{"id":107476,"date":"2020-10-11T17:22:26","date_gmt":"2020-10-12T00:22:26","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=107476"},"modified":"2020-10-11T17:22:54","modified_gmt":"2020-10-12T00:22:54","slug":"power-sharing-arrangements-in-conflict-resolution","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2020\/10\/11\/power-sharing-arrangements-in-conflict-resolution\/","title":{"rendered":"Power sharing arrangements in conflict resolution"},"content":{"rendered":"

N.A.de S. Amaratunga\u00a0<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n

As discussions on drafting a new constitution gathers\nmomentum the ethnic problem may assume significant importance as it has been an\nintractable issue in the politics of Sri Lanka. Some political scientists\nbelieve that ethnic based conflicts could be resolved by power sharing methods\nthat strengthen democracy (Hartzell CA, 2015) while others disagree as results\nare rather disappointing in a large majority of countries (Horowitz D, 2015).\nThis letter looks at these points of view in an attempt to see what useful\ninformation could be gleaned from these studies relevant to Sri Lanka.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The concept of power sharing is not new to Sri Lanka,\nduring the time of kings there were administrative units at village level which\nwere continued by colonial rulers, Rate Mahathaya\u201d, Korale\u201d are examples. In\n1927 Donoughmore Commission had recommended Executive Committee system for\nexecutive function in the State Council to be formed out of the 58 elected\nmembers. This could be considered as a method of power sharing at the centre.\nThe Commission also recommended Provincial Councils as a means of devolving\npower to the periphery.        <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sri Lanka had provincial councils since India forced it\non us in 1987 as a solution to the ethnic problem which, however, have not been\nvery successful to say the least. For one thing, it does not solve the problems\nof Tamils as more than half of them live outside the North and for another, it\nis a huge redundant financial burden for a small country like ours. Further the\n13th<\/sup> Amendment carries land and police powers which are almost\nfederal features and difficult to implement though there is pressure for their\nimplementation. We must also remember that the Supreme Court only very narrowly\nendorsed the 13th<\/sup> A and also Justice Wanasundera’s powerful dissent\nwhen it was referred to the Supreme Court for clearance before enactment in the\nParliament in 1987.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore it may be worthwhile to examine the\nalternative methods available and tried out in other countries that come out of\nconflict when a new constitution is under consideration in Sri Lanka. Ethnic\nbased conflicts are not uncommon in the world. From 1945 to 2006 there had been\n127 civil wars in the world that ended during that period. Only 67 (52%) of\nthese countries had called for power sharing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In most of these countries there had been intense civil\nwars and none had ended with one side winning the war. The wars had been\nbrought to a halt by third party intervention, either the UN or regional\ncountries. The Sri Lankan conflict was a war waged by a group of terrorists\nagainst an elected government and was brought to an end by a total defeat of\nthe terrorist group. The terrorists were fighting for a separate state or\nsomething close to it. Moreover terrorism in the country was sponsored and\nassisted by foreign countries who also had their own agendas. Whether it could\nrecur may very much depend more on the geopolitical situation in the region and\nthe foreign powers involved in it and their designs for the region including\ntheir capability and strength of carrying it through than local politics.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Power sharing methods that are being discussed by\npolitical scientists of repute (Liphart A, Horowitz D, O’Leary B, Wolf S,\nWeller M)  fall into two broad categories\nknown as Consociationalism and Integrationalism or Centrepetalism. The former\nis more suitable for countries where there is no significant difference in the  population ratios of communities. This\narrangement  may have the following\nfeatures; coalition government, proportionality, veto rights and autonomy.\nConsociationalism in its early times featured only political power sharing,\nlater power sharing had extended to other areas such as economic, territorial\nand military (Hartzell CA, & Hoddie M, 2015).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In integrationalism or centrepetalism as the name\nsuggests there is encouragement of voluntary cross ethnic cooperation and\ninducement for inter ethnic cooperation and fair allocation of resources. The\ngoal of both these methods is inter-ethnic power sharing. Consociationalism\nattempts mandatory post-electoral governing conditions of all ethnic\nantagonists who find their way into parliament through a proportional electoral\nsystem. Centrepetalism by contrast aim at voluntary per-electoral inter-ethnic\ncoalitions of moderates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of the 67 countries mentioned above which had adopted\npower sharing methods most had gone for a combination of these methods, 54\n(80%) had wanted political power sharing while 29 (43%) had territorial and\neconomic arrangements and 47 (70%) had wanted military power sharing as well\n(Hartzell CA, & Hoddie M, 2015).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These arrangements no doubt could be considered fair\nand just if the difference in the population ratios of the groups involved is\nnot too big. If on the other hand one group is less than 30% of the total\npopulation the criticism that it is rewarding violence may arise. Further the\narrangement may be viewed as an agreement between elite groups instead of a\nsocial contract for the benefit of ordinary people. However whether these\narrangements in any case have lasted a length of time that justifies their\nadoption needs to be looked at.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were 78 countries in Asia, Africa,  Middle East, Eastern Europe, former USSR and\nthe Caribbean which were in intense ethnic conflict during 1980 to 2010. Of\nthese only 20 managed to conclude inter-ethnic power sharing arrangements, many\nfailed, some experienced genocide eg. Rwanda in 1993 and others ended with\nsecession eg. Sudan in 2005. Only 4 to 6 achieved stable arrangements but even\nthese have serious political instability (Horowitz D, 2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These inter-ethnic power sharing arrangements seem to\nhave failed due to three innate problems. Firstly there is the difficulty of\nadoption, for example the majority would want majority rule and the minority\nwould want guarantees against majority rule which may be given when the\nmajority is weak but take back when strong. Another problem is the degradation\nof the arrangement due to manipulations by both sides which could happen in\nCentrepetalism, a good example is what happened in Malaysia in 1969. Third\nproblem is due to immobilism caused by mechanisms like minority veto which\ncould be a power endowed to the minorities in a second chamber. The veto could\ncause immobility of progressive projects resulting in economic stasis as\nexperienced in Northern Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia and perhaps in Sri Lanka too\nregarding Divineguma\u201d project.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Researchers who support the idea of power sharing as a\nmeans of resolving ethnic conflict do not seem to have substantial evidence of\nsuccess anywhere in the world, yet they say it is the only means of encouraging\ndemocracy in these countries in deep conflict and violence (Hartzell CA &\nHoddie M, 2015). Security concerns of minorities cannot be addressed by any\nother means. For example some stability has been achieved in Burundi as both\npolitical and military power sharing has been attempted. However it is a\nfragile arrangement as seen by intermittent flaring of violence. In Sudan, they\nsay, territorial power sharing has worked but the opponents say what happened\nin 2005 is virtually a secession. Economic power sharing has been attempted in\nSierra Leon and Indonesia, the situation in the former is improving and in the\nlatter it is stable and economy is doing well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What useful information could be gleaned from all this\nthat could be used in resolving the problem in Sri Lanka. Regional autonomy\nwithin a unitary state was attempted with the 13th<\/sup> A which would be\nalmost federal if land and police powers are granted. The majority community\nhad never been consulted regarding this arrangement and opposition against it\nis mounting in the society and within the parliament also. Some may say it is a\nfate accompli and is best left alone without creating an issue of it and may be\nutilized with improvements to solve the problem. Yet they forget that it does\nnot solve the problem of 50% of the minorities who live outside the North and\nthe East. For instance the minorities who live in Colombo and in the Estates\nhave well organized political parties with representatives often joining the\ngovernment in coalitions. They may not need provincial councils and now nobody\nseem to want them. Few of the elected representatives from the North also have\njoined the government. In fact the coalition governments at the centre  that include the minorities proposed by\nconsociationalism as one of its main features have been operative to some\ndegree in most of the governments since independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Proportionality in government expenditure in the\nimportant areas like employment, education, infra structure, culture etc. would\nbe another aspect the constitution committee \ncould look at and devise means of giving constitutional guarantee for\nsuch expenditure. Political power sharing at cabinet level proportional to\npopulation ratios of the minorities utilizing those elected to parliament could\nalso be considered and this arrangement could also be given constitutional\nguarantee. The degree of power sharing in the areas of politics and economy as\nproposed here would be more meaningful to everybody than provincial councils.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

N.A.de S. Amaratunga \n<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

N.A.de S. Amaratunga\u00a0 As discussions on drafting a new constitution gathers momentum the ethnic problem may assume significant importance as it has been an intractable issue in the politics of Sri Lanka. Some political scientists believe that ethnic based conflicts could be resolved by power sharing methods that strengthen democracy (Hartzell CA, 2015) while others […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[127],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-107476","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-n-a-de-s-amaratunga"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/107476","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=107476"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/107476\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=107476"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=107476"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=107476"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}