Hon Lakshman Kadirgamar’s
May 2003 speech on the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM).
The Permanent Mission of
Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office at Geneva
09th January 2008
"How long shall they kill
our prophets,
While we stand aside and look?"
Bob Marley, 'Redemption Song'
WORDS OF WARNING FROM A PROPHET SLAIN
Statements on the recent abrogation by the Government of Sri Lanka of
the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002 attribute it variously to the 'hard-line
Sinhala nationalism' or 'militarism' of the incumbent administration
of President Rajapakse, and/or the alleged influence on it of the radical
ultranationalist JVP (and, in some versions, the JHU). This distorted
interpretation is given the lie by the Parliamentary speech of former
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar delivered in May 2003, which also
makes extensive reference to the early criticism of the CFA made in
a letter by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, days after
Prime Minister Wickremesinghe signed the agreement in Feb 2002. Both
the 2002 Presidential statement and the 2003 speech contain trenchant
criticism of the CFA and the role and functioning of the Nordic SLMM.
Hon Lakshman Kadirgamar goes on to warn that the CFA would turn Sri
Lanka into "a sovereign shell".
President Mahinda Rajapakse was elected in December 2005.
His recent decision to abrogate the CFA puts an end to and reverses
the dangerous erosion that the late Foreign Minister, murdered by an
LTTE sniper, strenuously cautioned Sri Lanka against.
"Our contention is that from the very signing of
the Ceasefire Agreement on 22nd February 2002 the sovereignty of Sri
Lanka has been steadily and visibly eroded to the point where Sri Lanka
is in danger of being reduced to a nominal sovereign State. Soon Sri
Lanka will be a sovereign shell, the major attributes of a sovereign
State - the capacity to govern, to resolve justifiable issues, to enforce
the law, to protect its citizens throughout the entirety of its territory
are being drained away by stealth, fractured by assault and worn down
by attrition. This process commenced, with, and is being facilitated
by, the Ceasefire Agreement itself, a structurally flawed document whose
imperfections have now been clearly revealed, and are being deeply felt,
as the weeks and months go by".
- Hon Lakshman Kadirgamar May 8, 2003
www.lankamission.org ©
Full text of the speech:
Mr. Speaker,
In January 2002 I had the privilege of opening the debate for the Opposition
on the Prime Minister's policy statement. On that occasion I said that
the Opposition would do nothing to disturb the peace process that was
just being resumed. The new government must have time to settle in.
We have kept that pledge. The Prime Minister was generous enough, during
one of our routine consultations, to say so. I also said that the time
will come when the substantive issues will have to be addressed. We
reserved our opinion on those issues. That time has come. Hard issues
have surfaced. They must be addressed. The Opposition owes a duty to
the people to raise them and address them.
Our contention is that from the very signing of the Ceasefire
Agreement on 22nd February 2002 the sovereignty of Sri Lanka has been
steadily and visibly eroded to the point where Sri Lanka is in danger
of being reduced to a nominal sovereign State. Soon Sri Lanka will be
a sovereign shell, the major attributes of a sovereign State - the capacity
to govern, to resolve justifiable issues, to enforce the law, to protect
its citizens throughout the entirety of its territory are being drained
away by stealth, fractured by assault and worn down by attrition. This
process commenced, with, and is being facilitated by, the Ceasefire
Agreement itself, a structurally flawed document whose imperfections
have now been clearly revealed, and are being deeply felt, as the weeks
and months go by. The Prime Minister himself recently said that the
CFA is not a perfect document and that if he had striven for perfection
there might have been no Ceasefire at all. Yes, I agree. But if the
Prime Minister had thought it fit to consult the President about the
CFA before it was signed - which did not happen - some of those imperfections
could have been removed, and a better balanced document drawn up, not
only to serve the interests of the LTTE, but the interests of the nation
as a whole. A bipartisan approach to the problem could have been established
at an early stage. However, while the Prime Minister was prepared to
extend his trust and confidence unreservedly to the LTTE, even to the
extent of dismantling with unnecessary alacrity, the security structures
that had been erected to protect the city of Colombo - the consequences
of which the public are now beginning to understand - his government
did not extend an iota of trust and confidence to the Head of State,
the Head of Government, the Head of Cabinet and the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces over the so-called peace process. Instead, the Government
embarked upon a campaign of vituperative abuse against the President
and harassment of Opposition supporters which receded only when it became
clear that a 2/3rd majority in Parliament was not forthcoming for certain
Constitutional amendments.
Within a few days of the signing of the CFA the President
outlined in a letter to the Prime Minister some of the flaws in the
Agreement. They were as follows:-
1. The question of naval operations. Article 1.2 of the
CFA itemizes a number of prohibited military operations, including "offensive
naval operations". Article 1.3 graciously permits the Sri Lanka
Armed Forces to continue "to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging
in offensive naval operations". How is the Navy to safeguard the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka if it is prohibited
from engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE if required?
If a suspicious ship approaches our shores laden with arms, defies challenge
and inspection and opens fire on the Navy, and the Navy sinks that ship,
is that a prohibited offensive operation? If not, is it a defensive
operation? If it is a defensive operation, then what is an offensive
operation? If the Navy gives chase in the open seas to an LTTE ship
carrying arms, in exercise of the right of hot pursuit, to prevent it
from landing those arms on our shores, is that an offensive or defensive
operation? Why was this grey area created in the CFA? In the course
of a statement made by the Prime Minister at Vavuniya on 22nd February
2002 when he signed the CFA - Mr. Prabhakaran having signed it the previous
day in the presence of the Norwegian Ambassador - he said: "The
Army, Navy and Air Force will have the right to intercept the illegal
movement of arms into Sri Lanka". What does "intercept"
mean? Could there be interception by offensive naval operations, in
which case there is a contradiction between the CFA and the Prime Minister's
statement. Why could not the Prime Minister's oral statement in Vavuniya
have been incorporated into the CFA itself? Did the LTTE object? What
was the Norwegian position on this issue? The Prime Minister's statement
in Vavuniya being outside the CFA naturally does not bind the LTTE.
Did the Prime Minister seriously believe that the LTTE could be trusted
not to smuggle arms by sea into Sri Lanka, so that the meaning of the
expression "offensive naval operations" would never have to
be tested?
(Two) Under Article 3:2 of the CFA if a dispute arises
on a question involving the interception of illegal arms (for instance,
what is an offensive naval operation?) it will be the Head of the Monitoring
Mission, a foreign national, who will be "the final authority regarding
interpretation of the Agreement". Thus, the jurisdiction of the
Courts of Sri Lanka has been ousted on a question so vital to national
security and the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of Sri Lanka.
(Three) Articles 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 of the CFA deal with
the "drawing up of demarcation lines regarding defence localities
in all areas of contention". The parties are required to provide
information to the Monitoring Mission about their defence localities.
In the event of disagreement between the parties the demarcation lines
will have to be drawn by the Head of the Monitoring Mission who is "the
final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement". Article
2.7 refers to the establishment of checkpoints to facilitate the flow
of goods, and the movement of civilians on the "lines of control".
The "line of control" is a highly evocative expression in
our region and elsewhere in the world where lines of control and demarcation
have been source of confusion, bitterness and tragedy. Inevitably, a
line of control becomes a line of division, of separation. This is the
first time in the history of post independence Sri Lanka that a foreign
government has been authorized to draw demarcation lines on the soil
of Sri Lanka. The submission of such matters to the binding authority
of a single individual appointed by a foreign government is wholly inconsistent
with the sovereignty of Sri Lanka which is vested in its People and
is declared by the Constitution to be inalienable.
(Four) The powers and functions which by this Agreement
are vested in the Norwegian Government travel far beyond the role of
a facilitator of the envisaged negotiations towards a political agreement.
The Norwegian Government has now been cast in the role of a mediator
or arbitrator, and the Monitoring Mission has been given the role of
a judge, in the resolution of disputes between the parties which is
not the basis on which Norwegian assistance was sought in the first
place. The nature of the Norwegian Government's mandate has changed
to such an extent, its role has become so inflated, as to make it incompatible
with the sovereign status of Sri Lanka.
(Five) In the light of the verified evidence coming in
from various LTTE controlled areas, especially in the East, relating
to extortion, intimidation, abduction and harassment of civilians, much
of it against members of the Muslim community but extending also to
the Tamil and Sinhalese communities in these areas, we surely have to
ensure that our people are protected by the strict application of Article
2.1 of the CFA which expressly prohibits such acts. Among the six districts
(Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara) in which
the Monitoring Mission maintains a presence and local monitoring committees
have been established, Kilinochchi and Mulaitivu, which are LTTE-controlled,
are not included. This means that if "hostile acts against the
civilian population including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction,
extortion and harassment", referred to in Article 2.1, are committed
in those two districts the Monitoring Mission and the local committees
cannot intervene to help our citizens who live in these areas. We have
thus recognized and legitimised an enclave in those two areas where
the Government's writ does not run. What does this do to our sovereignty
over the entirety of our territory?
(Six) What about the plight of children forcibly recruited
by the LTTE? This odious practice is continuing. The evidence gathered
by reputable national and international sources is irrefutable and depressing.
Sri Lanka has been in the forefront of the international campaign against
the conscription of child combatants. There are many treaties and international
resolutions on this subject. This is a matter which gravely troubles
the conscience of mankind. The LTTE has given to the United Nations,
but disregarded in practice, assurances that they will not recruit under-age
children. Can we, I ask the House, be so callous, so cynical that in
the pursuit of peace, we are willing to compromise the rights of these
children, to condone the brutal treatment meted out to them and their
parents ?
(Seven) The extensive freedom of movement for "political
work" in Government - controlled areas in the North and the East
granted to LTTE members under Article 1.13 is not afforded to others
(political parties, for instance) who might wish to do "political
work" in LTTE - controlled areas in the North and the East. In
a democratic society this is a totally indefensible distinction, violative
of the Constitution, between one group of political parties and another.
Democratic parties like the EPDP which entered the main stream of national
politics many years ago now find themselves at a considerable disadvantage
in relation to the LTTE. Disarmed by the CFA they are at the mercy of
the LTTE. They have lost a number of their cadres. The government appears
to be unconcerned with these terrible violation of the CFA. Is the government
unwilling or unable to help the EPDP to protect its cadres ? Has the
government abdicated its sovereign right, its duty, to bring the culprits
to justice even if they be the LTTE?
(Eight) This erosion of sovereignty to which I have referred
must also be viewed against the backdrop of the significant omission
in the Agreement of any reference to any assurance given that negotiations
for a political settlement will be commenced by the parties by a fixed
date and concluded by an agreed date. Even the apparent suspension of
the authority of the State reflected in this document could lead to
the accentuation of the movement towards secession on which the Agreement
is singularly silent despite the innumerable "confidence building
measures" which have been explicitly stated with great particularity.
In his statement to the House in January 2002 the Prime Minister said:
"After formalising the basic Agreement as regards peace talks,
the talks should be held within a definite time frame between the Government
and the LTTE". Nearly 15 months have passed. Where is the time
frame ? It is nowhere in sight.
The structural flaws in the Ceasefire Agreement to which
I referred at the opening of my speech are now being dramatically revealed
as events unfold on the ground and at sea. The burning issue of the
day is the question of the sea. In its so-called initial discussion
paper the Head of the Nordic Monitoring Mission made a series of proposals
which the Opposition parties , in their press release of 25th April,
have described as "preposterous". One of them was that "in
the spirit of the CFA the government of Sri Lanka, and especially its
Navy, should recognise the LTTE Sea Tigers as a de facto naval unit."
Another was that "the LTTE should be excluded from the law concerning
limitations on the horse power of outboard motors". Yet another
was that "the Sri Lanka Navy and the LTTE Sea Tigers should have
specific marked exercise and training areas at sea, designed for navigation
training and for live firing exercises as well".
These propositions can be faulted on a number of grounds:
(One) Is it "in the spirit of the CFA" that
the LTTE should systematically smuggle arms into the country ? If not,
why should it be "in the spirit of the CFA" that the Navy
should recognise the LTTE as a de facto naval unit?
(Two) The SLMM has cited the Oxford English Dictionary
meaning of de facto ("existing as a fact although it may not be
legally accepted as existing") to justify its proposal. A criminal
gang may exist as a fact. Does the Police force have to "recognise"
it; and having "recognized" it what is the Police Force expected
to do - ignore it or pursue it and bring it to justice ? The plain fact
is that the LTTE naval unit is an illegal entity. No country in the
world has two navies. To which country does the LTTE's naval unit belong
? De facto recognition by a sovereign State of an illegal entity which
mounts a challenge to the authority of the State is only a whisker away
from the achievement of de jure status by that officially recognized
illegal entity.
(Three) When the CFA was entered into there were no areas
marked out at sea for training exercises and live firing by the LTTE
and the Navy. The Navy made no such concessions to the LTTE. The preservation
of the balance of forces is said to be one of the principal concepts
underlying the Ceasefire Agreement. If that be so, does not the delimitation
one of these zones at sea disturb that balance.
(Four) In any event, why should a sovereign State hand
over to an illegal entity an exclusive zone that derogates from its
sovereignty? The real problem is that the government of the day is by
its conduct, by its palpable anxiety to accommodate even the most unreasonable
demands of the LTTE, encouraging the LTTE to believe that it is a legal
entity with legal rights.
(Five) Even if the exercise and live firing areas are
within our territorial waters, live firing will create serious practical
problems. Indian fishing boats habitually enter our territorial waters
in large numbers. What would happen if they enter the LTTE zone during
live firing practice ? There could be a major rupture in our relations
with India, especially with Tamil Nadu. The Chief Minister of Tamil
Nadu has clearly made known her deep concern that LTTE craft are capturing
Indian fishermen. A shooting incident in a LTTE zone recognized by the
government of Sri Lanka could have disastrous consequences on our relations
with India and Tamil Nadu. Moreover, fishing craft belonging to other
countries - China, Japan, South Korea - enter our waters on legitimate
business. We must remember what recently happened to a Chinese trawler.
If the "armed criminal gang unknown to Sri Lanka "which is
said by the Head of the Monitoring Mission to be prowling our coastal
waters enters the LTTE zone will there be a shoot out between these
two illegal entities ? We would be encouraging gang warfare at sea.
(Six) Live firing could be with short range or long range
weapons. The LTTE has 23 millimeter guns mounted on their naval craft
with a range of 6 kms. If these guns are fired within the exercise zone
the bullets could go beyond the zone and hit innocent ships fishing
or cruising just outside our territorial waters.
(Seven) We allow India to use our airspace above our territorial
waters. When LTTE live firing is going on are we to tell the Indian
government that our air space will be closed to them ? Would this not
be an unfriendly, hostile act towards a neighbour that has proscribed
the LTTE?
(Eight) When the CFA was entered into the LTTE was limited
to outboard motors of 40 horse power maximum. The Nordic proposal is
that they be allowed the use of outboard motors of unlimited capacity.
This will allow the LTTE legitimately to acquire inshore craft, gunboats,
fast attack craft and off shore patrol craft which are used by blue
water navies. During the British colonial period there was only one
navy in our region. With the independence of India and Sri Lanka two
navies emerged - the Indian and Sri Lankan. Now is there to be a third
navy with a license to expand at will ? Again, I ask the question to
which sovereign State does that navy belong ?
Our Navy Commander has reacted strongly to the Nordic
proposals. He has said : "The Sea Tiger arm of the LTTE is not
a legitimate organisation or force to carry weapons and ammunitions
at sea according to international laws at sea and also in the territorial
waters of Sri Lanka which are controlled by the Sri Lanka navy as per
1.7 of the CFA"; "at the time the MOU was signed it was very
clear that the Sri Lanka navy was in total control of the sea and is
the only legitimate force at sea. Hence, the issue of a de facto force
is of no relevance. At the end of peace talks some day, even if Federal
status is given to the North and East, there will be only one navy and
that is the Sri Lanka navy. Therefore, excluding the Sea Tigers from
the normal law of the country is unacceptable and out of the question";
the Monitor"s proposal that the parties vessels should be marked
in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) implies,
according to the Navy Commander, that "LTTE Sea Tigers are on par
with the Sri Lanka navy which is not so. Therefore, the proposal is
totally unacceptable"; "as for the proposed confidence building
measure that "the Sri Lanka navy and the LTTE Sea Tigers should
permit observers from the other party on board their vessels while conducting
exercises and training", the Navy Commander says the "proposal
is not possible.
Refraining from the violation of the CFA, while at sea
off Iranativu on 17th July 2002 and Delft on the 6th February, 2003,
by the LTTE itself would be a confidence building measure between the
parties"; with regard to the Nordic proposal that "neither
the SLN nor the LTTE Sea Tigers should conduct offensive or aggressive
operations and movements at sea and that the minimum distance between
the parties vessels should be kept to one nautical mile," the Navy
Commander says the "Sri Lanka navy has the right to dominate, and
to free movement, at sea because it has to safeguard the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the country and also in conformity with
Article 1.3 of the CFA"; with regard to exercise and training areas,
the Navy Commander says the territorial waters and the contiguous zone
up to the economic zone is under Sri Lanka navy control. No other party
can be allowed to conduct military training at sea since it is against
the Constitution and sovereignty of the country and Article 1.3 of the
CFA".
The government, in presenting its response to the SLMM paper, modified
the Navy Commander's response in several respects - important among
them being the government's willingness to allow the LTTE to conduct
training and exercise within a designated area (which the Navy Commander
was opposed to) but without the right to live firing. The SLMM's adjusted
proposals return to its initial working paper. It reposes a training
and exercise area for the LTTE with live firing rights and prohibits
both the SLN and the LTTE Sea Tigers from "offensive or aggressive
operations and movements at sea".
The Opposition has already made it clear in its press
release of 25th April, and now reiterates its position on the floor
of the House, that the Opposition parties wholeheartedly support the
Navy Commander in his opposition to the proposal of the Monitoring Mission
with regard to the status of the LTTE's Sea Tigers. The Opposition has
already stated, and now repeats, that it has no confidence in the competence
and impartiality of the Monitoring Mission. The Opposition proposes
that the Monitoring Mission should be -recomposed.
I turn now Mr. Speaker, to that other major security question
of the day -the High Security Zones. The LTTE wants the Army to withdraw
from these zones to accommodate internally displaced persons (IDP's).
Major General Fonseka, the Northern Security Forces Commander, supported
by the Army Commander, has said in a report last December that while
appreciating the urgent need to resettle civilians in these zones that
process should go hand in glove with a de-escalation process agreed
between the government and the LTTE; no risks should be taken to weaken
the safety environment by making the zones vulnerable; security can
be relaxed only in stages i.e. disarming of LTTE cadres and decommissioning
of LTTE long range weapons. The Ministry of Defence has confirmed that
the 152 Army camp in the peninsula have been reduced to 88.
The government has hired the services of a retired Indian
General, General Nambiar, to advise it on security matters. In his report
of last December he has said that "SLA Commanders in the field
as also at headquaters, appear to be unanimous in the firm conviction
that if civilians are allowed unrestricted re-entry in these areas,
LTTE cadres would infiltrate, establish their control even if only covertly
in the initial stages, and seriously compromise the ability of the SLA
to conduct operations should the peace process break down. Any vacation
of these areas is therefore perceived as dereliction of their responsibility
towards the troops and the country's security." Therefore, General
Nambiar has proposed that "as things stand it would appear that
any review of the scope and content of the High Security Zones will
only come about if the LTTE deposits its weapons to neutral supervision
and initiates measures to withdraw from frontline positions into nominated
areas. Such a step would provide a measure of reassurance to the SLA
that surprise LTTE attacks may be discounted. Similarly, there would
need to be some reassurance that there would be no coercion of civilians
and officials by LTTE cadres given access to areas on dismantling of
the zones. "General Nambiar in his first report has completely
supported General Fonseka's position. Indeed, the last Head of the SLMM
also stated, supporting General Fonseka, that during a ceasefire the
balance of forces should not be disturbed, that if the Army were to
withdraw from the zones it would place the Army at a disadvantage. General
Nambiar has also said that there are rumours that in a Federal structure
the LTTE might be allowed a separate Army. He says; "In my view
any such rumour should be scotched at this very stage by the Prime Minister
or Minister of Defence making it absolutely clear that no matter what
constitutional system is finally agreed upon there can be only one Army
for the country, namely the Sri Lanka Army".
For some mysterious reason the Government Commissioned
General Nambiar to prepare a second report even before the first report
had been discussed with the relevant security authorities. I understand
that the second report is ready. General Nambiar has returned to Colombo.
Between the two reports General Nambiar has been visited more than once
by important Government personalities. If there are any substantial
changes in the second report serious questions will arise. General Nambiar
is not the representative of the Government of India He is a private
consultant engaged by the government in his private capacity.
Mr. Speaker, Sri Lanka has become a carnival ground for
international players, a sort of Hawkers Street for foreign experts
peddling their wares. Do we really need foreign experts to advise us
on how to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State.
Surely, our own Service Commanders, native to our soil, know best what
needs to be done.
What we in the Opposition say to these worthy experts, there are many
from different nationalities, who come to advise the government is this
please remember that the Sovereignty of Sri Lanka is precious to us
its citizens, to the members of this House, to our people. It may be
a plaything in the hands of others, to us it is not a marketable commodity;
it is not negotiable; it cannot be compromised. If any of these expert
reports make recommendations that impinge on our sovereignty we of the
Opposition will be duty bound by our people to denounce such reports
whoever the author may be. He who pays the piper calls the tune.
The Prime Minister in his statement referred to a "safety-net
of the international community" and "a firm expression of
views by our friendly countries including the United States, UK Japan,
France and India". They have certainly made, and with the United
States and India, in particular, strong made, statements in support
of our territorial integrity and sovereignty . The United States has
warned the LTTE that it must renounce violence, abandon the notion of
a separate State and embrace the concept of a plural society if it is
to gain international legitimacy and acceptance. Is it not a great shame
that our government has never made a statement of that nature ? How
does the government expect other countries to uphold our sovereignty
when it is shy or doing so itself ? But what is this safety net ? The
Prime Minister must tell the House what it is ? It is important for
the House to know. Are there any secret understandings ? Will an aircraft
carrier come our way if hostilities break out again?
The Prime Minister has said that in consultation with
all parties the government will proceed to develop a "road map"
towards the objective of devolution and that it is open to wide-ranging
discussions on many issues - the core issues.
We seem to have heard this before. Is it true ? If so it is welcome.
The hour is late but not too late to make the process of consultation
inclusive which it is not at the moment. In the meantime the Opposition
is of the view that we are moving inexorably towards the day when Sri
Lanka will no longer be a sovereign State.
(Source : Official Website of the Government of Sri Lanka)
http://203.115.31.130/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200305/20030508si_lanka_sovereign_shell_kadirgamar.htm
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