{"id":150854,"date":"2025-07-21T16:31:40","date_gmt":"2025-07-21T23:31:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=150854"},"modified":"2025-07-21T16:31:40","modified_gmt":"2025-07-21T23:31:40","slug":"the-turning-point-by-wasantha-karannagoda-pt-3c","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2025\/07\/21\/the-turning-point-by-wasantha-karannagoda-pt-3c\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cTHE TURNING POINT\u201d BY WASANTHA KARANNAGODA\u00a0\u00a0 PT 3C"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00a0KAMALIKA PIERIS<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n

LTTE \u00a0established small\u00a0 Sea Tiger bases the north- eastern\u00a0 and north- western coasts \u00a0in lagoons opening to the sea. They were approx. 10-15 km apart along the coast. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>In 1994\u00a0 LTTE went into the Vanni, it was pushed out of Jaffna. In Vanni, they freely used all the lagoons that opened to the sea.[1]<\/a> <\/strong>\u00a0\u00a0Over\u00a0 8 Sea Tiger camps were set up\u00a0 in the Vanni. LTTE \u00a0<\/strong>attack boats and suicide boats were hidden in the jungle adjoining.\u00a0 LTTE had found a \u00a0\u00a0way to launch and pull back the boats, using \u00a0the bull dozers and tractors kept in \u00a0each base .[2]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

LTTE \u00a0\u00a0engaged in asymmetric warfare with suicide boats and wolf pack type attacks on the navy. .this is well known. LTTE did not invent asymmetric warfare. It was\u00a0 there before. Asymmetric tactics at sea consisted of \u00a0small, fast moving, elusive, \u00a0hard hitting teams , engaging in surprise attacks,[3]<\/a> using\u00a0 a\u00a0\u00a0 superior knowledge of the\u00a0 territory.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

LTTE \u00a0also introduced\u00a0 suicide divers,\u00a0 \u00a0suicide boats, \u00a0\u00a0and semi-submerged submarines.[5]<\/a> .Suicide boats were used successfully against the slow speed naval craft such as landing craft and merchant vessels. <\/strong>[6]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0Suicide divers attacked two surveillance vessels,\u00a0 Abhita and Edithera\u00a0 at KKS harbor in 1990.[7]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0LTTE used suicide divers effectively until the last stages of the war.[8]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0Navy lost a FAC with its entire crew off Mullaitivu on January 2009. That was the last suicide attack.[9]<\/a> \u00a0LTTE also had\u00a0 moored mines and limpet mines. Mines were used successfully on two occasions, destroying two logistic vessels in KKS and Trincomalee <\/strong>[10]<\/a> <\/strong>\u00a0.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Four months after the Ceasefire Agreement  was signed in 2002, LTTE found that the sea was not included in  the hurriedly prepared Ceasefire Agreement.  LTTE  decided to rectify this omission and  get their Sea Tiger camps legitimized.[11]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

LTTE  asked the government to transfer LTTE cadres training at Vakarai, from Vakarai to Mullaitivu  and  back  by sea.  LTTE cadres were to be taken past the  Trincomalee harbour on both journeys.  Karannagoda found this a strange request.LTTE had been transferring their cadres by land between LTTE and government controlled land, why seek a sea route. When the Navy objected defense ministry overruled it. LTTE obtained approval for the sea transfer from the government. [12]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first movement took place in August 2002. Then after a few more trips, LTTE wanted the sea convoy to stop at Verugal aru, 15 miles from Trincomalee harbor and pick up   LTTE from there.  This was also approved , despite objections of the navy . Then LTTE got permission to pick up two LTTE from a location very close to Trincomalee harbor, Illankanthei. Navy objected but government agreed.  Illankathei was  next to Sampur village. LTTE was trying to  establish their presence on the southern side of the Trincomalee harbor.[13]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Before 2002, the LTTE camp closest to Trincomalee was the camp at Nayaru. It was not possible to  attack Trincomalee from Nayaru as naval patrols and shore based radar  were in operation between Nayaru and Trincomalee  . LTTE  therefore  needed camps closer to Trincomalee harbour. [14]<\/a>  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Karannagoda  found  in 2003 that   the LTTE had  established new  camps surrounding  the Trincomalee harbour,  using the Ceasefire Agreement . LTTE already had a camp close to Morawewa.  They were  now converting this  into a  permanent camp, taking building materials   secretly through the jungle.[15]<\/a>  Morawewa was 25 mins drive  from Trincomalee. <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

LTTE  had  started a program to settle Mahaveer families\u201d   in     colonies planted  in Trincomalee near the harbour. Mahaveer families\u201d  were families of LTTE cadres killed in action. The houses were built by  the NGO known as Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). There were 50-100 houses in   each  colony. [16]<\/a>These colonies  encircled Trincomalee harbour and Trincomalee town  and LTTE could use them to mount an attack on the  military bases   near the harbour.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Karannagoda found that LTTE  had also got into the restricted area of the Naval  headworks Sanctuary, which faced Tambalagam Bay. Three fourths of Naval Headworks Sanctuary    is covered in thick jungle and preserved as a sanctuary while only one fourth is used for naval purposes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 In  January 2003 Karannagoda as Area Commander  visited the jungle area.  Access  was thorugh  a gravel road,   off the Trincomalee Colombo road,  1 km before Tambalagamuwa town, where the majority  are Tamil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

500 km onwards, he found that  thousands of cattle were grazing freely and 27 huts had come up with men in each hut. I had never before seen cattle and huts within  the Naval Sanctuary, said Karannagoda . He was told these  cattle belonged to the  villagers of Tambalagamuwa.  They has  arriving  in  increasing numbers after the Ceasefire Agreement was signed. Karannagoda  found that  the  LTTE was occupying 2 of the 27  huts and from these, they  were monitoring all the naval movements  in the    Naval Headworks.[18]<\/a> If the LTTE had free access to the  sanctuary they could  disrupt the water supply  to all the military camps in the Trincomalee area.  They could poison the water supply too.[19]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Karannagoda ordered the cattle  be removed, also the huts.[20]<\/a> This was a restricted area. He ordered the withdrawal of over 1000 cattle from the  Naval reservation and from 18,000 hectares of jungle in Tambalagamuwa.[21]<\/a> He  sent additional troops to Headworks camp,  together with  platoons of the elite Special  Boat squadron (SBS)  with instruction to cover the entire jungle. He also instructed not to allow LTTE to enter naval sanctuary and to use force if necessary[22]<\/a> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UNP and the Tamil Separatist Movement were angry with Karannagoda for  this. TNA MP Sampanthan rang Karannagoda and said that his order went against the Ceasefire Agreement . The sanctuary area was a traditional grazing area for cattle,  you have no right to give such order. The practice  must continue and the huts  must remain.  Karannagoda refused and Sampanthan said he would complain to the Prez.  Sampanthan reported Karannagoda to President  Chandirka Kumaratunga.[23]<\/a>  President  supported Karannagoda. [24]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then SLMM rang. You have stopped the movement of the LTTE on Naval Sanctuary in Tambalagamuwa area.  LTTE might retaliate. They might plant landmines, attack naval vehicles on the road, said SLMM. Then we will retaliate replied Karannagoda. That ended the matter.[25]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0In\u00a0 2000 LTTE had attacked\u00a0 two fast passenger carrier inside the\u00a0 Trincomalee arbour evne without h aving camps on the\u00a0 south side. By 2006 it was different, LTTE had establish several sea tiger camps and ships and craft in Trincomalee harbor\u00a0 were vulnerable. <\/strong>[26]<\/strong><\/a> .<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

LTTE had\u00a0 established\u00a0 camps\u00a0\u00a0 at Koddiyar bay. LTTE has establish several small sea tiger coams in the estuary of Mahaweli river\u00a0 as it entered Koddiyar Bay, approx. 500 to 1000 upstream. The camps were completely concealed by the thick vegetation, they could <\/strong>not be detected\u00a0 even from the air.[27]<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong>LTTE had also\u00a0 set up 13 new camps\u00a0 including\u00a0 five\u00a0 Sea Tiger camps in Sampur\u00a0 directly facing the Naval headquarters across Koddiyar Bay. This\u00a0 was a meticulously planned campaign. [28]<\/a>These Sampur camps were a serous threat to the navy and Karannagoda was\u00a0 very concerned about them. As he expected, in August 2006 LTTE attacked the Naval dockyard, Air force camp in China Bay\u00a0 and the airfield using\u00a0 artillery from\u00a0 Sampur.[29]<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong>The fishing villages\u00a0 facing Koddiyar\u00a0 bay,\u00a0 in the Sampur area were all Tamil except for Mutur, which was Muslim.\u00a0 Karannagoda wanted a navy camp at Mutur\u00a0 but under the Ceasefire Agreement They needed\u00a0 permission from the Peace secretariat .Therefore\u00a0 Karannagoda tried to persuade the Muslim villagers to ask for a navy camp there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong>However, LTTE attacked Mutur and set fire to shops in March 2003, Minster Hakeen went on a hunger strike and\u00a0 demanded a naval detachment at Mutur .On the instructions of Defense Minister , Karannagoda promptly\u00a0 established a naval detachment near Mutur pier. Marapana also suggested, later on,\u00a0 in conversation, send more troops and when the order to\u00a0 withdraw troops comes, withdraw the excess lot, keep the rest\u201d.<\/strong>[30]<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong>\u00a0Karannagoda \u00a0\u00a0was deeply concerned about the LTTE camps at Sampur. He\u00a0 \u00a0informed Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe , Minster for Defense, Tilak Marapana and Permanent Secretary, Defense, Austin Fernando about this Samur build upon three separate occasions , but they did not take it seriously.\u201d<\/strong>[31]<\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong> In April 2003 Prime Minister\u00a0\u00a0 had visited Trincomalee . Karannagoda told him of the new sea tiger camps in Sampur. They were a serious\u00a0 threat.\u00a0 Intelligence\u00a0 said that\u00a0 under cover of Ceasefire Agreement LTTE was training large number of new cadres.\u00a0 Already they had trained over 10,000 cadres. Prime Minister said Cant be, how to train so many in such a short time.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0 Karannagoda said that\u00a0 LTTE\u00a0 only\u00a0 trained recruits in the handling of weapons, not seamanship. Prime Minister then changed the subject.[32]<\/a>\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Defense Minister ,the three service commanders and the\u00a0 IGP came to Trincomalee to discuss security\u00a0 in July 2033.. The\u00a0 army and navy made two power point presentations which tallied on the subject of Sampur. Both showed a total of 18 camps of which 13 were new camps.[33]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 Karannagoda\u00a0 had a map which showed the LTTE camps, both \u00a0new ones and old.\u00a0 This map is given in the book.[34]<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\u00a0 September 2003\u00a0 Mahinda Rajapaksa, then Leader of Opposition came to Trincomalee to obtain first hand information on the\u00a0 security situation. Karannagoda\u00a0 made a presentation to him as well.<\/strong>[35]<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In August 2003 Karannagoda was asked to make a presentation to the President of Sri Lanka . regarding Sampur\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Lakshman Kadirgamar\u00a0 came instead of President. He accepted\u00a0 what Karannagoda said. [36]<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Karannagoda then found that the UNP government was very angry with him for making a presentation to the\u00a0 President.\u00a0 Austin Fernando rang, did you meet the President, he asked.. They also wanted to see Karannagoda\u2019s presentation. So he \u00a0showed it. They queried , \u00a0how did they get this information,\u00a0 they asked, when no\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 one was allowed near the LTTE camps . From people living nearby, came the reply. How did you know the exact position of the LTTE new camps. By listening to their\u00a0 radio communications.<\/strong>[37]<\/strong><\/a>\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In September 2003 \u00a0Karannagoda was informed that \u00a0the\u00a0\u00a0 Commander of the 22 Division of the army based in Trincomalee had said, in an ITN broadcast, that there were no new LTTE camps in Trincomalee, the\u00a0 Karannagoda report was false. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Karannagoda\u00a0 then produced\u00a0 the presentation made in July 2003 \u00a0\u00a0by\u00a0 \u00a0the earlier divisional commander of the 22nd Division, \u00a0Brigadier John Senaweera of the army,\u00a0 which showed\u00a0 13 new LTTE camps.[38]<\/a>\u00a0 Karannagoda later learnt that the new Divisional Commander 22nd<\/sup> Division had given a false statement because\u00a0 a very senior official in the Defense Ministry had asked him to do so. <\/strong>[39]<\/strong><\/a> .<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Karannagoda\u00a0 stated that he had informed the authorities on five occasions about the threat\u00a0 from Sampur. The information he supplied was accurate. He had\u00a0 set up three separate boards to report on the matter. He also had\u00a0 information from his\u00a0 operations staff and intelligence Department.[40]<\/strong><\/a> .<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I brought the threat posed by Sampur to\u00a0 the notice of Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Defense secretary on five occasions in January, April and July 2003, \u00a0\u00a0said Karannagoda in the book. They took no notice.\u00a0 When the President\u00a0 took up the matter, these three suddenly got worked up and started slinging mud at me on ITN, \u00a0a government owned TV channel.\u00a0 [41]<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three \u00a0ITN broadcasts \u00a0were made on \u00a0three successive Fridays ,5,12 and 19 September attacking Karannagoda regarding Sampur. Karannagoda\u00a0 sued ITN for 150 million, and after\u00a0 two years won the case. This event is described in detail in the book. <\/strong>[42]<\/strong><\/a> \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Army Commander was also an obstacle where Sampur was concerned. Whenever he was asked to clear Sampur of the LTTE , Army Commander made excuses. The troops were insufficient and Army \u00a0was not ready\u00a0 for a war with LTTE \u00a0.Army Commander was angry with Karannagoda. Karannagoda had \u00a0opposed \u00a0the\u00a0 Army Commander\u2019s \u00a0attempts to control the navy.[43]<\/a> \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Karannagoda had made repeated requests to the Security Council to clear LTTE from the Sampur area, as a \u00a0priority[44]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0After the attack on Jetliner in August 2006 it \u00a0became \u00a0urgently necessary to clear Sampur[45]<\/a> \u00a0. \u00a0I silently cursed the Army Commander for not clearing the Sampur area giving silly excuses, despite my repeated requests , said Karannagoda in his book.<\/strong>[46]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

When Mahinda Rajapaksa became President, in 2005, Karannagoda\u00a0 spoke to him and he ordered Army \u00a0Commander to clear the Sampur area on priority basis, ignoring his excuses. Army Commander said that his army\u00a0 did not have the troops to hold the ground after clearing. Navy said they would do that. So Army Commander had not further excuses. He had to clear Sampur.[47]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

He had earlier said that\u00a0 he needed to deploy around 2000 troops for the purpose, but\u00a0 used a much smaller\u00a0 number of troops for the job. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0When the \u00a0navy moved in, they found that LTTE had only \u00a0had 300-400 cadres there.[48]<\/a> \u00a0Once Sampur was cleared ,navy established four camps\u00a0 with over 1000 trained sailors. This removed the biggest threat to Trincomalee harbor \u00a0\u00a0and \u00a0was a\u00a0 huge relief to the \u00a0navy.[49]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0( continued)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 21<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 138<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> https:\/\/www.spsnavalforces.com\/story\/?id=163.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> https:\/\/www.spsnavalforces.com\/story\/?id=163.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 127<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 136<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 135<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 135<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 135<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 136<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 42<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 41<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 41,42<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 23.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 15.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 19.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[17]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 43.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[18]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 18.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[19]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 26.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[20]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 26.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[21]<\/a> Rohan Gunaratne .foreword to The Turning point p xvii-xvii<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[22]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 27,28.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[23]<\/a> Rohan Gunaratne .foreword to The Turning point p xvii<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[24]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 25,26.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[25]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 27.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[26]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 252.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[27]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 23, 52<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[28]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 19, 22.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[29]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 56<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[30]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 51-55<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[31]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 76<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[32]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 57<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[33]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 76<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[34]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 79<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[35]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 87<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[36]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 77,79<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[37]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 82,83<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[38]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 89<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[39]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 91<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[40]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 84<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[41]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 84<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[42]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 85<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[43]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 252<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[44]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 252<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[45]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 253<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[46]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 261<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[47]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 265<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[48]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 265<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[49]<\/a> Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 266<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00a0KAMALIKA PIERIS LTTE \u00a0established small\u00a0 Sea Tiger bases the north- eastern\u00a0 and north- western coasts \u00a0in lagoons opening to the sea. They were approx. 10-15 km apart along the coast. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In 1994\u00a0 LTTE went into the Vanni, it was pushed out of Jaffna. In Vanni, they freely used all the lagoons that opened to the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[104],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-150854","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-kamalika-pieris"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/150854","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=150854"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/150854\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=150854"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=150854"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=150854"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}