By A. Jathindra, Courtesy Eurasia Review

In South Asia, history shows that setting streets ablaze rarely leads to constructive change. Yet, the region continues to see such upheaval, which only worsens domestic politics in the affected countries. Bangladesh has been a terrible witness,” engulfed by unrest, and now Nepal faces its own crisis.

The tragic death of the wife of Nepal’s former Prime Minister Jhalanath Khanal—killed after her house was allegedly set on fire by protesters, reportedly led by Gen Z activists—has become the latest flashpoint, underscoring how dire the situation has become.

Why do violent protests so often become tools of political manoeuvring in India’s neighbouring countries? The answer is not simple. Political turmoil is often blamed on sudden events, but beneath every eruption lies a deeper cause. Even when spontaneous incidents spark unrest, the roots often run far deeper.

Nepal’s political scene has been in constant flux. Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, a four-term incumbent who once said, Indian Virus Looks More Lethal than Chinese, Italian,” resigned amid worsening unrest following a strict ban on social media. In the shadow of this ban, a youth movement calling itself the ‘Voice of Nepal’s Gen Z’ rose up against the political elite. This raises a critical question: Can a social media blackout alone ignite such an uprising?

Nepal has long maintained close economic and social ties with India. Some even saw Nepal as an informal extension of India, although it has always remained sovereign. Recently, however, Nepal—like other Indian neighbours—has drifted strategically closer to China. Under Prime Minister Oli’s leadership, Nepal’s foreign policy began to resemble Sri Lanka’s approach during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure, when heavy borrowing forced Colombo to pivot toward Beijing. Although China claims to follow a policy of non-interference, its ambassador to Nepal reportedly held a series of meetings with key leaders of the Nepal Communist Party to broker a deal that would keep Oli as Prime Minister for a full five-year term. This shows how China is becoming increasingly involved in Nepal’s domestic politics, pulling the country further into Beijing’s orbit.

In December 2024, Oli visited China, breaking an unwritten diplomatic tradition that neighbouring leaders first visit India. The Nepalese ambassador to China later dismissed claims of such a tradition during an interview in Beijing. During Oli’s visit, Nepal signed several agreements under Beijing’s One Belt One Road” initiative, aimed at transforming Nepal from landlocked to land-linked. This deal promised both virtual and physical connectivity, including roads, railways, aviation, power grids, and telecommunications. It also restarted Nepal-Tibet trade, which had been cut off after China’s occupation of Tibet in 1959.

August 2024 saw a student uprising in Bangladesh that ousted Sheikh Hasina. The head of the caretaker government, Mohammad Yunus, soon met with Xi Jinping in Beijing and invited China to treat Bangladesh as an extension of the Chinese economy, using Dhaka as a maritime conduit to India’s northeastern states, Nepal and Bhutan”. Bangladesh thus became the first country in South Asia to openly invite Chinese expansion into the Indian Ocean region.

There is a visible thread running through the region’s recent turmoil. Is China’s growing interference the common factor? The answer is not straightforward. Increased Chinese involvement often brings a surge of loans and investments, but when these are accepted without oversight, corruption and abuse of power inevitably follow.

Sri Lanka offers a cautionary tale. During Mahinda Rajapaksa’s rule, Chinese loans fueled the construction of the strategic Hambantota port—ultimately trapping Colombo in a debt trap.” The $216 million Pokhara International Airport in Nepal, financed by China Exim Bank, has raised similar concerns and is linked to massive corruption. Just as the Chinese-built Hambantota port faced criticism for potential dual-use, Pokhara Airport has attracted similar scrutiny. Allegations swirl that $71 million from China’s Exim Bank was embezzled through deals between Chinese firms and Nepali politicians. While some individuals have faced charges, investigations have led nowhere. Corruption festers, fueling political instability.

Despite glaring parallels, Nepal’s political elite seems unwilling to heed Sri Lanka’s lessons. Since 2007, China’s presence has grown on India’s periphery—most notably in Sri Lanka and Nepal. During the final phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2008–09, China extended military support to Rajapaksa. Meanwhile, in March 2008, protests and crackdowns swept Tibet, deepening Beijing’s ties with Kathmandu. Since then, China-Nepal relations have revolved around financial support and a tacit understanding: in exchange, Nepal is expected to suppress ‘anti-China’ activities within its borders.

Nepal’s current unrest is a symptom of deeper geopolitical shifts and unresolved domestic issues. The cycle of protests and violence is unlikely to yield positive change unless leaders learn from the region’s troubled history. The fires burning in Nepal are fueled not just by local grievances but by the complex interplay of regional power, debt, and diplomacy.