{"id":150880,"date":"2025-07-22T13:26:20","date_gmt":"2025-07-22T20:26:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=150880"},"modified":"2025-07-22T13:28:15","modified_gmt":"2025-07-22T20:28:15","slug":"the-turning-point-by-wasantha-karannagoda-part-5","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2025\/07\/22\/the-turning-point-by-wasantha-karannagoda-part-5\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cTHE TURNING POINT\u201d BY WASANTHA KARANNAGODA\u00a0\u00a0 PART 5"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00a0KAMALIKA PIERIS<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n

Karannagoda\u00a0 \u00a0in his book The turning\u00a0 point \u2018 provides us with a detailed account of the arms procurement method of the LTTE . Navy intelligence knew about these movements, but lacked the strength to stop them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Initially, most of the explosives and weapons LTTE used were obtained from Tamilnadu and also from the government of India. The items obtained from the international market were\u00a0 unloaded on their boats off the Tamilnadu coast and came in, mingling with the fishing boats. From there, the cargo came to Sri Lanka across Palk Strait wit dinghies fitted with multiple outboard motors\u00a0 for greater speed.<\/strong>[1]<\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

i<\/strong>n the 1990s LTTE \u00a0used the \u00a0direct sea route \u00a0to smuggle arms to the \u00a0northeast and northwest coasts. The area between Point Pedro and north of Trincomalee had the largest number of LTTE sea tiger bases along the coast. Merchant vessels carrying LTTE cargo approached the Sri Lanka \u00a0waters up to about 20 km from north east coastline and unloaded cargo unhindered. at the time, \u00a0Navy did not have\u00a0\u00a0 enough craft to stop them and LTTE was able to bring its goods in without any difficulty.[2]<\/a> \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the increase in navy\u00a0 patrols, LTTE change its tactics. In\u00a0\u00a0 2000 LTTE\u00a0 transferred its\u00a0\u00a0 goods stuff in small quantities onto different types of boats in mid sea from their large ships acting as floating warehouses ,and brought them ashore to LTTE controlled areas on the northeast coast. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The floating warehouse remained on high seas and approached Sri Lanka \u00a0up to 150-200 km from the coast. The transfer took place there.. LTTE radars installed at strategic locations in northeast and northwest coastlines monitored the present or absence of navy craft and communicated the info to the incoming arms carriers which then decided on which route to take.[3]<\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One method they adopted was to use\u00a0 large high speed fiberglass boats fitted with multiple outboard motors of 150-200 HP to carry the cargo ashore. Once the transfer was done they made a \u00a0\u00a0dash for the coast. <\/strong>[4]<\/a>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second method was for the ship acting as a floating warehouse to tow a large boat approx. 20 m in length, loaded with items\u00a0 up to 100 km from land, and release it to proceed on its own.\u00a0 Navy Intelligence showed that such large\u00a0 boats took off\u00a0 from remote areas in Indonesia where the LTTE arms procurement network was active . \u00a0These boats came out of the Indonesian coastline up to 150 km to meet the warehouse ship. that took them in tow.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third method was to transfer\u00a0 the goods onto multi day fishing trawlers from the floating warehouses and\u00a0\u00a0 bring them ashore. These trawlers had Sinhalese names painted on the bow of the boat. With that they could mingle with the\u00a0 regular fishing clusters. About 95 % of the multi day trawlers were owned by the Sinhala, who, I am sure could have detected the rogue boats. [6]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong>After the transfer the LTTE floating warehouse ship would move away from Sri Lanka waters to\u00a0 the high seas, and stay there in an area close to Indonesia, until the next transfer was to take place. The operating base for LTTE was Indonesia close to Jakarta. [7]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong>LTTE had obtained its weapons \u00a0and ammunition\u00a0\u00a0 from different countries\u00a0 illegally through their international arms procurement network. LTTE had a cell in Indonesia that provided war material including HP outboard motors and large fiberglass boats.[8]<\/a> \u00a0The items were stored on the high seas in merchant vessels belonging \u00a0to them that acted as floating warehouses.\u00a0 This was a very judicious move of the LTTE\u00a0 as the high seas were\u00a0 common to all.[9]<\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I, Kamalika Pieris would observe at this point that it is highly questionable whether an uneducated, non-English speaking local\u00a0 group, based \u00a0exclusively in Jaffna could have accomplished all this. Clearly the LTTE was merely the local front for a war directed by and\u00a0 supported from abroad. The boats they used, such as Indumathi, were built \u00a0\u00a0abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The book gives the inside story of how the SLMM \u00a0( Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) helped the LTTE\u00a0 floating warehouses. One of the condition in the Ceasefire Agreement was that whenever the navy conducted an operation against the LTTE , a member of the SLMM must be present\u00a0 in its vessel. Later navy was instructed to carry a SLMM member on board when they went on special operations as well. The SLMM representatives\u00a0\u00a0 carried\u00a0 satellite phones\u00a0 when they\u00a0 travelled in a navy vessel. [10]<\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0<\/strong>We adopted tactics to prevent SLMM\u00a0 joining us, said Karannagoda . We \u00a0gave them very short notice,\u00a0 ensuring they missed the craft, \u00a0we cancelled the sailing after they got on board citing engine problems, we \u00a0took them out to sea when the sea was rough and kepi \u00a0them at sea for many days, grealty exhausting\u00a0 them. This had\u00a0 the desired \u00a0effect. SLMM started to avoid sailing with us.[11]<\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I<\/strong>n June 2003 Director, Military Intelligence\u00a0 Kapila Hendavitarana\u00a0\u00a0 contacted Karannagoda about another LTTE ship movement . it gave details of the ship expected to come into position 180 nautical miles northeast of Trincomalee harbor. Ship was towing a smaller craft.[12]<\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then came a message from Navy HQ that if a suspicious ship was identified as an LTTE ship then SLMM was ot be informed immediately. Someone at Naval HQ, \u00a0it had to be a very senior person, had informed Defence Ministry\u00a0 This was. same person as before,\u00a0 purpose again to prevent Karannagoda from getting credit if the operation succeeded.[13]<\/a> \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nandimithra had spoken to the ship .\u00a0 They have given bogus details, it\u00a0 is not registered in any country, \u00a0it has no flag and does not belong to any company. When ordered to stop, it continued to move away from the navy reported Nandimitra.[14]<\/a> .<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Navy Commander was out of the country and he had\u00a0 given instructions\u00a0 to area commanders to use their discretion. Karannagoda decided to\u00a0 destroy the ship. The navy was very enthusiastic about the operation.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

When the order to\u00a0 fire was given, \u00a0\u00a0<\/em>\u00a0I could see faces light up with satisfaction recalled Karannagoda ,[15]<\/a> but \u00a0a power failure occurred at Nandimithra. it could not fire and the ship moved away. The ship was\u00a0 sunk but the\u00a0 smaller craft\u00a0\u00a0 detached and escaped. A Board of Inquiry was held against the commanding officer of Nandimithra. .<\/strong>[16]<\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0Defence secretary Austin Fernando rang. .\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 LTTE at Kilinochchi had complained.Have\u00a0 you captured a LTTE ship. This will hurt the peace talks. Who permitted you to do this.[17]<\/a> \u00a0This is a serious matter. You will face the consequences [18]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0Then Defence Minister rang.\u00a0 He was\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 also not in a good mood.\u00a0 Was there an SLMM on board, he asked. Only one of the four were available and by the time he came, it \u00a0was late, the\u00a0 craft had sailed. We sent \u00a0him in another boat \u00a0but that boat could not catch up with the other craft.[19]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The next day, June 15. 2003, Karannagoda \u00a0was told that Defence Secretary had issued\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0instruction to allow the SLMM to inspect all the craft that took part in the operation and question the commanding officers and officers in charge.[20]<\/a> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

SLMM turned up the next day and wanted to inspect the location where the ship sank.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 They were sent\u00a0 on Shakthi, given an uncomfortable journey on a very rough sea. The skipper was instructed to steer a course that would exhaust SLMM, and they returned quickly. [21]<\/a> \u00a0After this incident, Defence ministry imposed further restrictions on the navy. It was made mandatory to take SLMM even on special operations.[22]<\/a> \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fishing trawler Tharindu had informed Fisheries Corporation\u00a0 signal office in Galle on 16\u00a0 Oct 2003\u00a0 that there was a suspicious ship off the east of Trincomalee harbor.[23]<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0Karannagoda took action, The FACs\u00a0 at that position were \u00a0alerted and in addition navy\u00a0 vessels \u00a0Edithara and Ranadhera and \u00a0\u00a0the\u00a0 FGB Prathapa \u00a0were\u00a0\u00a0 directed there. Sri Lanka Air force also sent a plane to report on the ship. <\/strong>[24]<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

SLMM representative had come \u00a0in Prathapa.\u00a0 SLMM had\u00a0 informed \u00a0its head office\u00a0 who then checked with LTTE\u00a0\u00a0 at Kilinochchi whether any of their ships were in the area. When they sited the ship, SLMM had called head office in Colombo and informed of the detection of this ship.\u00a0 The ship\u00a0 left the area.\u00a0 The time it left tallied with SLMM phone call. <\/strong>[25]<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Karannagoda reported the incident and Defence Minister, Defence Secretary, and Navy Commander came to inquire into Karannagoda\u2019s actions. \u00a0They questioned Prathapa commanding officer,\u00a0\u00a0 other officers and Karannagoda . They appeared suspicious of Karannagoda\u2019s report. The matter ended when in Nov 2003 President \u00a0Chandrika\u00a0 took over the Defence Ministry and deported the Country head of SLMM, Major Telifsen .[26]<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2006, the Joint operations Command\u00a0\u00a0 was sending reports to the three service\u00a0 HQ with details of the number and type of artillery and mortar rounds the LTTE\u00a0 had fired the previous day.\u00a0 Karannagoda looked at this data and saw that the \u00a0LTTE was always well supplied with weapons and ammunition regardless of how many LTTE \u00a0boats were destroyed. This \u00a0meant that they had a regular supply of \u00a0weapons from outside. This had to be stopped if the war was to be won.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The book \u00a0describes in great detail the role of the navy in destroying LTTE floating warehouses \u00a0Operation Sagara Balaya\u00a0 is\u00a0\u00a0 described at length in the book. The event was well publicized at the time, but the media did not provide the full story. This book does.\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Karannagoda\u00a0 was sure that\u00a0\u00a0 if he had good intelligence and good weapons, four vessels that could sail far, with another vessel to provide logistics support, the task could be accomplished. \u00a0Karannagoda\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 spoke to the\u00a0 Defence advisor\u00a0 in the US embassy in Colombo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He told him that  the LTTE warehouses also posed a threat to US as they may be selling arms to organization like Al Qaeda. If US could provide satellite pictures,  Sri Lanka navy could  neutralize the ships. The US embassy spoke to US Pacific Command and the  US Pacific Command provided  locations to the LTTE  ships.[27]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The public \u00a0wondered why the USA\u00a0 suddenly provided information against the LTTE .This book explains .<\/strong>Karannagoda\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 had earlier\u00a0 established a relationship with\u00a0 Admiral R Willard, Commander US Pacific Command.[28]<\/a>\u00a0 This fact is not well known. It would have been crucial to obtaining the location information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The navy had only five vessels that could sail long distances. They were\u00a0 missile boats Nandimithra,\u00a0 Suranimila, landing ship, Shakthi, ex-coast guard cutter Samudra and\u00a0 \u00a0the \u00a0offshore patrol vessel, Sayura. . Two other old vessels were modified to act as logistics ships.[29]<\/a> Sayura was the\u00a0 youngest at 19 years, the others were more than 30\u00a0 years old <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Operation Sagara Balaya was carried out using \u00a0these aged ships. The ships set off\u00a0 on their historic mission, from\u00a0 Trincomalee, Kankesanturai, Galle and Colombo harbors at different times on different days, at auspicious times provided by an astrologer.[30]<\/a> The astrologers\u00a0 calculations\u00a0 were sound. The last four LTTE\u00a0 warehouse ships were\u00a0\u00a0 destroyed in September and October\u00a0 2007 very neatly and\u00a0 efficiently by these ships .LTTE no longer had a \u00a0supply of \u00a0heavy weapons.[<\/a>31]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 ( CONCLUDED.)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 127<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 284<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 284<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 284<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 285<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 285<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 286<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 249<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 286<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 63<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 63<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 62<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 65<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 68<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 69<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 69<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[17]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 69<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[18]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 70<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[19]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 71<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[20]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 72<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[21]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 73<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[22]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 74<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[23]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 94<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[24]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 94<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[25]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 95,96<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[26]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 97<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[27]<\/a> Karannagoda turning point p 304.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[28]<\/a> Rohan Gunaratne .foreward to The Turning point pxix<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[29]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning pointP 288-289<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[30]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 299<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[31]<\/a> Karannagoda The turning point p 172,173<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00a0KAMALIKA PIERIS Karannagoda\u00a0 \u00a0in his book The turning\u00a0 point \u2018 provides us with a detailed account of the arms procurement method of the LTTE . Navy intelligence knew about these movements, but lacked the strength to stop them. \u00a0Initially, most of the explosives and weapons LTTE used were obtained from Tamilnadu and also from the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[104],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-150880","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-kamalika-pieris"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/150880","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=150880"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/150880\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=150880"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=150880"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=150880"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}