Insinuations regarding the
Muttur Massacres
Prof Rajiva Wijesinha
Secretary General
Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process
SECRETARY GENERAL
Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process
Block 05,BMICH,Bauddhaloka Mw,Colombo-07,
Sri Lanka
SCOPP/40 27th June 2007
Insinuations regarding the Muttur Massacres
There has been much publicity recently regarding the killing of 17 ACF
workers in Muttur last year. This is particularly worrying to the Secretariat
for Monitoring the Peace Process, since it will contribute to a further
erosion of confidence amongst stakeholders. While one of our main purposes
now is confidence building, as the National Peace Council noted at a
recent consultative meeting, it is equally important to deal with the
erosion of confidence.
This has been increased by the recent press release of the International
Commission of Jurists. In dealing with it however, it is also necessary
to go back into the history of the allegations concerning the event,
as well as the event itself, in order to get a clearer picture of the
use being made of this tragic episode.
The Birnbaum Addendum, the Secretary-General's Letter and the ICJ Press
Release
The ICJ release is based on an addendum to his initial report issued
by Mr Michael Birnbaum, the observer into the inquest that it appointed.
Though there are some procedural points in this report too, as media
reports indicate, the main focus is the question of a discrepancy between
two descriptions of one bullet found in relation to the killing. Mr
Birnbaum's report is based on a report by the Australian Forensic Pathologist,
Dr Malcolm Dodd.
Obviously such a discrepancy could have arisen for two reasons, either
because two experts reached different conclusions, or because they were
looking at two different bullets. Sadly Mr Birnbaum assumes the latter
without any reasons.
As he is well aware, Dr Dodd has photographs taken at the examination
on October 24/25, at which he observed the work of the Sri Lankan pathologist
Dr Waidaratne, whom he commends. The description in Dr Dodd's subsequent
report seems to be based on those photographs. It would therefore have
been proper to have checked as to whether the bullet on which the subsequent
description was made was a different bullet, or the same one as in the
photographs.
The identification that is in dispute was by a Sri Lankan ballistics
expert, who has no doubt that it is the same bullet. The ICJ insistence
that it was a different bullet, which has been substituted, makes no
sense when clearly there has been no attempt to inspect the bullet in
question and compare it with Dr Dodd's photograph. When he was given
Dr Dodd's report, the government expert stood by his description, and
sent his reasons to Dr Dodd, and suggested a discussion. There has as
yet been no response to this.
Though one or the other may have been mistaken, neither has at any
stage suggested that there was tampering with a bullet or a photograph.
It is unfortunate therefore that Mr Birnbaum claims there are 'powerful
grounds to suspect that someone removed from the exhibits a bullet that
he thought might be incriminating and substituted another' and that
the ICJ release speaks definitely of evidence. Such an assertion would
be laughed out of court in any serious judicial system. More worryingly,
it strikes at the heart of the confidence that the ICJ should command.
The matter itself can be swiftly resolved by recourse to photographs,
those Dr Dodd has and those of the object - still available - on which
the Government analyst made his report. It should be noted that Dr Dodd
is a forensic pathologist, and not a ballistics expert. If there is
a discrepancy between his views and those of the Sri Lankan ballistics
expert, perhaps the services of a ballistics expert, Australian or the
British acquaintance Mr Birnbaum mentions, could be obtained.
It should also be noted that Mr Birnbaum adds to the emotive impact
of his report by citing selectively countries in which Dr Dodd has worked.
The impression seems to be that he wants Sri Lanka to be seen in the
same light at Kosovo and East Timor and the Solomon Islands, whereas
here we have a case of a government voluntarily requesting assistance
which has been graciously supplied by the Australian government.
To exacerbate Mr Birnbaum's excesses, it was conveyed through a letter
from the ICJ Secretary General that incorporated even more staggering
leaps of faith. Dr Dodd's one disputed bullet has turned into 'bullets'
and there is a claim of 'evidence of tampering' which is an advance
on Mr Birnbaum's 'powerful grounds to suspect'. The ICJ release seems
to rely on its Secretary General's egregious interpolation rather than
Mr Birnbaum's report, let alone the professional report by Dr Dodd.
That the Secretary General's letter has also been made public is apparent
from some newspaper reports that use the work 'tampering' which appears
neither in Mr Birnbaum's report nor in the press release.
Finally, the ICJ report includes what seems comprehensive knowledge
of the weapons issued to Sri Lankan armed forces and their movements
which is not sourced. It is possible that this information was supplied
by elements that are anxious to discredit the armed forces. This is
worrying for the reasons given below.
General Henricsson's prejudices
The sustained prejudice against the Sri Lankan armed forces in this
connection began with the initial report furnished by the Head of the
Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission who ruled categorically that the killing
of the 17 workers was a gross violation of the CFA by the Security Forces
of Sri Lanka.
Gen Henricsson's reasoning is however bizarre. One reason he gives
is 'Firstly the SLMM cannot find the reasons for the restrictions of
movements into the said areas especially in above mentioned circumstances
acceptable, thereby strongly indicating the GOSL's eagerness to conceal
the matter from the SLMM.'
Firstly, Gen Henricsson confuses the security forces with the GOSL.
Secondly, that the SLMM does not accept the reasons given cannot be
taken as indicating something. Thirdly, his refusal to accept the reasons,
namely the safety and security of the SLMM, is particularly preposterous,
given that this is the same man who withdrew SLMM monitors from naval
vessels, partly because of 'statements by the LTTE instructing SLMM
to limit its activities and refrain from sailing with SLN vessels or
face the risk to put their monitors into danger'. Clearly threats from
particular sources work with Gen Henricsson whereas advice of danger
is immediately suspect.
Gen Henricsson's ruling goes on to say that 'At the same time as denying
SLMM entry into the area, the GOSL had provided escorts for a number
of journalists wishing to enter the area, by this showing that the restrictions
put on the SLMM freedom of movement were grounded on other reasons'.
Since such journalists were amongst those who highlighted the killing
of the ACF workers, suggesting that GOSL had nothing to hide in taking
them in, Gen Henricsson seems to have lost all control of logic in his
prejudice against the Sri Lankan government as well as its armed forces.
Then, for his next reason, Gen Henricsson says that 'Taking into consideration
the fact that the Security Forces had been present in Muttur at the
time of the incident it appears highly unlikely to blame other groups
for the attack. Provided that was the case it would be particularly
illogical for the security forces to prevent the SLMM from entering
the area and making proper inquiries in order to find the perpetrator(s).'
This is absolute nonsense, perhaps caused by Gen Henricsson's lack
of familiarity with the English language. There is no indication of
what is supposed to be the case, whether it is 'it appears highly unlikely'
or 'the fact that the Security Forces had been present in Muttur'. There
is no discussion of whether other groups might have been present in
addition to the Security Forces, even begging the question of the precise
timing of the incident.
The nonsense is aggravated by Gen Henricsson's confused chronology.
He states categorically that the LTTE withdrew 'from Muttur center during
the day of Thursday August 3rd bringing the the GOSL troops back into
town. This information has been confirmed by the reports provided to
the SLMM'.
Whilst it must be accepted that the chronology of those days is uncertain,
even at the time the general impression was not in accordance with Gen
Henricsson's pronouncements. The Sunday Leader claimed on its front
page on August 6th that 'The LTTE pulled out its cadres from Muttur
Friday evening after three consecutive days of fighting and the Security
Forces moved into the city and started clearing operations'. Though
elsewhere the Leader (which has been concerned throughout, even at the
risk of self-contradiction, to fix the blame on the government) had
another view, a more reliable source is the Jaffna University Teachers
for Human Rights report which, also reproduced in the Leader, shows
the LTTE pulled out of the town area on August 4th. Incidentally, the
Leader four weeks later cited the only source that Gen Henricsson names
in his ruling, 'the Political Wing leader, Mr Elilan' (of the LTTE,
though that is not specified) to the effect that 'the LTTE went into
Muttur town on August 1st and withdrew at 12 midnight on August 3'.
That, despite his interview with Mr Elilan Gen Henricsson got his chronology
all wrong in an official report, is simply another element that indicates
the frivolous nature of his ruling.
Whilst there are arguments to suggest that the incident in fact took
place later, it is astonishing that the international community continues
to place reliance on a man who categorically makes statements that are
highly dubious.
Finally, there is a third reason for Gen Henricssons's definite ruling,
namely 'confidential conversations with highly reliable sources regarding
the party who most likely has been responsible for the act.' In the
references cited in the report he cites nine such sources, as well as
'Observations made by the Head of SLMM and the Head of SLMM Trincomalee'.
Three of the sources are security personnel, but they are all from the
police, and based at Trincomalee. He has not interviewed anyone in the
security forces at Muttur, nor anyone in the army, nor is there any
suggestion that he tried to do so. He also interviewed personnel of
the Trincomalee hospital, though there is no reference in his report
to the post mortem examination of the JMO.
In addition there are 'Interviews with the international personnel
of the ACF' and 'Communication with relevant actors within the International
Community'. Who these last are is not mentioned, which is unfortunate
since one of the reasons for the ruling is that 'The views have not
proved contradictory and the security forces are widely and consistently
deemed to be responsible for the incident'.
Then there is an interview with 'family members of one of the victims',
though where these persons are based is not indicated. Most tellingly
there is an 'Interview with the Political Wing leader, Mr Elilan', who
obviously needs no other identification. Whether it was stupidity or
cunning that led Henricsson to omit that this is the Political Wing
of the LTTE, the fact that he is the only person mentioned by name in
the report is a particularly telling faux pas, not least in the context
of the characterization of him as 'highly reliable'.
Finally there is 'Information received from an eyewitness'. We are
not told what the person was an eyewitness of. The word in this context
would imply an eyewitness of the killings, but the failure of the report
to assert categorically that there is direct evidence of who did the
killing indicates that the eyewitness account was of something else.
What this was remains shrouded in mystery.
Equally significant is the use here of the word 'information' as opposed
to 'interview', indicating that this evidence was received at second
hand. Apart from the culpable failure of Gen Henricsson and his cohorts
to interview such an important witness, or to indicate why they failed
to do so, the question arises as to their source for this information.
If it was one of their interviews, the suggestion, given the order in
which the sources are cited, is that it was Mr Elilan. Sadly, none of
this is publicized internationally, as opposed to Gen Henricsson's definitive
conclusion.
Initial suspicions about Gen Henricsson's objectivity were compounded
by his further pronouncements on the incident. He seems to have delivered
them at a commemoration by Action Contre Faim of the second month anniversary
of the deaths of their workers. It was not clear whether this was in
Paris, and whether he had been specially flown in for the occasion.
Needless to say, his statement that categorically put the blame on the
Sri Lankan armed forces was given prominent coverage by the LTTE.
Why Gen Henricsson has not been taken to task for his message to ACF
remains a mystery. The current Head of the SLMM has assured the Sri
Lankan Peace Secretariat that there are strict conditions on monitors,
including a ten year moratorium on going public with their experiences.
Whilst obviously there are rogue elements in any establishment, it is
sad that, instead of taking such elements to task, the international
community continues to rely on their assertions.
The role of Action Contre Faim
Finally, it is clear, if only from their assiduous cultivation of Gen
Henricsson, that the Agency to which the murdered workers were attached
is anxious to establish that the Sri Lankan forces were responsible
for the deaths. One reason for this may be that, were this established,
their own role in putting their workers at serious risk would not come
under scrutiny. If for instance the workers were killed by say the LTTE,
or perhaps home guards of the area who had responded wildly to the initial
LTTE attack on Muttur, the Agency would certainly be found culpable
for not having taken sufficient precautions. However, by focusing attention
on the Sri Lankan armed forces, and claiming that the massacre definitely
occurred after Sri Lankan forces were in control of the area, they divert
attention from their own culpability in having sent the workers into
a war torn area and having kept them there when the workers themselves
had asked to be evacuated.
Though there is no need to think in terms of one current conspiracy
theory, that the ACF actually wanted the workers killed, so as to attack
the Sri Lankan government, it takes only one rotten egg, briefed by
someone who wanted such aid workers placed in a dangerous situation,
to create mayhem.
But, rejecting the idea of guilt, as opposed to culpability, the role
of ACF as a whole in this episode is distinctly unsavoury. The report
of the University Teachers for Human Rights has drawn attention to at
best the ignorance, at worst the callous indifference, of the ACF, when
it notes that, 'On 1st August the army had commenced a large military
operation south of Muttur the previous day and the ICRC was also pulling
out of the area. Why the ACF sent a group of local workers by vehicle
from Trincomalee without a French national accompanying them, suggests
their ignorance of the ground situation. When the local workers agreed
to go by themselves despite advice to the contrary by the non violent
peace force cannot now be answered'.
Who this 'non violent peace force' was is not mentioned. But certainly
the 'international personnel of the ACF' cited by Henricsson should
be questioned in detail, which they have thus far managed to avoid because
of their determination to criticize the Security Forces. Certainly there
must be suspicion at least of the bona fides of some members of the
organization, international or local ones, given its determination to
keep the 17 aid workers in Muttur in spite of the advice they received
from so many disinterested sources. The UTHR report begins by citing
a brother of one of the 17 who called an acquaintance in Colombo on
August 2nd, to ask for help. Since at this time clearly communication
with the aid workers direct was not a problem, one would assume such
concerned relations were also indicating to them that they should vacate
the place.
The report goes on to mention 'a church official with the acting Divisional
Secretary for Muttur' advising them to leave the office on Thursday.
The same official and the DS went again on Friday morning with the same
advice. In the afternoon (when, according to Gen Henricsson, the aid
workers were already dead), a relative of 'M Narmathan, one of the ACF
workers' spoke to him and advised him to leave, and later a Roman Catholic
nun 'told another ACF worker Kodeeswaran very strongly that he should
either go with them or stay with Father the parish priest'.
The UTHR Report notes the aid workers rejected this advice because
'their head office had asked them to stay in the premises'. Narmathan
had explained that they were asked 'to remain in the office for transport
that would be sent the next day'. Arulrajah obviously believed this
too. But given the situation, which must have been reported to the 'international
personnel of the ACF', that the residents of the area strongly advised
either immediate withdrawal from the city, or else refuge at a church,
it is quite extraordinary that those personnel are reported, on Thursday,
and on Friday, to have asked the workers to stay on in the office.
Perhaps realizing how suspicious their actions looked, in a context
in which the ICRC 'was also pulling out of the area', ACF later pointed
out that 'At the time the workers went to Muttur the security situation
was normal'. That is ridiculous, and the attitude of the privileged
Europeans in the ACF is made even clearer by what the Leader notes,
that 'The advice from the Trinco ACF office to the workers who had planned
to return that evening (August 1) was to wear their ACF t-shirts, raise
the ACF flag in the office compound and stay inside the office which
is in Muttur town'. That workers sent in on August 1st should have wanted
to get back that very evening, and been dissuaded by the complacent
foreigners in Trincomalee, has not been sufficiently highlighted, and
should be raised forcefully both by those in Paris who govern the organization
as well as journalists and human rights activists universally.
The desire to return was on August 1st. By Thursday it seems the workers,
'reportedly in a good mental state' until then (while battles by all
accounts raged around them in what the Leader claimed were 'three consecutive
days of fighting' until Friday evening), got upset. 'Some started to
cry', though how that was ascertained and by whom is not indicated.
'Meanwhile' (whatever date is referred to, following the earlier sanguine
assumption that wearing ACF t-shirts would keep the workers safe) ACF
'endeavoured to evacuate their employees - "We pleaded with everyone
possible, the police, army, navy, ICRC, LTTE to check on the safety
of our workers," ACF sources said'. This is contradicted by the
UTHR report that one of the workers had claimed that 'their head office
had asked them to remain in the office for transport that would be sent
the next day'.
Obviously this is something else that clearly should be checked, particularly
with the ICRC, given too that David Vignati of the ICRC is quoted as
saying that '"Among the civilians escaping Muttur fighting on August
4th, there were effectively also three ICRC national staff"'. This
exodus had begun about 6 am on the 4th, when even according to Gen Henricsson's
account the ACF workers were still alive. The detailed account by the
UTHR of the several attempts made by civilians to persuade the ACF workers
to take shelter elsewhere is ignored in the Leader's later account,
with its heavy reliance on its ACF and ICRC and LTTE sources, the first
of which, suspiciously enough, remains anonymous.
It is astonishing then that the international community has not subjected
ACF to much greater scrutiny about its actions. This may be an unfortunate
consequence of international organizations necessarily standing by each
other whatever the evidence of culpability. It could also be a result
of the concerted campaign, in which ACF so skillfully enlisted Gen Henricsson,
to insist on the culpability of the Sri Lankan forces.
Certainly the sustained campaign, that has used a biased and inaccurate
report, compounded now by arbitrary pronouncements by the ICRC, can
only contribute to increasing suspicions in a context in which confidence
in basic principles of justice and fair play must be promoted. Whilst
confirming the need for a full and free inquiry therefore into the deaths,
the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process calls for the international
community also to ensure that the decision makers at ACF and General
Henricsson are questioned as to their role in this process, along with
the officials at the ICJ responsible for twisting the contents of Prof
Dodd's report.
Prof Rajiva Wijesinha
Secretary General
Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process
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