{"id":104875,"date":"2020-07-25T23:10:48","date_gmt":"2020-07-26T05:10:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=104875"},"modified":"2020-07-25T16:02:43","modified_gmt":"2020-07-25T23:02:43","slug":"erasing-the-eelam-victory-part-17-c1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2020\/07\/25\/erasing-the-eelam-victory-part-17-c1\/","title":{"rendered":"ERASING THE EELAM VICTORY Part 17 C1"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2><span style=\"color: #0000ff;\"><em>KAMALIKA PIERIS<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n<p>The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna was created by Rohana Wijeweera, whose real name was Patabandige Don Nandasiri Wijeweera. He was a member of Sri Lanka\u2019s Communist Party\u00a0\u00a0 (Moscow wing) led by S.A. Wickremasinghe and in 1962 was awarded a scholarship to Lumumba University in Moscow, to study medicine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;In Moscow, Wijeweera had apparently changed\nhis loyalties from Moscow to China. When he came on a visit to Sri Lanka in 1964,\nRussia did not permit him to return. According to Wijeweera, the reason given\nwas his new attachment to Communist China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Unable to return to Moscow, Wijeweera had joined the Communist\nParty (Peking wing) in Colombo. Wijeweera was given the task of re-organizing its\nyouth, but instead tried to promote his own ideas. He had apparently tried to\noust the Shanmuganathan faction in the party as well.Wijeweera\nwasexpelled from the Communist Party\n(Peking wing) in 1966. It is clear that neither Moscow nor Peking wanted\nhim.&nbsp; He was not valuable to them. Also\nthey did not trust him. Rohana Wijeweera, it is alleged, had been secretly\nrecruited by USA when he was in Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Starting\nin 1965, Wijeweera set up a&nbsp;&nbsp; well\norganized underground movement, initially labeled simply as\u2019 Viyaparaya&#8217;. &nbsp;The Viyaparaya had become Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna\nby May 1970. There was a political party called Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna led\nby KMP Rajaratne In the 1950\u2019s. This party is forgotten today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Wijeweera\nvisited various parts of the country, to obtain support for his movement. The\nmovement gained support in the rural areas&nbsp;&nbsp;\nwhere there were many alienated youth.&nbsp;\nHe was able to build a base among the educated Sinhala youth there. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Wijeweera\ntargeted O and A Level students and unemployed graduates. Only 19 per cent of\nthe membership was poorly educated, concluded Gamini Samaranayake. 79% were\nfrom Maha Vidyalaya and 6.4% from Madhya Maya Vidyalaya.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The movement\nreceived strong support from University students. The Socialist League of the\nUniversity of Peradeniya, the&nbsp; Communist\nParty ( Moscow) breakaway faction &nbsp;from\nthe University of Vidyodaya led by M. Wijesekara&nbsp; and the Communist Party ( Moscow)\noriented&nbsp; faction of the Student society\nof the University of Vidyalankara, headed by D. I. G. Dharmasekera joined the\nmovement. Arasaratnam observed that there were definitely more University students\nin the JVP than the mere 156 given In Obeysekera\u2019s sample.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Wijeweera\nwas looking for followers, whom he could trust and who were dedicated.\nRecruitment of new members was therefore done at a personal level. \u2018A\u2019 brought in\n\u2018B\u2019 who had been a classmate and so on. Gathering new members into the fold was\nreferred to as &#8220;koku gahanava&#8221;. The term is revealing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Those\nseeking membership were initially exposed to a discussion on the prevailing\npolitical situation in Sri Lanka. Those who passed this\u2019 test\u2019 were then\ntreated to a series of&nbsp;&nbsp; \u2018classes\u2019, which\nwere held in secret. &#8220;Classes were held in the night, in cemeteries for\nsmall groups of five or 10, recalled a member.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;Those who passed this hurdle were then\nadmitted to the fifth lecture which dealt with the JVP strategy. The\nprospective members were thereafter placed under observation, to see whether\nthey would be loyal to the movement and then admitted into the movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These five \u2018classes\u2019 were on five different subjects.&nbsp; The first class dealt with the &#8216;economic\ncrisis&#8217;, the problems facing the peasant farmer and the rural worker. The\nsecond was on &#8216;Independence&#8217; giving a historical background into the\nill-effects of colonial rule. The third on &#8216;Indian expansionism&#8217; focused on how\nIndian capitalists were trying to spread their tentacles into smaller\ncountries. The fourth was on the failure of the Left movement. The fifth class,\nwhich came later, was on &#8216;the path the Revolution should take&#8217;.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>J. V. P.&nbsp; Members were\nclassified into two lists.List A\nconsisted of full time members, trustworthy, loyal, and identified only by pseudonyms. There were 500 full-time members in 1970, said\nSamaranayake. We had a sense of adventure and never felt the\nhardship. We would travel without any money for bus fare and walk into a\nboutique, eat and walk out without paying. &#8220;Polu thibba,\u201d recalled a JVP\nmember.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The B List\nconsisted of part-time\nmembers, who were employed or studying, and were prepared to devoted their\nspare time to the activities of the group.<em>\n<\/em>These sympathizers were used mainly for\npropaganda activities, such as poster campaigns. There was also a C List\u201d of\nthose who could be approached for help.&nbsp;JVP established contacts in Buddhist\ntemples. They&nbsp;&nbsp; used them as hide outs&nbsp;&nbsp; after the 1971 insurrection. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The\nstrength of the JVP is not known. Samaranayake said that before 1970 the\nmembership was 2,000, but by 1970 it had increased to about 3,000<em>.<\/em> 98 % were under 35 years of age.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The JVP&nbsp;&nbsp; organization\nconsisted of a Central committee and Politbureau at the top, followed by\ndistrict leaders, district secretaries, village\ncommittees, police committees, grass roots units and full time volunteers. Cadres\nwere organized according to police divisions and police districts.&nbsp;&nbsp; The grass roots unit was a group of five, in\neach Police area, the \u2018pahe\u2019 committee.\nThe police committees were charged with preparing an armed attack on the local\npolice station.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Politbureau was not elected at a party congress. But was probably appointed by Wijeweera.\nThere was even a doubt as to how many it contained. The leaders, when questioned could not agree\non the number. Each gave a different figure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The\npolitbureau met every month in Colombo and the district secretaries would take\nthe decisions back to their district and from there to the cadres. Couriers,\nthe &#8220;mallis&#8221; who knew the hideouts would take the messages to the\ncadres. Communication was by code. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But decisions were not made by Central committee or Politbureau.\nAll matters were decided by the Secretarial committee composed of Wijeweera,\nSanath, Karunaratna and Loku Athula.Sanath\u201d was Wijesena Vitharana,\na teacher from Kalattawa, Karunaratna\u201d was W.T. Karunaratne from the Inland\nRevenue Department, &#8216;Loku Athula&#8217; was Nimalsiri Jayasinghe. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The high degree of security consciousness introduced into each of\nthe JVP committees, is significant, said Godahewa Indradasa of Sri Lanka\nIntelligence, who had been assigned to investigate insurgent activities.&nbsp; JVP conducted their political affairs in\nsecret. The leaders used aliases to prevent identification. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The ordinary\nmembers of the JVP did not know the structure of the organization. They were\nkept in the dark. It was only after I came to prison, that I came to know, that\nthe Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna had a politbureau, one JVPer told the police.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The JVP\nhad four working\ndivisions, propaganda, education, organization and arms, with each division\nheaded by one of the four members of the Secretarial\ncommittee.JVP started a propaganda section to conduct meetings all over the\ncountry, except North and East. JVP impressed the public through its poster\ncampaigns. The same poster appeared island wide overnight.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Several \u2018farms\u2019 were established, not for farming but for\nconducting secret classes and storing weapons.\nThe first were in Anuradhapura, Tissamaharama and Kirinda. The Kirinda one was a poultry farm. The\nfirst educational camp was held in Akmeemana in 1967 followed by one in\nTanamalwila. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Education camps were thereafter held secretly\nin remote parts of the country. Camps were held in Kurunegala,\nAnuradhapura&nbsp;&nbsp; Tissamaharama, Elpitiya,\nAkmeemana, Tanamalwila, Tambuttegama, Kataragama and Middeniya. Each camp taught about&nbsp;&nbsp; 25 to 100 cadres. Food was obtained from chenas. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The trainees had to be up by 4 a.m. for military-style drills and\narms training by navy personnel who had been drafted in. The youth were told\nthat armed struggle was necessary, and they must be prepared to fight. Instructions in the use of arms were done\nthrough diagrams.&nbsp; A rudimentary form of\nmilitary training was given at the camps, with sketches of guns on the\nblackboard, pictures of rifles being circulated and rifle drills and karate\nbeing taught. The inadequacy of the military training was clearly shown in their\nattack on the Polonnaruwa police station, said Samaranayake, where 39 JVP were\nkilled and many were wounded compared to few government casualties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The JVP\nalso started making bombs. Bombs were\nmade using condensed milk tins. These were collected in large quantities and\nsent to remote areas. JVP cadres\nwere&nbsp;&nbsp; collecting fused bulbs and jam\nbottles, tins and similar-sized containers to make bombs and Molotov cocktails.\nThe containers were filled with kerosene or petrol and had a fuse. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Bombs were\nalso being made using cheena chatti, cast iron shells, dynamite and had an\nelementary mechanism to blow them up. &nbsp;In\nSeptember 1970, Rohana Wijeweera ordered the distribution of 1000 bombs and\n1000 Molotov cocktails (petrol bombs) to each JVP police division unit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Every member was asked to have a gun and 10 cartridges ready. Due\nto this, there was a spate of robberies of guns and cartridges in 1970. They\nwere removed from houses, taking nothing else.&nbsp;\nThere was an unprecedented increase in the theft of guns in the country,\nsaid Indradasa.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By early\n1971, recruitment to the JVP was stopped and members were urged to collect as\nmuch money as possible, through whatever means to arm the movement. Several\nheists were carried out, such as the Okkampitiya bank robbery, the Badulla mail\nbag robbery, the Ambalangoda bank robbery and the York Street robbery to raise\nfunds. There were robberies also at branches of Peoples Bank, Bank of Ceylon, a\nCTB depot, a Mail train and the Urubokka sub-post office. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Although the movement was supposed to be secretive and undercover,\nJVP openly conducted political debates, contested University student council\nelections, and organized University student strikes. Between July and December\n1970, Wijeweera addressed some twenty public rallies in places like Kegalle,\nWellawaya, Tangalle, Negombo, Moratuwa and Elpitiya. The JVP also published its\nown paper, the Janatha Vimukthi, which was widely read. JVP held 16 public meetings between August 1970 and February 1971.In\nMarch 1971 Wijeweera travelled around the country, visiting Hambantota,\nColombo, Kandy, Matale, Dambulla, Polonnaruwa and Batticaloa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The\nMovement was now gathering momentum. Each member was instructed to collect his\nuniform and kit consisting of a gun, box of cartridges, boots, stockings, black\ntrousers, blue shirt with pockets, an army belt, black running shorts, black\nvest, steel helmet, knife, torch, Lighter, haversack, first aid box, and canvas\ncloth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The\nsubversive activities of the JVP had come to the attention of the intelligence\nservices and &nbsp;a special unit has been formed in the CID to\nwatch them, said Indradasa. The first\npolice report of the existence of the JVP underground movement was presented to\nthe Cabinet in 1968<em>. <\/em>In 1970 the government set up a\nspecial police unit nicknamed the `Guevara Bureau&#8217;, through which all\nintelligence pertaining to the subversive movement was channeled.<em>\n<\/em><em><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>&nbsp;<\/em>From January 1971, at Kegalle, police\nintelligence and the spy network floated by SP Seneviratne with the special\nvote of Rs. 50,000 started receiving significant information. Reports came in\nfrom grama sevaka, DROs and school principals in Kegalle district, of young\nboys going &#8216;missing&#8217; from home for days. Tailors in the area told us how orders\nfor a large number of uniforms had been placed.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There were reports in Kegalle of small groups\nof youth meeting in secret in lonely places,&nbsp;\nthe &#8216;desana paha&#8217; being delivered, collection, manufacture and storage\nof weapons, jungle training of fighting cadres, testing of devices in the\njungle, shooting practice, strange explosions. Six-foot lengths of barbed wire\nwere being removed from fences. These were subsequently cut into pieces and\nused in anti-personnel bombs<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At the Government Agent\u2019s residence in\nKegalle, one could hear at night, the tell-tale &#8216;clink-clink&#8217; of the insurgents\nmaking their way through the forest behind the Residency. They were carrying\n&#8216;Molotov cocktails&#8217; in their haversacks and as they walked over the uneven\nterrain, stumbling over rocks and roots, the bottles and cans would knock\nagainst each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Kegalle authorities informed the government\n.Daily dispatches were sent through special messengers, but no action was\ntaken. Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike discussed the intelligence reports\nat her Cabinet meetings with MPs from the area. The MPs said repeatedly that\nour boys&#8221; wouldn&#8217;t do such things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Then in February 1971, a clear warning went to the authorities\nthat something was brewing among the university students. The JVP had hidden a\nlarge number of detonators in the ceiling of Peradeniya University&#8217;s Marrs Hall\nand due to the heat, they began exploding like firecrackers. The explosions went\non for five days.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In March\n1971, there was a massive blast at Nelundeniya in Kegalle. Five died. The\nauthorities found a 15&#8242; x 20&#8242; pit with many tunnels leading from it. It was an\narms dump. The army was alerted. The\npolice began raiding JVP hideouts &nbsp;police arrested<strong> <\/strong>about 500members and sympathizers of the JVP. Wijeweera\nwas arrested on the 13<sup>th<\/sup> March and sent to the Jaffna jail. On March\n16, the government declared a state of Emergency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The JVP was not deterred by these developments. The JVP inner circle\nmet in secret On April 2 at the Sangaramaya temple of Vidyodaya University,\nKelaniya and decided that all police stations in the country would be attacked\nat 11 p. m.on April 5th.&nbsp; This decision\nwas communicated to the district cadres and local leaders. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Wijeweera had sent a message that posters and leaflets should be\npublished calling for his release and 500 comrades should be sent to Jaffna to\nsecure his release. The&nbsp;&nbsp; plan therefore was\nto launch a simultaneous night-time attack on the police stations. Also to\nattack concurrently the Jaffna police station, Jaffna naval base and Jaffna\nprison and rescue Wijeweera.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The police\nstation attacks were to be launched by 15 separate groups, each consisting of\n40 to 50 JVPers.The attackers were armed with shotguns, locally-made hand\nbombs and `Molotov cocktails&#8217;. They were in home-sewn dark blue uniforms,&nbsp; military boots, and\ncarried haversacks. They were ordered to fly the JVP flag, a lion on a red\nbackground, on captured police stations. Their&nbsp;\nattack approach varied. Some launched frontal attacks arriving in buses\nand Lorries which had been forcibly commandeered, while others resorted to more\nsurreptitious approaches. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But things\ndid not go according to plan. Wellawaya Police Station was attacked&nbsp; prematurely&nbsp;&nbsp;\nat dawn, 5.20 a.m. on the 5<sup>th<\/sup> April. Two policemen were\nkilled. This&nbsp; attack alerted the\ngovernment.&nbsp; An all-island curfew was\ndeclared on the 6th of April.This curfew lasted until\nmid-July. It continued till the end of November , 1971 in the Western Province.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This\ncurfew prevented JVP attacks in Ampara, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, Ratnapura and\nMonaragala,but did not deter the JVP elsewhere. JVP continued to attack police\nstations, in the rural areas till the&nbsp; 11<sup>th<\/sup>\nof April. Police stations around the country were placed on alert but they were\nill-equipped to face the sudden onslaught. Police stations in remote areas were\ntemporarily closed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ninety two\npolice stations across the country were attacked and five, Deniyaya, Uragaha,\nRajangane, Kataragama and Warakapola were&nbsp;\ntaken by the insurgents. Fifty-seven police stations were damaged.&nbsp;\n43 police stations in Kegalle, Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Galle and Ambalangoda\ndistricts were abandoned.&nbsp; Police\nstations at Akuressa, Hakmana, Kamburupitiya and Mawarala were closed and the\npersonnel were brought down to Matara. In the Matara District all police\nstations other than Dondra and Matara were attacked and several policemen were\nkilled. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After the initial attack on the 5th of April\n1971,&nbsp; there came a second phase which\nwas confined to the following districts: Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa in the\nNorth Central Province, Kurunegala in the Central Province, Monaragala in the\nUva Province,&nbsp; Kegalle in Sabaragamuwa\nProvince,&nbsp; Matara, Galle and Hambantota\nin the Southern Province. Kegalle and Galle were&nbsp; hotbeds with over a thousand full-timers\neach.&nbsp; Badulla had around 500 members. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>JVP occupied several major towns in semi-urban\nand rural areas.In some cases the JVP&nbsp;\nby passed&nbsp; towns to secure the\nsurrounding countryside, thereby isolating the government forces in the town centers.&nbsp; There was long-term occupation, protracted\nguerrilla warfare&nbsp; and open fighting with\nthe military. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>JVP assumed command in areas where the police\nhad withdrawn and the civil administration was in disarray. They&nbsp; took over&nbsp;\nwhole areas , disrupted the transport system, telecommunications, power\nsupplies.Main roads and rail tracks were damaged. They ran&nbsp; the post office, distributed food from\ncooperative stores&nbsp; and even held\ntheir&nbsp; own courts of law. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The JVP&nbsp;\nentrenched itself in Kegalle district. The Kachcheri&nbsp; area, where&nbsp;\nthe police station and the Courts of Law are located, was held by the\narmed forces while the JVP dominated the rest of the district. There were&nbsp; fierce confrontations along the main road from\nKegalle to Colombo. Tholangamuwa Central College, located some five miles from\nWarakapola on the Kegalle road was the JVP headquarters. A bulldozer was parked\nacross the entrance to the school so that no one could storm them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>All petrol stations in the Kegalle district\nwere sealed ,by the government&nbsp; to\nconserve fuel and police guards deployed at water supply stations, electrical\nsub-stations and the telecom exchange.&nbsp; But the JVPers were one step\nahead, said KHJ Wijedasa , who was GA, Kegalle at the time.&nbsp; They felled trees across the power lines,\nplunging whole areas into darkness. Cycle chains were thrown over high tension\nwires to cause short-circuits. Phone lines were cut and roads blocked with\nuprooted trees and lamp posts.&nbsp;&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By midnight on April 5, there was a total\nblackout in the district. There was no transport, no communication, no vehicles\non the roads, and no water. Kegalle was deserted,&#8221; said Wijedasa.&nbsp; The police radio was the only link with the\noutside world. Within the district, all 14 police stations had fallen. There\nwas minimal resistance by the Police. The cops just vanished. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>JVP&nbsp;\nfought in certain areas in the Anuradhapura District,and\nin the small towns of Elpitiya and Deniyaya. Elpitiya was under&nbsp; the JVP for nearly three weeks. &nbsp;At Batapola, in&nbsp; Ambalangoda, the JVP had barricaded\nthemselves with trees and lamp-posts. Sentry points had been set up and big\nbungalows and walauwas commandeered. Some 300 shotguns had been stockpiled like\nfirewood. The cadres got around on bicycles, with couriers going from one\nstronghold to another. Villagers were only allowed to leave their homes to find\nfood.&nbsp; The JVP held Batapola till April 23. Then the army with the help of\nvillagers attacked their camp.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At Matara a lorry-load of bombs entered the fort. The moment we found the lorry of bombs we\nclamped a curfew and everyone chased away from all roads&nbsp;by the army.\nLater we found evidence of two other lorries coming with bombs. The cadres\ncould not group and the lorries could not reach the cadres and Matara was saved\nfrom a bloodbath, said Garvin Karunaratne, then GA Matara. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At Deniyaya the police station was repeatedly attacked and the\npolice retreated all the way to Rakwana and Embilipitiya as the roads to Matara\nhad been taken over by the JVP. &nbsp;Deniyaya\nwas ruled by the JVP for around three to four weeks. In Deniyaya many well to\ndo people were &nbsp;killed. This included Dr.\nRex de Costa. it was his murder that made Prime Minister dispatch a platoon of\nsoldiers to the Matara District, said Karunaratne.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Akuressa was under the control of the insurgents. The army was\nambushed&nbsp; about ten miles from Matara and the JVP fire power was so strong\nthat the army had to retreat. the Government&nbsp;had lost control of most of\nthe Matara&nbsp; District for around three\nweeks during which period the JVP ran their kangaroo courts\narresting,&nbsp;charging people and punishing them even with death, said\nKarunaratne.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The armed\nforces delayed&nbsp; launching a counterattack\n. Initially, the government&nbsp; did not send\narmy troops to the affected areas when the GAs asked for them. Garvin Karunaratne,\nthen GA Matara and Neville Jayaweera, then GA Vavuniya,&nbsp; said, independent of each other, that the\ngovernment ignored their requests for&nbsp;\nsecurity forces&nbsp;&nbsp; when the JVP\nattacks were at the initial stage. Army units were sent much later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, by\nthe end of April the government forces had got their act together.<strong>&nbsp; <\/strong>the\nJVP &#8216;s entire plan of attack had been revealed to the security forces by an\ninformant<strong>.&nbsp; <\/strong>JVP &#8216;s camps were attacked by air and\nland. Mortars were&nbsp; used. Military co-\nordinators were `appointed to govern the districts previously&nbsp;&nbsp; held by the JVP. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>JVP &nbsp;retreated to&nbsp;&nbsp;\nthe jungle or national park nearest the areas they were in.&nbsp; They went, in the south to Sinharaja , from\nAnuradhapura, Kegalle and Kurunegala districts to&nbsp;&nbsp; Wilpattu, Ritigala and&nbsp; from Dambulla and Polonnaruwa to the\nsurrounding jungles. By the end of August 1971, 69 were hiding in Wilpattu and\nabout 50 in the forest surrounding Dambulla. They did not know how to survive\nin the jungles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At Haputale,&nbsp; the 100 cadres\nwho had gathered to attack the Haputale Police Station, retreated through\nAttampitiya to Uda Pussellawa and on to the Walapane jungles, heading for\nHunnasgiriya. One they way, the seized guns from people who possessed licensed\nfirearms.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>200\nfrom&nbsp; the Kegalle and Kurunegala\ndistricts retreated to Wilpattu National Park in two lots under the cover of\ndarkness and along unpopulated tracks. During the day they camped in isolated\nareas either on the mountains or in the jungles. A. C. Alles observed that this\nretreat was marked by murder, arson and looting. only about 30 reached their\ndestination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A special\nDepartment under&nbsp; former IGP, Aleric&nbsp; Abeygunawardena&nbsp; was&nbsp;\nset up to &nbsp;investigate the&nbsp; insurgency. OICs and ASPs were asked to send\ntheir investigation files direct to this office. Under Emergency Regulations,\nadmissions made to ASPs by suspects were made admissible in courts. State Counsels and other lawyers were asked to\nprepare cases for prosecution and advise the police officers on further\ninvestigations. Cases were filed in courts without delay. CID and Intelligence\nofficers &nbsp;&nbsp;were recruited to help&nbsp; with arresting the rebel leaders in hiding. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In May and\nJune&nbsp; 1971, with the backbone of the\nuprising broken, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike offered an amnesty to\nthose who were willing to surrender. It is reported that 3,978 surrendered in\nresponse to this amnesty. Yet another amnesty was offered from the 7th to 9th\nof June when 236 surrendered. It appears that another ten day amnesty was declared\nthereafter and \u2018thousands surrendered to local DROs\nand temples.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There were\napproximately 18,000 in custody by the end of 1971, said Samaranayake.11,748\narrested and 6,025 surrendered.Not all of them were&nbsp; JVP. On the contrary, it is obvious that some\nof them were never involved in the armed struggle, said Samaranayake. He&nbsp;&nbsp; suggests that only about 20,000 to 25,000,\nactually participated in the insurrection. According to Indradasa, 8000&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; JVPers, out of a possible 14,000, were\narrested by government. The last JVP\nfighters were not captured until 1976, observed Samaranayake.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The JVP &nbsp;in custody, were kept in detention camps in&nbsp;&nbsp; the Universities, under army volunteer\nofficers. Some\n200 state officers were mobilized to question them and record their statements\non &#8216;pink&#8217; forms for those who had been arrested and &#8216;blue&#8217; forms for those who\nhad surrendered. charges were brought against 3,872 persons who were believed\nto have been involved in armed attacks on police stations and other acts of\npolitical violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A Criminal Justice Commission comprising five\njudges of the Supreme Court, including Justice Alles was hurriedly set up, in\nMay 1972 to try those prisoners,&nbsp;\ndispensing with the normal laws of evidence, to deal with the heap of\ncases.&nbsp; when the C. J. C. trials concluded in 1975, 92 of the accused had\nbeen acquitted, 2,519 had been released on suspended sentences, and 365 had\nbeen sentenced to prison terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to Sri Lankan Government statistics,\nabout 12,000 suspects were placed in rehabilitation camps &nbsp;&nbsp;Those not involved in the insurgency were released\u2019. This\nprocess was slow.&nbsp; Nevertheless, compared\nto release rates in other Third World countries, the rate of release in Sri\nLanka was quite fair and timely, said Samaranayake.When\nthe U. N. P. Government&nbsp; came to power in\n1977, the remaining detainees, including Wijeweera, were released.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The human cost of the JVP insurrection was high.\nFifty-three Security Forces personnel had died and 323 were injured.&nbsp; 37\npolice officers were killed and 195 wounded.\nThough the government gave the figure &nbsp;for JVP as 1,200 dead, it could be safely\nclaimed that the actual number of deaths ranged between a minimum of 6,000 to a\nmaximum of 8,000 said Samaranayake.it was estimated that some 8,000\n-10,000 JVPers were killed said another source. According to Wijeweera, 15,000\nof his cadres had died and twice that number of civilians had lost their lives.\nJVPers who escaped &nbsp;death and custody\nwent underground with the objective of re-organizing the JVP.&nbsp;( continued) <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>KAMALIKA PIERIS The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna was created by Rohana Wijeweera, whose real name was Patabandige Don Nandasiri Wijeweera. He was a member of Sri Lanka\u2019s Communist Party\u00a0\u00a0 (Moscow wing) led by S.A. Wickremasinghe and in 1962 was awarded a scholarship to Lumumba University in Moscow, to study medicine. &nbsp;In Moscow, Wijeweera had apparently changed [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[104],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-104875","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-kamalika-pieris"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/104875","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=104875"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/104875\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=104875"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=104875"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=104875"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}