Dr. Alon Ben-Meir

Trump never tested serious, sustained diplomacy to resolve the wide-ranging, conflicting issues with Iran; instead, he defaulted to the illusion that enough bombs could end” a conflict that has spanned nearly five decades.

This war with Iran is a war of choice, and a reckless one at that. President Trump has floated a carousel of justifications—an imminent” threat, the need to destroy Iran’s missile stockpile and manufacturing capacity, to dismantle its nuclear program, to trigger regime change, to spark an uprising from within. Yet, weeks into a brutal conflict, his administration has still not articulated a clear, coherent objective commensurate with the risks and costs involved. That is not a strategy; it is improvisation with live ammunition.

A war of choice that should not have started Defenders of the war claim that Iran’s expanding missile arsenal, its accumulation of highly enriched uranium, and its network of proxies left the United States with no choice but to strike. They speak of an imminent threat in slow motion,” arguing that the alternative to war now is a far worse war later. But even if one accepts that Iran’s trajectory was deeply troubling, it does not follow that a maximalist air and naval campaign—decapitation strikes, broad attacks on infrastructure, and open-ended escalation—was the only or wisest option.

Miscalculating Iranian resistance, resilience, and war plans The miscalculation at the heart of this war is the belief that Iran would crumble quickly under shock and awe. Trump and Netanyahu appear to have badly underestimated Iran’s resilience, its capacity for asymmetric retaliation, and the depth of its preparation. Iran has done pretty much what its own doctrine and countless experts said it would do: fire missiles and drones at US bases and Israel, mobilize its axis of resistance” across the region, and move to close or heavily disrupt the Strait of Hormuz—putting global shipping and energy markets at risk.

Instead of a short, sharp epic fury,” we now face a grinding confrontation that has driven up oil prices, rattled global markets, and forced US and Israeli air defenses into high-intensity operations with no clear end in sight. Proponents of the war insist that Iran’s military capabilities are being badly degraded.” Perhaps. But degraded is not defeated, and a wounded adversary with intact asymmetric tools is often more dangerous, not less.

Netanyahu’s push vs Trump’s desire to end” the conflict Many observers blame Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu for pushing Trump over the brink. For years, Netanyahu has championed a confrontational Iran policy, opposing past nuclear deals and casting the Islamic Republic as an existential threat to be confronted, not managed. His fingerprints are all over this crisis. Yet focusing solely on Netanyahu obscures Trump’s own agency and ambition. Aides describe the war as a historic chance to finally end” the Iran problem—to do what previous presidents would not.

This is a fantasy. You cannot bomb away a nation’s identity, trauma, sense of encirclement, or deterrent logic. The belief that decapitation strikes and infrastructure damage will yield a pliant, post revolutionary Iran ready to embrace US preferences lacks any historical foundation. Worse, leadership decapitation often empowers the most hardline factions, confirming their conviction that only missiles, proxies, and nuclear latency can keep the country safe.

No exit strategy and fraying coalition

Three weeks into the war, there is still no exit strategy. Trump appears politically and strategically trapped. He cannot point to a defined set of war aims achieved, yet he also cannot escalate indefinitely without risking a wider regional explosion or a surge of American casualties. Meanwhile, his pleas for an international naval coalition to keep the Strait of Hormuz open have been met with lukewarm responses. Key allies in Europe, Canada, and Australia have either refused to dispatch forces under US command or have limited their role to protecting their own shipping, explicitly stating they will not be drawn into a war they neither initiated nor were seriously consulted about.

End of war scenarios and mission accomplished”

This is the context in which we must consider the endgame. Broadly, several scenarios are debated: a prolonged air and naval campaign ending in a unilateral US declaration of victory”; a ceasefire mediated by regional and international actors; dangerous escalation into limited ground operations; or uncontrolled regional war involving multiple fronts. Of these, only a negotiated de escalation grounded in realistic objectives offers a path that avoids producing more instability than it resolves.

The United States needs an off ramp enabling Trump to claim success without demanding Iranian capitulation. A carefully crafted mission accomplished” narrative—asserting that Washington has severely degraded Iran’s military, missile production, and capacity to reconstitute its nuclear program—can provide that. But it must be paired with substance: a several-week cooling-off period with no new offensives, an end to triumphalist and humiliating rhetoric about Iran, and discreet back-channel contacts to explore conditions for resuming broader talks.

Cooling off period and avoiding humiliation The importance of tone is often dismissed as cosmetic. It is not. Iranian politics are saturated with memories of humiliation—foreign intervention in 1953, the brutal Iran–Iraq War, and decades of sanctions. Public gloating by American or Israeli leaders over killing Iran’s supreme leader or crushing” its armed forces will only narrow the space for any Iranian decision-maker to contemplate engagement.

We must all remember, national pride is not a luxury good in Tehran; it is a political necessity. If the United States wants Iran to show flexibility, it must allow Iranian leaders to tell their own public that they defended the nation’s honor and extracted concessions, not that they were forced to kneel.

Back channel contacts and multilateralizing talks Back channel diplomacy, facilitated by trusted intermediaries such as Oman or Qatar, is essential. Formal talks should not begin with crowds or media fanfare. Quiet exploration of parameters—red lines, sequencing, verification—must come first. Since Iran, for good reason, distrusts Trump after he withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and attacked Iran twice during negotiations (June last year and February this year), representatives acceptable to both sides—perhaps British and Saudi—should later join as observers. Invited by Washington, they would reassure Tehran that the US is bound to the process and signal to skeptics that the outcome is durable, not a fragile bilateral deal.

Professional negotiators and psychological understanding of Iran Just as important is who negotiates. Trump’s habit of sending personal loyalists and real estate fixers to handle enormously complex security dossiers is a recipe for spectacle, not success. Negotiating with Iran requires deep technical knowledge of nuclear and missile issues, sanctions architecture, and regional security dynamics, as well as a nuanced understanding of Iranian political psychology and factional dynamics. The United States should appoint first-rate diplomats and experts in international negotiations and conflict resolution, not family or business partners, to lead these extraordinarily sensitive talks.

Constrained but realistic US negotiating agenda Washington must narrow its demands to what is legitimate and achievable. A realistic package would aim to end Iran’s funding and operational support for proxies attacking US forces and destabilizing neighbors; roll back its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile under a mutually agreed mechanism; and establish a new Israel Iran security framework in which Tehran halts direct and indirect threats against Israel, and Israel ceases threatening the Iranian regime.

In return, the US would recognize Iran’s right to a peaceful, strictly monitored civilian nuclear program; coordinate with key partners to lift nuclear related sanctions in phased steps tied to compliance; gradually unfreeze Iranian assets; pledge non interference in Iran’s internal politics; and move toward gradual normalization.

Critics will bristle. Iranian hardliners will resist limiting support for Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and other axis of resistance” elements seen as essential to deterrence. Israeli leaders will argue that anything short of zero enrichment and missile dismantlement leaves an existential threat intact. American hawks will denounce sanctions relief or recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights as appeasement.

Yet the alternative to such a constrained bargain is no tidy victory, but an indefinite, simmering war—one that repeatedly ignites regional crises, keeps oil markets on edge, hardens Iran’s radicals, and erodes the US-Arab Gulf alliance system as partners recoil from Washington’s unilateral adventurism.

Anticipating Israeli attempts to sabotage a deal That is why the United States must also stop allowing its Iran policy to be effectively subcontracted to whoever sits in the prime minister’s office in Jerusalem. Yes, Israel has legitimate security concerns, and Iran must not be allowed to threaten Israel’s existence or use the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a permanent lever of regional destabilization.

But it is not for Washington to conduct its foreign policy on Israel’s behalf. Furthermore, neither Israel nor the US should dictate who governs Iran. As long as Tehran refrains from threatening Israel and interfering in the Israeli–Palestinian arena, the United States should judge the Iranian government primarily by its behavior, not its ideology.

Iran is not going away. Neither is Israel. Nor is the durable reality of American strategic interests in the Middle East, or the universal desire—among Americans, Iranians, Israelis, and their neighbors—for a more stable and peaceful region. The war we are in now is a choice. Continuing it without a plausible political endgame is also a choice. So is building an off-ramp that trades maximalist fantasies for hard-nosed, enforceable peaceful coexistence.

The question is not whether that off-ramp is easy. It is whether we have the wisdom to take it before the alternatives become far worse.

____________ Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies