{"id":154925,"date":"2026-02-26T16:32:10","date_gmt":"2026-02-26T23:32:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=154925"},"modified":"2026-02-26T16:32:10","modified_gmt":"2026-02-26T23:32:10","slug":"returning-to-easter-sunday-attacks-institutional-failure-not-intelligence-failure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2026\/02\/26\/returning-to-easter-sunday-attacks-institutional-failure-not-intelligence-failure\/","title":{"rendered":"Returning to Easter Sunday attacks: Institutional Failure, Not Intelligence Failure"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2><span style=\"color: #0000ff;\"><em>Shenali D Waduge<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.shenaliwaduge.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image_cedad6322d.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-6873\"\/><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n<p>On&nbsp;21\u202fApril\u202f2019, Sri Lanka was struck by coordinated suicide bombings targeting&nbsp;three churches&nbsp;and&nbsp;three luxury hotels, killing&nbsp;at least 270 people and injuring around 500. The attackers were linked to&nbsp;National Thowheed Jama\u2019ath (NTJ), an extremist group previously under the radar of Sri Lankan security services. Intelligence warnings of an imminent attack \u2014 including specific threats to churches and the&nbsp;Indian High Commission&nbsp;\u2014 were reportedly issued in the weeks before the incident but were not acted upon effectively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This systemic failure would become central to every major inquiry that followed \u2014 including the&nbsp;Parliamentary Select Committee Report (PSC, 2019)&nbsp;and the&nbsp;Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI, 2021)&nbsp;\u2014 and eventually the&nbsp;De\u202fAlwis Committee Report (2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The De\u202fAlwis Committee &amp; Its Mandate<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/srilankabrief.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/A-N-J-DE-ALWIS-report-.pdf\">https:\/\/srilankabrief.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/A-N-J-DE-ALWIS-report-.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.shenaliwaduge.com\/easter-sunday-attacks-justice-de-alwis-report-sept-2024\/\">https:\/\/www.shenaliwaduge.com\/easter-sunday-attacks-justice-de-alwis-report-sept-2024\/<\/a>&nbsp;(Committee Findings &amp; Recommendations)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In&nbsp;June\u202f2024, then President&nbsp;Ranil Wickremesinghe&nbsp;appointed a three\u2011member inquiry committee chaired by retired High Court Judge&nbsp;A.N.J.\u202fde\u202fAlwis. Its brief was narrower than earlier inquiries:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>To explore specific actions and measures taken by the State Intelligence Service (SIS), Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and other relevant authorities on prior information or intelligence relating to the impending attack on 21<\/em><em>\u202fApril<\/em><em>\u202f2019; and to assess the adequacy of those actions\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>(Direct from report text under&nbsp;<em>Chapter<\/em><em>\u202f2: Mandates of Inquiry<\/em>.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The committee received documents including the&nbsp;Final Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (31 January 2021)&nbsp;for reference and began hearing evidence on&nbsp;3 July 2024, concluding on&nbsp;2 September 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, the&nbsp;government did not officially publish the De\u202fAlwis Report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It was&nbsp;leaked publicly in October\u202f2024 by former MP Udaya\u202fGammanpila, who held a press briefing and released it because official channels withheld it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Reported Quotes &amp; Expanded Findings from the Leak<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Because the government never officially published the full text, journalists and researchers have relied on the leaked copy and excerpts cited in media.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Intelligence Dissemination by the Director, SIS (Nilantha Jayawardena)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>From report text:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Director, SIS\u00a0<em>received intelligence on\u00a04 April 2019from his Indian counterpart regarding attacks by members of NTJ, including threats against churches and the Indian High Commission.\u201d<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>He\u00a0<em>disseminated the WhatsApp message and a written report to the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, SDIG\u2011CID, CNI and IGP.\u201d (the names of those who held these positions are given below)<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><td>Abbreviation \/ Role<\/td><td>Person at the Time<\/td><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Secretary, Ministry of Defence<\/td><td>P. B. Jayasundara&nbsp;\u2013 Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and former Treasury Secretary<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>SDIG \u2013 CID&nbsp;(Senior Deputy Inspector General, Criminal Investigation Department)<\/td><td>Ravi Seneviratne&nbsp;\u2013 Senior DIG overseeing CID<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>CNI&nbsp;(Chief of National Intelligence)<\/td><td>Sisira Mendis&nbsp;\u2013 Head of National Intelligence (coordinating intelligence from SIS, police, and military)<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>IGP&nbsp;(Inspector General of Police)<\/td><td>Pujith Jayasundara&nbsp;\u2013 Head of the Sri Lanka Police Service<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The report notes that he even identified a dry\u2011run motorbike explosion on&nbsp;16 April 2019&nbsp;and shared this with senior police officials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Committee Finding: (He = Nilantha Jayawardena Head of SIS) (former President = Maithripala Sirisena)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>He had considered his role being fulfilled upon disseminating the information\u2026 However, he had not been able to inform the former President regarding the impending attack\u2026 He had not shared the information with the Tri\u2011forces \u2026 he failed to exercise caution by sharing the information which would have assisted a more cohesive investigation\u2026\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Committee Recommendation (quoted):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The Committee recommends that the Director, SIS should be prosecuted under a suitable provision in the Penal Code by the relevant authority.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Chief of National Intelligence (CNI)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>From the report:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The CNI was informed of intelligence but&nbsp;did not check his mobile on 20 April 2019, allegedly because it was kept in his car, and he accompanied his wife to church on 21 April \u2014&nbsp;even though credible warnings existed\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Committee Conclusion:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The CNI \u2026 failed to take adequate measures and\/or steps to disseminate the information as well as take steps to monitor and follow up on the intelligence.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Committee Recommendation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Criminal action should be instituted against him for negligence under suitable provisions in the Penal Code.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Secretary, Ministry of Defence<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>From report text:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Though he acknowledged seeing intelligence on&nbsp;20<\/em><em>\u202fApril 2019&nbsp;and instructed the IGP to take action, he&nbsp;failed to convene the NSC&nbsp;or alert the President\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Committee Finding:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The lack of seriousness given to the information is attributable for not taking steps to inform the president regarding the developments\u2026 The Secretary had failed to take diligent action regarding the attacks and his conduct had not been adequate.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Committee Recommendation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The Committee recommends that the former Secretary, MoD should be prosecuted under suitable provisions in the Penal Code for negligence.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Inspector General of Police (IGP)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>From report text:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The IGP had been aware of prior extremist incidents involving Zahran and associates. Official letters and WhatsApp warnings were received but&nbsp;he waited to assemble a special team rather than issuing a nationwide alert.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Committee Finding (direct):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Although the former IGP mentioned there was a rift with the former President, this does not justify complete disregard of the intelligence\u2026 The lackadaisical approach ultimately resulted in missing reports until after the incident.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Committee Recommendation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The Committee recommends that the former IGP should be indicted under relevant provisions of the Penal Code.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Other Police Officials<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The report goes on to assess dozens of mid\u2011level police officers \u2014 from SDIGs to DIGs, SSPs, OICs and ASPs \u2014 and found that many&nbsp;received intelligence instructions but failed to ensure coordinated security measures or take proactive steps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Examples of direct findings include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em>Multiple officers\u00a0received instructions to tighten security, but no special measures were taken to strengthen security around churches.\u201d<\/em><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><em>In several cases, officers\u00a0failed to follow upon written directives or simply\u00a0went on leave despite imminent threat notifications.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Committee Recommendations for these ranks repeatedly included:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>He should be prosecuted for negligence under suitable provisions of the Penal Code by the relevant authority.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Finding on President Maithripala Sirisena<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The report states explicitly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The Committee observed that the aforesaid intelligence had not reached President Maithripala Sirisena. As such the Committee decided that it was beyond their mandate to consider culpability regarding his conduct\u2026 However, the Committee is mindful that his actions overall had contributed to the deterioration of security in the country\u2026\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So although the report declined to assign direct legal responsibility due to its limited mandate, it&nbsp;recognized a structural failure in how the intelligence apparatus was positioned under executive command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Importance of the Leak<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The&nbsp;Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) Report (2019)&nbsp;identified systemic intelligence failures, including that SIS did not effectively share external warnings. It noted:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Intelligence information received indicated that the Indian High Commission was targeted, yet proper dissemination was not made by the SIS.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By contrast, the De\u202fAlwis leaked findings go further by&nbsp;assigning specific actions (or inaction), timelines, and responsible officials&nbsp;\u2014 something the PSC report did not do in named terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>From Systemic Failure to Personal Accountability<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The De\u202fAlwis report \u2014 through its own words \u2014 found repeatedly that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em>Actions and measures taken by senior officials were inadequate\u2026\u201d<br>\u2026failure to take diligent action\u2026\u201d<br>\u2026conduct had not been adequate\u2026\u201d<br>\u2026crimes of negligence should be prosecuted\u2026\u201d<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>These repeated findings represent a&nbsp;shift away from institutional critique to personal accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Udaya\u202fGammanpila\u2019s Role and Concerns<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Udaya\u202fGammanpila&nbsp;publicly released&nbsp;the report and consistently argued:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The public has the right to see official inquiries conducted in their name.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>If the government refuses to release these reports,\u00a0<em>he will.<\/em><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>He promoted the finding that\u00a0criminal cases should be filed against at least 17 officialsfor negligence \u2014 a claim derived from the report\u2019s own recommendations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Gammanpila\u2019s actions turned the document from a confidential government briefing into a public discourse on accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Why the Leak Matters Today<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Complements the PSC Findings<br>Where the PSC spoke in general systemic terms, the De\u202fAlwis leak names\u00a0<em>who<\/em>\u2014 and how \u2014 they allegedly failed.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"2\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Highlights Withheld Accountability<br>Despite these clear recommendations for prosecution,\u00a0major prosecutions have not been launched\u2014 feeding ongoing public frustration.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"3\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Pushes Debate to Legal Accountability<br>The report itself recommended criminal prosecution under the Penal Code \u2014 not just policy reform \u2014 bridging inquiry outcomes with real legal consequences.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Connects with Ongoing Terror Probes<br>Recent high\u2011profile arrest (2026) of a former intelligence chief not holding position during the attacks signify that unresolved inquiry findings continue to shape law enforcement action.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p>What the De\u202fAlwis Leak Reported<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><td>Aspect<\/td><td>What the Report Says (Leaked Text)<\/td><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td><em>Intelligence Warning<\/em><\/td><td>SIS informed SDIG Ravi Seneviratne on 9\u202fApril\u202f2019\u2026 warning letter remained unopened.\u201d<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>Repeated Alerts Ignored<\/em><\/td><td>Multiple alerts on extremist activity, including NTJ dry\u2011run evidence and church threats.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>Inadequate Measures by SIS<\/em><\/td><td>He had not shared information with the Tri\u2011forces\u2026 actions were inadequate.\u201d<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>Inadequate Action by CNI<\/em><\/td><td>Failed to disseminate and follow up on intelligence.\u201d<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>Inadequate Actions by IGP<\/em><\/td><td>Lackadaisical approach\u2026 failed to prevent or mitigate the attacks.\u201d<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>Recommendations<\/em><\/td><td>Criminal prosecution should be instituted under Penal Code provisions.\u201d<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><em>No Official Publication<\/em><\/td><td>Government withheld report \u2014 leaked by Udaya\u202fGammanpila.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The leaked&nbsp;<em>De<\/em><em>\u202fAlwis Committee Report<\/em>&nbsp;is significant because it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Names specific individuals and datestied to intelligence failures;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Quotes authoritative findingsof inadequate intelligence action;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Directly recommends criminal prosecutionfor negligence;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Casts new light on previously known inquiry gaps;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Continues to shape legal, political, and public debates about accountability for one of Sri Lanka\u2019s worst terror tragedies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>1\ufe0f<\/strong><strong>.&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>State Intelligence Service (SIS)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Mandate:<\/strong>Collect, analyze, and report intelligence on internal and external threats to national security.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Authority:<\/strong>Advisory only\u00a0\u2014\u00a0<strong>cannot arrest, detain, or execute operations<\/strong>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Output:<\/strong>Reports, alerts, and recommendations to enforcement authorities (e.g., IGP, CNI, Defence Secretary).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"2\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Chief of National Intelligence (CNI)<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Mandate:<\/strong>Coordinate all national intelligence agencies, consolidate intelligence, advise top government leadership.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Authority:<\/strong>Coordination and recommendation\u00a0\u2014\u00a0<strong>cannot implement operations<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>3<\/strong><strong>\ufe0f<\/strong><strong>.<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;Inspector General of Police (IGP)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Mandate:<\/strong>Head of all police forces; responsible for public safety, law enforcement, and operational decisions.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Authority:<\/strong>Can order investigations, raids, arrests, and preventive actions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>4<\/strong><strong>\ufe0f<\/strong><strong>.<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;Senior DIG \u2013 CID<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Mandate:<\/strong>Lead Criminal Investigation Department; investigate crimes, coordinate with intelligence, execute preventive and legal measures.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Authority:<\/strong>Directs CID officers; implements operational actions based on intelligence.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>5<\/strong><strong>\ufe0f<\/strong><strong>.<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;Secretary, Ministry of Defence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Mandate:<\/strong>Oversee national defence and coordinate security policy; ensure agencies implement government security directives.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Authority:<\/strong>Administrative and strategic approval \u2014\u00a0can authorize police\/military action but does not execute investigations personally.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>6<\/strong><strong>\ufe0f<\/strong><strong>.<\/strong><strong>&nbsp;Military Units<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Mandate:<\/strong>National defence and emergency support.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Authority:<\/strong>Only acts when formally deployed by Defence Ministry or requested by law enforcement.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Key Distinction:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Collection &amp; Reporting:<\/strong>SIS, CNI \u2192\u00a0<strong>cannot act operationally<\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Action &amp; Enforcement:<\/strong>IGP, SDIG\/CID, Ministry of Defence, Military \u2192\u00a0<strong>responsible for preventive action<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>This makes it crystal clear:&nbsp;<strong>negligence in responding to warnings is on the enforcement chain, not the intelligence collectors<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Accountability must follow Authority<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The De Alwis Committee Report, when read alongside the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) Report and the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI), leads to one unavoidable conclusion: the Easter Sunday tragedy was not the result of intelligence failure, but of institutional paralysis and executive breakdown in the enforcement chain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The evidence clearly establishes that actionable intelligence was received, documented, and disseminated through formal channels. The failure occurred after dissemination, within the agencies vested with legal authority to act \u2014 namely the Ministry of Defence, the Chief of National Intelligence, and the Sri Lanka Police hierarchy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Committee\u2019s own findings demonstrate that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The State Intelligence Service (SIS) fulfilled its statutory role by collecting and transmitting intelligence.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The Chief of National Intelligence (CNI) failed to coordinate, monitor, and escalate urgent threat warnings.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The Secretary to the Ministry of Defence failed to activate the National Security Council or issue emergency security directives.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The Inspector General of Police and senior police command failed to execute preventive security measures despite repeated alerts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>These failures were not abstract administrative lapses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>They constituted criminal negligence, as explicitly identified by the Committee, warranting prosecution under relevant provisions of the Penal Code.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Yet, nearly years after the attacks, systemic accountability remains absent, while selective legal action risks distorting the true chain of responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The deliberate withholding of the De Alwis Committee Report, followed by its public leak, underscores a deeper institutional reluctance to confront where real authority \u2014 and therefore real liability \u2014 resided on the eve of the attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Transparency was not denied due to national security concerns, but because the findings directly implicated senior decision-makers within the enforcement and executive command structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For justice to be meaningful, accountability must follow authority, not convenience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Failure to uphold this principle:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Weakens public trust,<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Undermines national security credibility,<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Distorts future counter-terrorism policy,<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>And leaves the country vulnerable to repeat failures.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>True justice for the victims of Easter Sunday does not lie in symbolic prosecutions or political scapegoating. It lies in faithfully implementing the findings of Sri Lanka\u2019s own official inquiries, without fear, favour, or selective omission.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Until that occurs, the Easter Sunday tragedy will remain not only a story of terror, but of unresolved state failure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Shenali D Waduge<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Shenali D Waduge On&nbsp;21\u202fApril\u202f2019, Sri Lanka was struck by coordinated suicide bombings targeting&nbsp;three churches&nbsp;and&nbsp;three luxury hotels, killing&nbsp;at least 270 people and injuring around 500. The attackers were linked to&nbsp;National Thowheed Jama\u2019ath (NTJ), an extremist group previously under the radar of Sri Lankan security services. Intelligence warnings of an imminent attack \u2014 including specific threats to [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[47],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-154925","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-shenali-waduge"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/154925","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=154925"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/154925\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":154926,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/154925\/revisions\/154926"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=154925"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=154925"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=154925"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}