{"id":100141,"date":"2020-03-19T17:53:59","date_gmt":"2020-03-20T00:53:59","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=100141"},"modified":"2020-03-25T15:59:21","modified_gmt":"2020-03-25T22:59:21","slug":"erasing-the-eelam-victory-part-14-b","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2020\/03\/19\/erasing-the-eelam-victory-part-14-b\/","title":{"rendered":"ERASING THE EELAM VICTORY Part 14 B"},"content":{"rendered":"

KAMALIKA PIERIS<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n

Revised 24.3.20<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This essay, which\nis a continuation of the previous essay, gives other reasons for the bungling\nof Eelam War II and III. One reason was the attitude of the army high command\nin Colombo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The army high command\nof this period   was not interested in\nwinning Eelam war II or III. They did not know how to fight it either. The high ups in the army HQ in Colombo did\nnot know what was happening in the operations areas   of the war, said Kamal Gunaratne. Those who knew did not care. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There was a\ncasual attitude at the time, he said. Soldiers were getting killed and wounded\nbut the authorities still wanted us to fight.  When peace talks collapsed,\nthey wanted us to commence military operations though we were short of infantry\nsoldiers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Army HQ had held an inquiry into Mankulam,\nbecause this defeat had created a huge uproar in the country.  Kamal was summoned to Colombo and asked, to\nhis surprise, \u2018why did you abandon camp.\u2019 Colombo did not seem to know that an\ninstruction had been given to do so. Joint Operations Commander Cyril\nRanatunga, had   observed, during the\ninquiry, that if 40,000 rounds of ammunition had been used, \u2018You must have\nkilled at least 10,000\u2019.  Kamal was\nsurprised that a senior officer would make such a statement.  Kamal was told that there would be a high\npowered inquiry into Mankulam. This did\nnot happen. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The staff officers of the army, who dealt with\nadministrative, operational and logistical matters, were chosen not for\nknowledge of battle but for knowledge of English. Officers with a wealth of\nexperience were overlooked if they lacked a command of stylish English. English\nwas the medium of correspondence in the army at higher levels. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Promotions in the army were made on seniority,\nnot merit or experience, said Kamal Gunaratne. Leadership also was given on\nseniority. This was practiced right down the line. Officers were appointed to\ncommand postings, based on their seniority, over more experienced, capable,\nsoldiers. \u2018If you were senior in\nservice, you would be appointed a Division Commander, whether you were capable\nor not.\u2019    Battlefield achievements and fighting\ncapabilities were not taken into consideration. We lost battles because those\nwho were capable of commanding the soldiers were not given the opportunity to\ndo so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unsuitable appointments were made. A brigadier\nfrom the Engineering Corp was appointed to command the elite 53 division during\nJaya Sikurui.  He was walking around with\na broad smile and was playing games like ‘tak tik tuk’ with officers while his\ntroops were engaged in battle, reported Kamal Gunaratne. The CO of 10VGW had\ngone on leave the day prior to the Mandativu attack o f 1995, saying he had a\nfamily emergency. His   deputy died in\nthe attack the next day. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was clearly evident In July 1996 that LTTE\nwas planning to attack Mullaitivu. The\nday before the attack the Brigade commander and senior CO of 9SLSR left camp.\nAccording to regulations if the Brigade commander is away then all COs of all\nthe battalions should be on duty. Also the most senior officers should be on\nsite. In this case, the entire\nresponsibility fell on the only other senior officer, Major Aliba. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Major\nAliba was originally from the General Service Corp which handled logistics. He\nlacked the required experience in actual fighting which an infantry officer\nwould have. The troops were left to\nfight the terrorist onslaught on their own. The Brigade Commander and CO were\nordered back but left as soon as they could on the helicopter which brought\nback reinforcements. Then they bragged\nabout themselves in Colombo, said Kamal Gunaratne. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

During Jayasikurui, the forces were informed\nthat a battery of six pounder guns was about to be attacked and order was sent\nto the CO of an infantry battalion to immediately go to its rescue and secure\nit. But the CO just marked time without going forward. The artillery officer\nrepeatedly informed that an attack was imminent but since the cowardly CO was\nnot going forward he was asked to destroy the guns and retreat. Later they found that guns were intact, the\nGun Position Officer had been so anxious to run away that he did not wait to\neven destroy the guns. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While making sure\nthat the army would not win Jaya Sikurui, government news said that army had\nadvanced   destroying terrorist camps   and that\nLTTE was having heavy losses.  This was\nfalse, said Kamal Gunaratne. Government\ngave much publicity to Operation Rivi Bala, but Rivi Bala had not inflicted any\nharm on the LTTE. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The HQ had an\nodd attitude to secret operations. We need to maintain secrecy about our\nidentities and what we do, announced the  Navy Special Boat Squadron, the Navy\u2019s\nequivalent of commandos in the Army. We have remained in obscurity over the\nyears. After saying this,   the squadron had a demonstration in\nTrincomalee for the media in 2004. The squadron showed how they attacked a land\nbased target. They said that they had blasted bridges and causeways in Jaya\nSikurui. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 The\narmy was given a novel task to carry out in the north. In 1994 army was asked\nto carry out an offensive operation south of Palaly and conduct the general\nelection in the same area at the same time. \nThe plan was for army to launch an offensive operation  from Thelippalai area advance about one\nkilometer, and leave the ballot boxes out for a few hours  then return with the ballot boxes.  This was to show that elections were held in\nthe north while ensuring that no votes would be cast.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were appalling battle defeats and withdrawals,\nresulting in huge loss of manpower. Over 1200 soldiers were killed at\nMullaitivu (1996) and many more wounded and missing. This was one of the most painful and\nhumiliating defeats, said Kamal Gunaratne.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Mutur, the navy managed to land a contingent\nof commandos close to Brown Rock point, east of Muttur in the early hours of\nJune 14, 1990. Having allowed the commandos to come ashore, the LTTE ambushed them. Commandos lost over 40 men in this single ambush. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At Mankulam, the HQ had plenty of warning. HQ\nwas told many times that LTTE was getting ready to attack. There was an\nincrease in their radio transmissions, there was continuous training of cadres\nat night and LTTE   senior leaders had\ncome to Mankulam.   LTTE was also seen\nbuilding a huge structure for launching Pasilan mortars. The army HQ sent a\nmeasly reinforcement of 500 soldiers, reported Kamal Gunaratne.    Six helicopters did leave Vavuniya for\nMankulam, with ammunition, defenses, and stores but only the first could\nland.  LTTE   attacked and killed the gunner. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Once the attack started, the forces at\nMankulam begged for ammunition, over and over again. They also said fresh\ntroops were needed by nightfall.  Vanni\nHQ did not respond.   Then when it was\nobvious that Mankulam was going to fall to the LTTE, the   Vanni HQ \nordered  the forces  to abandon Mankulam and withdraw into the\njungles, saying that Vanni HQ  had no way\nof helping.  This was a shock to the\narmy. It was a painful withdrawal into the jungle. Kamal Gunaratne described\nthis withdrawal at length in his book \u2018Road to Nandikadal\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The order given to abandon Mankulam and\nwithdraw into the jungle was a totally unexpected order, he said. Leaving the\ncamp unnoticed was difficult. It had to\nbe done secretly. Also they had to\ndestroy mortars that had helped them a lot. They were sad to do so. All left camp safely, with the more\nexperienced soldier going last. They did\nnot eat for a long while. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was difficult to walk in the jungle in the\ndark carrying the wounded on stretchers, said Kamal Gunaratne. The wounds would\nget scratched by thorny bushes and their agonized cries were painful to hear. The group also had to make sure that the\nrear did not get lost. They were\nsurrounded on 3 sides by LTTE. The\nhelicopter rescue had to be aborted as LTTE had got at the network and were\nmocking them. They were finally rescued\nby a Bell helicopter where the pilot bravely swooped down and took them in. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At Elephant Pass, it was obvious that LTTE was\npreparing for a massive assault. Palaly instructed that the forces should take\nTamilamadam, to expand the area and increase security. HQ promised to send\nfresh troops to guard the new territory, but did not do so. 90 soldiers died.  Then came the order \u2018withdraw\u2019. They should\nnot give false promises like this, said Kamal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Helicopters containing soldiers had been sent,\nbut when the helicopters attempted to land, they were pummeled with a new LTTE\nweapon, a sort of 23mm cannon.  The\nhelicopters gave up and returned to base. There were more than 10,000 troops\nand only 5,000 LTTE at Elephant Pass, but army was a demoralized force by that\ntime, said Kamal Gunaratne.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 LTTE\nattacked Pooneryn in 1993. The army fought back and Pooneryn was saved. Those\nwho were wounded also fought. But the\ndamage was on a scale never before experienced, said Kamal.  8 officers, 225 other ranks were killed in\naction. 17 officers, 544 other ranks, were wounded and 302 missing in action.\nArmy lost equipment worth over LKR 50 million. \nA large stockpile of arms   fell\nin to the hands of   the LTTE.  They got small arms, machine guns, RPGs,\nmortars, and the MBT (Main battle tank).  <\/em>Thecaptured MBT was used against the army till the end of the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elephant pass camp was a large base which\nincluded almost all the buildings, the salterns and school.    Paranthan and Kilinochchi were thereafter\nlinked to Elephant Pass.  Satellite camps\nwere established at Vettilaikerny, Kattikadu and Pullaveli and a safe supply\nroute by sea and land was ensured.  The\nKilinochchi \u2013Elephant Pass- Vettilaikerny base became a sprawling complex that\nhoused the entire     54 division. It was\nconsidered impregnable.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But this complex fell easily to the LTTE.  To win Kilinochchi, LTTE first took over the\nwells at Iyakachchi, which was the army\u2019s source of drinking water. Due to\nthis, the troops died a sad death from dehydration due to the extreme heat and\nlack of water.  At Elephant Pass too,   there was a lack of drinking water and many\ndied due to acute dehydration. The camp had a machine for desalination of water\nbut it had broken down and was not repaired.  \nThe Chandrika government was unfazed, observed Kamal Gunaratne  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Army high command\nwas slow to obtain the modern weapons the army needed. It was only after LTTE\ndeployed shoulder fired heat seeking missiles that the government bought anti\nmissile equipment. Army was initially using obsolete 76 mm and 85 pounder guns\nand 25 pounders.   122 mm howitzers were\nobtained later from China. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

When they did\nmake purchases, the government bought the wrong items.   In 1998, they bought a hovercraft at a\nstaggering cost of Rs. 250 million. It was never used in war. The government\nwanted to get rid of it  in 2007, but was\nunable to find a buyer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Battle\ntanks were usually bought from Russia but for Jaya Sikurui they were bought\nfrom China. The tanks did not match the Russian guns the army was using.  When the tanks were operated, the guns got\ndestroyed. The army purchased\nunsuitable armored personnel carriers, with thin weak body. They were called\nice cream vans. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The MiG combat\naircraft the Air Force had bought in 2000 were not operational by 2003 as their\nguarantees had expired and they needed to be overhauled. The government bought Chinese F7 fighter   jets when they needed   fighter ground aircraft. The F7 is an\ninterceptor, not suited to fight a ground battle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fighter pilots were handicapped in identifying\ntargets. The government\nhadn\u2019t felt the need to acquire jets, dedicated helicopter gunships or Unmanned\nAerial Vehicles (UAVs) to facilitate a complicated operation. <\/em>LTTE simply went underground and emerged\ncheering when the planes had gone. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

We did not use the correct tactics in Eelam\nWar II and III   said Kamal Gunaratne. Our main objective should have been to\nweaken and destroy LTTE and not capture ground.   Jaya Sikurui for instance, was\ncapturing    areas which had no LTTE. We\nwere taking useless ground. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a war the army is expected to conduct \u2018deep\noperations\u2019 going deep inside the enemy territory. Our \u2018deep ops\u2019 were pathetic\nor non existence. Instead the army went in for \u2018limited operations\u2019 where they\nadvanced a few kilometers and retreated carrying their wounded and dead and\nthen boasted in the news about their success. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government   set up military camps without planning in\nadvance for reinforcements, replenishment of ammunition and evacuation well in\nadvance said Kamal Gunaratne. There must be plans for reinforcements and they\nmust also be rehearsed so that when they go, they know exactly what to do. Instead,\nthere were no plans in place for contingencies and there was no high level of\npreparedness. We did not keep a battalion in reserve for an emergency but\ndeployed all battalions on ground. There\nwas a lack of reserve troops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Battle plans were\ncalculated to lead to defeat. <\/em>There was no secrecy in the battle plans\neither.  The decision to move northward\non A9 was clearly visible to LTTE.  In\nJaya Sikurui our weaknesses were observed by LTTE, as they got ready for a\nmajor attack. In Jaffna, LTTE had had\nample time to study and prepared a counterattack on Jaffna Fort. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

We over extended ourselves, said Kamal Gunaratne.\narmy failed to secure the newly captured areas. It was imprudent to encircle jungles,\nbecause we were unable to secure them. Our weak defense lines in Jaya Sikurui\nand large expanses of empty jungle were easy for LTTE to penetrate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 We\nalways used large numbers of troops in our offensive while LTTE used their\nsparingly. Also our FDLs (Forward\nDefence Line) were weak. The FDL at Nagar Kovil after the ceasefire was a very\nweak one with dilapidated sandbags, and deteriorating palmyrah logs. The\nauthorities had ignored requests to improve the fortifications. The army presence at Nagar kovil FDL was\na volunteer battalion which had been there a long time. They had no drinking\nwater and unsanitary toilets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The army lacked basic information. At\nMullaitivu the rescue mission did not have enough maps, proper radio\ncommunication or artillery support when it took off to rescue those at\nMullaitivu. There was misuse of equipment, as well, due to ignorance, and\npossibly the lack of suitable weapons.  The\nnavy had used heavy machine guns which had an effective range of 3000 meters, to\ncover short ranges of around 300 meters. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The army lacked intelligence on LTTE\nactivities,   its strength and its\nfortifications.   We\nshould have taken more serious note of the LTTE capability such as Sea Tigers\nand the ability to infiltrate from the beach end for reconnaissance, and\nability to hide in scrub jungles within our camp premises.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a war, armies were expected to set up\nsignboards   indicating gun positions,\ntanks and so on. They did so using military symbols, not words. During Jaya Sikurui,\nthe army had erected large name boards, using language instead of military\nsymbols. These boards were erected  \nwhere they could be easily seen by the enemy, indicating locations such\nas division, brigade, battalion, artillery, battery, squadron etc.  When the army objected, they were told the\norder had come from the top.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Eelam wars II and III there was no plans to\nincrease the fighting strength of the Army and also no continuous flow of\nweapons and ammunition for the Army.  The army had an acute shortage of\nthe troops it needed to conduct operations and hold ground. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The soldiers who were there, were not equipped\nand trained adequately to conduct offensive operations. We did not train troops for night time\ncombat. We attacked only  in broad day\nlight. In Jaya Sikurui  the army would control the main road during\nthe day and retreat to camp at sunset leaving the road free for LTTE to\ndominate at night.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Jaya Sikurui the three forces,\narmy, navy, air force did not work together. There\nwas no co-ordination between them. Each service worked under their own chain of\ncommand, so instructions had to go upwards within each force.  <\/em>Navy and air force  refused to take orders from division  commanders unless ratified by their own HQ. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There was a serious  erosion of discipline and  morale, in the army, because of the failed\ncampaigns and defeats in Eelam War II\nand III . In Jaya Sikurui  team\nspirit  vanished,   division commanders would not  look or \neven speak to each other. On one occasion,  there were heated word between commanders of\n55 and 56 divisions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There was very low morale among the soldiers and\ndesertions were extremely high.\nMorale of army  fell after Kokavil, said\nKamal Gunaratne  for they knew that\nMankulam was next. LTTE  had already\nconstructed bunkers around Mankulam.  The  situation \nat Mullaitivu camp  was dismal,\nmorale was low and they had no proper food or leave, said Kamal Gunaratne .  Usually at the risk of their lives they would\ntry to drag back the dead and wounded after a battle. Now they did not, he\nsaid. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There was a deliberate withdrawal of services\nwhich benefited the soldiers. The Vanni Sevaya radio broadcast  was providing a very useful service to the\npolice and security forces. During the ceasefire, the Ranil Wickremesinghe\ngovernment ordered the service closed. \nSLBC  was directed to use the\nfacilities to set up a Tamil commercial service. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The army retreated in great disorder  in Jaya Sikurui and the scale and speed\nsurprised even the LTTE. Only one officer was successful in halting the retreat\nin Jaya Sikurui .Col Roshan Silva  of\nGajaba  regiment held an FDL across Omanthai\nwith his  air mobile brigade, This FDL\nremained  in the Wanni till Eelam war IV.\nRoshan was never recognized  for this. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were other successes too. In 1995, there\nwas a surprising win at   Weli oya under\nJanaka Perera.  The camps at Kokkuthuduwai,\nKokilai, Jayasinha pura, Janakapura and Parakramapura were all under heavy\nattack. But they withstood it.  Brig\nJanaka Perera   emerged victorious at\nthese battles. As a  result, there was\nrenewed  faith in the army’s ability to\nwin the war. This was surprise to the army \nas well. They thought by then that the war was already lost, said Kamal\nGunaratne .(Continued) <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

KAMALIKA PIERIS Revised 24.3.20 This essay, which is a continuation of the previous essay, gives other reasons for the bungling of Eelam War II and III. One reason was the attitude of the army high command in Colombo. The army high command of this period   was not interested in winning Eelam war II or III. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[104],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-100141","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-kamalika-pieris"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100141","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=100141"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100141\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=100141"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=100141"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=100141"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}