{"id":151290,"date":"2025-08-09T15:40:03","date_gmt":"2025-08-09T22:40:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=151290"},"modified":"2025-08-09T15:40:03","modified_gmt":"2025-08-09T22:40:03","slug":"the-truth-about-hambantota-port-debunking-the-china-debt-trap-narrative","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2025\/08\/09\/the-truth-about-hambantota-port-debunking-the-china-debt-trap-narrative\/","title":{"rendered":"The Truth about Hambantota Port: Debunking the China \u2018Debt Trap\u2019 Narrative"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2><span style=\"color: #0000ff;\"><em><strong>Shenali D Waduge<\/strong><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n<p>Hambantota Port has been wrongly portrayed as a symbol of China\u2019s debt trap diplomacy.\u201d In truth, it was a strategic infrastructure investment, misrepresented by local and foreign actors with geopolitical agendas. Here are the facts.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Hambantota Port: A Factual Q&amp;A<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Historical Maritime Significance<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The name&nbsp;<strong>Hambantota\u201d<\/strong>&nbsp;is believed to derive from&nbsp;<strong>Sampan-thota,\u201d<\/strong>&nbsp;meaning port of&nbsp;<em>sampans<\/em>\u2014for small trading boats historically used by&nbsp;<strong>Chinese and Southeast Asian<\/strong>&nbsp;maritime traders.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The area has been a&nbsp;<strong>long-standing maritime hub<\/strong>, with active trade links predating European colonial rule and extending across the Indian Ocean trade routes.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Origins of the Project<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Hambantota was a long-held dream of the southern region.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The project was&nbsp;championed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa&nbsp;and formally initiated in&nbsp;2007, aligning with his broader vision for national infrastructure development.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;India was offered the project first in 2005 but declined.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>What is the strategic value of Hambantota Port?<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Located just 10 nautical miles from a major east-west shipping lane traversed by over 31,000 ships annually.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Designed to complement Colombo Port, focusing on:<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Roll-on\/Roll-off (Ro-Ro) vehicle transshipment.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bunkering and energy services.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bulk and break-bulk cargo.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Why was it initially called a failure?<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Funded by China\u2019s Exim Bank (around 6.3%)&nbsp;<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Lack of a commercial business strategy.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The broader &#8220;troika&#8221; vision of integrating port, airport, and industrial zone remained unrealized.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Was the lease to China a debt trap?<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>No.&nbsp;<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The lease was not a debt-for-equity swap but a commercial lease agreement. It was initiated by the Sri Lankan government\u2014not China\u2014as a way to raise $1.12 billion in cash to service other debts.&nbsp;<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The port remains under Sri Lankan sovereignty, with the Navy in charge of security. China\u2019s role is purely commercial, conducted through China Merchants Port Holdings<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Key facts debunk the myth:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The lease was proposed by Sri Lanka\u2014not China.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Lease yielded $1.12 billion in cash, used to bolster foreign reserves and pay other international debt.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The deal was not a debt-for-equity swap.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Sri Lanka retains full sovereignty; the Sri Lanka Navy maintains control of port security<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is a commercial port only.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>What are the port&#8217;s achievements post-lease?<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Under China Merchants Port Holdings (CMPort), Hambantota has:<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Specialized in Ro-Ro, bulk cargo, and bunkering.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Attracted industrial investment, reviving the &#8220;troika&#8221; model.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Achieved operational profitability.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Created thousands of jobs locally.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Hambantota Port \u2013 Key Operational Statistics (2023\u2013early 2024)<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>1. Vehicle Transshipment (Roll-on\/Roll-off or Ro-Ro)<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>2023 Total Vehicles Handled<\/strong><strong>:&nbsp;<\/strong>Over&nbsp;<strong>730,000 units<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Hambantota ranked among the<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>top 10 vehicle transshipment hubs in Asia<\/strong><strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Major clients:<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>Kia, Hyundai, Toyota, Tata, Mahindra, Nissan<\/strong><strong>,&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>Volkswagen<\/strong><strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>2. Container Throughput (TEUs)<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Though still growing, Hambantota handled&nbsp;<strong>over 150,000 TEUs<\/strong>&nbsp;in 2023 (a 35% year-on-year increase).<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Projected to cross&nbsp;<strong>300,000 TEUs by end-2025<\/strong>&nbsp;with new capacity investments.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>3. Bulk Cargo<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Growth in&nbsp;imports &amp; transshipment of&nbsp;<strong>cement, fertilizer, clinker<\/strong>, and&nbsp;<strong>petroleum<\/strong>&nbsp;products.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Handles LPG, dry bulk (coal, clinker), and liquid cargo.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>4. Infrastructure<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>11 berths<\/strong>, including:<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Ro-Ro terminals<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;General cargo terminals<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Liquid bulk terminals<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Managed by&nbsp;<strong>Hambantota International Port Group (HIPG)<\/strong>, a joint venture between&nbsp;<strong>China Merchants Port (85%)<\/strong>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<strong>Sri Lanka Ports Authority (15%)<\/strong>.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Hambantota Port Income: Hypothetical vs Actual Performance<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>1.<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>Hypothetical Earnings Without Leasing (Sri Lanka runs port alone):<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Assumption:<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>Sri Lanka retained full control and funded development through loans or state funds.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Reality:<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>Before leasing, the port saw extremely low traffic:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Less than<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>200 ships per year<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>compared to 5,000+ at Colombo Port.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Annual revenue was under $1 million, while annual operating losses reportedly reached&nbsp;$10\u201312 million&nbsp;due to low throughput and debt-servicing costs.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Throughput averaged less than 200 ships per year\u2014minuscule compared to over 5,000 at Colombo Port.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Challenges:<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>Sri Lanka lacked:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Expertise in port marketing and global shipping networks.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Ability to drive transshipment traffic independently.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Capital to modernize the port for commercial viability.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>2.<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>Current Model (Post-China Lease to CMPort):<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Lease Deal (2017):<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>$1.12 billion paid to Sri Lanka (used to settle urgent foreign debt).<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Operator:<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>China Merchants Port (85% stake), SLPA (15%).<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Progress:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Over<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>2,000 ships per year<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>as of recent data.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Expansion into logistics, energy, and industrial zones underway.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Long-term projected hub for Indian Ocean transshipment and energy.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Sri Lanka\u2019s Revenue:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>SLPA receives a<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>share of port-related income<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>(undisclosed in public domain), plus<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>employment and tax benefits<\/strong><strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>o&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Also retained<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>sovereignty and security control<\/strong><strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Had Sri Lanka retained full control, Hambantota would likely have remained a white elephant&nbsp;<strong><em>\u2014draining national finances with minimal return.<\/em><\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The China lease enabled:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Capital infusion<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Operational efficiency<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Growth in cargo volumes<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Strategic use of a once-idle asset<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Thus, if Sri Lanka had held onto Hambantota without leasing it, the port would have remained a loss-making monument to debt. The lease arrangement brought in over $1 billion in urgently needed foreign exchange, but transformed a dormant facility into a growing logistics hub\u2014 something unlikely to have been achieved under Sri Lanka\u2019s fragmented political environment, where infrastructure projects often became politicized instead of being prioritized &#8211; and strategic infrastructure often falls victim to short-term politicking rather than long-term national planning.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Port Achievements (2020\u20132023): From White Elephant to South Asia\u2019s Maritime Powerhouse<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Strategic Location:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Positioned on the world\u2019s busiest East\u2013West maritime trade route.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Maritime Growth:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Over 2,000 ship arrivals in 2023 \u2014 a 30%+ increase from 2020.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Now the largest vehicle transshipment hub in South Asia, handling major global auto brands.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Local Economy:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Thousands of new jobs created in logistics, port services, and support industries.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Dedicated industrial zone now drawing increased FDI and regional trade interest.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Revenue Growth:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Port revenue surged&nbsp;81% from 2020 to 2023, marking a dramatic financial turnaround<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Sovereignty Maintained:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Sri Lankan Navy retains full security oversight.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>\u00b7<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;No military presence or strategic control ceded to any foreign power.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Sri Lanka&#8217;s Debt Reality<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Less than 10% of Sri Lanka\u2019s total external debt is owed to China.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Majority lies with Western bondholders and multilateral lenders like the IMF and World Bank.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Sri Lanka never defaulted on the Hambantota loan.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Who Spread the Debt Trap\u201d Narrative?<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Politicians:<\/strong>&nbsp;Harsha de Silva, Eran Wickramaratne, Ranil Wickremesinghe, Mangala Samaraweera, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sajith Premadasa, M. A. Sumanthiran.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Think Tanks &amp; Economists:<\/strong>&nbsp;Dr. Nishan de Mel (Verit\u00e9), Dr. Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asanga Abeyagoonasekera, Akhilan Kadiragamar,&nbsp;<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Media Figures &amp; NGOs:<\/strong>&nbsp;Feizal Samath, Roel Raymond, Jehan Perera (NPC), CPA, Groundviews, Hashtag Generation, Roar Media, YAMU, Tisaranee Gunasekera<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Online Influencers:<\/strong>&nbsp;SL Vlog, Patta History.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ironically, those criticizing the China deal were the ones who executed the lease in 2016\u20132017 under the Ranil-Mangala administration.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Who Pushes the Debt Trap Narrative and Why?<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Western think tanks (CSIS, Chatham House, Carnegie).<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Indian lobbies (ORF, SVIF).<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>\u00b7<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;Strategic players keen to keep Sri Lanka in their geopolitical orbit.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Comparative Silence on Indian Strategic Control<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While Hambantota draws disproportionate international scrutiny, India&#8217;s expanding footprint in Sri Lanka&#8217;s strategic infrastructure receives little to no public or diplomatic pushback:<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Trincomalee Oil Tank Farms<\/strong>: India controls 85 of 99 tanks.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Colombo Dockyard<\/strong>: Controlled by India&#8217;s defence ministry company -to build military ships in Sri Lanka.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Colombo West Container Terminal<\/strong>: 51% owned by Adani Group.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>SAGT (via John Keells):<\/strong>&nbsp;Lease may be extended with Indian partnership.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Renewable Energy Grid (North):<\/strong>&nbsp;Led by Adani; strategic implications for Sri Lanka\u2019s grid sovereignty.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>These deals rarely spark public debate-despite their implications for national sovereignty and regional neutrality.<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Troika Vision Realized:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Hambantota\u2019s potential lies in synergy:<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Integrating Port + Airport (Mattala) + Industrial Zone.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bypasses congested Colombo for direct access to global trade.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>3.<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;During COVID-19 pandemic, Mattala Airport played a key logistics role.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Think Strategically, not Emotionally<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The so-called debt trap\u201d narrative was never about protecting Sri Lanka. It was about limiting &amp; controlling Sri Lanka\u2019s choices and its partnerships.&nbsp;<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Hambantota Port lease was a sovereign decision. It has delivered returns. It is generating income and employment. It preserves national sovereignty.&nbsp;<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Instead of fearmongering, Sri Lanka must engage with all partners based on facts, mutual benefit, and strategic independence for national interests \u2014not emotion or outdated ideological loyalties or geopolitical appeasement.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Sri Lanka must judge partners by outcomes, not narratives or compromise &amp; appeasement.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Shenali D Waduge<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Shenali D Waduge Hambantota Port has been wrongly portrayed as a symbol of China\u2019s debt trap diplomacy.\u201d In truth, it was a strategic infrastructure investment, misrepresented by local and foreign actors with geopolitical agendas. Here are the facts. Hambantota Port: A Factual Q&amp;A Historical Maritime Significance \u00b7&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The name&nbsp;Hambantota\u201d&nbsp;is believed to derive from&nbsp;Sampan-thota,\u201d&nbsp;meaning port of&nbsp;sampans\u2014for small [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[47],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-151290","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-shenali-waduge"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/151290","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=151290"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/151290\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=151290"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=151290"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=151290"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}