{"id":95373,"date":"2019-11-19T16:18:50","date_gmt":"2019-11-19T23:18:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=95373"},"modified":"2019-11-19T16:18:50","modified_gmt":"2019-11-19T23:18:50","slug":"taming-the-dalit-panthers-dalit-politics-in-tamilnadu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2019\/11\/19\/taming-the-dalit-panthers-dalit-politics-in-tamilnadu\/","title":{"rendered":"Taming the Dalit Panthers? Dalit Politics in Tamilnadu\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"

Gorringe, H Courtesy Journal of South Asian Development Vol. 2 (1): pp51-73<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n

Abstract<\/strong>: Although Dalit orators and slogans threaten (or promise) to
‘turn Tamilnadu on its head’, the 2006 state elections offer Dalit
analysts pause for thought. In compromising its principles and allying with established parties, the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (Movement) – the largest Dalit movement in the state – has come full circle since 1999. In alternately backing the two dominant parties in the state (the DMK and the AIADMK) the DPI appears to be increasingly institutionalized. Excavating the future of Dalit action from past trends and contemporary politics I suggest that Dalit parties are following an established political repertoire in which a phase of militant activism gives way to \u2018politics as normal\u2019. In the face of this analysis
the paper asks whether such an approach is sustainable or can carry the
majority of Dalits with it. If Dalit politics is a continuation of
hegemonic politics, it argues, the liberatory promises of Dalit activism
will have been betrayed.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Keywords: <\/strong>Dalits, Caste, Tamilnadu, Elections, Democracy<\/em>
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction: Tamil Politics and\nthe Dalit Challenge<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the seemingly surreal world of Tamil politics, the Southernmost Indian\nstate, anything is possible: sworn enemies make up before clashing again;\nfilm-stars become politicians, turning fan-clubs into party organisations; a\nconvicted politician became Chief Minister before\n<\/em>securing an appeal verdict; the leader of the opposition assured party\nactivists that she would not<\/em> attend\nthe Assembly unless absolutely necessary (Hindu 2006a); and a key manifesto\npledge of a winning alliance offered a colour TV to households meeting certain\ncriteria. Parties routinely split, merge and reform in an endless kaleidoscope;\narch-secularists ally with Hindu chauvinists; and people (claim to) vote 17\ntimes for their candidates despite the \u2018indelible ink\u2019 used to identify voters\n(cf. Subramani 2006). An insult (perceived or intended) to one leader can\nreshape political coalitions overnight and contingency and compromise prevail. As\nthe political stability accorded by the predominance of two main parties has\nbeen challenged, the shifting panoply of electoral alliances and the colourful\njostling for position have added further complexity. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Until\nrecently, however, one feature has remained constant (albeit unacknowledged) in\nthe post-independence Tamil political system: it has been dominated by Backward\nCaste (BC) parties and interests.[1]<\/a>\nCommentators, such as Subramanian (1999), recognise this but argue that\nDravidian parties have created an open, democratic and plural society. This\npaper argues that the egalitarianism of Dravidian rhetoric has not translated\ninto social practice and the incorporation of marginal groups into a system of\nstate patronage does not equate to an extension of democratic participation\n(cf. Harriss 2002). T. Subramanian (2001a) notes the irony \u2018that such a large\nnumber of caste parties should sprout in Tamil Nadu, the cradle of the\nDravidian movement\u2019, but it is because the interests of marginal social groups\nwere not served by established politics, that they have mobilised for a share\nof political power. The innumerable Dalit (formerly untouchable) and caste-parties\nemerging over the past decade are an attempt to extend or, in the case of\nparties emerging to counter Dalit assertion, limit the scope of Tamil politics.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Subramani,\na Dalit activist, summed up this process: \u2018without protest we cannot achieve\nanything. One cannot claim anything from the government without protest. Only\nif we protest is there an opportunity for our community to do anything\u2019 (Interview,\n27 April 1999). When the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam\n<\/em>(DPI \u2013 Movement), the largest Dalit movement in Tamilnadu, abandoned its\nelectoral boycott in 1999, therefore, it promised to redraw the \u2018political map\nof Tamilnadu\u2019 (Gorringe 2005: 301). Seven years and two State elections later,\nthe DPI\u2019s radical rhetoric looks as tattered as old election posters \u2013 clinging\ntorn and dishevelled to walls and billboards. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper\ncharts the changing face of Tamil politics, focusing on the subaltern\nchallenge. Drawing on fieldwork with Dalit movements and analysis of subsequent\nstate elections, this paper assesses the entry of autonomous Dalit parties into\nthe body-politic.[2]<\/a> Having\ncharted the rationale behind political participation, and the opportunities\nthat this engagement offers, I argue that the radical possibilities suggested\nby the initial foray into electoral competition have evaporated. Rather than reforming\nthe institutions they entered, Dalit movements have been institutionalised. In\nclosing, therefore, I will consider where Dalit politics goes from here. First,\nhowever, a brief introduction to the intricacies of Tamil politics is required\nto contextualise the ensuing discussion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dravidianism, Dalit Marginalisation and\nEmergence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tamil\npolitics is bewildering to those familiar with its ideologies, parties and\ncharacters; for the uninitiated, it is a welter of nigh-identical acronyms and\npolitical fluidity. Any comprehension of current trends, therefore, requires the\nhistorical background without which all Tamil politics is \u2018sound and fury\u2019.[3]<\/a>\nThe starting point must be the non-Brahmin movement which dominated state\npolitics in the 1920s and, in interaction with the colonial power, set the\ntemplate for subsequent engagements in the political sphere (Irschick 1986). In\nthe protracted exchanges between Brahmins who monopolised administrative power\nunder the British, and a rising Backward Caste elite, caste was established as\nthe mobilising strategy par excell\u00e9nce<\/em>\nand elections as the vehicle for its expression. Into this heady mix, the\nSelf-Respect and Dravidian parties introduced the emotive issues of Tamil\nnationalism and autonomy from the expansionist ambitions of Hindi-speaking\nnorthern politicians, which continue to inform contemporary politics (cf.\nSubramanian 1999). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Though the Congress party dominated post-independence Tamil politics, each\nelection saw their vote-share eroded by the Dravida\nMunnetra Kazhagam<\/em> (Dravidian Progressive Federation – DMK) – a regional\nnationalist party which played on language nationalism and espoused\npopulist\/socialist policies that were successfully mediated to the electorate\nthrough cinema and an efficient party-machine. In 1967 Tamilnadu became the\nfirst Indian state to elect a regionalist party, heralding the decline of\nCongress pre-eminence and the rise of the region (Pandian 1992, Kohli 1990).\nIndeed, the DMK victory was hailed as the end of \u2018Brahmin\u2019 rule and the birth\nof a new nation of \u2018Tamils\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under its founder, Annadurai, and his successor, Karunanidhi,\nthe DMK ruled until 1976. The party became increasingly conservative and\ncentred around the leader, however, and the DMK split in 1972 with M.G.\nRamachandran (MGR), a Tamil screen legend, founding the Anna DMK <\/em>(ADMK – \u2018Anna\u2019<\/em>\nby reference to Annadurai) which claimed to be closer to the party\u2019s original\nideals. The ADMK gained power in 1977 due to MGR\u2019s popularity and populism (as\ntypified by his provision of free school meals for children), and dominated\nTamil politics until MGR\u2019s death in 1987. Since then both parties have\nalternated in office. Corruption and a personalisation of politics in the\npersonages of MGR (or his successor Jayalalitha) and Karunanidhi,\nhas pervaded Tamil government in this period and populist politics (to maintain\npower) have prevailed over ideological or fiscal concerns (Kohli 1990, Pandian\n1992). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dravidian social radicalism, thus, was strictly curtailed. Rather than\nenvisaging inequality in class or caste terms, both Dravidian parties used the\nBrahmin\/Non-Brahmin divide to suggest a commitment to social change whilst\ndrawing their leadership and core constituents from dominant, landowning BCs\n(Subramanian 1999). Stressing language rather than inequality the DMK (and\nlater the ADMK) attempted to foster Tamilness and avoid acting upon politically\nsensitive election pledges on land-reform, dowry and caste. Over time both\nparties abandoned their anti-Centre and anti-Hindi positions, softened their\nanti-Brahminism (to the point where a Brahmin could succeed MGR) and failed to\nimplement meaningful redistributive policies. The DMK\u2019s progressive reforms\nresembled \u2018charity from above\u2019, and the ADMK disproportionately taxed the poor\nto finance populist programmes (Pandian 1992, Harriss 2002).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Subramanian\u2019s admiration for Dravidian pluralism, therefore, seems\nmisplaced. Indeed, he shows (1999: 58) that state politics are dominated by BCs\nwho have become jealous of their power as new entrants to Tamil politics have\neroded their authority. This is evident in the \u2018increasingly overt conflict\nbetween lower-caste Hindus and Dalits\u2019 (Harriss 2002: 97).[4]<\/a> Faced\nby frequent violence, Dalit movements voice grievances and highlight atrocities\nrather than campaigning proactively for social change. Their protests,\npetitions and demonstrations demand the enforcement of the constitution, and\nseek to de-legitimise a polity that does not adequately represent or serve them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The subsidiary position of Dalits is evident in that 84 per cent of Dalit\nland-holdings are marginal (under 1 hectare) and only 4 per cent are over 4\nhectares, as opposed to over 10 per cent for others.[5]<\/a>\nDalit land is seldom irrigated (Gorringe 2005). Thus, while 80 per cent of\nTamil Dalit workers are in the agrarian sector, 64% are agricultural labourers.[6]<\/a>\nThe failure to implement effective land reform has curtailed Dalit autonomy by\nrendering them dependent upon others for work. This deprivation is compounded,\nand alternate opportunities are limited, by poor education. Literacy, as\nMendelsohn and Vicziany observe, \u2018lends confidence and expands mental horizons.\nIt leads to a more assertive, less compliant, community\u2019 (1998: 35). In 1991\nthe 58 per cent literacy rate for Scheduled Caste (SC)[7]<\/a>\nmen compared to 74 per cent for Tamil males. 35% of SC women were literate\nopposed to 51% overall (Rath and Konlade 2000).[8]<\/a>\nThese inequalities render Dalits vulnerable to social boycott (denied work,\naccess to shops and common resources), intimidation, assault and murder if they\nresist caste norms.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Faced by socio-political\nmarginalisation, Dalit movements in the 1990s mobilised extra-institutionally\nbefore entering mainstream politics. Puthiya\nTamizhagam<\/em> (PT, New Tamilnadu) – the second largest Dalit Party in TN –\narose as a Pallar movement and, despite its casteless title, remains strongest\nin Pallar strongholds in the South and West.[9]<\/a> Its\nleader, Dr Krishnasamy, battled discrimination to qualify as a doctor and came\nto Dalit activism via Marxist-Leninism (Warrier 1998). Despite this, he is\nportrayed as Westernised \u2013 appearing in jeans and trainers \u2013 and removed from\n\u2018ordinary\u2019 Dalits (Gorringe 2005: 254). Krishnasamy was the first autonomous\nDalit leader to win a Legislative Assembly seat in 1996. This seat was subsequently\nlost, but PT consolidated its vote-base in the 1998 national elections polling\nmore votes than the victory margins in several seats (Wyatt 2002). Although PT\nremains a significant force, and preceded the DPI into electoral competition,\nthis paper focuses on the Panthers for two reasons. Firstly, the DPI is the\nlargest Dalit party in TN and, secondly, it entered electoral politics during\nmy fieldwork enabling an analysis of the dynamics of institutionalisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The DPI was formed in 1982, inspired by the Maharashtrian movement of the\nsame name. Although billed as a Dalit movement, it is preponderantly Paraiyar\nand is flourishes in the northern districts. Thirumavalavan, its leader, came\nfrom a poor family to gain a Law degree and a government job and entered Dalit\npolitics through social networks (Gorringe 2005). He is famed for his oratory\nand for popularising the assertive slogan: \u2018a hit for a hit\u2019. Thirumavalavan\nlived in humble surroundings and frequently visited Dalit villages. Whilst Dr\nKrishnasamy faced questions about his choice of a luxury hotel in one interview\n(Warrier 1998), thus, Thirumavalavan cited his \u2018life situation\u2019 as evidence\nthat the DPI had no resources (Illangovan 1998). Lacking resources, the DPI\nrelied on grass-roots mobilisation to succeed. A decade of poll boycotts\nemphasised the movement\u2019s radicalism and denied legitimacy to the Legislative\nAssembly, but in 1999 the DPI completed a tactical volt\u00e9 face <\/em>and contested the polls on the slogan: \u2018We are voting\nfor ourselves\u2019. Why, however, did they choose the electoral route and what did\nthey hope to achieve thereby?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Entering Politics: Rationales,\nOpportunities and Pitfalls<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dalit movement\u2019s reliance on exclusive identity categories constituted a\ndefensive response to caste repression, but effectively legitimised caste\nactors. Contesting elections, by contrast, raised the question of citizenship\nand the prospect of reform. \u2018India\u2019s institutions are not only the bedrock of\nits democracy, providing an ordered process for the politicisation of\npreviously marginalised groups\u2019, as Jenkins argues, \u2018but also \u2026 the means by\nwhich democracy\u2019s change-resistant tendencies are overcome\u2019 (1999: 224). Whilst\nDravidian dominance narrowed the political agenda, recent elections confirmed\nthe fragmentation of Tamil politics (Yadav 2001) and this erosion of political\nfealty offered opportunities for Dalit movements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1998, Thirumavalavan averred that elections achieve little, and\nrefused to \u2018take part in something which upholds the status quo\u2019 (Illangovan\n1998). The following year, therefore, Nandan\n<\/em>(1999)pressed him on the\nabandoned boycott: \u2018Will you not be tainted\u2019 they asked, and \u2018is your decision\n\u2026 a victory for government repression\u2019? Contradictory responses insisted that\nthis was a change in tactic not policy; that the boycott harmed the movement;\nand that \u2018if Dalits are to gain official power we have to vote\u2019. He maintained\nthat the DPI would not \u2018put forward a representative\u2019, but that \u2018if we gain\nseats in the Centre [Delhi]\nwe will be able to act against abuses\u2019. \u2018We are not going to support\nopportunist or self-serving political parties\u2019, he maintained (ibid.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The above quotes reveal the contingency of the move to politics. Key\nissues and longer-term prospects were not thought through. The attractions of\npolitics are seen in vague references to \u2018using Dalit votes\u2019 and gaining \u2018Dalit\npower\u2019. The obvious forerunner here is the Bahujan\nSamaj Party<\/em> (BSP – Majority People\u2019s Party: the most successful Dalit-based\nparty) in Uttar Pradesh (UP). The BSP was referred to in movement speeches as\nepitomising the possibilities of Dalit politics, because it united the Dalit\nvote in UP and forged pragmatic coalitions which enabled it to take power (Pai\n2002). In brief periods of office, furthermore, the BSP expedited the\nemployment of Dalits to positions of responsibility and instituted \u2018programmes\nof Dalit uplift\u2019 (Pai 2002: 178). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chandra (2004) and Pai (2002) argue that the BSP successfully altered its\n\u2018representational profile\u2019 \u2013 by allocating seats to higher castes for example \u2013\nto widen its appeal beyond its caste-base. Pai (2002) shows that the Dalit vote\nremained fairly constant but politically astute seat allocations and pragmatic\nalliances carried the party to power. Puthiya\nTamizhagam <\/em>echoed these tactics in Tamilnadu, fielding non-Dalit candidates\nin 1999 and 2001 (Illangovan 2001), and both the DPI and PT have attempted to\nbroaden their social base by appealing to \u2018Tamils\u2019 and dropping caste terminology\nfrom their titles (the DPI renamed itself the \u2018Liberation\u2019 Panthers in 1999). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The BSP\u2019s experience, however, is of limited relevance in Tamilnadu.\nElections in UP are often contested between 4 strong parties (Pai 2002) but,\nthough Ananth (2006) notes that Congress, Communists and Caste parties retain\nstrong support they have failed to establish autonomous alternatives and Tamil\nelections are dominated by two Dravidian coalitions. Non-aligned alliances have\noccasionally secured a respectable vote-share, but this has failed to translate\ninto seats. Chandra\u2019s (2004) account of ethnic headcounts also seems simplistic\nin this context where 50 years of Dravidian discourse has fostered a Tamilian\nidentity that shatters the automatic assumption that Dalits (for instance) will\nvote for a Dalit party. Furthermore, Dalits in Tamilnadu are divided amongst\nthemselves. Following the fragmentation of the Dravidian vote, therefore, Dalit\nparties in the 1990s attempted to create an \u2018ethnic\u2019 constituency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the absence of strong \u2018pull factors\u2019, Nandan <\/em>is right to question whether political participation is a\n\u2018victory for government repression\u2019. In considering DPI actions, the\ncompulsions of politics are more obvious than its attractions. The boycott\nenabled the government to cast the Panthers as undemocratic extremists, thereby\njustifying repressive measures which alienated the movement from the people (Gorringe\n2005). Thirumavalavan concedes that political engagement is important to \u2018show\nour strength in and commitment to democratic means\u2019 (Nandan 1999). Secondly,\ndespite the DPI boycott most Dalits continued to vote. Elections are exciting\ntimes, politicians seek you out and party activists distribute largesse and\npromises of more if they come to power (De Wit 1996). The boycott withheld the\nvotes of activists and offered sympathisers no electoral alternative, so they\nvoted for established parties, including those antithetical to Dalit\nempowerment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lacking a positive vision to justify political participation the DPI was\nin tumult preceding the 1999 Indian elections; internally they faced\ndiscontented activists, externally they confronted a casteist social\nenvironment and a political scenario in which they were isolated. Many\ndedicated activists were distraught: \u2018Government is a sewer\u2019, Subramani \u2013 an\nactivist from Cuddalore observed, \u2018we do not want to fall in\u2019 (Interview, 27\nApril 1999). Not everyone, he insisted, would follow Thirumavalavan into\npolitics. The DPI emerged as a radical grass-roots movement that fought back\nagainst caste oppression. Parliamentary parties were frequently castigated for\nfailing to advance social justice and conniving in continuing caste\ndiscrimination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such concerns were unavoidable in 1999 because Dalits in one village had\nbeen forced to flee their homes by a casteist mob in March and, on the eve of\nthe elections, the police violently dispersed a Dalit demonstration in\nTirunelveli killing 17 people (Gorringe 2005: 297, 350). In the teeth of these\nincidents the DPI could not ignore the records of political parties or downplay\nthe realities of caste. The decision to contest the elections was unpopular,\nand these events rendered an alliance with Dravidian parties untenable. A\ndalliance with the (opposition) AIADMK raised such a storm that rebuttals were\nissued with alacrity. The identities of social activists, Jasper (1997)\nastutely notes, frame how they view both the world and themselves. Having\ninvested significance in the concept of radical action, forging links with an\nenemy was unbearable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indian elections, however, operate on a first-past-the-post system which\nmeans that parties need not secure an overall majority to win a seat. The\n\u2018practice of electing representatives according to geographical constituencies,\n<\/p>\n\n\n

[implies]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2026 that interests are relatively homogenous within localities\u2019\n(Philips 1991: 63). The polarisation of caste-based parties illustrates the\nnaivety of such assumptions and reveals the \u2018universal citizen\u2019 to be a myth.\nThere are no geographical concentrations of Dalits sufficient to guarantee\nvictory in any constituency and although certain seats are reserved for Dalits\n(as part of affirmative action to offset inequality) such candidates are\ndependent on the votes of others. Whilst voting is tied to localities, therefore,\nDalits cannot neglect other castes.\n\n\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

DPI leaders, thus, were torn: to appease activists they needed to suggest\nradicalism, but to stand any chance of winning they needed cross-caste\nalliances. This latter point was particularly contentious given the problematic\nof representation. As Kamaraj, a DPI adherent put it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yes there are hundreds of Dalit MPs in India, but they do not win alone.\nThey win as party people, as politicians. There is no opportunity for Dalit MPs\nto speak out about Dalit society and problems so we do not need them. We need\nour own MP who will speak for us (Interview, 10 September 1999).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This context explains why the DPI decision seemed so momentous. Dalit\npoliticians are commonly portrayed as political pawns or self-interested careerists\n(Roy & Sisson 1990). \u2018Suitcase politics\u2019 was the contemptuous phrase used\nby respondents to denote \u2018unprincipled\u2019 and \u2018self-aggrandising\u2019 leaders who\n\u2018sell out\u2019 in return for resources. Against this backdrop, DPI leaders had to\npersuade followers of their continuing autonomy and to justify electoral\nparticipation and alliance formation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The exoneration of police for the violence in Tirunelveli at this point encapsulated\nDalit distrust of institutions but also facilitated a realignment of political\naffiliations. The protests surrounding the incident brought the fissiparous\nDalit movements onto a common platform. They were joined by the Tamil Maanila<\/em> Congress (Tamil State Congress –\nTMC) which had been frozen out of the main coalitions. Contingency, thus,\ndictated the DPI\u2019s decision to join the (non-Dravidian) Third Front in 1999. As\nViswanathan (1999) argued, the \u2018consolidation of the oppressed sectors,\nparticularly Dalits, in Tamil Nadu\u2019 constituted a significant fall-out of the\nmassacre. This solution to the DPI\u2019s political dilemma was welcomed in the\nmedia but distrusted in the movement. The TMC, when allied to the DMK\ngovernment, had overlooked anti-Dalit violence and so DPI cadre were sceptical\nof the alliance. Faced by such disaffection Thirumavalavan belatedly insisted\nthat the DPI\u2019s political engagement was conditional on four key demands: A\nshare of power; political recognition; the consolidation of Dalit forces and;\nthe attempt to force the Dravidian parties out of office (Speeches and\nInterview 1999).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These conditions refuted prevalent projections of Dalits as a vote-bank\nwho could be bought with promises or hand-outs. This development, as\nViswanathan (1999) opined, was \u2018seen as having the potential to bring about\nsubstantial changes, not only of electoral politics in the state but in the\nnature of political activism in general and the approach of mainstream\npolitical parties to organisations that represent Dalits\u2019 aspirations\u2019. Dalit\nengagement in elections promised an expansion of the political sphere to\ninclude marginalised sectors of society, but also reflected the growing\nstrength of caste-based groups and the declining appeal of Dravidian parties.\nWyatt (2002) subsequently argued that a coalition government requiring\nDravidian parties to share power is no longer a chimera. The DPI had abandoned\nrevolutionary struggle, but looked set to revolutionise Tamil politics. We turn\nnow to the impact of this move and the DPI\u2019s gradual integration into the\npolitical system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Parliamentary Route to Change? 1999-2006\nElections.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018If, after Thirumavalavan has\nspoken and left, you listen to what the DMK lot or the AIADMK lot or any other\npolitical party people are saying and are scattered, then the Dalit Panthers\ncannot protect you. It is necessary for us all to unite. It is necessary for us\nto cast our votes for our own sake. We need to show our opponents that we are a\nunited political force\u2019 <\/em>(Thirumavalavan, Speech, 16 June 1999).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After all the posturing and positioning accompanying the move to politics,\nhow have the Panthers fared at the ballot box? To what extent have they\nmaintained the united front that Thirumavalavan extols above? As analyses of earlier\nelections have been provided elsewhere (Wyatt 2002, Gorringe 2005), I confine\nmyself to a brief summary before turning to more recent developments. The\nTMC-led Third Front (above) fared poorly in the 1999 elections. Despite polling\nheavily in several constituencies it failed to win a seat, thus emphasising the\nelectoral pre-eminence of the Dravidian parties. Significantly, the Front was\nnot humiliated and Thirumavalavan came second in Chidambaram constituency, forcing\nthe AIADMK candidate into third place. The ability of a non-Dravidian, Dalit-based\ncoalition to mobilise significant votes was established and the easy assumption\nof Dalit loyalty to the status quo was shattered. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite intimidation and violence, thousands of Dalits voted for\nThirumavalavan. Press coverage increased noticeably as did the political\nrecognition accorded to the party. In playing on the issue of representation,\nthe DPI persuaded many Dalits that it was their \u2018duty\u2019 to support them.\nSakthidasan an agricultural labourer from a remote village in Chidambaram\nconstituency was typical: He insisted that the political process was the only\nmeans for leaders to gain more \u2018respect, attention, and power\u2019. Dalits here\nprimarily depend on other castes for work as agricultural labourers, and\nSakthidasan was forthright in his analysis: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

We do not have that much faith in democracy, but for the first time a\nDalit has stood as a Dalit and we have done our duty by voting for him. Whether\nhe does anything for us or not is the next question, but our votes are for\nourselves (Interview, 26\n September 1999). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sakthidasan\u2019s assertion reveals both the cynicism that characterises\nDalit views of politics, and the fact that the proactive election campaign\nsucceeded in raising consciousness even if it failed in the polls. The quote also\nadds complexity to Chandra\u2019s (2004) notion of ethnic head-counts in emphasising\nthat material concerns need not determine electoral choices. The symbolic and\nemotive reasons of pride and duty can outweigh expectations of reward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The publicity and votes gained by the DPI (especially in northern\ndistricts) persuaded leaders that the electoral process was worth pursuing. The\nfluid nature of Tamil alliances, however, meant that the Third Front was\nprecarious. There was no guarantee that the TMC would remain independent and\nwithout the resources and credibility of an established party the Front would\nbe undermined. Furthermore, the question of what the DPI hoped to achieve came\nto the fore. Persisting with a non-Dravidian Front would radicalise voters and\noffer a critical alternative: pursuing the same ends using institutional rather\nthan radical (often criminal) means. Contesting elections, however, proffered\nnew opportunities (cf. Coy & Hedeen 2005): Strategic alliance building, for\nexample, could lead to financial resources, extensive networks, a wider pool of\nvoters, and Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) status. To be most\neffective, though, this path required a Dravidian alliance which seemed\nimpossible since neither was trusted in 1999:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yesterday the AIADMK fostered the BJP, now it is the turn of the DMK.\nYesterday Jayalalitha, today Karunanidhi.\nWe need to question which is the scoundrel and which is the rogue\n(Thirumavalavan, Speech, 16 June 1999).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The implication was of a Hobson\u2019s choice, since both had betrayed their\nideals and fostered the Hindu nationalist BJP which is antithetical to Dalit\ninterests. Furthermore, Dr Krishnasamy re-iterated the concern for autonomy:\n\u2018Dalit leaders should retain the leadership of Dalit campaigns \u2026 and that\nmainstream political parties should not derive undue political mileage from the\nstruggles of Dalits against caste oppression\u2019 (Nambath 1999). Despite the\ncompelling logic of Dalit assertion, Krishnasamy\u2019s principled but unrewarding offer\nof autonomous action was rejected by the TMC and DPI who allied to the AIADMK\nfor several bye-elections in 2000.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The DPI\u2019s dramatic volte<\/em>–face<\/em> invited accusations of \u2018suitcase\npolitics\u2019 and outraged activists felt betrayed, but it is worth considering the\ndecision more dispassionately. The votes garnered by the Third Front\nhighlighted that shifting from movement to party entailed more than a \u2018tactical\u2019\nshift: It altered the constituency to whom the DPI appealed. The 225,000 people\nwho voted for Thirumavalavan far exceeded those prepared to engage in social\nprotest. This wider constituency was, by definition, less radical and more\ninterested in the bread-and-butter issues of political participation. Activists<\/em> spoke of Thirumavalavan\nturning parliament on its head, but most voters<\/em>\nwanted him in office as a symbol of Dalit assertion and as a source of patronage.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Election campaigns require resources and organisational infrastructure\nthat Dalit movements lack and established allies can provide. Finally, Pandian\n(1992) notes how Dravidian parties (the AIADMK in particular) have successfully\nmediated subaltern consciousness and secured active consent despite neglecting\ntheir interests. Whilst autonomous Dalit movements increasingly counter\nDravidianism, interviews and observations confirmed his analysis. Allying with\nthe AIADMK, therefore, was a pragmatic<\/em>\nrecognition of Dravidian hegemony. Thirumavalavan continued to critique\nDravidian policy and his exhausting schedule of engagements and relatively\nobscure and humble accommodation suggested that he had not profited personally\nfrom the new strategy. The alliance with the AIADMK was the lesser of two evils\nsince the DMK was portrayed as most opposed to Dalit liberation and the AIADMK\nis traditionally more popular with Dalits and women. The main drawback was that\nthe coalition isolated PT (which was at loggerheads with the AIADMK) and\nsplintered the Dalit vote. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The results of the 2000 bye-elections threw the wisdom of pragmatism into\ndoubt, however, when the \u2018DMK gained from Dalits\u2019 apathy to the AIADMK\u2019 (Nambath\n2000), suggesting that real-politick<\/em>\ncould alienate principled actors and blur the distinction between a Dalit party\nand an established one. The DPI emerged as a radical response to parties that saw\nDalits as pawns to be bought off before each election. In 1999, the campaign\nslogan (\u2018our votes are for ourselves\u2019) resonated with many Dalits and\nencouraged them to vote for the first time or to back an autonomous Dalit\ncandidate. In 2000 Dalit voters refused to be the pawns of their own leaders\neither, and rejected the AIADMK-DPI combine because they saw Dravidian parties\nas ideologically opposed to them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite failing\nto persuade their supporters, the DPI remained in alliance with the AIADMK preceding\nthe 2001 Legislative Assembly elections. PT mooted a principled alternative before\nsuccumbing to the politics of pragmatism themselves when their attempt to initiate\na Congress-led Front failed. Unwilling to contest without a mainstream partner,\nPT sought an electoral pact with the DMK. The fragility of alliances and\nelectoral understandings, however, came to the fore in this election when disputes\nover seat sharing (how many seats each alliance partner should be allowed to\ncontest) disrupted both coalitions. The DMK was not accommodating (retaining\nmost seats for itself) and alienated its main electoral allies who swapped\nsides. The major party to defect was the Vanniyar (a Backward Caste) dominated Paatali Makkal Katchi<\/em> (PMK \u2013 Toiling\nPeople\u2019s Party) which is seen to hold sway in northern Tamilnadu. The DPI was\nformed partly as a defensive reaction against Vanniyar assertion, so when the\nPMK joined the AIADMK, the DPI jumped ship. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bereft of\nother allies, the DPI allied to the DMK, thus abandoning a key rationale for\nelectoral contestation. In 1999, Thirumavalavan pilloried the PMK leader for\nswallowing his pride and rejoining the DMK despite being insulted. He also insisted\nthat: \u2018Karunanidhi\u2019s complete\ngovernment has been against the downtrodden and remains so. He is only\nconcerned in nurturing the dominant castes\u2019 (Speech, 01 November 1999). At the\ntime (Gorringe 2006a) I saw the acceptance of Dalit parties into the DMK Front\nas significant for 2 principal reasons. Firstly, Karunanidhi\nhad been the subject of personal attacks by movement orators: \u2018Karunanidhi is a scoundrel and we need to oppose him\nfirst\u2019, as Thirumavalavan had said. Granting 18 seats to the DPI and PT,\ntherefore, constituted a loss of face for the party. Defections and splits are\nendemic in Indian politics, and the colourful language used at the point of\ndeparture has rarely precluded reconciliation, but swallowing the insults of an\nuntested group is uncommon. Secondly, the two Dalit organisations were given\nmore seats than established parties (Hindu 2001). In retrospect this\nsignificance was overstated. The bargaining for seats suggested the DPI would\nonly enter alliances on the basis of a share\nof political power<\/em>, and wresting so many constituencies from the DMK signalled\nthat Dalit parties are now considered capable of delivering votes. Beyond this,\nhowever, the import is limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The accommodation\nof the Dalit parties must be viewed in context: as a desperate attempt by the\nDMK to attract more votes after<\/em> the\ndeparture of other allies. Dalit parties are now treated as vote-banks that can\nbe won over at election time, and the asymmetry of power was emphasised by seat\nallocations. Though the PT had proved itself in previous elections the DPI reached\na swift agreement over seats because it opted to campaign on the DMK symbol of\nthe rising sun. The PT, which demanded its own flag, was engaged in protracted\nnegotiations (Nambath 2001). The DPI, thus, acted as a pawn and did not gain\nautonomous political recognition. Its allocation of 8 seats testifies to the\ncaste-based logic of electoral competition rather than its strength. Caste\ninforms the electoral outcomes of many constituencies and five decades of\nrhetoric on \u2018Tamilness\u2019 has not constrained its salience. If anything, caste figures\nmore prominently in contemporary elections due to the caste-based parties that\nhave arisen in the past two decades. The Dalit Panthers were welcomed by the\nDMK as a possible counterweight to the PMK.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rise of\nminor parties has meant that neither Dravidian party can win unaided in several\nconstituencies. The PMK, for instance, is seen to dominate in the north-east\nand has broken the Dravidian duopoly in a way that Communist and Congress\nparties failed to do. The DPI\u2019s heartlands are here, reflecting the fact that\nthey campaigned against Vanniyar caste domination. Sure enough, the DPI\u2019s lone\nsuccess was in Mangalore where Thirumavalavan emerged victorious although the\nDMK-Front was routed in the polls. PT did not win a seat, but their strongholds\nin the south are where the DMK has struggled to make inroads. Paradoxically, far\nfrom furthering their ultimate objective of eradicating caste, the DPI victory\nemphasised the importance of caste considerations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was\nmost evident in the fact that Dalits voted en\nmasse<\/em> for DMK candidates (Subramanian 2001b, Yadav 2001) whilst other caste\nvoters shunned the \u2018Dalit-friendly\u2019 parties. Even DMK cadres neither campaigned\nnor voted effectively for their Dalit allies (Subramanian 2001b, Venkatesh 2001).\nKamaraj, a DPI activist from Madurai\ninsisted that BCs have an \u2018allergy\u2019 to Dalit mobilisation, and his crude\nanalysis gained credence in 2001. \u2018The social aversion\u201d on the part of DMK\ncandidates, mostly belonging to Mukkulathors and other OBCs, to be identified\nwith Dalit leaders and cadres\u2019, Illangovan (2001) reported, \u2018has made the DMK\nan untouchable\u201d among its own rank and file\u2019.[10]<\/a>\nAs Dalit organisations have entered politics, the social ostracism associated\nwith untouchability has informed the electoral process. Indeed, caste sentiment\nhas been exacerbated as Dalit movements have confronted BC dominance (Pandian\n2000) \u2018The DMK\u2019s gamble with the Dalit card \u2026 failed\u2019, Illangovan concluded,\n\u2018thanks to the sharp polarisation of Dalits and non-Dalits, where the party\naffiliations became irrelevant\u2019. Untouchability at the ballot box is arguably\npart of a backlash \u2018resisting Dalit efforts at claiming their human rights and\ndues\u2019 (Rajadurai and Geetha 2002: 119). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The heightening of caste sentiment helps explain why, despite entering\npolitics later, the Dalit Panthers have surpassed Puthiya Tamizhagam<\/em>. The social antipathy to Dalit interests\ndictates that Dalit parties are a default option to mitigate the loss of key\nallies. The Panthers have an advantage since they offset the PMK vote-bank,\nwhilst PT has no equivalent opponent. Poll results, thus, have established a\npecking order based on electoral arithmetic. The DPI are a natural second<\/em> choice if an alliance with the\nPMK fails. Their secondary status became apparent, however, when their\nDravidian ally canvassed their support for the 2004 Lok Sabha elections but\ndenied them any representatives. The Legislative Assembly has 234 members\nwhereas Tamilnadu only has 39 representatives in the Lok Sabha, but the failure\nto grant even one seat to the Panthers was telling. Thirumavalavan resigned from\nMangalur (which he had contested on a DMK ticket) \u2018on principle\u2019 and joined an\nalliance of Dalit and non-Dravidian parties:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A majority of the mainstream parties in the State, such\nas the TMC, the Congress(I), the PMK and the two Left parties had already\nallied with the AIADMK. The DMK then had only the BJP with it. Karunanidhi was left with no option but to\naccommodate the DPI and the P.T. along with some small caste-based parties. But\nnow, because Kaunanidhi has had the support of some much bigger parties, he has\nditched Dalit parties,\u201d Thirumavalavan said (Viswanathan 2004).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The message is clear:\nDravidian parties use the DPI as a vote-bank when necessary and abandon them\nwhen more tested alliances appear. Karunanidhi\u2019s\ncall for the DPI to support the DMK alliance from the outside was rightly\nperceived as an insult, but the hastily assembled Dalit alliance was a\nwashout, coming third in most seats except for Chidambaram where Thirumavalavan\nagain came second.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the repeated ability to secure thirty percent of the vote without <\/em>the main parties it cannot be\nlong before the DPI contests national polls in a Dravidian Front. The reticence\nof the main parties to offer the Chidambaram constituency to the DPI supports\nthe argument (above) that this would alienate Dravidian cadre. Until they contest\nnational constituencies, however, the Panthers will remain the Cinderella of\nTamil politics and lack adequate political recognition. This was emphasised in\n2006 when the DMK compounded its earlier insult by requesting unconditional DPI\nbacking for Assembly elections. The DPI\u2019s actions at this point are noteworthy.\nRather than reviving the Dalit alliance that unsuccessfully contested the 2004\npolls, Thirumavalavan led the DPI back into the AIADMK fold. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The outset of the 2006 elections, therefore, saw a complete reversal of 2001.\nThis time the AIADMK was isolated and its allocation of 9 seats to the DPI (1\nmore than it contested in 2001) must be read against this backdrop. \u2018The AIADMK\nconsidered us a political force and invited us to join their front\u2019, Thirumavalavan\ninsisted, but had roles been reversed there would have been no place for them. The\nincremental road to political recognition took another step, however, when the\nDPI stood as the Viduthalai Ciruthaikal\nKatchi <\/em>(Liberation Panther Party), not under the AIADMK banner. The\nElectoral Commission allotted them a \u2018bell\u2019 as a campaigning symbol, because the\nDPI have no established emblem. The political significance of visual imagery\ncannot be overstated in a society where most voters identify the symbol they\nintend to vote for rather than the party. The emotive force of such markers was\napparent when the fledgling Desiya\nMorpokku Dravida Kazhagam<\/em> (National Progressive Dravidian Federation – DMDK)\nwas assigned a drum in 2006, leading several Dalit women to align themselves\nbehind Vijayakant: \u2018It is our symbol\u2019 they are quoted as saying \u2013 since beating\ndrums made of polluting leather is traditionally a Dalit task (Hindu 2006c). The\nDPI\u2019s allocated marker rang no such \u2018bells\u2019. That a film-star with no history\nof Dalit activism should elicit such a response is an indictment of Dalit\nparties and raises questions about the current strategy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2006 results favoured the DMK-led \u2018Democratic Progressive Alliance\u2019,\nforcing Jayalalitha to resign as Chief Minister. The DMK, with 96 out of the\n234 seats, became the largest single party, but remained 22 short of an overall\nmajority raising the real prospect of coalition government in the state. The\nmost likely coalition partner (the Indian National Congress which secured 38\nseats), however, overrode the desires of the state wing of the party and\nbrokered a deal whereby they shored up the minority government in return for a\nsimilar favour in Pondicherry. The AIADMK alliance gained 69 seats of which the\nDPI gained 2 (double its previous return). The remaining 7 DPI candidates all\nfinished second but the Dravidian alliance would account for this. The Panthers unerringly backed\nthe loser again, but how much choice did they have? As a second choice ally,\nthey are limited to the weaker coalition. Perhaps the strategy needs to\nbe rethought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Caging the Dalit Panthers?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Seven years after entering the elections the arguments, tactics and\nresults remain static. Whilst the exigencies of political competition require\npolitical parties to compromise and agree to a minimum common platform, if this\nexhausts the DPI\u2019s ambition then political participation will accomplish\nlittle. Indeed, their participation merely legitimises the political system and\nbuttresses the politics of contingency. The repeated assurance that elections\nare a \u2018tactic\u2019, not a \u2018principle\u2019 (Warrier 2006), is increasingly tenuous. The\nDPI now routinely gains press coverage of speeches, meetings and its manifesto,\nand the number of seats it has contested has risen. It has, however, become a\nstock player. Although Dalits are prevented from standing in at least four panchayats<\/em>, this was not central to the\nparty\u2019s manifesto. \u2018We may have come to the elections\u2019, Thirumavalavan insisted\nin 1999, when trying to persuade followers, \u2018but our warrior spirit has not\nchanged \u2026 we will not give up our struggle for liberty\u2019 (Speech 07 August 1999).\nPolitical opportunism, it seems, has tamed the Dalit Panthers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The DPI, I contend,\nis becoming institutionalised and losing the mantle of radicalism. Institutionalisation\nessentially refers to the process whereby movements \u2018develop internal\norganisation, become more moderate, adopt a more institutional repertoire of\naction and integrate into the system of interest representation\u2019 (Della Porta\n& Diani 1999: 148). As Coy and Hedeen (2005: 407) argue,\ninstitutionalisation may lead a movement to become \u2018bureaucratized and\ntechnique centred, losing its adaptive vitality\u2019. They observe that\nassimilation into institutional practices can involve a dilution of movement\ncritiques and tactics. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\ninstitutionalisation of the DPI is evident in the formalisation of the party (a\nrule book outlining roles and responsibilities was prepared) but also in the\nactions and expectations of leaders and participants: Firstly, its willingness\nto support alternate Dravidian parties indicates an attenuation of ideological\nprinciples and an adaptation to the prevailing political environment. Secondly,\nthe disappointment when Thirumavalavan decided not to stand in 2006 (Hindu 2006b)\nsuggests that activists are increasingly focused on elections rather than\nsustained anti-caste activism. Thirdly, the choice of candidates for the nine\nconstituencies in 2006 highlighted a growing distance between the leadership\nand the grassroots. Dedicated local activists were passed over in the\nnominations (ibid.) though the party promised to bring the Assembly closer to\nthe people. The four \u2018key demands\u2019 on which political involvement was\npredicated (see above) have disappeared: Institutionalisation, Piven and\nCloward (1971) observe, can entail co-optation and demobilisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alert to this danger, Thirumavalavan argued that \u2018if the gap between the\n<\/p>\n\n\n

[people and movement]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

widens too far, the people will be alienated from the\nmovement\u2019 (Interview, 03 November 1999). Opportunist politics, however, will widen\nthis rift. Already the sympathisers inspired by the DPI\u2019s radicalism in 1999\nhave begun to look elsewhere for a Dalit revival. \u2018Thirumavalavan is finished\u2019,\na Jesuit priest and one-time supporter opined (Father J, Personal\nCommunication, 27 April 2006).[11]<\/a>\nThe decision to join a Third Front in 1999 breathed air into the stultified\natmosphere of Tamil politics. The failure to consolidate the Dalit vote, and\nthe support for Dravidian parties, has re-instated the status quo. The dilution\nof radicalism is illustrated in the neglect of local activists who cultivated\nconstituencies and established movement strongholds. They were by-passed in the\nselection of candidates, suggesting that the calculations of a party-machine\nare eroding the DPI\u2019s grassroots basis.\n\n\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recounting the\ncosts and motivations for action Subramaniam, a Tamil Dalit Liberation Movement\nactivist, encapsulated a problematic now confronting the DPI: \u2018None of us have\nsaved a penny in our activism. This movement is our asset. The liberty of the\npeople is our future. In that context it is unjust for someone to say: This is\nmy movement\u201d\u2019 (Interview 11 October 1999). The top-down allocation of\nseats and alliances, and the move from a movement responding to ideological\nimperatives and social injustices to a party with a set agenda renders the DPI\nincreasingly leader-centred. Father J noted the frustrations occasioned by this\ntrend and spoke of DPI youth, imprisoned due to previous radicalism, plotting\nrevenge against Thirumavalavan because they felt abandoned and betrayed\n(Personal communication, April 2006). If the groundswell of support that was\nevident in 1999 evaporates then the tactics will have back-fired. Supporting\nthe main parties has yet to ensure elections in reserved panchayats<\/em>, let alone objectives such as land-reform. Were\nThirumavalavan to become an MLA or MP then members would at least feel that\nthey have a voice, but in 2006 the two DPI MLAs were not only on the losing side\nthey were parachuted into the constituencies they contested. Is political\nengagement a failure then?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Social Impact of Politics?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Judging the decision to contest elections solely on the basis of\nvote-share and seats gained, would be mistaken. Democracy, Lefort (1988) shows,\nis as much about social practice as political institutions, and it is arguably\nin social terms that the greatest impact of DPI politics can be seen. Dialogue\nwith political opponents since their entry into the electoral sphere, for instance,\npotentially offers a more inclusive politics: that of Tamil nationalism.\nRajadurai and Geetha (2002: 121) claim that \u2018Dalits have a quarrel with the\nvery notion of Tamilness\u2019, and Nambath (2005) regards the DPI\u2019s adoption of\nTamil nationalism as a deliberate \u2018attempt to grow beyond identity politics\u2019\nenabled by the low social status of the dominant castes in Tamilnadu who \u2018owe\nno allegiance to Hindutva\u2019. What they neglect is the long-standing attachment\nto Tamilness occasioned by Dravidian ideology and anti-Hindi agitation. The\nDPI, thus, aspires to a \u2018nation of Tamils<\/em>\nundivided by caste\u2019 (Thirumavalavan: 18 July 1999).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The cross-cutting nature of social descriptors, led Pandian (2000: 515) to\nquestion the analytical utility of catch-all caste categories, arguing that the\ncomplexities of political coalitions and social mobility cannot be captured by\nreference to \u2018Dalits\u2019 and \u2018Backward Castes\u2019. We have seen that Dalit castes\nhave their own leaders, and cannot assume that Vanniyars share interests with other\nBackward Castes (Radhakrishnan 2002). The dominant discourse is restricted to\ncaste categories, obscuring the contingency of identity claims: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Vanniyar, however he may assert his specific caste identity, also\nclaims a Tamil ancestry and in this, rhetorically at least, is willing to be\npart of a common nation that is transcendent of caste (Rajadurai and Geetha\n2002: 123).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The contingent nature of identity formations and the possibilities of\nnon-caste activism were emphasised between 2004 and 2006. Having been locked in\nimplacable conflict with the PMK for a decade, the DPI began 2006 in alliance\nwith them. The roots of this rapprochement lie in the party leaders\u2019 attempt to\nmitigate spiralling caste violence, and their ability to forge a common identity\naround the supra-caste issue of Tamilness. Since 1999, the DPI have courted \u2013\nand been courted by \u2013 various political interests. In this process, a\ncommitment to Tamil self-determination took Thirumavalavan to Sri Lanka to support the fight for\na Tamil nation. The PMK shares this objective and both parties agreed to\ncampaign jointly as the Tamil Protection Movement (TPI).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tapping into an emotional political current, both parties have called for\nTamil medium education and the eradication of English titles for shops and\nfilms (MyTamil.com 2004, Tamil Info Daily 2005). Political immediacy colours\nthe cognitive template of DPI politics and the na\u00efve expectation that\ncommunities can be re-imagined so speedily reflects this. Thirumavalavan argued\nthat the TPI had fostered more harmonious social relationships: \u2018You will see\nthat there is no brutal violence against Dalits there now. There are no law and\norder issues also there. The northern districts are quite peaceful\u2019 (Warrier\n2006). Whilst the TPI has enabled DPI\/PMK (commonly seen as proxies for\nParaiyars and Vanniyars) dialogue, the rosy picture painted by Thirumavalavan\nis misleading. The lack of physical (brutal) violence against Dalits does not\nmean that the structural inequalities which render Dalits dependent upon the\ndominant castes have been addressed. Rather it bolsters arguments that much\ncollective violence is politically organised. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The truce between the rival parties is welcome, but unless and until the\nstructures of mind, body and resources are reconstructed Tamil Dalits will live\nunder the shadow of caste discrimination. Caste clashes are not spontaneous\neruptions of communal sentiment, rather they feed on everyday processes of\nidentity formation, misunderstanding and the cultural concepts of honour and\nshame (Gorringe 2006b). Establishing the humanity of the Dalits in the eyes of\ncaste superiors requires more than a political alliance as the 2001 results\ntestify. Even granting the reduction in caste enmity, though, there are grounds\nto question whether the TPI advances Dalit objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In articulating a \u2018Tamilian\u2019 identity, in fact, the TPI could compound\nthe marginalisation of the most vulnerable Dalits. The politicisation of a\nlinguistic ethnicity, marginalises Telegu-speaking Chakkiliyars further, and\nobscures the fact that Tamil nationalism has done little to mitigate\nuntouchability. Furthermore the TPI\u2019s nationalism has been accompanied by a\nmoral conservatism and ethnic chauvinism that clashes with a theoretical\ncommitment to women\u2019s rights. The stress on chastity and the virtues of \u2018Tamil\nwomen\u2019 that greeted a film actress\u2019 comments about pre-marital sex are in\ndirect contrast to earlier critiques of patriarchy and the cultural constraints\nplaced on women. \u2018All women wish to enter politics, wish to stand on the front\nline of such protests, do all husbands permit that?\u2019 – Thirumavalavan asked at a\nmovement wedding. Addressing the Women\u2019s Struggle Committee\u2019s protest against\npoll violence he went further still:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Woman\u2019 is taken to mean being the handmaid of her husband, women have\nyet to enter politics. Whether it be the Communist party or the Dravidian\nparties they see women as objects to be kept within boxes (Speech, 1 November\n1999).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In pursuing the TPI agenda, however, Thirumvalavan has joined the\n\u2018morality police\u2019 trying to impose an idea of virtue and rectitude onto Tamil\nwomen (cf. Anandhi 2005). This confirms the sense that the demand for women\u2019s\nrights was tokenistic. It is pertinent, here, that none of the DPI candidates\nin 2006 were women. Thirumavalavan said he would \u2018sacrifice anything for the\ncause of Tamil\u2019 (My-Tamil.com 2004), but if the Tamilian \u2018solution\u2019 to\nexclusive identity relegates Dalit interests it constitutes a \u2018dramatic dilution of its [DPI\u2019s] radicalism\u2019 (Anandhi 2005:\n4876). There is also a question mark over the extent to which an appeal\nto a trans-caste identity can be mobilised given the extent to which the\npolitical sphere has been colonised by caste concerns. Indeed, in April 2005,\nthe joint PMK\/DPI protests against the erosion of Tamil culture faltered in the\nface of two bye-elections (Venkatesh 2005). Is the DPI\u2019s radicalism now\nconfined to socio-political conservatism?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Concluding Remarks: Dalits and the\nPolitics of Opportunism<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Our people only think: If I don\u2019t like Karunanidhi,\nI\u2019ll vote for Jayalalitha. If I don\u2019t like the Two Leaves [AIADMK symbol], I\u2019ll\nvote for the Rising Sun [DMK symbol]. But what we need to ask is: what have\neither government done for the downtrodden?\u2019 (Thirumavalavan, Speech, 7 August\n1999).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Omvedt suggests that Dalit protest laid the basis of an \u2018alternative Indian <\/em>identity\u2019 (1994: 340). In TN this\nalternate identity has withered as the DPI is increasingly assimilated into\nDravidian hegemony. The centrality of caste to Tamil politics, however, makes\nthe revival of such a project both essential and overdue. Restricting such an\nendeavour to the \u2018Tamil nation\u2019 reveals a blinkered opportunism that ignores\nthe pan-Indian possibilities offered by the Dalit tag and the perils attending\nparticularist nationalism. Whilst broader in scope than a reactionary Tamil\nidentity, however, the Dalit struggle remains limited whilst \u2018Dalit\u2019 continues\nto be a proxy for \u2018untouchable\u2019. Anti-caste activism is undermined by\ncaste-based mobilisation mirroring the hegemonic social relations it aims to\ntransplant. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018The struggle for tolerance\u2019, as Subramanian concludes, \u2018will attain\nfuller success only if organisations less constrained by the interests of\ndominant or upwardly mobile groups play an important role in it\u2019 (1999: 329).\nDalit movements followed the established repertoire of protest to establish\nthemselves on the map of Tamil politics, but \u2018the existing repertoire [also]\nconstrains collective action\u2019 (Tilly 1986: 390). Continuing repression and isolation\nraises the question of what \u2018politics as normal\u2019 can achieve. The success of\nthe BSP makes it an obvious referent here, but Pai\u2019s analysis of the BSP raises\nsimilar dilemmas. Noting the compromises entered into by the party she argues\nthat it has failed to implement social change. In a question with resonance for\nthe Panthers, she insists that the BSP is \u2018faced with a difficult decision: is\nit a movement with an agenda for radical social change, or a political party\ndriven solely by the compulsion of achieving power?\u2019 (2002: 1). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Athu meeru\u2019 <\/em>(fight back,\nresist), was theDPI slogan that\ngalvanised Dalit resistance. The radicalism inherent in the assertion touched a\nnerve in rural TN and raised the prospect of a significant social\ntransformation. Chellamma \u2013 a landless labourer in a village blighted by caste\nviolence \u2013 insisted that; \u2018It is only if we return a blow for a blow that the\ngrindstone (ammi kallu) <\/em>will shift\u2019\n(Interview, 20 March 1999). The assertion rests on the dubious assumption that\ncounter-violence will make upper castes respect their social \u2018inferiors\u2019 as\nequals. The empirical evidence from Tamilnadu indicates that such optimism is\nmisplaced at best and probably counter-productive. The occasional use of\nviolent means may have discouraged groups minded to attack Dalits, but it has\nnot prevented anti-Dalit atrocities or shifted the structural inequalities\nwhich render Dalits dependent upon higher castes for land, work, water and\nother amenities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The DPI\u2019s transition to politics is an implicit acceptance of the failure\nof violent protest. Politics, as Mouffe argues, is about \u2018domesticating\nhostility\u2019 (2000: 149), and whilst elections have occasioned Paraiyar\/Vanniyar\nconflict, they have also facilitated (an imperfect) dialogue and the interaction\nseen above. The DPI certainly cannot hope for electoral success without\nreaching out to other groups. Unfortunately, scepticism about political\ninvolvement has been compounded as the DPI has compromised its ideals.\n\u2018Parliamentary politics is the deciding factor\u2019, Thirumavalavan assured me in\n1999, \u2018that is the centre of power\u2019 (Interview, 3 November 1999). The flaws in\nsuch analysis were papered over in justifying the DPI\u2019s engagement in electoral\npolitics, but they have since come home to roost. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pai concludes that the BSP reflects the ambitions of a class of Dalit\npower-seekers and differentiates it from grassroots attempts to erode the bases\nof caste domination. Her analysis begins to ring true for the DPI, as does her\nprescription for the BSP to democratise itself and articulate a new ideological\nperspective rooted in the material conditions of the disadvantaged (2002: 244).\nThe DPI insists that electoral participation is a tactical rather than\nideological move, but Coy and Hedeen (2005: 418) note how rarely movements\n\u2018return to other forms of contention\u2019. Short of the transformation outlined by\nPai, however, the DPI has institutional alternatives. In 2002, Wyatt (2002:\n753) noted that \u2018the possibility of a viable third front emerging cannot be\nignored\u2019. In 2006, Vijayakant\u2019s DMDK \u2013 which gained just under 10 per cent of\nthe vote and polled more the difference between victory and second place in\nmany instances – highlighted the viability of a serious, non-Dravidian\nalternative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This example suggests that the DPI could harness the politics of\nprinciple. The Dravidian parties have fomented casteism in Tamilnadu, as\nThirumavalavan avers. The eradication of caste discrimination, therefore, is\nnot furthered by shoring them up. The real prospect of a coalition government\nin 2006 has punctured the Dravidian parties\u2019 aura of invincibility. The DMK and\nAIADMK can no longer assume that governing the state is their birthright.\nTaking steps to establish an alternative can only further the democratisation\nof Tamilnadu and increase the credibility of the DPI. The enthusiasm accorded\nto autonomous Dalit candidates evaporates when \u2018our votes are for another\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Making \u2018room for dissent and foster[ing] the institutions in which it can\nbe manifested is vital for democracy\u2019, Mouffe (2000: 150) argues. Entering\nunstable and opportunistic alliances with political rivals is not a sustainable\nmeans of effecting social change: \u2018If a calf joins with piglets\u2019, DPI activist\nSubramani insisted, \u2018then the two will become one and you cannot distinguish\nbetween them \u2013 both run in the gutter\u2019 (Interview 27 April 1999). In striking\ncontrast to the promise of its political debut the DPI now constitutes an\noption not an empowering alternative. Unless it can revitalise its vision and\nmode of operation, the DPI\u2019s political participation will \u2018do nothing for Dalit\nrights\u2019 (Father J, Personal communication, April 2006). Alternately supporting\nthe rival Dravidian parties and placing a priority on Tamil rather than Dalit\nissues will not shift the grindstone of caste.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a>\nBackward Caste (BC) refers to the constitutional category of low-caste groups\ndeemed to require positive discrimination due to their social status. Many BCs,\nhowever, are politically powerful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> Empirical\ndata was collected in Tamilnadu between 1998-9. The multi-sited ethnography\nfocussed on Dalit movement activists, motivations, modes of operation, and\nideological aspirations. The data consists of 30 group discussions, 32 formal\nand 30 informal interviews with activists, leaders, academics and\nnon-participating Dalits. Interviews were complemented by participant\nobservation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> For\ndetailed accounts of Tamil politics see: Kohli (1990), Subramanian (1999), and\nWyatt (2002).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a>\nSee Harriss (2002: 107-8) and Gorringe (2005) for examples of mounting\nanti-Dalit hostility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a>\nGovernment of Tamilnadu, Statistical Handbook 2005. \u2018Other groups\u2019 are not\ndisaggregated. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> These\nfigures are for 1991. Source: Rath and Konlade (2000).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a>\nThe Indian Constitution rendered the practice of untouchability a punishable\noffence and reclassified Untouchables as \u2018Scheduled Castes\u2019 (SCs) by reference\nto a schedule of castes entitled to positive discrimination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a>\nLiteracy rates vary, with urban Dalits more literate than the average and rural\nDalits, especially in the West of the state trailing behind (Government of\nTamilnadu 2005).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> Paraiyars, Pallars, and Chakkiliyars\nare the largest Tamil SC groups. SCs constitute 18% of the population.\nParaiyars are the most populous. They live throughout Tamilnadu but are\nconcentrated in northern districts. Pallars are fewer in number but more\naffluent and better organised partly due to their higher social status. They\nare mainly based in the South and West. Chakkiliyars, the lowest of the main\nSCs, are traditionally landless. Many speak Telegu and are seen as outsiders.\nThey are distributed across Tamilnadu but mainly in central and western\ndistricts. The BC groups immediately competing against SCs are Vanniyars and\nThevars. Vanniyars gained Most Backward Caste status after successful agitation\nin the 1980s. They are the largest single Tamil community, accounting for 12\nper cent of the population, concentrated in the northern districts. Thevars\nhave an exaggerated sense of caste pride though their educational and economic\nachievements are negligible. They are BCs but are a major landowning caste in south\nTamilnadu. See Gorringe (2005:\n58-60).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a>\nMukkulathors are one of the most prominent Backward Caste groups in Tamilnadu.\nOBC (Other Backward Castes) refers to those castes perceived to require\naffirmative action to offset caste-based inequalities. Both groups are socially\n\u2018backward\u2019 but politically strong in Tamilnadu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a>\nAs someone who works for Dalit welfare, Father J is well placed to comment. As\nhe works closely with the DPI and other movements, however, he preferred not to\nbe named.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Gorringe, H Courtesy Journal of South Asian Development Vol. 2 (1): pp51-73 Abstract: Although Dalit orators and slogans threaten (or promise) to ‘turn Tamilnadu on its head’, the 2006 state elections offer Dalit analysts pause for thought. In compromising its principles and allying with established parties, the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (Movement) – the largest Dalit […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12,10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-95373","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-forum","category-world"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/95373","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=95373"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/95373\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=95373"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=95373"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=95373"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}

Government of Tamilnadu. 2005. Statistical Handbook: <\/em>http:\/\/www.tn.gov.in\/deptst\/<\/a> (Accessed 10\/09\/06)<\/p>\n\n\n\n