioned ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”Controversy over police raid on army officerƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s Millennium City residence,ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ on Jan 4, 2002, The Island revealed that police team from Kandy led by UNP loyalist, Kulasiri Udugampola, had raided an army safe house. The police team was backed by a team of CCMP (Ceylon Corps of Military Police). In spite of the army strongly objecting to the police action, with both Lt. Gen. Balagalle and the then Director of DMI, Brigadier Kapila Hendarawithana (currently Chief of National Intelligence) reassuring the government of the legitimacy of operations undertaken by the DMI, the police was let loose on covert operatives. In spite of Lt. Gen. Balagalle rushing Hendarawithana, who later figured in many controversies to the scene, SP Udugampola went ahead with the raid. He had obtained permission from courts to search the premises. Udugampola had the backing of the then Interior Minister, John Amaratunga. IGP Lucky Kodituwakku, though being convinced of the legitimacy of the DMI operation, was helpless.

Interestingly, Amaratunga, who authorised the damaging Aturugiriya raid was among those seated in the front row along with President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa at the recent launch of ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”GotaƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s WarƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ by The Island columnist, C. A. Chandraprema. ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”GotaƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s WarƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ dealt with a range of issues culminating with an alleged US attempt to hire one-time security forces spokesman, Maj. Gen. Prasad Samarasinghe to go against Sri Lanka on the human rights front.

The Island revealed former US ambassador Patricia ButenisƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s plot in an exclusive captioned ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”GR rejects testimony attributed to unnamed Gen.ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ with a strap-line ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”Reveals US attempt to bribe serving officer,ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ in the Jan 30, 2012 issue.

The Kandy police raided the safe house shortly after the officer-in-charge of the DMI operation had handed over part of their arsenal. Those involved in the hit-and-run operations in LTTE held-areas had returned to Colombo on Dec 27, 2001 in the wake of the Wickremesinghe administration declaring its readiness to go ahead with a Norwegian initiative to bring about a truce. The Kandy police also accused the army of planting two claymore mines targeting a UNP candidate along the Wattegama-Panwila road, in the run-up to the Dec 5, 2001 polls.

The then security forces spokesman, Brig. Sanath Karunaratne emphasised that those operating from Aturugiriya were involved in ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”army dutiesƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ (The Island Jan 4, 2002). Regardless of protests by the army, those arrested were taken away to the Narahenpita CMP headquarters before being transferred to Kandy. They were treated like criminals and held under humiliating conditions. Six of them, including an officer were held in one room. For two weeks, the media reported all sorts of conspiracy theories.

Those arrested were held for almost two weeks before being released. The police raid would never have been possible without an influential section within the army cooperating with the political establishment to undermine a vital operation, which brought the LTTE under immense pressure.

The UNP and the police justified UdugampolaƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s raid. Asked whether he had used the safe house to accommodate his sons, one-time Defence chief, Anuruddha Ratwatte, candidly acknowledged that he wasnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t even among those who knew of the existence of that particular rear base, though the army kept him informed of operations undertaken by the DMI. (Feb 1 issue of The Island, 2002)


The then Defence Minister, Tilak Marapone, one-time Attorney General, to his credit, thwarted an attempt by the Kandy police to prolong the detention of DMI operatives using the provisions of the PTA. The Wickremesinghe regime didnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t even bother to consult the armed forces and police top brass regarding the provisions of the agreement. Then Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri told the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) how then Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, had bypassed them with regard to sensitive military issues.

Fernando in an article captioned ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”The Peace Process and Security IssuesƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ (Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons) admitted that the failure on the part of the then government to consult the military had been a failing. Fernando said (page 42): “The military chiefs werenƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t consulted in the drafting of the CFA. Of course, a casual opportunity was given to them to discuss the draft with Ministers of Defence (Tilak Marapone) and Constitutional Affairs (Prof. G. L. Peiris). This wasnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t considered adequate by them as they didnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t get an opportunity to discuss the CFA with their senior officers”.

The UNP realised the importance of clandestine operations undertaken by the DMI when the CFA declared that ACTIVITIES BY DEEP PENETRATION UNITS should be ceased along with the cessation of all military action. The LTTE wouldnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t have demanded a ban on DMI operations unless it had been vulnerable to those hunting them in their own backyard. Obviously, the LTTE wouldnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t have bothered about the DMI had the latter been stalking Wickremesinghe in the run-up to Dec 2001 polls.

Retired Senior DIG Merril Gunaratne, who was Defence Advisor to Wickremesinghe during the CFA, exposed the UNP leadership in the recently launched ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”COP IN THE CROSSFIRE.ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ The first book of its kind, written by one-time Director General of Intelligence, revealed how the top UNP leadership has taken security issues lightly at the expense of the country as well as the party. Asked whether he had been involved in the operation to move the Kandy police against the DMI, Gunaratne told The Island on Friday that he categorically opposed the move. “I was convinced the PA government wouldnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t target Wickremesinghe, thereby allowing the UNP to benefit from the sympathy vote. Unfortunately, Wickremesinghe and his top advisors felt the army was hell bent on destroying the UNP.”

ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”COP IN THE CROSSFIREƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ revealed how the then Interior Minister John AmaratungaƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s son-in-law (Dinesh Weerakkody), did a weekly piece on military/intelligence matters after he turned down a directive to do a newspaper column in support of the peace effort.ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ 

The Aturugiriya raid had a catastrophic impact on the armed forces, which experienced untold hardships due to miscalculations on the part of political and military leaders. Following the betrayal of the DMI, the LTTE unleashed a series of operations in the city, its suburbs and in the Eastern Province. Altogether, about 50 military personnel, Tamil informants as well as ex-terrorists, died at the hands of the LTTE as their identities were revealed owing to the raid on the army safe house. The dead included two senior military officers, both killed in Colombo. Although, the two military officials, holding the rank of Major and Colonel could have been on a hit list regardless of the Aturugiriya fiasco, the LTTE exploited the situation to demoralise the army. Daring operations directed at the DMI and police intelligence helped boost the LTTEƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s image. The military was placed in an unenviable position as the suspension of the PTA effectively neutralised counter-measures directed at LTTE hit squads.

Inspector Dale Gunaratne, the then President of the Police InspectorsƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ Association, was perhaps the only official publicly critical of the UNPƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s response to the LTTE threat. Although his superiors reacted angrily, Gunaratne lashed out at the government for allowing the LTTE to exploit the CFA to its advantage. Citing the killing of Inspector Thabrew at the Dehiwela police station, IP Gunaratne alleged that the suspension of the PTA in keeping with the CFA was nothing but a grievous threat to those fighting terrorism. He kept on lambasting the UNP and his own superiors for not taking action to neutralise the LTTE threat. But the UNP was determined to salvage the crumbling peace process at any cost. For those at the helm of the government, the lives of security forces and police didnƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢t matter, as long as they believed the LTTE would remain in the negotiating process. Politicians felt whatever the provocations, the peace process should continue.

(Next installment on Wednesday (June 6)

18 Responses to “War on terror revisited:The Aturugiriya Affair”

  1. Lorenzo Says:

    Great minds think alike!

    We brought this up yesterday.

    “Had the UNP leadership been a little cautious, it would never have publicly accused the army of an assassination plot, Gen. Balagalle told The Island last Thursday.

    Operating hit squads behind enemy lines had been a key element in the army’s strategy, Lt. Gen. Balagalle said.”

    Bloody traitors.

    “Then Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri told the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) how then Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, had bypassed them with regard to sensitive military issues.”

    There it goes against this “defenceless secretary” Austin F’do as I wrote yesterday.

    “The UNP allegations had the desired impact in the wake of state television showing recovered items, which included 66 sets of LTTE uniforms, four thermobaric weapons, seven claymore mines each weighing 10 kgs, 10 claymore mines, each weighing one kg each, three T-56 assault rifles along with 400 rounds of ammunition, 10 anti-tank weapons, detonators, cyanide capsules, exploders, remote controlled devices and wire rolls.”

    LOVELY stuff! Could have been used for many exciting operations.

    Curse those who betrayed the DMI/LRRP/DPU at Milinnium City.

  2. douglas Says:

    This band of “TRITORS” led by Ranil Wickramasinghe is still haunting our country and seeks to topple the present Government and establish yet agian a “Oligarchy” to cater to the needs of the Western camps. They are a shameless set of hawkish Politicians who will resort to any dirty tricks to achieve their goals, as otherwise, could anyone with an atom of self respect sit in the front row of the book launching ceremony of “GOT,S War” along with the HE The President and other dignitaries.

    Now they have banded with the TNA and even gone to the extent of getting Sampanthan to wave the National Flag at a May Day rally. This they did to showcase the world that only UNP could win the Tamils. But it has boomerang on them, when the very man who waved the National Flag in public declared a “United” but not a “Unitary” country.

    These TRAITORS must be placed behind bars for life, if not punished according to the ancient laws existed during the Sinhala Kingdom.

  3. Lorenzo Says:

    “Is above a sabotage from within the army because of lack of communication and/or lack of co-oridnation among different groups.”

    “It looks US wanted very much to scuttle the army operations make LTTE wins. Why is that ?”

    No. It was LTTE—–> CFA—>UNP—–>Udugampola’s police unit with MP ———>the shameful incident

    UNP HAD to do it because they AGREED to do it with LTTE in CFA. Read the CFA extract. Bloody idiots. It was no accident.

    Bloody curse them.

    LTTE Shankar crap was busted in September 2001. After that Tigers were hiding in cesspits (too familiar for them but too stinky for LRRP to approach them). So they somehow wanted this unit dismantled.

    Not using PTA against LTTE (as per CFA) but trying to use PTA against DMI/LRRP/DPU is MOST DISGUSTING.

    This bloody Austin F’do the “defenceless secretary” at that time should be first investigated as I said yesterday. Later this dirty crap said hundreds of DMI operatives were not killed by LTTE. Only 40+ of them died. Shameless. Thabrew? Tuan Mutalif? 100+ more. ALL exposed by this shameful act.

    Credit goes to Fonseka and Kapila for REVIVING the DMI, etc. to its killer reputation once again. It was no easy task.

  4. Lorenzo Says:

    Look at the series of events.

    1. Foolish LTTE bombed SL leaders CBK, Lucky Algama, Ratwatte – 20 December 1999 and January 2000. A GRAVE mistake that didn’t go unpunished.

    2. You kill our leaders we kill your leaders. DPU was sent after Tigers in 2000 killing them.

    3. Tigers bombed airport. August 2001.

    4. You bomb our air force we bomb your air force. Around 15 September 2001 we busted LTTE air force chief Shankar crap using the 9/11 counter terror cover.

    5. The NEXT DPU target was VP who unfortunately escaped one attempt.

    6. IMMEDIATELY after that UNP started to CRY over DPU trying to kill them because VP was hiding inside Run-NIL!!!

    7. UNP Jaffna LTTE T Maheswaran cried DPU trying to kill him. In 2004 he did a Toilet Nadu stunt to show “DPU” trying to kill him in Colombo. His wish came true in 2009 when LTTE killed him. LOL!

    8. Hack-him also cried DPU is trying to kill him. Unfortunately his wish didn’t come true.

    9. Within a month UNP threatened the army commander to dismantle DPU.

    10. The Island news item containing all these letters was published on 11 November 2001.

    How quick was the UNP to take up LTTE’s DPU fear “grievances” BEFORE the CFA was signed? That shows they had a secret pact with LTTE BEFORE CFA.

    This should be investigated.

    Did Austin(k) Fernando come across “rehabilitated” LTTE terrorists when he was the rehabilitation secretary? This should be investigated.

  5. Lorenzo Says:

    “Foolish LTTE bombed SL leaders CBK, Lucky Algama, Ratwatte – 20 December 1999”


    To help Run-NIL win the election!!

    You scratch my back I scratch yours between Run-NIL and VP.

  6. Sirih Says:

    Small section of influential patriots still asking to create a commission behind doors to get the truth re. this incident and wants Austin Fernando, Kulasiri Udugampola and Ranil on dock to answer the greatest betrayal to our defence force.

    First two still enjoy life and should have taken them out long time ago… I believe on of these days those two will answer and will die a violent death. It is amazing how UNP still support this creature called Ranil.

  7. Nalliah Thayabharan Says:

    Aberrant leadership of Ranil Shriyan Wickramasinghe in UNP that was once patriotic and national but is now reduced to a servile and vocal outfit beholden to foreign powers and agencies that are hellbent on destablizing Sri Lanka. Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe’s manifesto is always paving the way for mortgaging Sri Lanka to international community, World Bank, IMF and the multinational corporations.
    Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe has lost several elections. Under Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe’s ‘leadership’ the UNP has lost several of high-profile MPs, hundreds of other elected officials, and millions of voters.
    Since its existence UNP – now being led by Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe — was responsible for all the antiTamil and antiMuslim agendas in Sri Lanka. It was UNP that was responsible for making more than a million Tamils speaking Sri Lankans who toiled to build the economy of Sri Lanka voteless and stateless.
    Almost all the antiTamil programmes were initiated and implemented by the UNP. It was the UNP leaders who were in Jaffna directly organized and supervised the torching and burning of the Jaffna Library which was one of the most violent examples of ethnic biblioclasm of the last century. Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinhe was a cabinet minister when the 1983 antiTamil pogrom was initiated by the UNP government led by his uncle President Junius Richard Jeyawardene. Under principles of parliamentary democracy guided by collective responsibility Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe too is guilty of the crimes committed against the Tamil speaking Sri Lankans in 1983. It was when Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe was a Cabinet Minister; the UNP Government initiated war as a solution to the ethnic conflict. Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe was a member of inner UNP Cabinet that organized and supervised military operations against the Tamil speaking Sri Lankans.

    Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe ordered and witnessed the execution of hundreds of innocent young men from Kelaniya area including prominent human rights lawyer Wijedasa Liyanarachchi who died as a result in September 1988, in his illegal torture centre maintained by the police Counter Subversive Unit (CSU) headed by Douglas Peiris who was directly responsible for the torture at the Batalanda Housing Scheme, during the height of the People’s Liberation Front (JVP) insurrection between 1988 and 1990 which was confirmed by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry which comprised retired judges. Since Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe committed these horrendous crimes in Batalanda, Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe had to abandon not only his electorate of Biyagama, but also the Gampaha District. Since these murders Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe is an MP without an electorate – thanks to his uncle Junius Richard Jeyawardene’s constitution. Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe recruited a convicted killer and hardcore criminal Gonawala Sunil as his secretary. Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe’s secretary Gonawala Sunil went around killing and intimidating people Ranil Wickremesinghe wanted to be silenced. When Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe was the education minister, officials at the education ministry used to call Gonawala Sunil as Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe’s husband. Gonawala Sunil is one of the earliest criminal gang leaders in Sri Lankan underworld. Gonawala Sunil had major connections with the UNP government at that time. Gonawala Sunil was convicted of the murder, and was serving in prison when he was famously released on a presidential pardon given by President Junius Richard Jayewardene just before the 1982 presidential election. Gonawala Sunil was involved in the massacare of 53 prisoners at Welikada Prison in 1983 and gang raping a 14 year old girl in 1982.

    Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe’s corruption in “LH Plantations” has been highlighted with excruciating details by his very close friend Mangala Pinsiri Samaraweera. Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe’s very close family members own several media outlets which promote Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe and help to prolong Ranil Shriyan Wickremesinghe’s political survival.

  8. Nalliah Thayabharan Says:

    The Army unit at the Aturugiriya safe house, apart from other units under Commandos and Special Forces, were in the process of eliminating LTTE terrorist leadership in the North & East. ASP Udugampola arrested a Captain and four regular soldiers of the Army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) unit along with a former Tiger guerrilla, who was helping the Army, on the night of January 2, 2002. This illegal arrest was carried out despite the fact that, the IGP had informed Udugampola that the arrested persons were performing their duties with the approval of the Army Commander.

    The raid was carried out barely one month after the Ranil’s government was sworn in. It was made out that Millenium City was a secret hide out from where military men had planned to carry out assassinations against Ranil.

    Army Military Intelligence unit along with the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) was engaged in infiltrating Tiger controlled areas in the east to attack targets. After the Millenium City raid, the LTTE launched a vicious campaign against LRRP operatives and informants. About 50 intelligence operatives, policemen, civilian informants and members of Tamil political parties were systematically eliminated by LTTE pistol gangs.

    The Presidential Commission appointed to probe the Millenium City raid had described it as a total betrayal and absolute treachery to the nation. ‘The country’s national security interests were compromised by this raid, and has neutralized the military strategy of the Army in combating terrorism in the N/E,’ the Commission Report had determined. (Dec. 12, 2003 ‘The Island’). Iqbal Athas in his analysis of this betrayal of national security, in the Dec 14 Sunday Times, had captioned his Situation Report as, ‘Military secret sacrificed on the altar of politics’.

    During earlier UNP regimes too, similar incidents of ‘compromising national security interests’ played into the hands of terrorists. In the Black July holocaust, during President JRJ’s regime, massacre of innocent Tamil civilians, intended to be a ‘deterrent’ to Tiger terrorism, back-fired on the majority community. Sri Lanka was labeled as a nation that harassed minority communities.

    Former President Ranasinghe Premadasa, not only supplied truck loads of arms and cement to build Tiger bunkers and money to LTTE, but also ordered the surrender of police stations in the N/E, that led to the LTTE’s brutal massacre of 700 policemen, entrusted with the maintenance of law and order in the region.

    Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNP regime too followed a similar pattern of playing into the hands of the LTTE terrorists. The so called Ceasefire Agreement signed with the LTTE is an example. LTTE flouted it more than 5000 times,conscripting children for war, extorting ransom money, killing civilians and political opponents.

    ASP Udugampola, backed up with political patronage, stopped the Army in combating terrorism in the N/E and betrayed this gallant unit, paving the way for the LTTE to go on a killing spree. The (former UNF) government, Prime Minister Ranil, ministers concerned, IGP and all other senior police officers are responsible for the illegal act of ASP Kulasiri Udugampola.

    Subsequent to the exposure of the safe house in Athurugiriya, a special unit was created by the LTTE to hunt down and kill Army informants. Exposing the activities carried out from the safe house, have exposed covert intelligence operations and operators enabling the LTTE to identify the informants.

    Several informants were killed in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and even at Dehiwala, Pepiliyana and Mount Lavinia.

    There was one man who was mainly responsible for all LRRP team actions in Batticaloa and Amparai districts. His name was a closely guarded secret. Only the head of the LRRP team, Captain S.H. Mohamed Nilam dealt with him. He knew the man only as Mike. It was Mike who in turn liaised with a network of operatives as well as informants, including one time guerrilla cadres, in the Batticaloa and Amparai districts.

    On January 16, 2002 guerrilla intelligence cadres launched a secret operation in the Batticaloa town. They abducted V. Vidyarathan. He was taken to a hideout in the guerrilla dominated Kokkadicholai area. He was subjected to torture and intense interrogation for four days. The man cracked under heavy pressure and pain. He confessed he was Mike and had been helping Captain Nilam and his LRRP team. He was shot dead on January 20.

    It saw the beginning of a campaign of arrest, interrogate and kill. On February 10, Lance Corporal “Clarry” was abducted in a secret operation in Chenkalady in Batticaloa. Soon, details of how agent Mike worked with Captain Nilam began to unfold. LTTE Intelligence cadres and pistol gangs fanned out from Batticaloa to mount surveillance on the names of the operatives and informants that had emerged. Similar exercises were also carried out in Batticaloa and Amparai districts.

    By July, 2002, LTTE had obtained a fuller picture of the LRRP operations and how they were conducted with the help of Mike. On July 3, 2002 guerrilla cadres abducted Lance Corporal Saundrarajan, a key operative who had taken part in an abortive attack on “Jim Kelly,” an LTTE cadre. He had also taken part in the attack on guerrilla area leader Babu on September 17, 2001 and the abortive attempt on Karikalan. He had also later taken part in the ambush and attack on two other guerrillas, Swarnaseelan and Devadas on November 26, 2001.

    By December, 2002, LTTE intelligence cadres had tracked down some of those assisting the LRRP and were moved from the East to Colombo. On December 11, 2002, the first informant, Ganesha Moorthy alias Thilakaraj was shot dead by a pistol group. This was followed by the murder on January 3, 2003, of Lance Corporal Pulendrarasa. He was an operative who had worked closely with Mike. Another close associate of Mike, Kadirgamathamby Ragupathi alias Ragu was shot dead on March 18, 2003.

    Neither the Security Forces nor the Police were able to launch any cordon and search operations to track down the Tiger guerrilla intelligence operatives or the pistol gangs. They had not only infiltrated the City but were operating with impunity. Ranil did not to want to order any crackdown on their activity for fear that the Ceasefire Agreement with the LTTE would be affected.

    The LTTE continued their witch hunt. On April 2, 2003, Sinnathambi Ranjan alias Varadan, who worked closely with Mike was shot dead. On April 26 of the same year, Lance Corporal Devarasa, an operative who took part in LRRP operations and worked closely with Mike was shot dead. He had left a military camp where he was living for reasons of security to visit his family in Dehiwala when the incident occurred.

    A guerrilla pistol gang, who had conducted surveillance and kept following Lance Corporal Paramanthan Ravindrakumar trapped him at a City intersection. They poured six bullets into his body on July 15, 2003, wounding him seriously. He survived after surgery and was moved to a safe location thereafter.

  9. Lorenzo Says:

    LRRP/DPU is proof that terrorism must be fought with terrorism.

    Like fighting fire with fire. When a fire is spreading, a controlled fire is ignited to burn a strip of area and douse it. Then the fire that is raging stops at that unable to spread beyond.

    We should have had the LRRP a long time before 2000.

  10. nandimitra Says:

    Ranil and his henchmen must be in jail for the treachery but they never will be. Politician’s defend each other at the countries expense. Treachery is a part and parcel of all politicians. some like ranil gets caught and in others treachery is hidden.

  11. May182009 Says:

    “During earlier UNP regimes too, similar incidents of ‘compromising national security interests’ played into the hands of terrorists. In the Black July holocaust, during President JRJ’s regime, massacre of innocent Tamil civilians”

    Black July holocaust?

    There was no holocaust in July 1983 just a riot. Don’t insult victims of the real holocaust.

  12. Dham Says:

    Good point May18.
    This is the best point to note, for me. All other news are well known.

    “Kata Boru kiwwath Diva Boru nokiyai”. We must be careful of various so called “PATRIOTS” appearing and dissapearing.

    Nalliah, please explain now why you used those words.

    Can the Hoocaust be compared to 1983 racial riots organised by UNP ? Why do you exaggerate so much ?

  13. Dham Says:

    John Amaratunge is a ntional traitor.
    What is our king HE Lorenzo’s opinion rather than boasting his “greatness” ?

  14. Nalliah Thayabharan Says:

    Tamils of Sri Lanka have been subjected to mass –scale mob violence in the years 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983. The anti-Tamil violence of July 1983 was the most terrible and horrible of them all.

    On the night of 23rd of July, members of LTTE ambushed an army patrol at the Post Box junction area in Thirunelvely in Jaffna and killed 13 soldiers. Troops went bersek in Jaffna in the hours that followed and shot dead 51 innocent civilians in the Jaffna Peninsula including 7 passengers in a minivan at Manipay.

    Some hours later on the Sunday that followed members of the Sri Lankan Navy ran riot in Trincomalee burning down Tamil houses and also forcibly relocating Tamil refugees.

    In Colombo the powers that be decided to publish, broadcast and televise the news about 13 soldiers being killed by the LTTE while blacking out reprisals by the armed forces.

    In an even more inflammatory move it was decided to stage a mass funeral for the dead soldiers at Kanatte. The situation took a violent turn and mobs began moving in the direction of Borella and Thimbirigasaya.

    Tamil homes and businesses were attacked and set on fire.As the Esala full moon shone brightly from a not so cloudy sky, clouds of smoke from burning Tamil establishments spiraled upwards.

    The following Monday 25th saw anti-Tamil violence spreading like wildfire. The plantation Tamil Patriarch Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman known for his pithy comments later described the violence that followed Poya on Sunday as – “Sunday Sil, Monday Kill”.

    The violence went on for three days peaking on Wednesday 27th and ebbing on Thursday 28th the day that Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent then Foreign minister P. Narasimmha Rao as her special emissary to Colombo.

    Friday 29th, saw Colombo and suburbs being terrified by the rumour that the LTTE had come to town. The afternoon of that fateful “Koti Dawasa” (tiger day) saw the goon squads massacring Tamils again after being “sure” that no tigers were in town.

    30th and 31st July saw the violence diminish gradually. By August the violence had ceased as International opinion and pressure compelled the J.R. Jayawardene regime to “normalise” the situation.

    It is noteworthy that the nature of anti – Tamil violence was transformed after July 83. Incidents of massive mob violence ceased although isolated sporadic incidents did occur but were quickly crushed by the authorities.

    It has been often said that the mob violence of 1983 has not been repeated which indicates that the “Sinhala people” who perpetrated those acts have learnt their lessons. There are many references to the “tolerance and greatness of the Sinhala people in not enacting another July 1983″ in this discourse.

    What should have been the “norm” is being depicted as the “exception”. Some strongly emphasise that “Black July 83″ will never ever happen again. Not all Tamil victims of that violent spree are convinced and many do have apprehensions of a repeat performance.

    Also the events of July 83 paled into insignificance as incidents of a more terrible nature proliferated in the North and East under the aegis of war.

    There is however a flaw in attributing the dark events of Black July 83 to the Sinhala people on the whole. It is correct that the perpetrators were Sinhala and the victims Tamils. But it was by no means a mass uprising of the entire Sinhala race against Tamils. If that had happened no Tamil would have been left to tell the tale

    The majority of the Sinhala people were horrified at what happened and were helpless onlookers while a minority of their ethnicity unleashed havoc in the name of their race and country. The mobs on a burning spree went in search of fuel chanting the slogan “Rata Jathiya Bera ganna, Petrol Thel Tikkak dhenna” (To save the race and country give a little petrol and oil)

    It is possible that a section of the people who were non–participants may have been supportive of the anti–Tamil violence and sanctioned it by their silence. But the majority of the Sinhala people were against what happened then. It cannot be forgotten that a very large number of Sinhalese protected and saved Tamils often at great personal risk.

    The second and more important point to note is that the July 1983 violence was not spontaneous in its entirety. It was basically an organized act. Several persons may have engaged in the violence on their own but there were core groups at different locations that planned and executed it.

    As is the case in mob violence these core groups were joined by others.These groups had absolute impunity and had the protection of important members of the United National Party (UNP) Government then in power.

    The mobs had lists of Tamil owned houses and businesses. They also knew the details of ownership. Wherever premises were owned by Sinhalese, only furniture and goods belonging to Tamil tenants were destroyed and set on fire. The buildings were not burnt or damaged.

    Many of the mobs were led by functionaries of the UNP trade union Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS). Several UNP municipal and urban Councillors were involved. Many prominent supporters and strong – arm men of cabinet ministers were involved. The Police were ordered by UNP politicians not to arrest the violent elements.

    In most instances the large groups of thugs and goondas were transported in Government owned Transport board vehicles or in vehicles owned by semi-govt corporations. Even food parcels and liquor were distributed systematically to these elements.

    When some decent UNP leaders like Shelton Ranarajah and Renuka Herath Ranasinghe got goons locked up by the Police in Kandy and Nuwara – Eliya respectively their release was secured by Cyril Mathew and Gamini Dissanayake. The role of Cyril Mathew and his political lackeys in the violence are well–known. Some of those involved are still in politics and holding high office.

    What happened in July 1983 was not a spontaneous riot but a planned pogrom. A “Pogrom” is defined as a form of violent riot , a mob attack, either approved or condoned by government or military authorities, directed against a particular group, whether ethnic, religious, or other, and characterized by killings and destruction of their homes, businesses, property and religious centers.

    The word pogrom is of Russian origin and means “to destroy, to wreak havoc, to demolish violently” in the language. Pogrom became commonly used in English after a large-scale wave of anti-Jewish riots swept through south-western Imperial Russia encompassing present-day Ukraine and Poland from 1881-1884. Later more bloodier waves of pogroms broke out from 1903–1906, leaving thousands of Jews dead and wounded.

    What happened in July 1983 was that there was a pre-planned conspiracy to launch a widespread attack against Tamil life, limb and property on a massive scale. All it required was a powerful incident to be the provocative pretext to justify such an attack. The Thirunelvely attack by the LTTE killing 13 soldiers provided such an excuse of being the flashpoint of tension.

    It is also noteworthy that violence against Tamils had preceded July 83 in Vavuniya, Trincomalee and the University at Peradeniya. July 83 in that sense was a grand finale or culmination of an on –going process.

    One of the best books that came out in the aftermath of the July 83 violence was “Sri Lanka” The Holocaust and After”. It was written by an unknown author L.Piyadasa – well known writer, reseracher and Social activist C.R.Hensman was L.Piyadasa.

    L.Piyadasa or CR Hensman describes the July 1983 violence as a pogrom and makes a solid case against the JR Jayewardena regime for it. The introductory paragraph in the book encapsulates July 83 perfectly.

    Here it is –

    Shops, Banks, Offices and Restaurants in the Capital’s crowded City Centre and Main Streets being burnt while the Police look on. Thousands of houses ransacked and burnt, sometimes with women and children inside. Goon squads battering passengers to death in trains and on station platforms and, without hindrance, publicly burning men and women to death on the streets! Remand prisoners and political detainees in the country’s top prison being massacred. The armed forces joining in and sometimes organizing this pogrom against members of Sri Lanka’s two Sri Lankan minority communities. The nation’s President and top ranking cabinet members publicly justifying the pogrom!”

    It is clear therefore that in spite of the attempts to rationalise the July 1983 anti-Tamil violence as a “Sinhala backlash to 13 Soldiers being killed by Tamil Tigers” evidence uncovered during the past years have proved conclusively that “Black July” 1983 was a definite Pogrom and not a spontaneous reaction of the Sinhalese.

    Notwithstanding the efforts of then President Jayawardene to tarnish the Sinhala people as being collectively responsible for this carnage, respected observers such as Paul Sieghart of the International Commission of Jurists exposed the real state of affairs.

    As Sieghart himself points out in his report (Sri Lanka: A Mounting Tragedy of Errors) “Clearly this (July 1983 attack) was no spontaneous upsurge of communal hatred among the Sinhala people – nor was it as has been suggested in some quarters, a popular response to the killing of 13 soldiers in an ambush the previous day by Tamil Tigers, which was not even reported in the newspapers until the riots began. It was a series of deliberate acts, executed in accordance with a concerted plan, conceived and organized well in advance”.

    Black July 83 saw over 4000 Tamils and a few Muslims mistaken for Tamils being killed. Thousands were injured. Some of the injured were killed in hospitals. There were over 200,000 displaced persons as a result. 130,000 were housed in makeshift refugee camps. More than 2500 business enterprises ranging from factories to petty boutiques were damaged or destroyed. The number of houses and dwellings damaged or destroyed is not fullyestimated.

    The rationale behind the Tamil homeland demand was demonstrated once again. While it was emphasised that Sri Lanka belongs to all her people and no community could claim exclusive rights to any part of the country , July 1983 resulted in the Tamils being cruelly denied existence in the Southern provinces.

    The victimised Tamils were sent to the North and East for safety thus proving the necessity for a safe haven in the North and East. This is what impelled opposition leader Appapillai Amirthalingam to state that the uppermost issues for Tamils then were the “security of our people” and “integrity of our homeland”.

    The same Amirthalingam was asked by the Ven.Walpola Rahula Thero at the all-party conference what problems were faced by the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Amirthalingam responded sorrowfully “How can you ask this question even after July 1983″?

    The mass scale deaths, destruction, displacement, deprivation and despair suffered by the Tamils both Sri Lankan and Indian made them characterise those days in July as a dark period in their life. The extent to which the Tamils were diminished in that month made them call it “Black July”. The Tamil people were at a nadir of despondency.

    When writing about “Black July” one is conscious of the negative connotations in using the colour “black” to describe something bad and evil and the colour white for pure and good. In this age of “political Correctness” these usages have been challenged and debunked as insidious vestiges of racism. Wittingly and unwittingly these usages keep promoting racist stereotypes of colour.

    Nevertheless it is difficult to adopt such a politically correct stance in the Sri Lankan context as the description “Black July” has pervaded national consciousness. Avoiding such reference would be particularly impossible in writing about the developments of July 1983.

    “Black July” also denoted a decisive shift in the politics of the Island. The bulk of the people affected in the violence were Tamils living outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces. With their hopes of living peacefully amidst the Sinhala people being blasted their future seemed bleak.

    Two trends started. One group of Tamils started relocating to the North and East. Another group migrated abroad mainly as refugees. As the War escalated, expanded and enveloped the North and East Tamil People started moving out of the Island in even greater numbers.

    The July 1983 pogrom saw more than a hundred thousand people fleeing to India as refugees thereby providing that Country with the necessary locus standi to intervene politically in Sri Lankan affairs.

    India also encouraged the training and arming of Tamil youths. Thousands of youngsters flocked to the different militant movements.

    Thanks to the 6th amendment the Tamil Parliamentarians of the Tamil United Liberation Front also kept away thereby losing their seats.

    The political leadership began passing slowly and surely into the militant youth hands. The economy of Sri Lankan was affected badly. The good name of the country was sullied irreparably.

    One of the lamentable features of that Pogrom was the abominable response of Junius Richard Jayewardene and senior ministers on Television. Not even one word was uttered in sympathy for the victims of the violence.

    Junius Richard Jayewardene indirectly blamed the Sinhala people and said it was a natural reaction. Instead of reaching out to the victimised Tamil people the President JRJ announced that legislation would be brought to forbid secessionism

    State minister Anandatissa de Alwis spoke about a hidden hand, a foreign hand being responsible. He said there was a conspiracy to provoke clashes between the Sinhalese and Tamils, the Sinhalese and Muslims and Buddhists and Christians.

    Lands and Mahaweli development minister Gamini Dissanayake warned Tamils that it would require 14 hours for Indian troops to come and rescue them but the Sinhalese could destroy them in 14 minutes if they wanted to.

    Trade minister Lalith Athulathmudali was sorry that people had to queue up again for essentials as a result of the violence. Finance minister Ronnie de Mel gave a lecture in history about Sena and Guttiga.

    Cyril Mathew the industrious minister of anti – Tamil affairs raised the Indian bogey and saw an alien hand behind the conspiracy that led to the July 83 violence. His cabinet colleague Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman refuted it and said elements inside or close to the govt were responsible.

    Black July 83 was a watershed in the contemporary history of the Island. Black July 83 aroused the conscience of many Sinhala people. Indeed it cannot be forgotten that a great deal of Tamils escaped danger only because of the courageous protection extended by their Sinhala friends.

    The brutalisation of the war as well as some of the reprehensibly inhuman acts by the Tamil militant groups helped reduce the moral superiority of the Tamil cause and predicament.

    Gradually the pangs of remorse and guilt felt by Sinhala public opinion about July 83 became lesser and lesser.

    Furthermore an insidious campaign resulted in changing and undermining the significance of Black July 83. This campaign was two fold. Firstly the scope as well as the original implication of Black July was altered.

    The past years have seen July being depicted as “Black” not for the 1983 anti Tamil Pogrom but for all the “bad” things that happened in July.

    The list was endless ranging from the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord to all acts of violence in July. Thus July was made to be “black” because of the large number of violent incidents that occurred in that month.

    The original significance of it being called “Black July” to mark the horrible pogrom against the Tamils was systematically diluted.

    Historical revisionists may even obliterate this “original sin” and substitute some other event as being the cause for July becoming Black. Thereby the long term “guilt” effect of the anti Tamil holocaust of 1983 July on the Sinhala psyche will be alleviated perhaps eradicated in time to come.

    The second aspect of this campaign was the demonising of an LTTE threat. The July 1983 violence as well as the phenomenon of Captain Miller, the first Black Tiger, embracing death on July 5th 1987 were used in a cunning roundabout way.

    The line trotted out was that the LTTE considered July as “Black” enough to warrant the perpetration of some terrible act of violence as symbolic defiance.

    So we saw the media being inundated with stories of how the security forces were geared up to face threats to the nation because the Tigers wanted to take revenge for Black July.

    The whole security apparatus is placed on a red alert it was said. Any relatively minor incident of violence by the LTTE in July was attributed to the Black July syndrome.

    After July passed , a collective sigh of relief was released. With the spectre of Black July behind it the nation strode boldly and confidently forward until of course the next evil “black July”. Each year saw this comical ritual being enacted faithfully.

    This annual “black July” scare helped each year to divert focus away from the remembering of the Black July 1983 pogrom against Tamils. Instead of letting the Nation recall this terrible act with remorse, the spotlight on an imaginary threat from the LTTE and helped reverse roles. The nation at large was perceived as “victims” because they were considered vulnerable to a diabolical LTTE threat because of “black July”.

    The perception of Black July was distorted. Instead of being portrayed as the month denoting the pogrom against the Tamils “Black July” was now the month where the nation particularly the Sinhala majority was perceived to be cruelly vulnerable to LTTE violence.

    The negative result of this campaign was the undermining and distortion of the significance of July 1983. Signs of blaming the victim syndrome were also visible.

    The LTTE debacle of May 2009 has now transformed the situation. With the LTTE gone there is no way of whipping up emotions of a “Black July” saying tigers could launch savage attacks on the South or on the Sinhala people. So those who attempted to distort the implications of Black July have no way or need to do so anymore

    But then there is always May 2009. The government is trying to project that month as victory month over the LTTE . But there were thousands of civilians who were killed, injured or disappeared in that month. So to a large number of Tamil people May 2009 is “Black May” like “Black” July 1983.

    Under these circumstances there is a possibility that the significance of Black July may decrease gradually.

    We are told nowadays that there are no minorities in this country. We are advised to forget the sordid past and look to the future.

    Remembering the past is depicted as unwanted and unnecessary in the current climate. The July 1983 anti – Tamil pogrom is fading into distant memory.

    The inherent danger in the pogrom of July 1983 being forgotten is that it may very well happen again. As the truism goes “those who do not remember the lessons of history are condemned to relive it again”.

    Arguably had the memory of 1958 anti – Tamil violence been frequently re-visited the incidents of 1977 and 1983 may not have recurred.

    A major demographic change of vast political significance is the phenomenon of about a million Tamils relocating to the areas outside the North and East in recent times. Politically this was a major obstacle to the Tamil separatist cause. Here were people electing to live in “enemy” areas even as a bitter armed struggle was being launched in the North and East on the rationale that coexistence was not possible.

    But this point is lost on the new spectrum that is emerging in the South. The ugly head of neo fascism masquerading as patriotism is being raised. The Tamil people in particular and the minorities in general are being pilloried as “aliens” and “visitors”.

    The purveyors of racial hatred are spreading their evil gospel and irresponsible sections of the media are peddling it regularly. Communalist propaganda in the garb of pseudo nationalism is gaining ground.

    The LTTE is no more but the Tamil population remains. They are seen as being relatively well –off or enjoying better standards of living compared to the lumpen elements in urban, semi –urban areas. Also the economic peace dividends expected by the ordinary people are yet to percolate downwards.

    Against that backdrop a communal conflagration cannot be ruled out decisively. Neo-fascism and pseudo-nationalism require the discovery of new enemies constantly.

    After the Holocaust of the Hitler era and its impact on the European Collective psyche few would have expected fascism or neo Nazism to resurface. Yet many European Nations including Germany are experiencing it now.

    All people of this land striving for a decent and humane future would hope that the July 1983 pogrom was only an aberration.

    But as in the case of eternal vigilance being a prerequisite for maintaining perennial liberty, constant rekindling of the tragic memories of “Black July 1983″ is very necessary to prevent repetition.

  15. Dham Says:

    machang Thayabaran,

    You worte so much but never accepted the fact that holocaust deaths x Lanka population / German population is <<<<<< 1.
    This shows how biased you are. Please be reasonable. Never ever call this "holocaust" if you yourself learnt any lesson.
    Remember, all these problems because tamils started asking for 50/50. It is the Tamils who have been agressors.
    It is a different type of holocaust here. it is like Jews tried to kill the Germans. That never happened. Hitlers reply was on the Jews economic holocaust. Here, Tamils started doing both economic and killing.

  16. Dham Says:

    machang Thayabaran,

    I agree with you on-

    “A major demographic change of vast political significance is the phenomenon of about a million Tamils relocating to the areas outside the North and East in recent times. Politically this was a major obstacle to the Tamil separatist cause. Here were people electing to live in “enemy” areas even as a bitter armed struggle was being launched in the North and East on the rationale that coexistence was not possible.

    But this point is lost on the new spectrum that is emerging in the South. The ugly head of neo fascism masquerading as patriotism is being raised. The Tamil people in particular and the minorities in general are being pilloried as “aliens” and “visitors”.

    But these are only a minority of idots living overseas. You cannot say this is happening in South. Not true. Lorenzo the king is not living in the South.

  17. Nalliah Thayabharan Says:

    What happened in July 1983 is a pogrom and definitely not a holocaust. It was my mistake. But there were several authors used the word Holocaust to describe the events of July 1983. I do have a copy of a book called “Sri Lanka: The Holocaust and After,” by L. Piyadasa, Marram Books, London (1984).
    Different laws to different races is nothing less than racism though it appears incredibly innocent! Perpetrators of ethnic cleansing and genocide must be punished. Promoting the ethnic cleansing ideology must be banned with equal force as the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

  18. Dham Says:

    I know that tamils would like to promote this “holocaust” storey, and to a big extent it helped.
    As for the Zionist Holocaust is the their biggest weapon, not the nuckear arms they process.
    Tamils would like to buy this weapon too.
    This is why I said “Kata Boru kiwwath Diva Boru nokiyai”.

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