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A Political Solution, but not to cater
only to Tigers
Secretary General
Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process
18th February 2008
The All Party Representative Committee (APRC) recently presented interim
proposals to provide a solution to the problems in the North and East
of the country. The government has accepted these proposals, which were
signed by thirteen political parties, making clear that a majority of
the democratically elected representatives of the people of this country
agree with these proposals. The special characteristic of these proposals
is the ability to implement them without looking for any amendment of
the constitution.
Finding a political solution to the
problem.
Clearly a political solution is essential for the prevailing national
problem, which began with political questions. A solution should be
achieved not through the division of the country but through the devolution
of power. By devolution is meant a system that will empower the public
to make decisions about matters that affect it closely. But, in facilitating
this, we need to pay attention to a prevalent fear, that devolution
could lead to a division of the country. The 13th amendment, which was
passed twenty years ago, will not rouse such a fear, but earlier it
was difficult to assert how effective it was since the LTTE had been
against it from the start. However the need to give the LTTE a decisive
voice passed with the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement that was
signed with the LTTE, so now we now have an opportunity to implement
the 13th amendment. In that sense the country obtained much greater
freedom with regard to moving towards a solution with the abrogation
of this Agreement.
In 1987 the 13th amendment to the constitution was passed in accordance
with the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. It was accepted by all minority parties,
including initially the LTTE, though they soon rejected it and fell
out with India. Because at that stage the Sri Lankan government got
close to the LTTE, even though subsequently the LTTE returned to war
against the Sri Lankan government too, the view point was created that
a problem which in reality involves a multitude of stakeholders was
essentially between the government and the LTTE. So, for a solution
to work, it was thought that it had to be acceptable to both the government
and the LTTE. This approach was reinforced by the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement,
which in effect sidelined the other Tamil political parties, for whom
there was no place in the peace process.
This does not mean we should blame the Ceasefire Agreement in itself.
The government of that day was of the view that, through that Agreement,
it would be able to bring the LTTE into the democratic process, and
thus get rid of terrorism. However within a short time that hope proved
false. The LTTE violated the Ceasfire Agreement repeatedly, continued
recruitment including of children, brought in weapons, and withdrew
from talks. The present government, when it came into office, nevertheless
tried to resume talks, and it seemed briefly to succeed. However, though
three opportunities for talks were arranged, only one set of negotiations
actually took place, the LTTE walking out on the other occasions, once
before the talks even started. After that, though the government kept
the door open, and though even informal talks were suggested, the Norwegians
reported that the LTTE remained unwilling to talk. So the abrogation
of the CFA simply confirmed what had already happened.
And through this there was greater freedom and increased possibilities
to hold constructive discussions with the parties who believe in democracy.
We do not have to look far to find out the LTTE view of this matter.
From the very beginning, the LTTE has consistently stood out, not for
any settlement, not for elections, but for an unelected absolute control
of an interim administration, even while continuing to destroy all opposition
to it amongst Tamils. This government was unwilling and unable to offer
such powers, so it was a blessing that, because of LTTE intransigence,
it was able to abandon the CFA and consider more seriously what other
Tamil groupings had to say.
The 13th amendment
The idea of fully activating the 13th amendment was brought up by one
such group, but it was the APRC as a whole that found it acceptable.
This does not prevent the APRC from discussing further options, and
it continues to do so, but agrees, especially in the context of the
people of the North and East not having had elected representatives
running their affairs for so long, that implementing the 13th amendment
fully in those areas would at least be a start.
A close look at the 13th amendment shows the opportunities for the
general public to fulfil their needs through the decentralization of
power. The powers available in this regard can extend to most things,
though of course there will be particular things under the central government,
as is the common situation in any country whatever its system of government.
Thus security issues, involving not only defence but also for instance
foreign policy, or financial security through monetary policy, or legal
security, will not be centralized.
The 13th amendment however had not two sets of powers, but three. Two
of these, obviously, were the authority of the central government and
the authority of the provinces. The different provinces should have
been able to use these latter powers, but in some cases some confusion
was introduced. For instance, with regard to education, that is supposed
to be a matter for the provinces. But there is an exception in the form
of National Schools. This should have been a minor exception, because
at the time the 13th Amendment was introduced there were few National
Schools. But because there were no clear guidelines on what exactly
a National School was, several central government Education Ministers
in turn created National Schools, in their own electoral areas for instance,
so that they could interfere with regard to appointments and admissions
and so on. So if the government agrees to fully implement the 13th amendment,
it should make sure that this sort of mechanism, to increase central
interference in what are recognized as areas of provincial authority,
is stopped.
Another area where some clarification would help the full implementation
of the 13th amendment is that of the concurrent list, subjects where
authority belongs both to the central government and to the province.
In theory both can exercise powers but, since the central government
will be superior to the province, most provinces have done nothing in
these areas, for fear that they would be countermanded. So here too
the government can make clear, by regulation, that in most if not all
these areas, it will leave decisions and necessary regulations to the
provinces.
It will be easier for the central government to give up power with
regard to most areas, because one important reason to fear devolution
is no longer relevant. We should remember that a huge problem was created
when the 13th amendment was introduced because of the merger of the
Northern and the Eastern Provinces. This was done in a very underhand
manner. Though the official position was that the President could proclaim
such a merger when arms had been surrendered, that was changed, simply
through a Gazette notification, to the power to do that when he was
satisfied that the process of laying down arms had begun. As you know,
J R Jayewardene could proclaim himself satisfied with anything, so he
went ahead with the merger even though violence was increasing.
In addition, the merger was supposed to be subject to a referendum,
to be held within a year, but that referendum was postponed for nearly
twenty years. Because of all this maneuvering, the positive benefits
to people of devolution were forgotten, and the impression developed
that the 13th amendment was all about encouraging the idea of a distinct
homeland within Sri Lanka, in two provinces that were given special
treatment.
Last year however these two provinces were separated following a court
case, and this means that there is much less fear about what devolution
means. That also, like the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement, has
meant that we could look with fresh eyes at the Provincial Council system,
which had otherwise been allowed to degenerate.
Further recommendations
At the same time, the APRC has indicated that it will go on with its
work, and will discuss whether there is need of further additions to
the system. As mentioned earlier, much of this could be done through
regulations, or sometimes through legislation that requires a simple
majority. In some cases all it will involve is a determination by the
Minister not to get involved in areas where Provincial Councils might
have better understanding of the realities of the situation. Similarly,
where safeguards might be required, as for instance with police powers,
which by and large belong to Provinces under the 13th amendment, there
are already some restrictions in that amendment, which could easily
be clarified so as to ensure that the type of suspicion that prevailed
when the system was first introduced in the eighties will not arise.
And that is how the APRC can go further if it needs to. Some of the
ideas that have already emerged in discussion, and which are in the
process of being finalized, may need a two thirds majority of parliament
if they are to be implemented. Obtaining that will be difficult for
the government, given the general intransigence of oppositions in Sri
Lanka. We know that twice the opposition under its present leadership,
having indicated that it was willing to support further measures of
devolution, opposed them, in one case even burning the draft proposals
in parliament on the grounds that they gave too much power to minorities.
That is why it is necessary to build up confidence, and show that there
need not be problems if power is devolved. If Provincial Councils, or
even Province based administrations, especially in the East and the
North, function productively, acting on behalf of people through close
knowledge without in any way affecting security considerations, the
country at large will understand that there will be no massive problems
because of devolution of power. It will then be easier, with regard
to areas in which further powers are desirable, to seek the two thirds
majority required in parliament for change. But, similarly, effective
devolution on the basis of current powers may make it clear to many
that not much more is needed.
Criticism of the APRC proposals
Obviously not everyone is satisfied with the present proposal. However,
given that criticisms have been equally harsh from those who think the
proposal gives too much away, and those who think it gives too little,
it would seem that this moderate approach will be the least contentious
and the most productive at this stage. The government after all is not
here to satisfy or dissatisfy one side or the other, it needs to provide
a practical solution for the betterment of the whole country.
Another criticism was that the proposals are not those of the APRC,
but rather those of the President. As mentioned, since all but one of
the APRC parties signed the proposals, this criticism does not make
sense. Certainly the President did, quite openly, request them to expedite
proposals that could be promptly implemented, but it was left open to
them also to present more comprehensive proposals at the same time.
The APRC membership decided however that the more comprehensive proposals
would take longer, and so they worked strenuously over two weeks to
produce a consensus document for immediate action in the interim.
It is then argued that the APRC need not have taken 1 ½ years
to present such proposals. However, since previously the assumption
was that they had to prepare proposals to be later discussed with the
LTTE, they could not think of the 13th Amendment as a starting point.
With the sustained refusal of the LTTE to negotiate, and the spate of
terror that finally prompted abrogation of the CFA, the APRC could think
beyond the box in which they had been confined. Thus liberated, they
can also go on to other measures as indicated above.
Yet another criticism is that these are not the proposals of all parties,
and that the parties involved in discussions are supporters of the government.
It is true that many of them are, but this takes no account of the fact
that they have widely divergent views on the ethnic question, and it
is therefore an achievement that they have reached consensus on so many
issues concerning which there were many differences in the past. Of
course it is true that the two largest parties in the opposition, the
UNP and the JVP, no longer participate, but they were involved initially
and have been asked for their views. Certainly you cannot change the
name of the group simply because some of the parties have walked out.
And given the very different approaches of the two groups that did walk
out, it is clear that the current APRC proposals represent a consensus
of the centre - which is doubtless what would have emerged had those
two parties stayed in and been inclined to try to achieve consensus.
Of course it is true that the TNA was not involved, but that was because
their approach was similar to that of the LTTE, with whom it was assumed
any APRC proposal would need to be discussed. There was thus no point
in engaging in the same discussion twice. Later, as LTTE intransigence
became clear, the TNA were asked for their views, but they have not
cooperated because they are basically in thrall to the LTTE. Certainly
when we have tried to interest them in discussions on other aspects
of constitutional reform, for instance reinforcing the power of the
provinces at the centre through a second chamber, they have reiterated
that the devolution question needed to be settled in terms of LTTE dogma
before anything further could be discussed.
We cannot, as said above, forget the role of the LTTE in ensuring that
the 13th Amendment could not be properly implemented, in particular
in Provinces where minorities are dominant, for which it was mainly
intended. Though people claim the 13th Amendment has been unsuccessful,
as you know the first and only Provincial Council for the North and
East took office in the midst of a war, a war fought by the LTTE against
the Indian army which was acting at the behest of the Sri Lankan President.
Then a new President took the side of the LTTE, and was opposed to the
North-East Provincial Council administration, which the LTTE thought
was supporting the Indians. The suspicions grew so intense that the
Chief Minister tried to declare independence and the President dissolved
the Council. The LTTE was delighted, but then, with the Indian army
gone and its opponents, the former Tamil militants who had taken up
a democratic approach, in total disarray, it turned its violence on
the government.
Provincial Councils
Obviously then, it makes sense, particularly now that the Eastern Province
is largely free of the LTTE, to try out the Provincial Council system
again. The government is in any case determined to restore democracy
there, and the local elections that are scheduled for next month are
the first step in this direction. With more involvement in democracy
for former militants, just as happened in 1987, we can hope that the
bulk of the Tamil people will realize that choosing their representatives
freely is their best hope.
Assuming we can then move on to Provincial Council elections, the people
will realize that the powers already available can be very productive
if properly used. We know that many Chief Ministers were unable or unwilling
to use their powers even in the rest of the country, but we cannot forget
the example for instance of Mr Jayawickrema Perera in the North-west
Province, who created in a sense the brand name Wayamba during his period
as Chief Minister. The Province developed rapidly because he was willing
to use the powers available, Kurunegala began to become a metropolis,
and he showed that much can be done under current legislation. If an
administration with his sort of vision and energy comes to the East,
if despite current difficulties a similar administration under a Governor,
but involving people of the area, comes to the North, the people of
those areas will realize that most of what they want, in terms of autonomy,
decision making powers, developmental initiatives, are already available.
There are objections to the suggestion to have an interim Council for
the North, on the grounds that this was denied to the LTTE. But remember
that what is proposed is under the Constitution, ie the Governor will
continue to exercise powers, and this will be an Advisory Council. Since
it will consist of a range of people from the area it will be able to
advise in the interests of the Province - whereas what the LTTE wanted
was full powers for itself, with control also of all Pradeshiya Sabhas,
whatever their ethnic composition. That would have been a basis for
totalitarianism, especially with a merged North-East, whereas what is
proposed here is a more pluralistic dispensation, with power sharing
within the Province, the Governor being the final authority until it
is possible to hold elections.
It should be noted that, while the TNA will we hope assist in this process,
it cannot have full power as sometimes claimed on the grounds that they
- and/or the LTTE - are the sole representatives of the Tamil people.
Though they claim they won a plurality of Tamil support at the last
election, it must be remembered that all observers ruled that the election
was fraudulent. In fact the European Union cites the report of their
own observers in saying that elections in the East now would not be
appropriate, forgetting that it was the LTTE that oversaw the situation
during the 2004 election, and it is those elected on that occasion who
are now most against allowing the people to exercise their franchise
in a more genuine manner. So we see now that, despite allegations and
dire predictions, the elections in the East are being conducted relatively
peacefully - in fact the only deaths recorded thus far are of TMVP candidates,
ie of those the LTTE wants to prevent making clear their democratic
aspirations.
Meanwhile the government will continue with other confidence building
issues, including concerted recruitment of Tamils into the police. Though
there is much talk about the majoritarian tendencies of this government,
it is the first in years to actually take practical action and ensure
such recruitment. Fortunately, with the LTTE threat reduced, Tamil youngsters
are willing to apply, no longer frightened that they would be treated
as traitors if they join the national security forces. In addition,
efforts to increase knowledge of the Tamil language amongst security
personnel have been redoubled. Sadly, many donors who claim to want
peace continue to give heaps of money to organizations in Colombo which
talk about peace, instead of helping with language training and other
essentials.
I think all this makes it clear that, while continuing the struggle
against terrorism, the government is committed to a political solution
to our problems. It is absurd that, when the CFA was abrogated, critics
said this proved the government was not interested in a political solution.
Then, when the government began to work on a political solution through
the APRC proposals, those same critics said this proves the government
wants to impose its own wishes. They do not see the contradiction in
their suggesting that this is a political solution the government wants,
however different it is from the sort of political solution they might
want, and their equally loud claim that the government is not interested
in a political solution.
But it is clear that such critics will say anything. What is important
is that the government should not be deterred from taking action in
all relevant areas as described above, so that we can move towards a
sustained peace.
Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha
Secretary General
Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process
(Adapted from an interview that appeared in the Lankadeepa on February
12th 2008)
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