{"id":155400,"date":"2026-03-30T15:35:51","date_gmt":"2026-03-30T22:35:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=155400"},"modified":"2026-03-30T15:35:51","modified_gmt":"2026-03-30T22:35:51","slug":"jr-and-india-signing-the-peace-accord-points-to-ponder","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2026\/03\/30\/jr-and-india-signing-the-peace-accord-points-to-ponder\/","title":{"rendered":"JR and India signing the peace accord\u00a0-Points to ponder"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dr Sarath Obeysekera<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n

1. The Agreement Context<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, there were implicit and explicit understandings about Trincomalee:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  • It should not be used in a way that threatens India\u2019s security<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Strategic assets (like the oil tank farm) would involve Indian consultation or participation<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

     In simple terms: India secured a strategic veto influence,\u201d not an automatic development obligation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    2. Why Didn\u2019t JR Push India Immediately?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    A. India Was Seen More as a Security Pressure Than a Partner<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    At that time:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n
    • Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    • Relations were tense and unpopular in Sri Lanka<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

      President J. R. Jayewardene was balancing:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        \n
      • Sovereignty concerns<\/li>\n\n\n\n
      • Domestic backlash against India<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

         Actively inviting India to develop Trincomalee could have been politically explosive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        B. No Immediate Commercial Urgency<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

        In the late 1980s:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          \n
        • Global oil logistics were different<\/li>\n\n\n\n
        • No strong regional demand for a tank farm hub<\/li>\n\n\n\n
        • Sri Lanka itself lacked a clear energy trading strategy<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

           So Trincomalee was seen more as a strategic asset than a commercial opportunity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          C. Internal Policy Fragmentation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

          Even strong figures like Gamini Dissanayake were focused on:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            \n
          • Mahaweli development<\/li>\n\n\n\n
          • Hydropower and agriculture<\/li>\n\n\n\n
          • Domestic infrastructure<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

            There was no unified maritime\/energy vision at the time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            3. Was It Because of US Alignment?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

            Partly\u2014but not in a simplistic way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Under JR:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              \n
            • Sri Lanka moved toward an open economy<\/li>\n\n\n\n
            • Strengthened ties with the West, especially the US<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

              However:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

               The US was not actively pushing to develop Trincomalee tank farmsM<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Nor were they offering investment comparable to what India might have done<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              So it\u2019s not that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              US influence blocked India\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Rather:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Sri Lanka was trying to avoid over-dependence on India while not having a clear alternative investor either<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              4. Strategic Hesitation: The Real Core Issue<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

              JR\u2019s government likely calculated:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                \n
              • Giving India a foothold in Trincomalee = long-term strategic dependency<\/li>\n\n\n\n
              • Not developing it = keeping optionality<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                 So they chose strategic delay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                This is a pattern Sri Lanka has repeated:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  \n
                • Delay \u2192 preserve sovereignty<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                • But \u2192 lose economic opportunity<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                  5. The Clause Backfired Over Time<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                  What you mentioned is very important:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Any future development needing Indian blessings\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  This effectively created:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \n
                  • A psychological and political barrier<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                  • Bureaucratic hesitation within Sri Lanka<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                    Later governments found themselves:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      \n
                    • Unable to move independently<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                    • Yet not proactively engaging India either<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                       Result: decades of paralysis<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      6. Missed Window<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                      By the time interest revived:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        \n
                      • India had its own ports under Sagarmala Programme<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                      • Global oil hubs consolidated in Singapore, Fujairah, Dubai<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                        Sri Lanka lost first-mover advantage<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        7. Your Hypothesis \u2014 Final Assessment<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                        You suggested:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Was it because JR + Gamini favored US alignment and didn\u2019t push India?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                         Partially true:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                          \n
                        • They did lean West economically<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                        • They were cautious about India\u2019s strategic expansion<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                           But not the main reason:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                            \n
                          • The bigger factors were:\n
                              \n
                            • Political sensitivity post-Accord<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                            • Lack of commercial vision<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                            • Fear of strategic dependency<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                            • Institutional weakness<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                              8. The Irony Today<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                              Today Sri Lanka is in a position where:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                \n
                              • It needs Indian cooperation for Trincomalee<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                              • Yet still lacks a clear, assertive development framework<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                                Exactly the situation that early indecision created.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                9. Bottom Line<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                                It wasn\u2019t a conspiracy or a single geopolitical alignment decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                It was:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                A cautious leadership choosing sovereignty and political survival over early economic exploitation of a strategic asset.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                                <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                                Dr Sarath Obeysekera 1. The Agreement Context Under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, there were implicit and explicit understandings about Trincomalee:  In simple terms: India secured a strategic veto influence,\u201d not an automatic development obligation. 2. Why Didn\u2019t JR Push India Immediately? A. India Was Seen More as a Security Pressure Than a Partner At that […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[116],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-155400","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-dr-sarath-obeysekera"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/155400","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=155400"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/155400\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":155401,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/155400\/revisions\/155401"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=155400"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=155400"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=155400"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}