{"id":97002,"date":"2019-12-28T20:56:01","date_gmt":"2019-12-29T02:56:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/?p=97002"},"modified":"2019-12-28T13:38:03","modified_gmt":"2019-12-28T20:38:03","slug":"eelam-war-series-5-winning-the-eelam-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/2019\/12\/28\/eelam-war-series-5-winning-the-eelam-war\/","title":{"rendered":"EELAM WAR SERIES 5. WINNING THE EELAM WAR"},"content":{"rendered":"

KAMALIKA PIERIS<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n

The first three Presidents of\nSri Lanka made no effort to win the war, though victory was possible.  J.R. Jayewardene halted the Vadamarachchi\noperation (1987) which would have permanently ended the LTTE offensive.\n.Premadasa handed over arms, ammunition, cement and cash to the LTTE. The LTTE\nused the ammunition and arms to kill 600 policemen in 1990. In Kumaratunga\u2019s\ntime, the army was almost wiped out at Mullaitivu (1996). A weeping soldier said\nthe men had nothing to resist the LTTE with except a pistol and few\ngrenades.   Four years later,\nsoldiers   died of dehydration at Elephant Pass.  \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These Presidents helped to\nstrengthen the LTTE  and weaken the army.\nLTTE was able to bring in large shipments of arms, ammunition and equipment\nsince coastal defence was neglected.  <\/strong>Unsatisfactory military equipment caused\nchaos in the battlefield. Sia Marchetti and Pucara planes bought   in 1993 were soon grounded. By 2005, around\n26,000 soldiers had died. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The person primarily responsible for Sri Lanka \u2018s\nvictory over the LTTE in  May 2009  is Mahinda Rajapakse,  then \nPresident of Sri Lanka and Commander in Chief of the armed forces.\nRajapakse did not get on an elephant and go to war, but he was the force behind\nthe war. He withstood enormous international pressure   and pursued the\nwar with determination. .He monitored its progress\nand took necessary decisions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

He managed   international relations skillfully. He\nstrengthened  diplomatic ties and persuaded\nseveral countries to sell arms to Sri Lanka .Israel replaced two UAVs\nshot down by LTTE without any charge. When India\nrefused to sell arms, Sri Lanka\nturned to China.  A bilateral body was set up to maintain\ncontinuous dialogue  with India and keep it\nsupportive. India was kept\nbriefed at all times    Sri Lanka could\nhave won the war three weeks before May 19th. But this would have affected the\nelection prospects of India\u2019s\nCongress Party in Tamilnadu.  Rajapakse\ntherefore held back the troops. Once Tamilnadu went to polls, he ordered the\narmy to finish the job before the next government was installed in New Delhi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The next person responsible\nfor the victory was Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, brother to the\nPresident. Lalith Weeratunga said that he had never seen such a tech-savvy,\nresolute, no-nonsense Defence Secretary as Gotabhaya. Gotabhaya had been a\ncareer officer in the Sri\n Lanka army. He had received training in India, Pakistan\nand USA\nand had won two awards for bravery in action. .He had been a commander at    Vadamarachhi and   Operation Thrividabalaya    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gotabhaya was the mastermind behind the war .As\nearly as 2006 he had submitted a long list of expensive war equipment he wanted\npurchased because he wished to be well prepared. He said I knew that if we had\na committed team, right planning, required numbers and the weaponry we could\nachieve our goal .I was not ready to give in to anything or anybody.\u201d He sued a\nnewspaper that made defamatory allegations regarding the purchase of MiG 27s\nand refused a settlement out of court. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

He had unreserved access to the President  and was the link between the President and\nthe armed forces.He was a good tactician and personally handled intelligence.\nWiratunge observed that Gotabhaya cared about the lower ranks of the armed\nforces. He said most Defense Secretaries did not know the plight of the\nsoldiers and did not bother about things like houses for them but Gotabhaya\ndid. He knew their problems and looked into them.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gotabhaya selected the Service commanders\nincluding Fonseka  and ensured that the\nthree armed forces worked closely together.  \nHe was in close contact with the ground commanders at all stages of the\nbattle. He sorted out their logistical problems and at times directly\nintervened to facilitate coordination between the different forces. Details\nwere looked into and requests processed quickly.His leadership style included\nsupporting as well as directing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 For the\nfirst time, the government followed a carefully planned strategy against the\nLTTE .War operations, from 1976 to 2002 were studied to find what had gone\nwrong. They found nothing wrong with the armed forces and concluded that they\ncould win. The\narmed forces were increased    to 450,000 with 300,00 for the army.   A dozen new fighting formations were\ncreated    \u201dLTTE thought that we didn\u2019t\nhave sufficient troops to hold the east and we lulled everyone into believing\nthis\u201d said\nGotabhaya. When Mavil Aru was blocked, we were ready\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government somehow\nmanaged to purchase the necessary military supplies despite cash flow problems\nand the need to keep the economy afloat. It set up a company, Lanka Logistics\nand Technologies for arms purchases. The directors were Secretary to Treasury,\nSecretary for Defense, chief of defense staff, the three service commanders and\nIGP. Local agents of foreign arms dealers were excluded.The company dealt\ndirectly with   foreign governments.  Purchasing procedures were trimmed and\npurchase approvals speeded up.   This had\nneeded some heavy handed measures by Gotabhaya. Arms purchases were based on\nrecommendations of the military with Gotabhaya making the final decision.\nFighter aircraft were purchased. Also, different bombs for different targets.. Earlier there was\nonly one type of bomb for all targets. Sri Lanka could\nhave saved a lot of money if it had set up this organization decades earlier. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Defying accepted military strategy the army\nattacked the enemy at their strongest points, not the weakest. This took LTTE\nby surprise.  The army fought on several\nfronts simultaneously.  Nearly all\nassaults were made in heavily mined areas. The momentum was never allowed to\nslacken. Instead of the large formations used in the past, the army was trained\nto fight in small teams of four and eight. These teams were trained to go\nforward on their own. They succeeded in advancing 8 to 12 kilometers per day. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Initially they did not go for territory but went\nfor the LTTE itself, killing and injuring as many\nas possible.   LTTE were harried in all\ndirections  and eventually lost their\nmost experienced fighters and also their morale.    The army then started taking territory. In\nten months, it reached Pooneryn in the north\n west and neared Mullaitivu on the east. The air force\nand navy were sent to hold this  territory  leaving the army free to go forward. Air\nforce was sent into the jungles, the navy to the coastal belt along\nTrincomalee.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Modern\nwars are not won solely on the ground. Navy and air support are essential. LTTE\nhad eight merchant ships that were bringing in ammunition. They were floating\nwarehouses carrying an arsenal which would have sustained the war for years.  These ships were destroyed in 2006 and 2007.\nThis task which took years to plan was executed to perfection by the aging Sri Lanka\nfleet. LTTE could not land a single shipment of arms thereafter  and started retreating on all fronts. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The air force took on several LTTE targets from\nthe air. They destroyed strategic locations and artillery positions. They went\nat bunkers,  camps munitions dumps  and     fuel dumps. Some dumps had two or three\nhundred thousand liters of fuel. They attacked Sea Tiger bases,  hit concealed vessels  and boat building yards. They forced the LTTE to shift\ntheir daytime training  to night. \nLTTE leaders also had to go underground. Planes provided air support for\nthe ground attacks, clearing the way for advancing troops. At Puthukudirippu\nthe helicopter squadron flew many sorties, day and night. It was like 31st\nnight\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Air force never gave in. When LTTE attacked Anuradhapura air base in\nOctober 2007, they went after Tamil Selvam and killed him. This stunned the\nLTTE and damaged its morale. The LTTE acquired air capability, with light fixed\nwing aircraft.This was the first ever air threat to a conventional air force by\na terrorist organization. Air force countered it with an air defense network,\nput together within the record time of one year. It usually took 5 to 8 years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

After every LTTE attack in Colombo the facilitators and supporters who\nprovided intelligence, finance and housing for the attack team were arrested. The government set up checkpoints and\nroadblocks, raided lodges, conducted cordon and search operations.  These measures were unpopular at the start,\nbut they helped break the rich LTTE support network in Colombo and elsewhere. Collaboration between\nthe military, police, and intelligence service led to the strangling of the\nLTTE in the south, reducing their ability to operate effectively specially in Colombo. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sri Lanka took 2 years and ten months   to\neliminate the LTTE  Paranthan,\nOddusuddan, Elephant\n Pass, the administrative\ncentre, Kilinochchi and the naval headquarters, Mullaitivu    fell in 2009.  LTTE leaders were cornered and killed. They\nwere not allowed to get away.  There was\na navy blockade at Mullaitivu and planes were stationed at China Bay[1]<\/a>to\nprevent them escaping.  On May 18 Army Commander,\nFonseka had told President that the end could not be achieved within the day. This\nwas contradicted by the field commanders and victory was declared on May 19\n2009. ( continued)
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Island 2.3.2010 p 6.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

KAMALIKA PIERIS The first three Presidents of Sri Lanka made no effort to win the war, though victory was possible.  J.R. Jayewardene halted the Vadamarachchi operation (1987) which would have permanently ended the LTTE offensive. .Premadasa handed over arms, ammunition, cement and cash to the LTTE. The LTTE used the ammunition and arms to kill […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[104],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-97002","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-kamalika-pieris"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/97002","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=97002"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/97002\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=97002"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=97002"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lankaweb.com\/news\/items\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=97002"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}