RAJAPAKSHA REGIME – THE MOST ACHIEVED & COURAGEOUS REGIME IN MODERN HISTORY
Posted on December 7th, 2013
Shripal Nishshanka
The whole world shall have the gratitude for the Rajapaksha regime of Shri Lanka which annihilated a dangerously brutal terrorist organization with exemplary with a genuine humanitarian style where other governments can follow.
Today Shri Lanka has been rated as the most developing country in the world with a highest speed of accelerations. The non-reversible progress and the ultimate dignity which that regime brought to Shri Lanka is perpetual.
Irrespective of race, religion or any other discriminative factor Shri Lanka has come to a top level.
May the true patriotism be lasting forever.
December 7th, 2013 at 4:11 pm
True patriotism is loyalty to SL not to politicians!!
December 8th, 2013 at 6:34 pm
LORENZO !!, Iam not that computer savvy.I like to ask you how to introdude dark or bold letters in a sentence to make it emphatic.. Can you please tell me. Particularly when writing a comment.
“”WHEN ONE LANP LIGHTS ANOTHER, NEE’R GLOWS LESS. SO NOBLENESS ENDINDERth NOBLENESS.Waiting for you to make the move.
December 8th, 2013 at 6:46 pm
To elaborate on Lorenzo’s statement.
It is about seeing the good as good and bad as bad, regardless of who does it.
December 8th, 2013 at 7:44 pm
SW,
Just add “” in front of what you need to BOLD and close with ““.
(NO ” “. NO spaces. I used them to show only.)
December 8th, 2013 at 7:46 pm
Didn’t work.
Use these things consecutively BEFORE what you need to bold.
(No commas. I used them to show.)
Then at the END of the thing, use these.
(No commas. I used them to show.)
December 8th, 2013 at 7:48 pm
Didn’t work again!!
Use these at the start.
“”
Use these at the end.
“”
December 8th, 2013 at 7:57 pm
WTF!
Type these in order at the start of what need in bold.
less than sign, b, more than sign.
Type these in order at the end of what need in bold.
less than sign, forward slash,b, more than sign.
December 8th, 2013 at 9:27 pm
Having crushed the LTTE’s multi-pronged offensive launched in early August 2006, President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared that he would have the best officers to lead the war against terror. In the wake of the armed forces beating back LTTE offensives in the Trincomalee and Northern theatres, addressing an SLFP convention at the BMICH in the first week of September 2006, he declared that the cast, creed, and race of an officer would be immaterial, as long as they did their duty.
In an obvious reference to SLAF chief Air Marshal Roshan Goonetilleke, the President revealed that some people had objected to Goonetilleke’s appointment as he studied at a particular college. They also pointed out that the officer’s father had been critical of the war effort and was not a Buddhist. The President said: “I consulted Gotabhaya regarding the appointment and he said that particular officer was the best choice and should be given the opportunity to command the service.”
Announcing the liberation of Sampur following a week-long battle at the SLFP convention, the President also referred to the appointment of Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka as the Commander of the Army, as he was about to retire (Mahinda says only the best will head the forces––The Island Sept 8, 2006). He told the media at Temple Trees in the run-up to the last presidential poll in Jan, 2010, that Fonseka’s appointment, too, had been made on the recommendation of his brother, Gotabhaya, who was present at the meeting. During the almost three year long offensive there couldn’t have been at least one occasion where President Rajapaksa taking a decision regarding security matter without Gotabhaya being consulted. In fact, there has been absolutely no change in the situation even after the conclusion of the conflict.
Gotabhaya’s response to Opp. strategy
As troops gradually made headway in the eastern theatre of operations, an influential section within the ruling coalition and the Opposition launched a destabilisation campaign. They triggered chaos inside the ruling coalition causing uncertainty. The political crisis threatened the on-going military action on the eastern front. Defence Secretary Rajapaksa was quick to realise the danger of political turmoil, as he felt the enemy could take advantage of the situation. The Opposition resented the Defence Secretary’s bold statements as regards the political crisis. They accused him of interfering in political issues. But, the Defence Secretary always voiced his opinion much to the consternation of some politicians.
In a brief interview with The Island published on Feb 25, 2007, an irate Defence Secretary lashed out at those undermining the war effort by propagating lies.
The Opposition alleged that government forces were moving into LTTE-held areas in the Eastern Province, while the LTTE was given the opportunity to run the Northern Province. The Opposition claimed that the SLA wasn’t confronting the LTTE, hence allowing large enemy forces to withdraw to the Vanni through the jungles north of Weli Oya. The propaganda operation succeeded to a large extent, with some even within the establishment suspecting significant battlefield victories achieved by the SLA on the Eastern Front. The Opposition sought to discredit the military in a bid to undermine President Rajapaksa and Gotabhaya.
In a front-page story captioned ‘Gotabhaya vows not to be distracted by political chaos with strap line Fresh offensive gets underway’, The Island quoted Rajapaksa as having said: “Absolute rubbish. See what is happening on the ground, not only in the East, but the North as well. We are working to a plan and won’t be distracted by unfair criticism.” The Defence Secretary was responding to Opposition allegations that the SLA was moving into the Eastern Province, while the LTTE took over the Northern Province.
The Defence Secretary said that whatever the Opposition said, the LTTE was on the run. He pointed out the absurdity in Opposition claims in the wake of the LTTE abandoning their important bases in the Eastern Province, leaving behind artillery pieces, mortars and explosives-laden boats. Rajapaksa stressed that squabbling, petty politics and insignificant disputes shouldn’t be allowed to impede the war effort.
In spite of losing some territory, the LTTE still felt that President Rajapaksa couldn’t sustain a major military campaign in the Eastern Province. The TNA believed in the LTTE’s wherewithal to thwart the UPFA’s military as well as political strategies, and the UNP, too, believed that the UPFA would fail on the war front, hence they attacked President Rajapaksa on a broad front. The Colombo based diplomatic community and the NGO circuit, too, believed that the government couldn’t sustain the offensive much longer as a massive LTTE onslaught was imminent. Even the destruction of the LTTE’s floating warehouses on the high seas didn’t influence their thinking. They believed Sri Lanka’s streak of luck would be short-lived.
What they didn’t realise was that the SLA was preparing to open a new front west of Vavuniya even before the successful conclusion of its campaign in the Eastern Province. The Army chief, Lt. Gen. Fonseka strongly felt the need to sustain maximum possible pressure on the LTTE in both provinces. Forces had faith in the Sinha Regiment veteran and his capacity to prosecute a ground offensive under extremely difficult conditions. Veteran of many a battle, Lt. Gen. Fonseka pushed for a all-out war on many fronts in the Northern theatre. Nothing would have contributed to that strategy more than opening a new front, thereby compelling the LTTE to commit some of its best units to confront the SLA. Fighting the LTTE on multiple fronts wouldn’t have been realistic unless the government increased the SLA’s strength. The President authorised the increase in the SLA’s strength so that the army would have the much needed flexibility. By March 2007, the SLA was ready to launch the newly raised 57 Division with the intention of liberating Kilinochchi. Before discussing progress on the Vanni front, it would be important to examine the political challenges faced by President Rajapaksa.
The entire war effort could have collapsed if the President didn’t overcome political obstacles in his path. The President to a large extent depended on his brothers, Gotabhaya and Basil, to ensure political stability, prompting the Opposition to call the ruling coalition ‘sahodara samagama’ (a company comprising brothers).
Challenge within the SLFP
Having won the Nov. 17, 2005 presidential election by a margin of about 200,000 votes thanks to the LTTE-TNA combination depriving the main Opposition candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe of the Tamil vote, the LTTE resumed major attacks in the first week of Dec. 2005. In January 2006, the LTTE destroyed an Israeli built Shaldag class Fast Attack Craft (FAC) off Trincomalee and in April, May and Dec targeted, Lt. Gen. Fonseka, ‘Pearl Cruiser’ carrying 700 officers and men and Gotabhaya, respectively.
Had the LTTE succeeded in executing any one of them, Sri Lanka’s war on terror could have suffered irrevocable damage. The LTTE launched eelam war IV in the first week of Aug 2006 but quickly lost the initiative. By early Feb. 2007, the military campaign in the Eastern Province reached a decisive stage, with the SLA readying to open a new front in the Vanni theatre.
The Defence Secretary in late Jan. 2007 indicated the government’s intention to continue with the offensive. Having visited newly liberated Vakarai, one of the strongest LTTE bases in the Eastern Province, the Defence Secretary said that the on-going successful military operations would influence further military action. The LTTE was in disarray and couldn’t carry out a phased withdrawal. They fled, leaving a vast quantity of equipment, including two 152 mm artillery pieces, one 120 mm mortar, two 12,7 mm anti-aircraft guns (Forces’ success in the East to influence further military action––The Island Jan 25, 2007).
An influential section within the SLFP initiated its destabilisation bid. The then Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, who had played a pivotal role in helping Prime Minister Rajapaksa to secure the PA presidential election candidature, opposed the President’s political and military strategies. Samaraweera challenged Rajapaksa much to the chagrin of the Rajapaksas. After consulting those close to him, the President, in early Feb. 2007, warned the rebellious members to fall in line or face the consequences. The President felt that failure to act swiftly and decisively could cause a political turmoil. Basil, too, accepted the urgent need to arrest the situation, while Gotabhaya asserted that the delay to ensure political stability could be an impediment to the on-going military campaign. Some government members, including several vociferous supporters of the Rajapaksas remained silent as they felt the battle for supremacy in the SLFP could go either way. No one wanted to take chances. The rebellion was gathering momentum. Then on Feb 8, 2007, the President gave an dire warning to the ginger group. Addressing a group of newly appointed electoral organisers at Temple Trees, he emphasised that he wouldn’t allow any group within the SLFP to challenge his authority. He warned that he wouldn’t succumb to pressure and added that those disgruntled elements could leave the party. The warning was given in the wake of Ministers Mangala Samaraweera, Anura Bandaranaike and Sripathy Sooriyaarachchi skipping an Emergency vote in Parliament. The bone of contention was the President accommodating a group of UNP MPs among the government ranks to strengthen his position in Parliament, due to the JVP spurning his invitation to join the government. Basil played a pivotal role in enticing Opposition members to join government ranks.
At the behest of the SLFP leadership, Ven. Vatinapaha Somananda thera, on behalf of the All Island Clergy Association urged the President to take punitive action against those who skipped the Emergency vote. The stage of was set for a critical phase of an operation targeting dissidents.
Dissidents sacked
While beleaguered UNP leader Wickremesinghe was fighting to reassert his authority in the wake of a powerful section of the UNP parliamentary group throwing its weight behind President Rajapaksa along with the SLMC as well as the CWC, which contested the parliamentary poll (April 2004) on the UNP ticket, the President stripped Samaraweera and Bandaranaike of their ministerial portfolios. The President bluntly told the SLFPdissidents to continue their campaign sans ministerial portfolios. A visibly upset Anura Bandaranaike called for CBK’s support to go on the offensive. He called CBK to join a media briefing in Colombo aimed at targeting the Rajapaksa brothers, in spite of him being warned not to cause further problems. The President sent a message to Bandaranaike through business tycoon Harry Jayawardena, a mutual friend, not to side with Samaraweera. Bandaranaike was warned to keep his distance from Samaraweera. CWC leader Arumugam Thondaman quickly realised that the dissidents’ move could end up in a catastrophe. Thondaman rushed to President Rajapaksa to reaffirm his support. Having sacked those who challenged his authority, a confident Rajapaksa on Feb 11, 2007 left for the Maldives on a three-day state visit. The President invited three UNP defectors, Milinda Moragoda, Prof. G.L. Peiris and Rohitha Bogollagama to join his delegation for talks with Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. The decision to go ahead with an overseas visit highlighted his confidence in Gotabhaya and Basil (Anura wants Chandrika to battle Rajapaksa brothers; SLFP seeks more UNP crossovers and MR confident dissidents helpless, leaves for Male––The Island Feb 11, 2007)
JVP’s response to Rajapaksas move
Much to the surprise of Bandaranaike, Samaraweera and Sooriyaarachchi, those who had been in touch with them and pledged their support for the attack on the Rajapaksas remained mum. The President’s decision to strip dissidents of ministerial portfolios wrong-footed them all. The JVP on Feb 11, 2007 issued a statement criticising the President’s move against Samaraweera and Sooriyaarachchi. The JVP politburo didn’t refer to Bandarnaike. The JVP alleged that the President was targeting some of those who had supported his presidential bid, while embracing those undermined him. The SLFP leadership asked the JVP to mind its own business. Among those who publicly supported the Rajapaksas move against rebels within days after them being stripped of portfolios were ministers Anura Priyadarshana Yapa, Nimal Siripala de Silva, Pavitra Wanniarachchi, Dilan Perera, Ranjith Siyambalapitiya, Sarath Amunugama and Jagath Pushpakumara (JVP sheds tears for Mangala and Sripathy, silent on Anura with strap line Mind your own business-SLFP––The Island Feb 12, 2007)
Although the JVP strongly backed Prime Minister Rajapaksa’s presidential election campaign in Nov 2005, the President couldn’t have forgotten how the JVP almost succeeded in blocking him from being appointed the Prime Minister immediately after the April 2, 2004 parliamentary polls. The JVP pushed for the appointment of Lakshman Kadirgamar as the Prime Minister of the UPFA government. The JVP proposed that if Kadirgamar wasn’t acceptable because of his ethnicity either Anura Bandaranaike or Maithripala Sirisena should be the next Prime Minister. The JVP went to the extent of making it a condition for its continued support. Due to its unexpected success in securing 39 seats, the JVP was in a position to exert pressure on the SLFP leadership. The JVP did everything possible to undermine Rajapaksa, particularly during Opposition protests against the UNP signing the Ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, in Feb 2002. The JVP always considered Rajapaksa a serious threat to their future political plans. Having undermined Rajapaksa for years, the JVP had no option but to support his presidential bid in Nov 2005, but refused to support him in parliament, thereby created uncertainty. Realising the danger, the President quickly reached an agreement with the UNP as early as Feb 2006. A section of the UNP considered the president’s move as an admission of weakness. Within weeks after signing of the Memorandum of Understanding by SLFP General Secretary Minister Maithripala Sirisena and UNP Chairman Malik Samarawickrema, the UNP boasted that the UNP would form a government in April 2006. The President responded by enticing a section of the UNP parliamentary group to join him.
December 8th, 2013 at 9:33 pm
courtesy of Reuters
“The news about the killing of Prabhakaran sparked mass celebrations around the country, and people poured into the streets of Colombo, dancing and singing. Looking back at the war General Fonseka made two insightful observations that must surely resonate in the minds of military strategists dealing with terrorism and insurgency in other parts of the world. The first is on the commitment of the political leadership to eliminate terror. Eelam IV war began as a poll-promise. President Mahinda Rajapaksa rode to power four years ago vowing to annihilate the LTTE. In the early hours of Tuesday the fight for Eelam, a separate homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka, begun in 1983 ended in a lagoon, the Nanthi Kadal. Velupillai Prabhakaran’s dead body, eyes wide open, top portion of the head blown off, the thick bushy moustache in place, was found in the lagoon by the Sri Lankan forces looking for remnant LTTE stragglers.
In the President’s Office in Colombo officials talk about the ‘Rajapaksa Model’ (of fighting terror). “Broadly, win back the LTTE held areas, eliminate the top LTTE leadership and give the Tamils a political solution.” Sunimal Fernando, one of Rajapaksa’s advisors, says that the President demonstrated a basic resolve: “given the political will, the military can crush terrorism.” This is not as simple as it sounds. Like most poll promises he did not have plans to fulfill his promise to militarily defeat the LTTE. Eelam I to III were miserable failures. So the ‘Rajapaksa Model’ evolved, it was not pre-planned.
FIRST FUNDAMENTAL: POLITICAL WILL
The first fundamental of this approach was unwavering political will. Rajapaksa clearly conveyed to General Sarath Fonseka: “eliminate the LTTE.” To the outside world he conveyed the same message differently: “either the LTTE surrenders or face, their end.” Rajapaksa instructed the Sri Lankan Army that their job was to fight and win the war. At whatever cost, however bloody it might be. He would take care of political pressures, domestic and international.
General Fonseka commented: “It is the political leadership with the commitment of the military that led the battle to success. We have the best political leadership to destroy terrorism in this country. It was never there before to this extent. The military achieved these war victories after President Mahinda Rajapaksa came into power. He, who believed that terrorism should and could be eliminated, gave priority do go ahead with our military strategies. And no Defence Secretary was there like the present Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa who had the same commitment and knowledge on how to crush the LTTE. Finally, they gave me the chance of going ahead with the military plan.”
SECOND FUNDAMENTAL: GO TO HELL
Following from the first, the second principle of Rajapaksa’s ‘how to fight a war and win it’ is telling the international community to “go to hell.” As the British and French foreign ministers, David Miliband and Bernard Kouchner, found out during their visit. They were cold shouldered for suggesting that Sri Lanka should halt the war and negotiate with the LTTE. As Rajapaksa said during the post-interview chatter “we will finish off the LTTE, we will finish terrorism and not allow it to regroup in this country ever; every ceasefire has been used by the LTTE to consolidate, regroup and re-launch attacks, so no negotiations.” Eliminate and Annihilate – two key operational words that went with the “go to hell” principle of the ‘Rajapaksa Model’. After Colombo declared victory the Sri Lankan Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka used words used by Rajapaksa. That the SLA will not allow the LTTE to “regroup”.
THIRD FUNDAMENTAL: NO NEGOTIATIONS
Naturally, the third fundamental was no negotiations with the LTTE. “The firm decision of the political hierarchy not to go for talks with the LTTE terrorists until they lay down arms had contributed significantly to all these war victories,” affirms Fonseka. But this meant withstanding international pressure to halt the war, the humanitarian crisis spawned by the war and the rising civilian casualties. Rajapaksa did all of this by simply ensuring ‘silence’ and information blackout under which the war was conducted. Rajapaksa’s biggest gamble was to give the military a free hand, shut the world out of the war zone.
When the United Nations, US and European countries raised concerns of high civilian casualties, Rajapaksa, said that the international community was “getting in the way” of Sri Lanka’s victory against terrorism. “We knew that the moment the military is close to operational successes, there will be loud screams for the resumption of the political process of peace negotiations. But there will be no negotiations.” That was the rock solid stand taken and communicated by Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa to all visiting dignitaries and diplomats.
FOURTH FUNDAMENTAL: REGULATE MEDIA
With just one version of the war available for the media to report, the Sri Lankan government ensured an unidirectional flow of conflict information. The information put out by the LTTE’s official website, TamilNet, could not be independently verified on the ground because access to the war zone was regulated and controlled. This was a vital fourth principle in the strategic matrix of the Rajapaksa model.
“Presidents Premadasa and Chandrika Bandaranaike gave orders to the military to take on the LTTE. But when success was near, they reversed the orders and instructed the military to pull back, to withdraw from operations because of international concerns about the humanitarian crisis and civilian casualties. So we had to ensure that we regulated the media. We didn’t want the international community to force peace negotiations on us,” says a senior official in the President’s office who wishes to remain anonymous.
FIFTH FUNDAMENTAL: NO CEASE-FIRE
Rajapaksa’s brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who consistently maintained that military operations would continue unhindered. “There will be no ceasefire,” was Gotabaya uncompromising message. The clear, unambiguous stand enabled other prominent personalities in the Rajapaksa cabinet to speak in a uniform voice. “Human rights violations during war operations and the humanitarian crisis that engulfs civilians caught in the cross fire have always been the trigger points to order a military pull-back,” asserted Mahinda Samarasinghe, Minister for Human Rights and Disaster Management. “The LTTE would always play this card in the past. They would use the ceasefire to regroup and resume the war.”
President Rajapaksa was clear that he did not want to go down that route. That was the traditional way of fighting the LTTE – two steps forward, four steps back. The Rajapaksa brothers’ commitment to a military solution was cast in stone. And it was anchored in a deft political arrangement. But first it is important to reveal the idea behind the political arrangement. “It was to ensure that there would be no political intervention to pull away the military from its task of comprehensively and completely eliminating the LTTE,” says a senior official in the President’s Office. “Prabhakaran was aware of the political contradictions in Sri Lanka and so was confident that the SLA will not indulge in an adventurous, all guns blazing, a full onslaught against the LTTE.”
SIXTH FUNDAMENTAL: COMPLETE OPERATIONAL FREEDOM
Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s appointment to the post of Defence Secretary was made precisely to break this political logjam. Gotabaya had a military past. He had taken voluntary retirement from the SLA. He had retained his long standing friendship with Lt General Sarath Fonseka. Gotabaya met Fonseka and asked him, “can you go for a win”? The battle-hardened veteran said “yes, but you will have to permit me to pick my own team.” Gotabaya and Mahinda agreed. “We will let the military do its job, while we hold the fort, politically,” they told Fonseka. This deft political arrangement worked because both, Gotabaya and Fonseka, were recruited and commissioned into the army at the same time.
This is the team Fonseka handpicked by August 2006 – Major General Jagath Dias, commander of the 57 Division, Brigadier Shavendra Silva, commander of Task force One also the 58 Division (the SLA formation that has recorded the maximum victories against the LTTE), Major General Nandana Udawatta, commander of the 59 Division and Major General Kamal Gunarathne and Brigadier Prasanna Silva, commanders of the 53 and 55 Divisions respectively. Their task was to recapture 15,000 square kilometers of area controlled by the LTTE. The defection of LTTE’s Eastern chief, Karuna, helped the Army take over Batticaloa, Tamil Tigers’ eastern stronghold on July 11, 2007.
By the time of LTTE’s defeat in the East, the 57 Division under the command of Major General Jagath Dias started military operations north of Vavuniya. Eighteen months later, in January 2009, the 57 Division marched into Kilinochchi, the head quarters of the Tamil Tigers. Parallel to this the Task Force One (58 Division) under Brigadier Shavendra Silva achieved stunning success moving from Silavathura area in Mannar in the west coast, capturing Pooneryn and Paranthan. These troops then swiftly recaptured Elephant Pass, linked up with the 57 Division and further moved to Sundarapuram, Pudukudiyiruppu and finally the eastern coast of the country. Meanwhile, the 59th division of the Army, commanded by Major General Nandana Udawatta opened a new front in Welioya area in January 2008 and within a year marched into the LTTE’s administrative hub, Mullaitivu. Finally, troops from 53rd, 55th, 58th and 59th bottled up the LTTE in along a small patch of eastern coastal land in Mullaitivu and killed the top leadership, including Prabhakaran.
The decision to bring Fonseka out of retirement paid off because he was a hardcore advocate of military operations to crush the LTTE. With rock solid political backing Fonseka was able to motivate his troops and officers to go all out without fearing any adverse consequences. It’s not surprising why Eelam IV turned out to be a bloody and a brutal war. “That there will be civilian casualties was a given and Rajapaksa was ready to take the blame. This gave the Army tremendous confidence. It was the best morale booster the forces could have got,” says a Sri Lankan minister who wishes to let this quote remain unattributed.
Is it any surprise, therefore, that LTTE wanted to assassinate Gotabaya in 2006? Prabhakaran knew that if he could assassinate Gotabaya then the carefully constructed political-military architecture pushing the war operations forward would have been gravely undermined. Gotabaya escaped the assassination bid and the rest as the cliché goes, is history.
So even though Gotabaya came into the
political set up virtually out of nowhere, he quickly became the bridge-head
between President Rajapaksa’s government and the military. The Rajapaksa
brothers fused political commitment to a pre-set military goal. “He (Gotabaya)
was embraced and accepted by the military and his was a legitimate voice in the
Army,” said a senior official in the President Office. Gotabaya communicated
the military requirements to the government – men, material and weapons.
His brother and head of the government, President Rajapaksa, ensured the military got what it wanted. He in turn instructed Gotabaya to tell the Army to go all out and get on with the task. The sixth fundamental of the Rajapaksa Model also had a clause – Basil, the youngest of the Rajapaksa brothers. “Neither Mahinda nor Basil saw their brother Gotabaya as a political threat to their political aspirations. So they gave him a free hand.” More importantly, Basil was used by President Rajapaksa for political liaison, especially with India.
SEVENTH FUNDAMENTAL: ACCENT ON YOUNG COMMANDERS
The other critical element was empowering young officers as GOCs to lead the battle. “I did not select these officers because they are young. But they were appointed as I thought they were the best to command the battle. I went to the lines and picked up the capable people. I had to drop those who had less capacity to lead the battle. Some of them are good for other work like administration activities. Therefore, the good commanders were chosen to command this battle.
I thought seniority was immaterial if they could not command the soldiers properly. I restructured the Army and changed almost all the aspects of the organization. I made the Sri Lanka Army a more professional Army. Everybody had to work with a sense of professionalism.”
Eighth Fundamental: Keep Your Neighbors in Loop
The seventh fundamental was India and an unsigned strategic partnership agreed by New Delhi and Colombo. India played a crucial part in the Sri Lanka military operations by providing intelligence and other kinds of tactical support. “The moral support, whatever support India gave us, is what they should have given to us. It is their duty to help us in this stage,” is President Rajapaksa’s rather candid admission of the Indian involvement. “I can’t demand, I shouldn’t demand anything from a neighboring country. I request.” The first significant request from Colombo was naval intelligence and intelligence on the movement of LTTE owned merchant navy vessels.
The 15,000 sq km area controlled by the LTTE in northern Sri Lanka known as Vanni was cut off from all land access. The A9 Colombo-Jaffna road ran through it. But in the Southern end was the Vavuniya frontline at Omanthai and in the North beyond the Elephant Pass was the northern frontline. The only way for the LTTE to get its supplies, weapons and other essentials was through the sea route. It had eight ‘warehouse’ ships, vessels that transported “artillery, mortar shells, artillery shells, torpedoes, aircraft, missiles, underwater vehicles, diving equipment, radar, electro-optical devices and night vision equipment.” These ships would travel close to the Sri Lankan coast but beyond the reach of Sri Lanka’s coastal Navy. War material from these ‘warehouse’ ships would be transported into smaller boats protected by Sea Tiger units, which would then make its way to the Sea Tiger bases. This is how the LTTE sustained itself for decades and continually upgraded its conventional military capability through funding provided by the Tamil Diaspora.
India played a crucial role in choking this well established supply line of the LTTE. This enabled the Sri Lankan armed forces on the ground to make rapid advances. The Sri Lankan Navy led by Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, executed a maritime strategy based on intelligence on LTTE ship movements provided by India. In 2006 the SL Navy had tremendous success when, based on Indian intelligence, it launched operations to destroy six LTTE warehouse vessels. Subsequently, by 2007, two more were destroyed, which completely disrupted the LTTE’s supply line. Some LTTE warehouse ships were located at about 1700 nautical miles, south east of Sri Lanka close to Australia’s exclusive economic zone. SL Navy clearly does not have this capability and this shows how deep and extensive intelligence sharing between India and Colombo have been ever since 2006.
In a recent interview to the Jane’s Defence Weekly, Admiral Karannagoda said, “It was one of the major turning points in the last 30 years of the conflict. That was the main reason why the LTTE are losing the battle, we did not allow a single supply of replenishment ship to come into (Sri Lankan) waters over the last two and a half years since 2006.”
In the final analysis the Rajapaksa model is based on a military precept and not a political one. Terrorism has to be wiped out militarily and cannot be tackled politically. That’s the basic premise of the Rajapaksa Model.
December 9th, 2013 at 5:43 am
What will happen? NOTHING!!
Because this ROTTEN SYSTEM bails ALL criminals out.
A nation is being wasted.
“The Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a coalition partner of the ruling government, has called for the immediate arrest of Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister for allegedly assisting in the distribution of narcotics in the country.
At least 131kg of heroin was seized on 30 August hidden in cans packed into a container sent from the Pakistani port of Karachi.
It had been unloaded at Colombo’s port two months earlier and was addressed to a local recipient, but had been held pending production of documents and cash needed for its import.
A letter emerged from the prime minister’s office, dated 23 August and signed by a co-ordinating secretary seeking to waive import charges on the container.
The letter reportedly said it was being imported by a local company which was just launching its business and could not afford heavy duties.
When the issue was raised in Parliament, Prime Minister D. M. Jayaratne said he wasn’t aware of it and that the letters are written by his staff.
The Prime Minister told Parliament that he has no time to read the 150 or so letters that pass through his office on a daily basis and that he has not approved such a thing, the Leader of the JHU Ven. Dr. Omalpe Sobitha Thero said.
He stated that the if the Prime Minister, who is also the Minister of Buddha Sasana and Religious Affairs, is unable to find a trustworthy and educated official to read these letters then he should understand that he can no longer do his duty.
“If he does not possess the physical and mental ability, the biggest service he should do is to resign from the Premiership,” he said, addressing a ceremony commemorating the 10th death anniversary of Ven. Gangodawila Soma Thero.
If the secretary has engaged in such an illegal act in violation of the Prime Minister’s orders, why is he not being punished or sacked, Sobitha Thero questioned.
The leader of the Sinhala nationalist party further said that in comparison to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Public Relations and Public Affairs, Mervyn Silva, somewhat has a policy.
When certain accusations are being made against his secretaries, Mervyn Silva either says “he is not my secretary” or removes that person. “It seems the Prime Minister doesn’t even have such manners,” he said.
“How does this fraudster continue to remain as a secretary to the Prime Minister?”
He stated that assisting in importing heroin will be the “main weapon” for destroying the Buddha Sasana and there is no doubt about it as it goes against the virtue of Buddhism.
“Therefore with complete responsibility we advise the country’s President to immediately arrest the prime Minister, who is assisting these illegal acts,” Dr. Omalpe Sobitha Thero.”
December 9th, 2013 at 10:14 am
Nothing worked Lorenzo.
December 9th, 2013 at 2:55 pm
The container labelled “Grease, Ceramic and Plastic Goods”, had been shipped from the Port of Karachi in Pakistan on June 17, 2013 and had been unloaded at the Port of Colombo on the June 22, 2013. Upon a tip-off received by the Western Province Intelligence Bureau officers, Police Narcotic Bureau had made a request from Sri Lanka Customs to examine the container before clearing it out. It is during this time, politicians had made undue influences upon Sri Lanka Customs to get the container cleared. The drug lords who tried to smuggle in 261 Kilos of Heroin from Pakistan concealed inside grease cans, had made a desperate attempt to get the container cleared from the Port of Colombo through the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka- Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne. The racketeers had even sent orders to Sri Lanka Customs, through secretaries, under official letterheads of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne and his son Anuraddha Jayaratne. One such order has demanded to reduce the VAT on the container from 15%. The second order had been sent to quicken the clearance of the container from the Port. These two orders have been sent in the form of letters and another order has been issued to the Petroleum Corporation under the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne’s letterhead to issue a report on the grease immediately. Sri Lanka Customs officers and the Police Narcotics Bureau which are investigating on this matter are in possession of the original copies and the photocopies of these letters.
Two racketeers who have been arrested regarding the matter, the Sri Lankan agent of this racket Mohammed Kaamil from Maligawatte railway flats and the Pakistani agent Abdul Jammal Kasin, had worked together for some time in Kuwait. There they had been associating with a female agency worker who had come to Kuwait. Husband of that woman had been a close associate of the Prime Minister Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne’s son Anuraddha Jayaratne. It is in that way the racketeers had gained the the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne’s connection to get this container cleared from the port.
Investigation sources reveal that neither the the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne nor his son Anuraddha Jayaratne had been aware of any drug racket and that they have been misled by the racketeers. However, the Pakistan drug lords had planned to start a tea exporting business by joining hands with the the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne’s son Anuraddha Jayaratne, appointing him as the Sri Lankan partner in the trade.
Secretary of the the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne admitted the issuing of the letters and said that it was a mistake. He stated that as the the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne was engaged in his son Anuraddha Jayaratne’s election campaign work and had signed many letters forwarded to him by his party associates and the racketeers had taken advantage of this busy nature. He further emphasized that the the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne or his son Anuraddha Jayaratne have no knowledge of this narcotics container at all.
The official of the the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne’s office also said that after the incident, the the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne has stopped signing for any of the letters except a few compulsory documents. However, the attention of the investigation squads who are following the trail, have been drawn into information received about this Pakistani drug Lord giving bribes of Rupees Millions to various parties, in order to get this container cleared. A senior investigation officer had said that information has been received about a bag of money which had been kept by the Pakistani suspect who had been staying in the Salmar Hotel Maradana, to be distributed among various parties. Meanwhile, a special team of the American DEA which comes under the US Department of Justice has arrived in Sri Lanka for a special investigation. These US officials have taken Samples of the Grease tins and also the fingerprints which were seen among the drugs. Pakistani Narcotics Control Unit and Indian “Q Branch” officers have arrived to Sri Lanka with regards to this matter.
December 9th, 2013 at 3:10 pm
Also please read
http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=29878
December 9th, 2013 at 3:15 pm
JVP Parliamentary Group Leader, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, making a special statement in Parliament, said that the nabbed importer, Mohammed Kaamil owner of Rohan Impex, of T-30, Railway Quarters, Maligawatte, had asked for concessions on demurrage and port charges, claiming that the container had ceramic ware and grease, but instead, on inspection, the container was found to have Asia’s largest stock of 260 kg with street value of Rs 2.6 billion.
He said there were letters written in response by an official in the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne’s Office, and communication had been made using the official letterhead of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne.
Allegedly written by the Coordinating Secretary to the Prime Minister, he had also promised the smuggler that he will recommend to the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne that port charges and demurrage be slashed, based on the fact that this was the first time the importer had brought in a consignment comprising ceramic ware and grease.
Dissanayake also requested the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne to disclose, (1) What were the materials that had been cleared from the container and the quantities of the same? ( 2) Were there any documents which were submitted to obtain any concession? (3) Who had advised him to request the stated concessions? (4) What action had been taken against the person who had sent the letter? (5) Has the cooperation of Interpol been sought? (6) What was the overall progress of the inquiries in this regard?
Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Disanayaka Mudiyanselage Jayaratne, replying to the questions that had been posed, said he was aware that inquiries were proceeding, and promised to reveal the details when the inquiry was concluded
December 9th, 2013 at 3:22 pm
DM Jayaratne CANNOT deny responsibility to it because it was raised by his OWN MINISTRY secretary!!
Obviously he KNEW of it or he OUGHT to have known it.
It was NOT a forgery.
Bloody drug dealer. Get out of parliament and into the jail.
December 9th, 2013 at 3:23 pm
Drug Mudalali Jayaratne.
December 9th, 2013 at 3:30 pm
“Over one billion dollars’ worth of heroin each year – that is the deadly fallout Pakistan gets from the blooming narcotics industry that provides the main cash crop in devastated Afghanistan. Locals say heroin is cheaper than food. It’s thought Pakistan has more than four million drug addicts, but less than 80 dedicated drug rehab clinics.”
Mohammed Kaamil owner of Rohan Impex, of T-30, Railway Quarters, Maligawatte was a BIG FINANCIER of Anuruddha Jayaratne at the PC election a few months before. BILLIONS of rupees spent. He won MOST number of votes.
But the president DENIED chief minister post to this drug dealer.
December 9th, 2013 at 3:32 pm
The shipper of the container was arrested in the Pakistan-administered Kashmir. He is due to be brought to Sri Lanka to face charges under an extradition treaty.