{"id":105491,"date":"2020-08-14T15:25:59","date_gmt":"2020-08-14T22:25:59","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=105491"},"modified":"2020-08-14T15:25:59","modified_gmt":"2020-08-14T22:25:59","slug":"erasing-the-eelam-victory-part-17-c3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2020\/08\/14\/erasing-the-eelam-victory-part-17-c3\/","title":{"rendered":"ERASING THE EELAM VICTORY Part 17 C3"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2><span style=\"color: #0000ff;\"><em>KAMALIKA PIERIS<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n<p>The 1971\nJVP insurgency has been described as a romantic, innocent revolution, an unplanned spontaneous attack. It was\nnothing of the sort. It was pre-planned and well organized. The purpose was to\nbring down the SLFP government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike. JVP was planning a\nputsch, to remove the government by force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike would be\ntaken into custody from her Rosmead Place residence. The army cantonment at\nPanagoda would be attacked.&nbsp; Navy\npersonnel at Ragama and air force personnel at Katunayake were to be immobilized\nby introducing a purgative to their food. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To help\nthis, JVP cadres were expected to take and hold certain Sinhala areas. There was method in their operations.&nbsp; Before attacking police stations, the\nelectricity supply was cut. Approaches to police stations were sealed off, in\nsome cases, by felling large trees. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>JVP took\nVavuniya&nbsp;&nbsp; in such a planned manner. JVP\ncontrolled the road at Iratperiyakulama and Omanthai, cutting Vavuniya off from\nAnuradhapura and Jaffna. JVP also\ncontrolled roads at Medawachchiya, Rajangana, and Polgahawela, which meant they\nhad control of all key road and rail junctions.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; JVP controlled Madukanda, a village&nbsp;&nbsp; in Vavuniya which provided a link to\nTrincomalee. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;Vavuniya was one of the\npockets where the JVP was able to hold out for a long time, observed\nJayaweera.&nbsp; They were eventually\ndefeated, but&nbsp;&nbsp; a hard core of about 25\nstayed on in the thickly forested ridge off Mamaduwa village, north east of\nVavuniya from where till mid August, 1971 they made regular incursions into\ntown and torched school buildings and buses and sniped at army camps and\npatrols. Air strikes failed to flush\nthem out,&nbsp; said Jayaweera.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The JVP\nalso tried to destablise the state. Once the new government came into power\nthere was an unprecedented outburst of lawlessness throughout the country. JVP\nhad infiltrated government industrial concerns and had intimidated the\nworkers.&nbsp; There were work stoppages, said\nSenator S.&nbsp; Nadesan.&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>JVP was from\nthe beginning, trained for armed violence. On\nthe night of the 5th of April, the J. V. P. was responsible for violence, on a scale\nwhich had never been experienced in Sri Lanka, observed Samaranayake. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>JVP only killed in Sinhala areas.&nbsp;&nbsp;\nJVP attacked 92 police stations.&nbsp;&nbsp;\nThey were all in \u2018Sinhala\u2019 areas. Estate owners were killed. At\nDeniyaya, there was the high profile killing of the popular Dr Rex de Costa,\nwho had openly helped the Deniyaya police during the insurgency. A friend told\nme that three of her husband\u2019s cousins, who owned tea small holdings in Matara,\nwere shot and killed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There were economic targets as\nwell, also in Sinhala areas. A cotton processing factory had been set up at\nMirijjawila near Hambantota In 1956, to encourage cotton cultivators in\nHambantota and Monaragala. Cotton was a popular crop in the Eastern part of\nHambantota and Monaragala, at this time. Cotton was cultivated under rain-fed\nconditions. This factory functioned satisfactorily and it had started\nprocessing their home grown cotton.&nbsp; JVP\nset fire to it.&nbsp; That was the end of the\nfactory. It was never re-started. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Garvin Karunaratne, who was GA,\nMatara during the insurgency observed that the insurgency affected the economy\nof the south.&nbsp; Many well to do people\nfrom the rural areas, immediately transferred themselves and their moveable\npossessions to the towns.I was\ninundated with requests for petrol for this purpose, he said. &nbsp;&nbsp;Karunaratne also observed that till then, houses\nwith gardens only had two-foot high parapet walls. After the JVP insurgency, walls\nwere raised&nbsp;&nbsp; to six feet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The notion that the JVP was only interested in taking over police stations\nis incorrect. This was only a cover. The target was the armed forces and the\nmilitary installations. During the insurgency, JVP took over the Anuradhapura\nair strip and was eyeing the one at Vavuniya.<em> <\/em>Several members of the armed forces were recruited into the JVP\nand used very discreetly, said Indradasa. Wijeweera\nhad tried to recruit SLFP army personnel arrested on suspicion of trying to\nover throw the UNP government, but they were not interested. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Wijeweera was more successful with the navy. Wijeweera targeted\nthe Sri Lanka navy from the very beginning. This is not well known. A list of\nnavy personnel were submitted to him by a contact whose name is given in\nIndradasa\u2019s book.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;Wijeweera met this group at\nTrincomalee navy base and spoke to them,&nbsp;&nbsp;\nprobably in 1965. Many naval personnel attended the JVP classes in 1966\nand 1967. And a group of JVP navy men\u201d was created. Naval ratings who were close to Wijeweera\nwere among the instructors at the JVP training camps, said Indradasa. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Uyangoda\nalias &#8220;Oo Mahattaya&#8221; of the JVP had visited Karainagar naval base in\n1971 and met one these JVP navy men.This navy man had succeeded in\nposting pro JVP sailors to work at the armories of the outstation navy bases,\ntelling his superior that they were trustworthy men. The gullible superior had believed him. If\nthe JVP plan had succeeded in 1971 it would have been disastrous for the navy\nas well as the country, said Indradasa. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Janaka Perera, former\nchief of staff of the Sri Lanka army described one navy episode. Towards the\nend of March, 1971, the Trincomalee Naval Base received a letter from the\nPeradeniya University requesting to arrange a football match between university\nstudents and Navy personnel on the naval base grounds n Trincomalee on April 5.\nThe letter also requested the Navy to arrange for the university team to spend\nthe night at the base, since it was difficult for them to return to Peradeniya\nthe same day after the match. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The naval\nauthorities were wary.&nbsp; The Navy decided\nit was not safe to allow a football match between the Navy and University team\nat Trincomalee. The university authorities were informed that the naval base\ngrounds could not be given for the match. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If the match was\nheld as planned, one of the Navy men who would have participated was Able\nSeaman H.M. Tillekeratne, one of the Navy\u2019s best football players. A strong\nwell-built man, Tillekeratne was serving at the Navy\u2019s Elara Camp in Karainagar\nat the time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Tillekeratne was\nthe \u2018Coordinating Officer\u2019 between the Navy and the JVP, which was planning to\nappoint him as North-East commander if they seized power.&nbsp;&nbsp;\n&nbsp;&nbsp;He was in the habit of regularly travelling between the Elara Camp\nand the Trincomalee Naval Base.&nbsp; He was conducting political classes for\nsome Navy personnel.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On April 4,\nTillekeratne was on duty at the Elara Camp&nbsp; when the JVP insurgency began.\nBy this time the CID had got wind of Tillekeratne\u2019s strong connection with the\nJVP. Within 48 hours of the JVP uprising\nSuperintendent of Police Jaffna, received a message from Colombo of a\nsuspected&nbsp;move by Tillekeratne to put sleeping tablets into the water\nfilters at the Elara Camp\u2019s officers mess.&nbsp;\nThe police took immediate action. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Tillekeratne was\nordered to go to Chunnakam and thereafter proceed to Palaly Airport for the\nflight to Colombo. &nbsp;He knew the game was up. &nbsp;There was no question\nhe would be arrested as soon as he arrived in Colombo. Tillekeratne headed for\nChunnakam in a Navy jeep.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What happened next\nwas like a scene from a gangster movie, said Janaka Perera. Upon reaching the power station Tillekeratne\ngot off the jeep, instructing the driver to keep the engine running.&nbsp;\nTillekeratne then walked nonchalantly towards the power station, which was guarded\nby a detachment from the Elara Camp. They knew him well. When he entered the\npower station the naval guards who had completed their duty the previous night\nwere relaxing. They had kept their submachine guns aside. Suddenly,\nTillekeratne picked up one of the guns ordered the other Navy men to raise\ntheir hands. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>All obeyed\nTillekeratne, except Petty Officers Cecil Gunasekera, N.J.T. Costa and another.\nSince the three men were his close friends they thought he was joking. He then\nrepeated his order. &#8220;This is my last warning. Are you putting up your\nhands or not?&#8221;&nbsp; But the three men ignored him. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Then Tillekeratne\nopened fire, killing two of them \u2013Gunasekera and Costa &#8211; on the spot. Several\nothers were seriously injured, among them a Navy PT instructor, T.M.N. Abdul,\nwho was crippled for life as a result.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Following the\nshooting Tillekeratne, according to Abdul, had forced two other Navy men at gun\npoint to load the jeep with all the weapons and ammunition he had seized from\nhis colleagues, and accompany him in the vehicle.&nbsp; Tillekeratne\u2019s aim was\nto join the insurgents.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Suspecting that\nhe would try to flee Jaffna, the SP Sunderalingam, promptly telephoned ASP\nMendis, manning the Elephant Pass Police check point to be on the alert for the\njeep carrying Tillekeratne. &nbsp;As soon as the message was received, the\npolicemen at the check point along with army personnel waited for the vehicle\nto appear. A short while later they saw the jeep at a distance. They waited\nuntil it came close and then ordered the driver to stop. Their guns were aimed\nat the jeep.&nbsp; At first it appeared the vehicle was going to slow down.\nSuddenly Tillekeratne tried to grab the submachine gun on his seat. But those\nmanning the check point were faster. Their shots killed Tillekeratne and the driver\non the spot. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After\nTillekeratne\u2019s death, police searched his personal belongings and found secret\ndocuments, and several bottles of sleeping tablets which were to be put into\nthe water filters of the Elara Camp\u2019s officers\u2019 mess.&nbsp; His plan was to seize\nall weapons and ammunition from the camp\u2019s magazine, before joining his JVP\ncomrades, after making naval officers unconscious, concluded Janaka Perera. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;JVP gained control of some areas during the\ninsurgency, but did not know what to do next. The hierarchical system of cells had\nkept members isolated from each other and ignorant of the JVP\u2019s overall plan.\nInstead of taking over neighboring towns and cities and marching on to other\nareas, they simply waited until those areas were also captured.&nbsp; They failed to set up a new government or new\nadministration in the areas they controlled.&nbsp;\nThey were not trained for that. They were trained to await orders from a\nhigher authority. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Analysts\nobserved that JVP\u2019s conspiratorial structure&nbsp;&nbsp;\nwas excellent for surprise armed attack, but not for long drawn-out\nguerrilla warfare. The cadres were not physically or psychologically prepared\nto continue an armed struggle either.&nbsp;&nbsp;They only had a scanty and inadequate\ntraining in military tactics and weapons use.&nbsp;&nbsp;The arms and ammunition\nsuch as shotguns and locally made hand-thrown bombs were not only inferior in\nquality but were in short supply as well.&nbsp;\n(Continued)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>KAMALIKA PIERIS The 1971 JVP insurgency has been described as a romantic, innocent revolution, an unplanned spontaneous attack. It was nothing of the sort. It was pre-planned and well organized. The purpose was to bring down the SLFP government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike. JVP was planning a putsch, to remove the government by force. &nbsp;Prime Minister [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[104],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-105491","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-kamalika-pieris"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/105491","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=105491"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/105491\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=105491"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=105491"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=105491"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}