KAMALIKA PIERIS
The two JVP insurgencies of 1971 and 1987 have not been looked at
deeply or analytically. Commentators have concentrated on describing what the
JVP did, not why they did it. Commentators
treat the JVP with great indulgence, calling the JVP an idealistic, romantic youth
movement.
Dharman Wickremaratne said that, as a working
journalist, he had associated with many JVPers. They had a broad vision, much
energy and strong voices, he said. Neville Jayaweera and S. Nadesan were also
sympathetic. These commentators have only
looked at the JVP student and youth base, observed analysts. JVP was not a youth rebellion at all, said Chandraprema. The youth were merely used by the JVP.
Analysts also suggested that the JVP movement arose primarily due to the poverty and unemployment in the
country. It is these two factors that
drove the youth to JVP, said analysts. That is not so. The poor and unemployed
did not run to the JVP. The JVP came after them. JVP was a shrewd, externally
directed movement, which needed an obedient cadre. They got one without any
difficulty.
In recruiting cadres, JVP made contact with most downtrodden and
desperate persons. These were
indentified and JVP made contact with them and convinced them that they should
support JVP. JVP focused on the lumpen proletariat and used them for their own
purposes, said Chandraprema.
JVP knew to exploit the envy and anger of those who could not make
it, those who were unemployed or in low paying jobs with no hope of advancement
for their children. JVP gave them ‘the psychological factor of hope’, said
Chandraprema. The notion of revolution gave the youth a zest, he added. There
was also disenchantment with the traditional left, pointed out Wiswa Warnapala.
When Wijeweera was discharged from prison in 1970, he was treated as a hero and
garlanded.
JVP
also used caste. In 1971, JVP had support from Karawa, Wahumpura and Batgam in
the south. Govigama, Navandanna
and Berava did not support, said analysts. Mahawatte
village consisted mainly of Batgama,
Wahumpura, Durawa, Nakathi castes and most of the villagers supported JVP.
Menikhinna consisted mainly of Batgam caste and was a hot bed of JVP activity.
Initially,
there was much sympathy for JVP in villages, said Rohan Gunaratna. Many people
had genuine sympathy for JVP because they too when they were young, had
experienced the frustrations articulated by JVP. The lower and lower middle class thought JVP
offered a better alternative to UNP and SLFP. They had high expectations from
JVP. There was
also the feeling that unemployed and underprivileged youth had the right to revolt,
observed Chandraprema.
Some writers, using their imagination, saw this
as ‘the first revolutionary organization of the Sri Lanka peasantry’. JVP was
trying to convert a rural backward peasantry to a revolutionary force, they
said.
JVP leaders
however, did not come from the unemployed group or the lower classes. They came
from the middle class. They were
educated and employed. This is to be expected. An uneducated group could not
lead an insurgency. There were professionals among the JVP leaders. Lalith
Chandrasiri was an electrical Engineer of Steel Corporation. Viraj Fernando was
a mechanical engineer at Steel Corporation.
Some were in stable employment. Somawansa Amarasinghe was a
technical assistant in Irrigation Department. Jude Anthony was electrical technician at St Anthony’s
Consolidated. Wijepala (1971 insurgency) was an employee of Colombo Port
commission. Beli sira” was a bullock cart renter at Hambantota. One member in the Womens division was a teacher, another was a
local government employee, and a third had worked in Singapore.
The JVP
Politburo of 1980 had seven University graduates or drop outs, observed Rohan
Gunaratna. The JVP top rankers also
included graduates and University drop outs. J.G. Wijegunasekera was a graduate
in mass communications, University Kelaniya. Upali
Jayaweera had graduated from University of Kelaniya with an honors degree in
economics. Saman Piyasiri has been in University of Kelaniya. Lalith Wijeratne
(Aravinda) studied in the Arts Faculty at University of Peradeniya.
The JVP
leadership became politicized due to various factors. Ananda Idamegama was an
engineering student at Peradeniya suspended for assaulting pro UNP
students. Shantha Bandara had studied at
Trinity College, Kandy and Ananda College Colombo. He was in the Science Faculty, Peradeniya,
and was secretary of Socialist Students Union.
He was suspended from the university
few months before his final exams.
JG
Wijegunasekera was an active trade unionist at Coconut Cultivation Board, and
Small Industries Board. He was dismissed
after the 1980 strike. Upali Jayaweera applied for dozens of jobs, but could
not get a job because of his leftist leanings. Palitha Dissanayake was a school
boy when he went to prison in 1971. He became a full time JVPer.
JVP seems to
have had good intelligence and knew to sniff out sound recruits. Upali
Jayaweera was the son of village headman, his mother was a school teacher, his
brother was an engineer and Upali was in the Medical Faculty. He went back home
when University closed in 1987. He was approached when reading at the Nuwara Eliya Public
Library.
His potential was immediately seen. Upali was
appointed leader for Maskeliya, and was sent to University of Colombo for
training, as Peradeniya University
representative from Medicine, together with the representatives for English,
science and arts. Rohan Gunaratne was
impressed by Upali Jayaweera, and said Upali would have commanded the party, if
he lived.
JVP posed as a Marxist party. But no one took their Marxism
seriously. Wijeweera was not supported by either Russia or China, the two
leading Communist powers. Wijeweera‘s own Marxism was always suspect. Wijeweera
changed from Leninist to Trotskyite in 1973.
Wiswa Warnapala heard Wijeweera address students at
Peradeniya In 1971. Wijeweera was all revolutionary rhetoric, gestures, and
gesticulations, said Wiswa. Wijeweera traversed the entire course of the
history of revolution and referred to all revolutionary ideologies in the
world. Wijeweera‘s own revolutionary ideology was a hotchpotch of all these
ideologies without a clear cut strategy. His ideology was, in Marxian terms,
not ideology at all, said Wiswa.
My assessment
was that this man, with neither ideology nor political strategy would put the
youth of the country into serious trouble, concluded Wiswa. In one manifesto Wijeweera had said that if a
person wrote to the government in French he would get a reply in French.
Dr. Wasantha Bandara had maintained secret links with Rohana
Wijeweera throughout 1984-1989 period. During
regular secret meetings with Rohana Wijeweera, Bandara said he realized Wijeweera
was not in full control of the operations undertaken by the JVP.
Indradasa said Wijeweera was ‘a person easy to control,’ though
his speeches sounded fiery. Facing the
camera for a video statement when arrested, the expression on his face was one
of disappointment and dismay, said Indradasa. He had spoken in a shattered
voice, with emotion.
When he was captured in 1971, Wijeweera was very docile, unlike
his public image, said Chandraprema. He had told everything about everybody
while trying to hide his own liability for the insurgence. His statement went
to 400 pages, in 1989 he was brief, said Chandraprema.
JVP was a hard headed cynical
organization under a ruthless leadership, said critics. Noble sentiments were lacking. There was a lack of heroism and
moral uprightness in the JVP, said Chandraprema.. The JVP leaders were never
idealistic. Rank and file may have had
idealistic views’ but not the
leadership.
JVP had boasted of their simple life style. Then in September 1989 Rupavahini showed the
public the mansions, cars, and personal luxuries including foreign aphrodisiacs used by the top JVP
leadership.
For the JVP high command , self protection came first. When they
ordered villagers out on a demonstration, JVP got those they disliked to march
first so they were the first to get killed. JVP leaders stayed in the rear,
they never went in the front.
They were safe from fire. They had followed this from the time they
started forced demonstrations, said Chandraprema. An enterprising officer had
once got a helicopter to fire at the rear of the procession.
In 1989 JVP did not display much bravery in captivity. Top
leadership told all within 24 hours. They
were captured within less than 24 hours
of each other. JVP was only willing to
kill for a cause but not to die for it,
critics observed. Analysts noted
that the junior cadres were much better, under interrogation .They did not sing even
under torture. I do not think this was due to courage and loyalty, they
probably knew very little about the
organization .
JVP had two levels of activity, open and
secret. One genuine, the other bogus. They
had two parallel
political agendas to match this, one for
the public and another for the
insiders in the party. The entire
organization was conspiratorial, said Wiswa Warnapala.
JVP ‘s
public agenda said the JVP wanted
to create a socialist revolution which would benefit the masses. This bogus agenda was put forward to win the popular support JVP needed
in order to capture political power. The
cadres were told that the public agenda was an
‘upakrama’. Whenever a party cadre showed any uncertainty over the dual
strategy, the answer was eka upakramayak,
sahodaraya”
The secret
agenda, which was the real one,
was armed seizure of power by a trained cadre of young men. JVP
while holding meetings for the
public was secretly arming. They
were getting ready to kill. Emphasis was
on weapons and training . It was to be a Fascist type putsch, said Wiswa
Warnapala.
JVP only had short term plans, not long term
ones, observed Chandraprema, indicating that
JVP was only a tool obeying its
handlers. JVP ‘s task was to bring the country to a grinding halt through
terror and killing.
JVP had foreign contacts and foreign support. Ananda Idamegama had contact with foreign
ministries in Colombo. DJV had trained a few of its members in India. In 1985 Amnesty International
issued a report on Sri Lanka taking the side of the JVP. When an armed gang abducted eight bhikkhus of the Manawa
Hithawadi Organization in 1988 Somawansa
phoned Amnesty international in London.
BBC filmed an attack on JVP at University
of Sri Jayewardenepura and showed it as
‘island of terror’. When JVP were arrested there were Habeas corpus
applications. These were paid for by applicant’s relatives or by an aid organization .
Early in the 1971 JVP insurgency,
it was rumored that JVP was
receiving covert aid from a foreign source. Godahewa stated firmly that JVP had received funds in
1971 and named Middle East, Thailand
and Japan. It was obvious that the JVP
was receiving some form of external aid in the period 1977-83 , said
Chandraprema.
JVP tried to
show that all funds were obtained locally,
through membership fees,
donations, robberies. JVP robbed
cash from banks and petrol sheds. Dalandagama Maho cooperative petrol shed, Polgahawela and Galagamuwa petrol sheds were robbed in 1986. In 1988,
Digana Peoples Bank was robbed of Rs 8
million, Wellawatte Peoples Bank robbed of
Rs 20 million in cash. JVP robbed cash and jewellery from
Marandagahamula Peoples Bank in 1987, and Wallewatte Peoples Bank in 1989. A
pay roll of Rs 4 lakhs was robbed in Balangoda.
Another pay roll from Kalebokka was taken in 1989.
But JVP could not have funded its two insurgencies
in this ad hoc manner. JVP had heavy expenses. Some Rs 1,000,000 to Rs
1,200,000 was needed as payment to full timers . Two activists in
Kandy were given Rs120,000 and 150,000 . Money was also needed to lease houses, purchase and maintain vehicles. In
the late 1980s JVP bought three houses. Araliyawatte in Lilambe
area Wariyapola, the house at Gonapola junction Batuwita and the mansion
Katugaha Walawwa in Neluwa near Attampitiya road . When Shanta Bandara was captured
Rs. one million had been offered for his release.
After
the 1989 defeat, the JVP was rescued by its foreign contacts. The foreign links
of the JVP came to light only then, said Godahewa. This fact has not received
the publicity it deserves., India’s
RAW had arranged to provide accommodation and other assistance in India to
fleeing JVP cadres. Nearly 400 were
given sanctuary. In April 1989 Somawansa’s wife and son had been sent to Japan,
then UK via Kerala, Thailand and Italy.’
The
sole Politbureau member to escape, after the 1987 insurgency, was Somawansa Amarasinghe. He left in March 1990. The media said Somawansa Amerasinghe was assisted by RAW to safely flee Sri Lanka, and he was
initially given refuge in India. Shamindra Ferdinando said Somawansa was helped by a section of the government to escape
to India where Indian authorities looked after him before facilitating his
migration to the UK.
In UK Somawansa had run a special
international JVP cell. This was used,
very successfully to conduct special meetings in different countries in
Asia, on behalf of the JVP. According to
Dharman Wickremaratne, Somawansa had traveled to Italy via France and
thereafter to Switzerland.. Somawansa
lived in Paris and London for 12
years and returned to Sri Lanka to lead the JVP in 1994. ( Continued)
