CLASSIFIED | POLITICS | TERRORISM | OPINION | VIEWS





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Human Rights of a Few or Human Lives of All?

Dilrook Kannangara

Due to extreme hypocrisy of vociferous human rights activists human lives are endangered. Strangely when the LTTE carries out barbaric acts against civilians these human rights humbugs are dead silent. The government must decide what is more important between human rights and human lives; people have already decided and unless the government follows suit, thing may turn very ugly. This article aims at explaining a civilian’s experience and the unpublished truth most Sri Lankans keep to themselves. Sri Lanka which is the oldest democracy in Asia is under threat from the most barbaric terrorists in the whole wide world. Increasingly the islanders feel insecure not only because of terrorist activity but also owing to lop-sided, hypocritical and naïve response from the international community for counter-terrorism measures. However, the government is duty bound to protect its civilians not terrorists. The need of the hour is not to satisfy the international community that Sri Lanka has the world’s best human rights record, but to provide effectively public security. The failure to do so will essentially lead to a situation where people will form into armed groups and give a free rein to violence.

The success of the present administration in the last two years can be directly attributed to law and order, calm and peace that generally prevailed in Colombo and other government controlled areas.

There was a rapid degeneration of security in Colombo with the withdrawal of a famous (infamous for a few) paramilitary group. The leader of this group became a folk hero among Sri Lanka even though he had committed many acts of terror through out his life. This claim can be justified by studying in detail the level of security in Colombo over the years of the conflict and the level of paramilitary activity.

Era 1: 1983-1987
Commander-in-chief: JR Jayawardena
Warfront: intense
Number of LTTE attacks in Colombo, etc.: many
Level of paramilitary involvement in Colombo: zero
Level of paramilitary involvement in the North-East: low

This was a time when the LTTE raised its ugly head in Sri Lanka supported by the world-wide arms embargo on Lanka. However, security forces unleashed a savage war against the tigers with available resources and scored many victories. However, tigers had an easy run in Colombo. Many huge bomb blasts rocked the nation including the Pettah and Maradana bombs. There was a time in 1986 when the bomb scare hit almost everywhere in Colombo including schools. Many explosions also took place during that time. It was a time when no paramilitary activity was seen in the South. Conventional army techniques of tracking infiltrators, conventional investigations, public vigilance and scant security forces presence were the key characteristics of that time. The North had a few paramilitary groups; but they were involved in direct warfare with the LTTE in which they proved disastrous.

Era 2: 1987-1988
Commander-in-chief: JR Jayawardena
Warfront: no war between them
Number of LTTE attacks in Colombo, etc.: none
Level of paramilitary involvement in Colombo: zero
Level of paramilitary involvement in the North-East: medium

The Indian Army (IPKF) was operating in Lanka; they were entangled in a bitter war with the LTTE. The IPKF introduced paramilitary forces in the North-East, mainly the Tamil National Army. EPRLF also had a military wing violently opposed to the LTTE. These para groups were very effective in weeding out LTTE elements in the Northern society.

As a result there were relatively few LTTE infiltrations into IPKF controlled areas. Jaffna City was declared a no-war zone and there were high number of low intensity LTTE activities.

Era 3: 1988-1993
Commander-in-chief: R Premadasa
Warfront: no war at start, inconsistent warfare later
Number of LTTE attacks in Colombo, etc.: few
Level of paramilitary involvement in Colombo: heavy
Level of paramilitary involvement in the North-East: low

Following subversion and terrorism by the JVP, a large number of paramilitary groups spun up in Colombo and elsewhere in the country. Special Task Force (STF) was also considered a paramilitary force and was allowed to function with relative impunity. There were only a few bomb explosions that took place in Colombo. The explosion in 1993 was masterminded by a close associate of the victim and the attack on Lalith was never really resolved as an act of the LTTE. However, amidst violence in the North and the East, Colombo and the rest of the country remained peaceful. Owing to heavy media clamp down, very little recorded evidence exist of how paramilitary activities were carried out. But anyone lived in the City at that time would have many experiences of them including evidence of their conduct.

Schools opened up and workplaces recommenced work thanks to them. Tiger infiltrations, activities of tiger sympathisers and publicising pro-LTTE and separatist views were handled violently. Many LTTE bomber groups were manhandled violently by both the military and the paramilitaries. Police intelligence divisions maintained a close nexus with the youth in the area for mutual benefits; sometimes these benefits exceeded the bounds of morality. However, public security was well managed and as a result business thrives in spite of the ongoing war. The entry-exit points from LTTE controlled areas remained closed; civilian movement was allowed after an intense and individual check followed by an interview. These were conducted in an atmosphere of impunity allowing enough authority to separate out terror elements.

Era 4: 1983-1994
Commander-in-chief: DB Wijetunga
Warfront: heavy
Number of LTTE attacks in Colombo, etc.: almost none
Level of paramilitary involvement in Colombo: heavy
Level of paramilitary involvement in the North-East: low but growing

The war intensified with the new no-nonsense national leader struggling to put things in order. He maintained the paramilitary groups that had become indispensible by then. There were a few paramilitary groups operating in the North. However, their area of operation was very limited. STF played an increasingly important role in handling security at economic establishments. Often they ventured out of these establishments in what was knows as ‘cleaning operations’. Tigers tried many times to cause havoc in the City but failed all the time thanks to heavy handling of trouble makers and potential trouble makers. Matters in entry/exit points remained same.

Era 5: 1994-2001
Commander-in-chief: CB Kumaratunga
Warfront: heavy, inconsistent later
Number of LTTE attacks in Colombo, etc.: many
Level of paramilitary involvement in Colombo: zero
Level of paramilitary involvement in the North-East: notable to heavy in the North

Colombo and all government controlled areas were rid of paramilitants. The STF was brought under the Army Act and was hurriedly dispatched to camps in the East. The close nexus between police intelligence divisions and others was broken. Police was put in charge of security of many establishments. They never ventured out to the surrounds of the establishment they were guarding to ensure security in the vicinity of their presence. Harassments caused by security measures became more prominent than effective security measures. Road blocks, road closures and other conventional security measures became prominent. As expected, many bomb blasts took place outside war zones.

Driven by this success, for the first time, LTTE attack parties came to Colombo. They staged some of the fiercest attacks in Sapugaskanda, Central Bank, Katunayake and Rajagiriya. This proved that it was safe for tigers to live in Colombo without being targeted by anyone. Lorry loads of bombs were used in terror attacks. In an epic display of extreme incompetency none other than the Commander-in-Chief herself admitted that the security forces had apprehended the Torrington bomber (1995) a day before the blast only to be released! This type of happenings would never have taken place before. More than 20 bombs went-off during this time.

However, Jaffna district became increasingly safe after the army captured it in 1995. Jaffna security was managed both by the military and paramilitaries. Many attempts to capture Jaffna by infiltration failed as a direct result of heavy paramilitary presence.

Era 5: 2001-2005
Commander-in-chief: CB Kumaratunga
Warfront: inaction by SL, covert warfare by LTTE
Number of LTTE attacks in Colombo, etc.: many
Level of paramilitary involvement in Colombo: zero
Level of paramilitary involvement in the North-East: reduced but active

A large number of assassinations took place in government controlled areas. Many intelligence officers and elite military corps were targeted by the LTTE with impunity. However, suicide (self killing of the attacker) bombings were unnecessary for the LTTE. The suicide attack on the EPDP leader was notable. Even conventional security mechanisms were dismantled. The government was essentially kept under siege by the LTTE; it became helpless to execute the law. Tigers showed all signs of ducking the global war on terror and were preparing for what they called the ‘final war’. However, the government allowed limited paramilitary activity in the North carried out mainly by a politico-paramilitary group supported by the government. Both the UNP-majority Cabinet and the PA-led Presidency were supportive of limited engagement of this group. As a result, amidst wide spread belief that Jaffna might fall to the tigers, it didn’t happen.

Era 6: 2005-2007
Commander-in-chief: M Rajapakse
Warfront: intense
Number of LTTE attacks in Colombo, etc.: few
Level of paramilitary involvement in Colombo: heavy
Level of paramilitary involvement in the North-East: heavy

The government had to arrest the fast degenerating security situation. The rift between the LTTE and the TMVP was an essential part in managing them. Many tiger operatives in Colombo were tracked down and handled appropriately. Colombo was safe once again for the general public. Many believed by that time that the whole Colombo City will be exploded by the LTTE. These fears were tactfully alleviated by the government that allowed paramilitary activity. Many sleepers were nabbed with their explosives. Many terrorists that planted bombs were identified and destroyed thanks to the newly established information derivation systems including interrogation. Meanwhile the covert war in the North and the East heated up as never before.

Jaffna was also kept under military and paramilitary rule. Dozens of tiger attempts to capture Jaffna which is considered their heart failed miserably as infiltrators were detected and eliminated. Very large hauls of explosives were recovered.

However, the tigers were desperate to launch attacks in Colombo. They knew very well that any attack party would meet with sure death if ventured into the South. Consequently they came with a novel idea by end March 2007. Two tiger planes dropped crude bombs into the Katunayake air force base. Again another tiger air attack was carried out in April.

Then came the liberation of the East. East was a vast area of land and required a very large number of security forces personnel to guard it. Tigers openly boasted about attacking the army when it is stretched to the fullest. However, Eastern paramilitants did a fantastic job by maintaining their security. Many pro-LTTE groups demanded, pleaded and begged to disarm the paras to no avail. Reason prevailed in the security top brass as another tiger attempt failed.

However, by then all paramilitants who operated in Colombo and suburbs were sent to the East once again just as how CBK did in 1994.

Era 7: 2007-to the present
Commander-in-chief: M Rajapakse
Warfront: decisive
Number of LTTE attacks in Colombo, etc.: many
Level of paramilitary involvement in Colombo: zero
Level of paramilitary involvement in the North-East: heavy

Colombo started to grab headlines again. After the send-off of paramilitary groups from Colombo and other government controlled areas, tigers restarted to infiltrate into these areas. For the first time in the history of this war, tigers used remote controlled claymore bombs in large numbers in and around Colombo. Free movement of tigers spelt disaster for the Anuradhapura Airforce Base.

To make matters worse, the Supreme Court enforce Constitutional provisions on fundamental rights which were enacted before the war began in 1978. Lodgers in Colombo have been notorious in harbouring not only terrorists but also many other undesirable, unlawful and immoral elements. At any given time more than 20,000 are expected to stay in these cheap hotels. Almost all of them come from war zones and were ethnic Tamils. In 2007 the Police started a campaign to provide transport to willing lodge-stayers who had no real reason to stay back to their villages. About 150 were thus transported back. Then all hell broke lose and this campaign was hastily abandoned. The Supreme Court enforced the pre-war Constitution and warned the police. Consequently more than 2,000 suspects were arrested.

Again the pre-war constitution messed with security measures in dismantling permanent road blocks that were seen vital in deterring terrorist movements and sustaining a sense of security among the general public. Yet the Supreme Court ordered against night searches. Studying all the recent terror attacks in civilian areas, it is apparent that all explosive devices were readied at night.

Following the liberation of the East all paramilitaries were disbanded from Colombo. The absence of paramilitaries revealed the vulnerability of Colombo and suburbs. Tigers managed to cause repeated blasts without killing any of their own cadres. One world famous suicide attack on the EPDP leader was another milestone during this time.

The relationship between paramilitary activities and public security is undeniable. The fact that all complicated and technocratic armies have failed against the terrorists the world over (terrorists use mostly primitive weapons) is also undeniable. Other undeniable facts include the following.

  • public security was the key to past military successes and national security
  • public security heavily influences the national economy
  • public security underpins the public support for the war effort

Therefore the government must use any and every available means to ensure that the 20 million Sri Lankans are safe and secure from terrorist attacks. Measures that affect only a fraction of this population are surely relevant and effective. All security measures have spill-over effects and nasty by-products; but their benefits far outweigh and outnumber their demerits.

As a responsible government, this government must bring back the days when amidst war in warzones, peace prevailed elsewhere. These proven methods must be used as there is no time for experiments. Going by the promises of the government and the Army Commander, the war shall be won within a maximum of 12 months. If so, a few human rights violations of a fraction of the total populace for just 12 months that can save all the fundamental rights of millions over decades must be compromised for bigger good. Bring back the able bodies that petrified the terrorists to take an aerial route to Colombo as all land avenues were closed for them; terrorists are best handled in their own terms. There is nothing to lose in terms of any further cuts of foreign military assistance, cut-off of foreign aid, bad publicity, foreign interferences, etc., etc. Reinstating checkpoints and night searches alone is insufficient; reinstate the paramilitaries. This is the only way to peace in the North, East and the South at the same time.



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