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The Man of the moment-Lieutenant
General Sarath Fonseka
By Malinda Seneviratne
-Courtesy Business Today
Politicians decide to wage battle, soldiers do the fighting. It takes
skill, courage, determination and absolute conviction that victory is
possible to fight an enemy. In this case, the enemy, the LTTE, was made
out to be battle-hardened, resourceful and even invincible. A man who
had fought in the trenches, led his troops from the front and was himself
targeted by a suicide bomber, he thought otherwise. Lieutenant General
Sarath Fonseka is single-minded and focused. He is aware of the challenges
ahead and determined to finish what he started.
It is widely acknowledged that the approach of engaging the LTT E took
a decisive turn after Mahinda Rajapaksa became President. Could you
outline the key differences in thinking and engagement that has led
to the current success of the security forces?
Yes, there was a marked difference in assessment of the enemy, necessary
preparations and also strategizing after President Rajapaksa came to
power. He immediately appointed Gotabaya Rajapaksa as the Secretary,
Ministry of Defence. I was appointed as Army Commander two weeks later.
This is not to say that we had failed miserably in earlier efforts
of course. We scored limited successes though, and suffered equally
bad reversals. It is natural for the blame to be laid at the door of
politicians. It is they that the praise or blame as the case may be
accrues to them. However, we, who do the fighting, were not blameless
either.
Overall, we didn’t handle the problem properly. This is why people
thought that the LTTE was invincible and that Prabhakaran was a tactical
genius. Both are false perceptions. Prabhakaran is just another terrorist.
‘Hit and run’ was his mode of operation. He had nothing to protect.
Our mistake was that we gave him room to operate and allowed such perception
to take root and indeed dominate the general political thinking.
Our politicians lacked determination. They were half-hearted for the
most part, prone to complacency or defeatism. There were too many briefs,
too many experts and too many advisors. It was difficult for politicians
to take firm decisions. On the other hand, when decisions were made,
we committed blunders, all three services did.
What was your battle-ground experience like?
I spent three years as a Battalion Commander, another three as Brigade
Commander, three years as the Commander of a Division and three as a
Security Forces Commander. I had considerable battle-ground experience.
Wherever I served, in whatever capacity, I did my job. I never failed.
It is unfortunate that on occasions when we succeeded, others failed,
thereby nullifying gains. We captured Mankulam in 1998 after fighting
for 2 years, but later, under a different commander, Mankulam was abandoned
in less than two hours.
In your opinion what was the fundamental flaw in the command structure
of the security forces and especially the Army?
Well, the main problem was not putting the right man at the right place
and the right time. It was all about service seniority and not about
performance. We had high-ranking officers, but not all of them had the
necessary commitment or proven skills. There was also a sense that people
were just going through the motions.
No one seemed to want to finish this matter. In fact many expected
me to follow suit, that is, hold this post, retire and then take up
some diplomatic posting.
What did you do differently?
I knew that the war will come, regardless of the CFA, regardless of
sporadic rounds of negotiations. So, as the Jaffna Commander, I launched
a training programme for the infantry.
So, when I took over as Army Commander, I was ready with troops, training
and tactics. On the ground, I deployed small teams into enemy territory,
especially Special Forces teams.
In fact, in general, I went against the traditional thinking. I appointed
junior officers who had battlefield experience to key commanding positions.
For example, it is the No.5 officer in terms of seniority who is posted
to case, the person appointed was No. 15 in seniority. There was, naturally,
a big hue and cry at the beginning, but as these officers began producing
results, these complaints died down.
Similarly, some of the Division Commanders in the front are way down
in the seniority list. Brigadier Shavindra Silva, for example, who spearheaded
the capture of Pooneryn is the 45th in terms of seniority.
In all this, the support and wisdom of the Secretary, Defence, Gotabaya
Rajapaksa was crucial. Together, we looked into the all important areas
of arms and ammunition, weapons systems procurement, strategy and recruitment
and training.
The Defence Secretary also knew that we would have to fight. At that
time 40,000 soldiers didn’t have helmets. Many had just one uniform
and one pair of boots. There was a short We needed to replenish stocks
and get ready for a prolonged engagement with the enemy and this is
exactly what we did.
We were lacking in strength of numbers as well. The battalions were
depleted. I created five more divisions. And, as the people realized
that something concrete was happening, that this time around there was
commitment, capability and determination on the part of the political
leadership as well as the security forces, the recruitment drive was
extremely successful.
Earlier we would recruit approximately 3,000 per year, but now we are
achieving targets of 3,000 per month. Immediately after we took Mavil
Aru in August 2006, we managed to recruit 6,000 in a single month. In
2007, the total number of recruits was 32,000 and this year we have
already recruited 34,000. The strength of the Army when I took over
was 116,000. Today it stands at 170,000. So we have sufficient reserves
now. I created 50 new battalions.
In fact this time around, it was the LTTE that was not ready. They
were taken by surprise when they realized we were ready. Indeed, their
strength has been depleted considerably. They started with 10,000 cadres
and with new recruits the number went up to 15,000. They’ve lost around
12,000 fighters. Today they are left with just 2,500.
The huge human resource problem that the LTTE is facing is evident
in the battlefield. We frequently come across teenagers, girls less
than 15 years of age, and even Sea Tigers and intelligence operatives
in the bunkers.
How about the general strategy in terms of battlefield operations?
We didn’t plan to nor were we interested in capturing a place and putting
thing as far as we are concerned. At times the pace was slow, at times
it was not. For five to six months last year, we proceeded only 7 kilometers.
From April to November this year, we marched 60 kilometers. When we
attacked and captured Mankulam in 1998 I was JOC. It took us 4 months
to secure the place. This time Mankulam fell within four days.
We have come a long way from Mavil Aru. The map indicating areas
controlled by Government forces and the LTT E keeps changing. What is
the current situation?
As you know, we have routed the enemy on the Western Coast and are
now pushing eastwards towards Mullaitivu. At the same time we have troops
moving North on the Vavuniya and Welioya fronts. We had one Division
and one Task Force operating from West of the A-9. Now we have 3 Task
Forces in operation. Earlier we inducted a new division, which is operating
from Welioya. On that front, they are now approximately 12 kilometers
from Mullaitivu. In fact Mullaitivu is now within artillery range.
The LTTE, we were made to believe, was a formidable foe. It was
said they possess a conventional fighting army and some even said that
Colombo would be blown to pieces if the security forces dared attack
the LTT E. Has there been any resistance?
Of course they resisted and they are still resisting. There is no
way that 12,000 cadres can die if the LTTE was not resisting. It took
two months to capture Malavi and Thunukkai. We were held up for two
and a half months at Nachchikudah. As you may have heard, the LTTE has
constructed a 17 km long bund South of Pooneryn and a similiar one west
of Kilinochchi and Paranthan. There are booby traps, landmines and of
course LTTE cadres for us to contend with.
We went looking for resistance. We didn’t look for easy gaps to penetrate
enemy lines. We kept attacking and softening the targets. We know they
are not going to hand anything over to us on a platter. Air Force operations
were also very important in this. They engaged key depth targets. Navy
killed over 300 Sea Tigers too.
There is the perception among certain circles that the LTT E has
been adopting a strategy of tactical withdrawal. Your views?
This is nonsense. ‘Tactical withdrawal’ has never been the LTTE’s strategy.
‘Tactical withdrawal’, in that case, should have happened before they
lost 12,000 men. Had they withdrawn from Pooneryn three months ago,
they would have saved 1,000 lives. No, they are weak. The ideal time
to attack was when we moved North on the Western front. They could have
attacked our flank. They also had the option of launching an attack
on Jaffna. Had they opted for this and succeeded, it would have been
a serious situation. Now it is too late.
The LTTE’s policy has been one of recapturing. This is what they’ve
always done. This is what they did at Sampoor when the CFA was in force.
The LTTE never talked ‘tactical withdrawal’ to its cadres.
Of course some people believe that the LTTE will hit back, as they
did in Mankulam. On the other hand, we know that history and we will
not allow repetition.
Has it been a one-way street though? How about losses on the side
of the security forces?
The LTTE has experienced and skilled fighting cadres and therefore
yes, we have suffered losses as well. About 500 of our men have lost
their legs to anti-personnel mines. Every inch of the way has been booby
trapped. We have recovered some 500,000 mines so far. It has certainly
not been a cake walk. Who should we blame for this, if not those who
gave the LTTE the hardware, those who made it possible for them to bring
in the hardware?
As of now, few would argue against the need to eliminate the LTT
E militarily. On the other hand, there is the question of civilians,
trapped in the Wanni and used as a human shield by the LTT E. How do
you negotiate around this problem?
Well, in no military engagement can you absolutely avoid collateral
damage. We cannot avoid destruction of property, for example. However,
everything that is damaged will be rebuilt. This is the strategy adopted
in the East and it has succeeded. On the other hand, contrary to the
claims made by those who pumped in a lot of money to the Wanni, there’s
absolutely no ‘development’ to be seen in these areas we have liberated
in the past few months. The NGOs and INGOs had done nothing in the East.
They have done nothing West of the A-9 highway in the North.
As for civilians, we have been exemplary in adhering to the policy
of Zero Damage to Civilians. There were 17 civilians who died in the
East when a rocket hit a refugee camp that the LTTE had re-located so
it was next to an LTTE facility.
In the North, there have been two incidents only. In Mullaitivu a
coconut estate controlled by the LTTE leader Swarnam was attacked. One
man and a child had died in this attack. Also, west of the A-9 and South
of Kilinochchi 4-5 children have been reported killed. In the second
incident it was found that they had done fatigue work for the LTTE.
Thus, we have 24 civilians confirmed killed after two and a half years.
All things considered, this itself indicates that the security forces
have done their utmost to minimize damage to the civilians trapped in
the Wanni. After the LTTE abandoned their entry/exit point in Omanthai,
cross over to Government controlled areas. These numbers will increase
in the coming weeks and months.
This doesn’t mean that everything is going to be easy, let me add.
The LTTE had 4 years to stockpile arms and ammunition during the time
the CFA was in operation. They still have a lot of money. They will
fight. But we are ready.
The East was cleared, but there is an alarming LTT E presence there,
with a series of killings happening over the past few weeks. What’s
the situation?
This is true. There is a group operating. But they can’t last. We are
not and will not overreact. Small groups do try to come through our
defences, many get killed, some get injured and a few manage to evade
us. However, they don’t have the back up necessary to continue for long
periods of time. They have to beg for food and medicine. Some hand themselves
over. Once the land route is sealed, we can expect this to end.
The LTTE has essentially lost the support of ordinary Tamil civilians.
There was a trade fair in Jaffna the same day that Balaraj died. He
was a top LTTE leader and a popular personality as well. We expected
a low turn out for the fair, but 50,000 people came. When we captured
Pooneryn, there were celebrations in Jaffna. There were 1,000 three
wheelers in that procession. And their slogan, significantly, was ‘Prabhakaran,
release the innocent civilians in the Wanni’. We were naturally surprised.
The truth is that infiltrators no longer have safe houses in Jaffna.
The civilians give us information. They have essentially lost confidence
and faith in the LTTE. The LTTE has lost all credibility as a group
claiming to represent Tamil people.
You said that one of the key reasons for this success is the political
leadership and its determination. Are you saying that if tomorrow there
is a different administration with a different approach, all this could
be reversed?
Like any country, Sri Lanka must have a national security plan. If
the people elect a weak leader, one who underestimates our ability and
overestimates the strength and capabilities of the enemy, we will lose
territory and the problem will get worse. Such a person can be a leader
but is definitely not a patriot. So yes, things can change. National
security will go for a six.
Whoever says ‘stop the offensive and go for a CFA better look back
at what happened during the last CFA. At that time the LTTE had two
120 motar and two 122m guns. Four years into the CFA they had 80 120mm
motars and 22 122m guns, 3 130mm guns and a 152m gun and of course correspondingly
large amount of ammunition.
In 2002 they had 4,000 cadres. By 2006 they had 12,000. During this
same period, there weren’t deaths, yes, but in four years another army
came into being. There were several rounds of talks between 2002 and
2004, but nothing came out of these discussions. There was another attempt
at negotiations in 2006. Again, no results. We didn’t achieve anything,
but the Tigers got stronger. They developed a police force, build runways,
secured airpower and developed the Sea Tigers outfit.
Such people, sad to say, don’t mind the security forces suffering
setbacks as long as it also means the President is weakened and their
political objectives are secured. They celebrate setbacks and are upset
when the security forces score any significant victory over the LTTE.
In fact, it seems that they wouldn’t mind if Prabhakaran became President
of this country.
I think, like in other countries, national security should not change,
even if governments change. The President has to be a patriot. We have
to live with pride and honour and this need has to be recognized by
whoever is in power.
Presidents and politicians, they come and go. But citizens remain.
They need security. They want a country, they want a future, for themselves
and their children.
There was an opinion expressed that the capture of Pooneryn was
timed to coincide with the vote for the Second Reading of the Budget.
Is there any truth in this conjecture?
No. Our strategy is directed towards eliminating terrorists and not
to put up a flag or become part of political games. It is the realities
of the ground situation that determine military strategy. I can’t win
the confidence of my fighting cadres if I let political imperatives
dictate battlefield decisions. If I did that I will lose my soldiers.
No one told me to capture Pooneryn on such and such a date and no one
expects me to do so either. This is a serious matter and we can’t be
playing games with our soldiers and our national security concerns.
In this regard I can also refer to the time of the last budget. At
the time we suffered a setback in Muhamalai. No one charged us of engaging
in a conspiracy to bring down the government then.
War is no doubt a political decision. The credit goes to the political
masters, that is, the Government. The timing of a particular success
is a different matter, though. These are processes that are independent
of one another in this case. We have been tasked with fighting an enemy,
eliminating a terrorist, and not buttressing a political party or a
Government.
Whether what we do on the ground has an impact on political affairs
is a different matter. We don’t concern ourselves with such things.
How has the business community responded to your efforts?
Tremendously. They appreciate the sacrifices of the security forces
and have contributed generously to the welfare of our fighting men and
women, especially the housing project. They want to see an end to this,
naturally. For a long time, they were asked to believe that the LTTE
could not be defeated and that some accommodation must be made. However,
now the business community, like most other people have realized that
negotiation is not possible with the LTTE and therefore we need to finish
this off and that we need to come together in this critical moment.
Finally, a word about NGOs and INGOs and ‘humanitarian concerns’
they articulate frequently…?
It is easy to make a song and dance when you don’t know what you are
talking about or know nothing of the ground reality. For example, the
suicide cadre who blew up the bus in Fort had been reported ‘missing’
to the ICRC by his mother. People need to have a sense of proportion.
I am not saying that all NGOs and INGOs are in cahoots with the LTTE.
That’s not necessarily true. The truth is that very little if at all
has been done in the North by NGOs and INGOs, a situation which would
naturally make anyone suspicious about what they were actually doing
in these areas with their money, their personnel, their equipment, vehicles
and other machinery.
The ICRC performs a very important role. Medicines Sans Frontiers does
some good work and I am aware of this. But the majority of INGOs and
NGOs have not done anything constructive. They’ve mollycoddled the LTTE,
have not acted in the national interest and the authorities should take
serious note about all this. We are aware that some actually left equipment
with the LTTE. The bottom line is this: if you can’t deliver, then leave!’
LIEUTENANT GENERAL G S C FONSEKA RWP, RSP,
VSV, USP, rcds, psc has been appointed the Commander of the Army in
Sri Lanka effective from 6th December 2005.
Widely admired as one of the top battle-hardened
warriors of our times, Lieutenant General G. S. C Fonseka has served
largely as an illustrious infantry soldier in the northern theatre of
war during his exemplary career, particularly at the peak of Tamil Tiger
terrorism.
When the Jaffna Fort was under siege for
a long period, then Colonel G. S. C Fonseka led troops in the famous
“Midnight Express” operation to rescue troops.
He was the Deputy General Officer Commanding
that launched ‘Operation Riviresa’ to evict terrorists and capture Jaffna
town in December 1995. His dynamic leadership, meticulous planning and
extensive tactical knowledge in this and other operations were also
in evidence during ‘Operation Unceasing Waves’ in 2000 which further
consolidated the security network to Jaffna during his four-month stint
as Commander, Security Forces Headquarters, Jaffna .
Lt General Fonseka, as a fearless infantryman
was at the forefront in operations ‘Balawegaya’ and ‘Jayasikuru,’ that
led to the rescue the Elephant Pass and capture of Mankulam.
Lt General Fonseka, who distinguished
himself by his dauntless bravery and excellent command in warfare as
well as for his common touch with his troops, sustained injuries during
the operation ‘Yaldevi’. Jaffna finally became his second home during
the period May 2002-November 2003 after he was reappointed as the Commander,
Security Forces Headquarters, Jaffna.
His awards and decorations include the
Gallantry Medals, Rana Wickrema Padakkama (RWP), Rana Sura Padakkama
(RSP), Vishishta Seva Vibhushana (VSV). Utthama Seva Padakkama (USP),
Riviresa Campaign Service Medal, Poorna Bhoomi Padakkama, North & East
Operations Medal, Desha Puthra Sammanaya and several others.
He served as Deputy Chief of Staff, Sri
Lanka Army (July 1, 2004 - December 9, 2004), Director General Infantry,
Army Headquarters and later on commanded the Sri Lanka Army Volunteer
Force between November 23, 2003 and August 15, 2004. In recognition
of his fearless leadership, he was twice appointed the Commander, Security
Forces Headquarters, Jaffna (April 21 - July 21, 2000) and (May 5, 2002
to November 23, 2003).
Enlisting in the Army on February 5, 1970,
he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant and subsequently posted to the
1st Battalion, Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment on June 1, 1971. He has followed
the UK-based course offered by Royal College of Defence Studies, Infantry
Officers Advanced Course (USA), Staff College Course (Bangladesh), Company
Commanders Course (Pakistan), Battalion Support Weapons Course (India),
Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare Course (India), Commando Officers
Course (India) and has represented Sri Lanka in a number of international
seminars and conferences.
Lt General Fonseka, a product of Ambalangoda
Dharmasoka College (1958-1965) and Ananda College, Colombo (1966-1969)
is a keen sportsman who has excelled in swimming and water polo representing
defence services and the country.
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