By Dharshan Weerasekera, Courtesy The Island

The UN Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) latest resolution on Sri Lanka raises serious questions about the Council’s impartiality and respect for the UN Charter. This new measure extends the mandate of the external mechanism established under Resolution 46/1 of March 2021.

At the start of the UNHRC’s 60th Session on 08 September, 2025, 43 nations objected to any further country-specific action on Sri Lanka, with several specifically arguing that the external mechanism contravenes Article 2(7) of the UN Charter — which prohibits the UN from interfering in the domestic affairs of states. Yet, barely four weeks later, the Council adopted the resolution, extending the mandate, regardless.

This sequence of events suggests that what drives the UNHRC is not principle or law, but politics. If so, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) must be informed of what has taken place.

Mechanism That Discredits the UN

The extension of the Sri Lanka Accountability Project (SLAP) discredits both the UNHRC and, by extension, the UN itself, for two reasons.

First, the UNGA created the UNHRC in 2006 to replace the former Human Rights Commission, which had been discredited for bias and politicisation. The UNHRC’s founding resolution (UNGA Resolution 60/251, para. 4) explicitly requires that its conduct be guided by the principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive international dialogue and cooperation.”

Successive Sri Lankan Governments — including the present one — have categorically rejected the SLAP, most recently on 08 September, 2025. When the concerned State rejects a measure, and the Council, nevertheless, re-endorses it year after year, that is an affront to the very principles on which the UNHRC was founded. The UNGA cannot ignore such a situation.

Second, the resolutions on Sri Lanka since 46/1 have all been brought by the so-called Core Group on Sri Lanka” led by the United Kingdom — in effect, a faction of Council members ganging up on a fellow member. This practice contradicts the ethos of the Council’s founding instruments.

For example, UNHRC Resolution 5/1 (Institution-building of the Human Rights Council”) establishes the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and the Special Rapporteurs as the main mechanisms for assessing Member States’ human rights performance. The UPR is an inclusive, cooperative process involving the State concerned, other Council members, and civil society. While Resolution 5/1 does not preclude country-specific measures, it assumes that scrutiny will proceed through the UPR or Rapporteur mechanisms, not ad hoc groups targeting one country session after session.

Every day that SLAP continues to operate therefore represents, arguably, an illegal act committed by both the OHCHR (which oversees it) and the UNHRC (from which it derives authority). The UNGA must act before this becomes a permanent stain on the institution’s credibility.

What Sri Lanka Should Do

One cannot negotiate with a bandit or brigand. The miscreant must be arrested, tried, convicted, and punished. If, as suggested above, the UNHRC is committing an arguably illegal act against Sri Lanka, then the UNHRC has become the equivalent of a bandit. In these circumstances, the only reasonable thing for Sri Lankans to do is to report this matter to the UN General Assembly and demand that it be investigated further.

Sri Lankans, however, should not stop there. They should take the necessary legal, as well as diplomatic measures, to protect the long-term interests of this country from the following: first, the possible harm that the OHCHR could cause by using the material in SLAP’s repository to pursue legal action, including under universal jurisdiction, against Sri Lankan citizens. Second, the possible harm to the good name of the country caused by the UNHRC’s continued accusations that human rights violations are rampant, especially against minorities. And third, the possible harm to the country’s reputation caused by claims of war crimes and other crimes allegedly committed during the war against the LTTE.

Legal Action

Sri Lankans — either privately or through registered nationalist organisations — should compile a detailed dossier setting out the possible illegality of the SLAP, along with any problems relating to the probable contents of its repository. The dossier should be handed over to the Government to be forwarded to its embassies abroad, which should in turn deliver it to the relevant authorities in those countries.

Those authorities should be instructed to inform their judiciaries that, if legal action, including under universal jurisdiction, is pursued against Sri Lankan citizens, any judicial officer reviewing such an application must have access to the dossier. The officer must be aware that the information on which a decision is sought may be compromised. Accused persons can then raise this as a preliminary objection if they are ever asked to appear in a foreign court — or in a Sri Lankan court that relies on SLAP’s material.

Diplomatic Counter-Narrative

Sri Lankans must also challenge the narrative that the High Commissioner and others are presenting about the human rights situation in this country. According to them, Sri Lanka is one of the world’s worst human rights offenders, a veritable pit of violence and oppression, especially for minorities. Yet Sri Lanka’s global reputation tells a different story. Forbes recently ranked the island third among the world’s most popular tourist destinations for 2025, highlighting its cultural richness, natural beauty, and appeal to international travellers. How could it possibly attract millions of visitors if the country were as dangerous or oppressive as the High Commissioner claims?

To correct this distortion, Sri Lankans — working through relevant nationalist organisations — should collaborate with a local university to establish an institute or desk dedicated to compiling facts about life in the country, especially for minorities. This could include databases on life expectancy, infant mortality, access to healthcare and education, average household income, and the composition of the prison population.

It could also collect testimonies from ex-combatants, statistics on inter-ethnic marriages — including between former members of the armed forces and ex-LTTE cadres, which demonstrate reconciliation — and verifiable accounts from foreign visitors describing their observations of daily life in the country.

On alleged war crimes, the same desk should collate and publish the databases of Sri Lanka’s two main domestic mechanisms — the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission and the Paranagama Commission — both of which categorically reject the claim that government forces committed system crimes” or crimes against humanity. These findings directly contradict the UNHRC and OHCHR’s accusations, as seen for example in the OISL Report of October 2015.

Making this information accessible in one place would enable any fair-minded observer, local or foreign, to assess the truth for themselves.

Time for Accountability — for the UNHRC

The UNHRC may argue that its global mandate entitles it to investigate states and launch accountability mechanisms. But no mandate gives it the right to break international law. If the Council exceeds its limits, it must itself be held to account.

The latest resolution — adopted despite formal objections by the Government of Sri Lanka and numerous Council members — is the final straw. Many of those objectors have stated openly that the mechanism violates the UN Charter. After four years of such warnings, the time for indulgence has ended.

The General Assembly must now weigh the Council in the balance — and if found wanting, eliminate it, reform it, or replace it with an institution that respects the law it claims to uphold.

By Dharshan Weerasekera