Madyawediya

Dilrook Kannangara

Reconciliation, harmony, inclusiveness, and coexistence are admirable ideals. However, they must not be used to distort historical facts. History should be interpreted within the context of the norms and conventions of its own time—not through modern lenses.

Valuable artefacts discovered around the Jetawanaramaya stupa include items of foreign origin from the Far West, China, and North and South India. Among them was a statue of a Hindu deity donated by a visiting trade group from Tamilakam (modern-day Tamil Nadu). This was simply one object among many collected artefacts. There is no evidence it was venerated. Gifts of religious symbols are often diplomatic or cultural gestures; they do not imply worship or doctrinal integration.

Foreign visitors have long been drawn to Jetawanaramaya. Even in modern times, much of its restoration has been funded by foreign tourists through ticket sales. Historical evidence suggests that such visits occurred for centuries. Foreign pilgrims and traders admired the shrine and contributed to its upkeep. This demonstrates long-standing patronage—not evidence of social inclusiveness or permanent settlement.

Similarly, Sinhalese Buddhists for centuries visited sacred Buddhist sites in India, Nepal, and across Asia, where they were received with hospitality. Visiting a religious site does not imply settlement or demographic change.

Ancient societies understood the balance between hospitality and sovereignty. They welcomed visitors while preserving their homeland and identity. Interpreting ancient history through modern political or ideological frameworks risks serious distortion.

History must remain grounded in evidence and context, not reshaped to fit contemporary reconciliation and political narratives.

Divaina Online

Shenali D Waduge

The oft-quoted disenfranchisement of Tamils” post-independence is often repeated internationally & referred to locally. Let us go back in time and evaluate the evolution of how colonials identified the natives. To answer that, let us trace how identity classification evolved. This study traces how Portuguese, Dutch, and British colonial administrations systematically identified indigenous populations and distinguished them from imported migrant communities. It then asks a central question: On what historical, legal, or civilizational grounds should externally imported colonial labour be granted automatic citizenship in a newly independent sovereign state? This is not an ethnic argument. It is a historical–legal inquiry, grounded in primary records, census data, administrative classifications, land registers, and colonial legal systems.

PORTUGUESE PERIOD (1505–1658)

How Portuguese identified populations

Key Sources

1. Fernão de Queyroz
   The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon (1617–1688)

• Identifies Sinhala population as indigenous
• Uses Malabars” to describe South Indian Tamil-speaking migrants and mercenaries
• Jaffna treated as a political entity, not a native civilizational base

1. João Ribeiro
   Fatalidade Historica da Ilha de Ceilão (1681)

• Distinguishes Sinhala natives from Malabar mercenaries and traders

Crucial point:

The Portuguese never recognized Tamils” as a native ethnic group of the island.
They recognized them as Malabars = South Indian origin.

This establishes the earliest recorded colonial distinction between indigenous populations and external migrant communities.

Term	Meaning
Chingalas / Singalas	Native inhabitants of the island
Gentios da terra	People of the land (natives)
Malabares	People from the Malabar coast (South India)
Coromandel	Eastern South Indian coast
Mouros	Muslims

DUTCH PERIOD (1658–1796)

Dutch Civil administration was more systematic

The Dutch created Thombo registers — land, population & tax records.

Their classification:

Term	Meaning
Inlanders	Natives of the land
Singalezen	Sinhalese
Malabaren	South Indian Tamils
Topasses	Mixed Portuguese descendants

Key Source Authors

• L. Brohier– The Dutch Thombo Registers of Sri Lanka
• Arasaratnam– Dutch Power in Ceylon 1658–1687
• VOC Archives – Colombo & Jaffna Thombos

Dutch Thombos:

• Record Sinhalese villagers as indigenous landholders
• Record Malabars as migrants, traders, mercenaries, and labour
• Land ownership overwhelmingly Sinhalese (strongest legal marker of indigeneity)
• Even in Jaffna, Malabars appear as occupational and migrant groups

Key finding:

Even in Jaffna, Tamil populations are documented mainly as service, trade, or mercenary groups, not as original indigenous settlers.

Under Dutch Roman-Dutch law — later inherited by the British and post-independence Sri Lanka — land ownership and ancestral rootedness defined legal belonging.

Thesavalamai Law (1707 / Dutch Period)

• TheThesavalamai is a codified customary law in Jaffna, officially recorded by the Dutch in 1707.
• Appliedexclusively to the Tamil/Malabar population of northern Sri Lanka.
• Regulated: property, inheritance, marriage, caste, and civil matters for Tamils.

1. Exclusive application to Malabars:

• Thesavalamai never applied to Sinhalese; how many of the Ceylon Tamils” enjoy this legal status for land ownership?

2. Colonial acknowledgment of external origin:

• By codifying Thesavalamai, Dutch and later British authorities treated Tamil-speaking populations as aself-contained, migrant community, distinct from the indigenous Sinhalese.

3. Legal precedent for citizenship and land ownership:

• Under Roman-Dutch law (and inherited British administration), land rights and ancestral rootedness defined legal belonging.
• The Thesavalamai codification reinforces that Tamils weredistinct settlers, with customs and property laws different from the island’s indigenous legal systems. The law is another headache of the colonials.

Implication for Separatist Claims:

• If Tamils were truly indigenous, there would beno need for a separate, codified law governing only their community.
• Colonial administration consistentlytreated them as external settlers, not as part of the indigenous Sinhalese civilization.

How Colonial Records Constructed ‘Native’ Identity

Colonial administrations were not anthropological institutions.

Their classifications were designed for governance, taxation, land tenure, military control, and population management. Yet across three successive colonial regimes — Portuguese, Dutch, and British — a remarkable continuity emerges in how indigeneity was defined.

Across all three COLONIAL administrations, native identity was determined by three consistent criteria:

1. Ancestral rootedness
2. Land inheritance
3. Long-settled village-based civilization

Populations satisfying these conditions were recorded as people of the land — the indigenous inhabitants. Only the Sinhalese fitted all 3 criteria.

Those lacking these characteristics were classified separately as (2^nd category):

• Migrants
• Mercenaries
• Traders
• Imported labour

From the 16th to the late 19th century, Tamil-speaking populations were consistently placed in the second category, not the first.

This demolishes the modern claim that Ceylon Tamil” indigeneity is ancient.

Instead, the evidence demonstrates that colonial bureaucratic convenience — not historical reality — manufactured the modern ethnic category.

EARLY BRITISH PERIOD (1796–1870)

Identity Categories still external-origin based

British continued Dutch classification:

Term	Meaning
Cingalese	Indigenous population
Malabar	Tamil-speaking South Indians
Coast Tamils	Migrants from Coromandel
Coolies	Imported labour

Key British Sources

• James Emerson Tennent– Ceylon: An Account of the Island (1859)
• Percival– Account of the Island of Ceylon (1803)

They describe:

• Sinhalese as the ancient people of the island
• Malabars as immigrant traders, soldiers, and labour

This confirms over three centuries of continuous administrative classification recognizing Sinhalese as indigenous and Tamil-speaking populations as external-origin groups.

Scholars such as Dr Karthigesu Indrapala and Mahindapala H.L.D. confirm that Tamils only became permanent settlers in the 12th–13th centuries.

Before that, Jaffna was not a native civilizational base, but a political and isolated outpost. Cultural development in Jaffna remained derivative of South India, with no independent artistic or state-building achievements comparable to Sinhala civilization.

THE CRITICAL SHIFT — BRITISH CENSUS ENGINEERING (1871–1911)

This is the turning point.

1871 Census — No Ceylon Tamil” Category

Tamils classified mainly as:

• Malabars
• Coast Tamils
• Indian Tamils

1881 Census — Transitional Identity Stage

First bureaucratic attempts to separate:

• Tamils of Ceylon”
• Tamils of Indian origin”

This was not historical recognition — it was administrative convenience.

Colonial Manipulation of Identity & the Birth of ‘Ceylon Tamil’

The 1911 Census formalized Ceylon Tamil” as an administrative category.

This was not historical recognition — it was colonial political engineering, designed to simplify electoral representation, allocate Legislative Council seats, and stabilize communal governance.

The creation of this identity gave rise to a politically privileged Tamil elite that dominated civil service, missionary education, and legislative influence — far beyond their historical numbers or civilizational contribution.

Meanwhile, Sinhalese were consistently recorded as indigenous inhabitants with ancestral land rights — a continuity that persisted across all colonial administrations.

1911 Census — The Political Reclassification

This is when Ceylon Tamils” formally appear as a census ethnic category.

Why?

Because:

1. Britain needed stable communal representation structures
2. Legislative Council reforms required ethnic group allocation
3. Political representation required simplified identity blocks
4. Census became a political instrument, not a historical one
5. Registrar-General was a Tamil – Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan

Key Source

• Patrick Peebles– The History of Sri Lanka
• M. de Silva– A History of Sri Lanka
• British Census Reports 1871–1946

Ceylon Tamil” is a 20th century colonial administrative construction — not an ancient historical identity.

This census shift later became the foundation of ethnic politics and separatist ideology.

PLANTATION TAMIL IMPORTATION (1820–1939)

British Import Policy

• Over 1,000,000 South Indian Tamils imported
• Purpose: Plantation labour
• Legal status: Temporary migrant workforce

This represents one of the largest organized labour migrations in colonial Asia. Comparable migrations in Malaya, Burma, Fiji, Kenya, and South Africa did not result in automatic citizenship upon independence.

Sri Lanka’s post-1948 approach was therefore consistent with global post-colonial legal norms.

Identified in British records as:

• Indian Immigrant Labour
• Estate Tamils
• Coolies
• Malabars

Key Sources

• H. Farmer – Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon
• Holmes Report on Indian Labour in Ceylon (1915)
• British Blue Books of Ceylon

THE KEY LOGICAL QUESTION FOR READERS

If the Portuguese, Dutch and British all identified all Tamils as – South Indian Tamils, Malabars, immigrants, labourers, and external populations, on what historical or legal basis should they suddenly become citizens?

1911 RECLASSIFICATION DOES NOT CREATE INDIGENEITY

Census categories are administrative tools, not historical truth engines.

They reflect:

• Political needs
• Governance convenience
• Electoral engineering

They do not confer ancestral legitimacy.

WHY THE 1948 CITIZENSHIP ACT WAS LEGALLY CONSISTENT

https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/srilanka/statutes/Citizenship_Act.pdf

The Act:

• Used ancestral descent
• Required generational rootedness
• Reflected pre-existing colonial classifications

Citizenship and Historical-Legal Question

This raises a key question:

On what historical or legal basis should South Indian migrant labour, imported for plantations, be granted automatic citizenship in a newly independent state?

International post-colonial practice provides clear guidance:

• Citizenship is granted based onancestral rootedness and generational permanence
• Migrant labourers, even if resident for decades, werenot considered founders or indigenous

Sri Lanka’s 1948 Citizenship Act was therefore consistent with global norms, codifying historical continuity rather than inventing exclusion.

HOW COLONIAL ENGINEERING FUELED SEPARATISM

The artificial 1911 Ceylon Tamil” identity produced a politically privileged Tamil elite, which benefited from:

• Missionary education
• Foreign scholarships
• Colonial civil service dominance
• Political over-representation

This elite:

• Advanced50–50 communal representation demands
• Formed theIlankai Tamil Arasu Katchchi (1949)
• Issued theVaddukoddai Resolution (1976)
• Paved the ideological path toarmed separatism

Thus, separatism did not arise from ancient grievances — it arose from colonial political engineering and elite privilege.

The Dutch and later colonial administrations also manipulated caste structures, elevating the Vellala caste artificially as a ruling elite in Jaffna.

Arumuka Navalar (1822–1879) codified Vellala dominance, creating a hierarchical structure that reinforced political control but had no basis in Sri Lankan indigenous society.

The transformation of the Bellala labourer into the Vellala landowner illustrates the colonial-engineered social hierarchy in Jaffna. As Wagenar notes, when the Bellala became landowners, a simple linguistic shift — B → V — symbolized their elevated status.

There is no equivalent Vellala caste in South India, highlighting that this was a Ceylon-specific construct.

This newly privileged Vellala class gained a strategic advantage during the arrival of American missionaries. The British, wary of empowering the majority Sinhalese with English education, effectively monopolized schooling for the Vellala, consolidating their socio-political influence.

This artificially created Vellala elite later became the backbone of political separatism, dominating peninsular Jaffna society and controlling education, social privilege, and access to resources, which ultimately fed into the rise of Tamil separatist ideology in the 20th century.

The British failed to comprehend the indigenous Sinhalese village-based structure.

Colonial administrators instead opened governance and education to select elites — the Mudaliyar system, inherited from the Portuguese — allowing a few families to amass wealth, collect taxes, and gain social respectability, while the majority remained marginal.

Modern neo-colonial actors continue this pattern, propping up and rotating power among these elite families across ethnic lines — their understanding being that maintaining elite privilege ensures influence, while preventing true mass empowerment.

The above may raise some counter questions:

The Tamils have lived in Sri Lanka for centuries — doesn’t that make them indigenous?”

• Portuguese, Dutch, British records classify Tamils asmigrant populations, not ancestral natives.
• Permanent settlement in Jaffna only begins around12th–13th centuries, much later than the Sinhalese, whose civilization spans millennia.
• Being resident for centuriesdoes not automatically confer indigeneity under international post-colonial legal norms. Indigeneity is linked to ancestral rootedness, land inheritance, and long-settled village-based civilization, criteria consistently recorded by colonial administrations.

The 1911 Census recognized Ceylon Tamils — isn’t that official historical recognition?”

• The 1911 Census wasadministrative and political, designed for electoral convenience, representation quotas, and colonial governance stability.
• Census categories arenot historical truth engines; they are tools for bureaucracy.
• Recognition on paperdoes not change historical or civilizational reality. Legal systems, land records, and prior colonial documents continue to show Sinhalese as indigenous landholders.

 The Vellala caste proves ancient Tamil roots — they are indigenous elite.”

• TheVellala caste in Jaffna emerged from colonial-engineered transformation of Bellala labourers.
• Linguistic shift (B → V) symbolizedcolonial social elevation, not ancestral legitimacy.
• There isno Vellala caste in South India, confirming this is a Ceylon-specific construct.

 What about Tamil contributions to culture, religion, or statecraft?”

• Jaffna culture and political systems werederivative of South India, with no independent Sinhalese-comparable civilization.
• Tamil settlements were mainlytrading, mercenary, or service-based communities until colonial times.
• Contributions of an elite minoritycannot redefine entire population identity as indigenous.

 Doesn’t denying plantation Tamils citizenship violate human rights?”

• International post-colonial normsdo not automatically grant citizenship to imported labour, even after decades of residence (e.g., Malaya, Fiji, Kenya, South Africa).
• Citizenship in 1948required ancestral rootedness and generational permanence, consistent with global standards.
• This approachprotected the sovereignty of a newly independent state, rather than discriminating against individuals.

 Why are Sinhalese considered fully indigenous — isn’t that biased?”

• Colonial classifications consistently recorded Sinhalese aslong-settled villagers with ancestral land ownership, a factual record, not bias.
• Sinhalese civilizationpredates European arrival by millennia, with continuous village-based governance, agriculture, and militia structures.
• Recognition is based onobjective historical and legal markers, not ethnic favoritism.

Doesn’t this dismiss Tamil grievances?”

• The argument doesnot dismiss Tamils as citizens; it distinguishes historical claims of separate-state indigeneity from administrative, elite-driven constructs.
• Tamils who seek coexistence areguaranteed full citizen rights and security
• Separatist claims arise fromcolonial engineering and elite privilege, not genuine historical exclusion.

Isn’t this an anti-Tamil racist narrative?”

• The narrative ishistorical-legal, not ethnic or racist.
• Those who have no solid arguments to counter hide behind racist slogans.
• Focus is oncolonial records, land registers, and census classifications.
• Itexposes manufactured political identities rather than targeting the community.
• The conclusion supportsshared national belonging and reconciliation, not exclusion.

Doesn’t British education policy justify Vellala dominance?”

• British policymonopolized schooling for a small elite to control administration; it was not evidence of ancient status.
• Sinhalese majority and other Tamil groups remainedlargely marginalized in governance, showing colonial manipulation of caste, not historic legitimacy.

 If Tamils were migrants, how can they now claim citizenship?”

• Citizenship post-independence islegally distinct from ancestral indigeneity.
• The 1948 Citizenship Actcodified historical continuity, granting rights to descendants with generational rootedness, not temporary imported labour.
• This aligns withinternational post-colonial precedent and is not discriminatory against individuals or communities.

shouldn’t Tamils be demanding accountability from the British for the uprooting of Tamils, importing them across seas and then planting separatist ideology”

Most definitely. It’s not too late to redirect the separatist campaign to demanding accountability from the British.

STRATEGIC MESSAGES TO ALL COMMUNITIES

To Tamil Separatists – mostly living overseas

• The historical bluff is now exposed.
• Chronology, land records, census classifications, and colonial administrative lawcollectively dismantle the claim of ancestral indigeneity.
• Separatism rests not on history, but oncolonial political manipulation and present day PR campaigns and well-funded lobbying.
• There existsno credible legal, historical, or civilizational foundation for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka.

To Peace-Loving Tamils who seek Coexistence

• This historical evolution offersreassurance, not rejection.
• Your future lies incoexistence, security, and shared national belonging — not in resurrecting colonial constructs that serve foreign geopolitical interests.
• Any hidden aspiration for separation exposes communities toregional domination, particularly by India, whose strategic doctrines openly emphasize subcontinental consolidation and subservience.
• Living as equal citizens within Sri Lanka is infinitely safer, freer, and more dignified than living as a peripheral minority under Indian dominance. It is a question the Tamil people must ask themselves.

To the Sinhalese People

• History calls formagnanimity grounded in truth
• Understanding these realities allows the Sinhalese majority toembrace Tamil citizens fully, once separatist demands cease.
• True national reconciliation is built not on denial, but onhonest historical clarity and mutual trust.

The colonial era engineered identities.

Independence demands decolonizing historical myths.

There exists no historical or legal justification for Tamil separatism.

There exists every moral, civilizational, and strategic reason for unity.

Sri Lanka’s future security, sovereignty, and harmony depend not on resurrecting colonial distortions and continuing the divisions — but on shared belonging, historical honesty, and national reconciliation.

Shenali D Waduge

Shenali D Waduge

Sri Lanka has been governed continuously by Sinhala-Buddhist monarchies for over 1,700 years, supported by advanced systems of governance, irrigation, taxation, law, and religious institutions. Despite intermittent South Indian invasions and mercenary occupations, the island has never experienced indigenous Tamil political sovereignty at any point in recorded history.

Modern claims for Tamil Eelam” do not arise from archaeology, epigraphy, genetics, history, or international law. Instead, they are constructed from colonial administrative distortions, selective historical interpretation, political myth-making, and post-colonial separatist ideology. These claims collapse under rigorous historical and legal scrutiny.

This dossier brings together prehistoric, archaeological, historical, genetic, colonial, and international legal evidenceto establish Sri Lanka’s unitary sovereignty and to decisively refute separatist narratives.

The conclusion is unambiguous:

Tamil Eelam is historically false, legally impossible, and geopolitically dangerous.

At the same time, the ultimate purpose of this analysis is not division, but unity — to ensure that all communities live together in peace, equality, dignity, and security, while firmly rejecting separatism promoted by external actors and overseas lobbies who bear no responsibility for Sri Lanka’s long-term stability, harmony, or survival.

Critically, Tamil Eelam ideology does not genuinely serve Tamil interests.
The Eelamist movement, driven largely by overseas lobbying networks, does not seek justice, development, or security for Sri Lankan Tamils. Instead, it weaponizes Tamil identity for geopolitical objectives that ultimately undermine both Tamil welfare and Sri Lankan sovereignty.

When the Eastern Province — which was never ruled, administered, settled, or conquered by South Indian powers — is forcibly included within the Tamil Eelam claim, it automatically exposes the entire Eelam project as a political fabrication, thereby casting decisive doubt even on the northern claim itself.

If the eastern claim collapses historically and legally, the northern claim collapses by logical extension, because the ideological foundation is revealed as territorial expansionism rather than historical justice.

Evidence indicates that the strategic objective of these overseas lobbies is not Tamil self-determination, but territorial reconfiguration — specifically, the merging of Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern Provinces with Tamil Nadu, thereby breaking Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity.

Such a geopolitical outcome would inevitably result in external dominance over Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern regions, as these actors already rely on historical South Indian origin narratives to justify political absorption.

Once territorial fragmentation is achieved, further expansionist claims would logically follow, including over Sri Lanka’s Central Plains, where new ethnic identity constructs — such as the recent Malayalam minority” narrative — are already emerging.

This pattern reflects a classic strategy of incremental territorial destabilization:

• Fragment sovereignty,
• Manufacture identity claims,
• Internationalize grievances,
• And progressively expand geopolitical influence.

Such a trajectory threatens not only Sri Lanka’s territorial unity but long-term regional stability, placing all communities — including Tamils — at risk.

Therefore, rejecting Tamil Eelam is not anti-Tamil.

It is a pro-peace, pro-sovereignty, pro-stability, and pro-coexistence position that protects all Sri Lankans equally.

In fact, rejecting Tamil Eelam is mostly beneficial for the Sri Lankan Tamils more than anyone else.

1. Prehistoric & Early Human Settlements

(38,000 BCE – 543 BCE)

Era	Territory (Present-Day)	Key Notes
Balangoda Man / Late Stone Age (~38,000 – 28,500 BCE)	Uva, Central Highlands, Horton Plains, Kitulgala, Ratnapura	Hunter-gatherers, microlithic tools, earliest evidence of humans on the island.
Mesolithic / Neolithic (~10,000 – 2000 BCE)	Dry zone plains (Anuradhapura, North Central, NW), Eastern river valleys	Early agriculture, cave settlements, pottery, ritual practices, organized communities.
Iron Age (~1000 BCE onward)	North Central (Anuradhapura), South-West (Kalu River basin), Eastern coast	Farming, early irrigation, local chieftains; island fully populated, no empty land”.

Key Takeaways:

• Indigenous civilization existed across Sri Lanka long before any founding myths.”
• Archaeology and inscriptions show organized societies with governance, agriculture, and religion.
• Genetic studies indicate modern Sinhalese directly descend from prehistoric inhabitants; Sri Lankan Tamils trace largely to later South Indian migration.
• Continuous human presence establishes long-term indigenous governance, meeting international legal standards of historical sovereignty.

2. Early Sinhala Kingdoms (543 BCE – 1215 CE)

Anuradhapura Kingdom

Total Sinhala Kings Pre-1215 CE: ~190–205 (Anuradhapura + Polonnaruwa periods)

Administrative Provinces (Not Ethnic):

Ancient Province	Modern Equivalent
Rajarata	North Central + Northern
Ruhuna (Rohana)	Southern + Southeastern
Maya Rata	Western + Southwestern
Pihiti Rata	Northwestern
Digamadulla	Eastern Province
Malaya Rata	Central Highlands
Vanni	North-central frontier forests

Evidence of Island-Wide Control:

• Centralized irrigation, taxation, and military administration.
• Buddhist monastic network across all provinces.
• Foreign invasions occurred but were temporary
• never establishing permanent Tamil sovereignty.

Key Kings:

• Pandukabhaya
• Devanampiyatissa
• Dutugemunu
• Valagamba
• Mahasena
• Dhatusena
• Aggabodhi series
• Mahinda IV

Major Foreign Occupations (Anuradhapura Era)

Period	Invader	Duration (years)	Notes
237–215 BCE	Sena & Guttika (Tamil mercenaries)	22	Overthrown by Prince Asela
205–161 BCE	Elara (Pandya)	44	Defeated by Dutugemunu
103 BCE	Five Dravidian Chiefs	14	Overthrown by Valagamba
433–473 CE	Pandyan mercenaries	~6	Defeated by Dhatusena
7th–8th c CE	Pallava naval raids	<1	Short coastal raids, repelled
993–1017 CE	Chola Empire	24	Partial control of northern Rajarata; expelled by Vijayabahu I

Total 110 years South Indian occupation

INVASION STATISTICS ANURADHAPURA ERA

Metric	Data
Total duration of Anuradhapura era	~1,400 years
Total foreign invasions	6 major + several minor raids (including naval raids)
Total years under full foreign occupation	110 years  (out of 1400 years – 110 occupied by foreign forces)
% of time under foreign rule	~7.9%
% of time under Sinhala sovereignty	~92.1%

Key Insight:

• Sena Guttika was the first recorded foreign occupation in Anuradhapura, before Elara.
• Occupation ≠ Homeland; invaders never created Tamil administrative systems, provinces, or infrastructure.
• Chola empire invasion of Anuradhapura (993-1017CE) when Rajadhiraja Chola/successive Chola kings controlled northern and central Sri Lanka.
• King Vijayabahu 1 began expelling Cholas and established Polonnaruwa as new capital in 1070 CE.

3. Polonnaruwa Kingdom (1055 – 1215 CE)

After Chola Expulsion (1070 CE) Until 1215 CE

• There was no major full‑scale successful South Indian invasionthat temporarily occupied or displaced the Sinhala monarchy between Vijayabahu I’s victory and Magha’s 1215 invasion.
• Vijayabahu I expelled the Chola occupation, re‑establishing Sinhala rule by 1070 CE, and Polonnaruwa became the capital.
• Parakramabahu I (1153 – 1186 CE) strengthened the kingdom and pursued foreign campaigns fromSri Lanka — there’s no historical record of another major South Indian power occupying Sri Lanka in this era.
• The next major foreign takeoverafter the Cholas was iMagha of Kalinga in 1215 CE, whose forces invaded and seized Polonnaruwa.

Smaller South Indian Interactions

• Pandyan involvement during Queen Lilavati’s reign (1197–1198 CE)
  – A Pandyan claimant momentarily deposed Lilavati and ruled for a few years — but this was not a full, lasting occupationof the kingdom like Chola (1017–1070 CE) or Magha (1215 CE).
• Some evidence of Chola or South Indian raids or military pressurein the later 12th century linked to wider regional conflicts, but none resulted in long occupation or conquest of the Sinhala state.
• The Polonnaruwa kingdom remained under Sinhala sovereignty, ruled by a succession of Sinhala kings.
• Minor South Indian influence or brief incursions (e.g., Pandyan claimant to Lilavati’s throne) occurred but did not constitute occupation or a replacement of sovereignty.
• Magha of Kalinga in 1215 CE is therefore the next major foreign intrusion after the Cholas.

Capital succession after Anuradhapura & Polonnaruwa: Dambadeniya → Yapahuwa → Kurunegala → Gampola → Kotte → Kandy.

Sovereignty Restored:

• Vijayabahu I (1055–1110) expelled Cholas, restored centralized governance.
• Parakramabahu I (1153–1186) consolidated administration, irrigation, and naval power.
• Island-wide irrigation networks (Kala Wewa, Parakrama Samudra) = proof of hydraulic state sovereignty.
• Archaeological and epigraphic evidence confirms Sinhala presence across north, east, and south (Polonnaruwa, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Jaffna).

External Confirmation:

• Faxian (5th c) & Greek geographers: single sovereign ruler of Taprobane.
• Arab traders: Sinhala kings recognized as rulers of entire island.

Key Takeaway: By 1215 CE, Sri Lanka was a unitary Sinhala-Buddhist civilization controlling the entire island.

4. Magha of Kalinga & Arya Chakravarti

(1215 CE Onwards)

Feature	Details
Magha Origin	Kalinga (Odisha), East India — not Tamil
Force	~24,000 mercenaries
Actions	Destroyed Polonnaruwa, Buddhist monasteries, irrigation networks; massacred monks
Outcome	Short-term occupation, limited to Rajarata; Sinhala resistance restored sovereignty

Arya Chakravarti Dynasty in Jaffna (Post-1215 CE):

• Installed by Magha as administrators/tributaries.
• Territory: Jaffna Peninsula + fringe Vanni, parts of Mannar.
• Role: revenue collection, maritime oversight, tribute to Sinhala kings.
• Did NOT rule entire island; did not build major Hindu temple infrastructure.
• Evidence: Yalpana Vaipava Malai, Pandya inscriptions.

Key Insight: Northern Tamil administration was an imposed, limited, tributary system — not indigenous sovereignty.

5. Post-Polonnaruwa Sinhala Kingdoms (1220–1815)

Kingdom	Period	Capital	Key Kings	Territory	Notes
Dambadeniya	1220–1345	Dambadeniya	Vijayabahu III, Parakkamabahu II	SW, Central, parts of East & North-Central	Reunited core Sinhala lands; tribute from north
Yapahuwa	1272–1293	Yapahuwa	Bhuvanaikabahu I	Central, NW, SW	Defensive capital
Kurunegala	1300–1340	Kurunegala	Bhuvanaikabahu III, Parakkamabahu IV	NW, Central, South	Consolidation of central authority
Gampola	1341–1412	Gampola	Bhuvanaikabahu IV	Central, South	Tribute maintained from Jaffna
Kotte	1412–1597	Kotte	Parakramabahu VI	SW, Central, East	Maritime trade expansion; tribute from Arya Chakravarti
Kandy	1597–1815	Kandy	Last kings	Central Highlands, parts of South-Central	Last bastion before British conquest

Tribute System Evidence: Jaffna rulers acknowledged Sinhala kings, paying grain, elephants, and taxes.

6. Colonial Construct: Northern & Eastern Provinces

• Pre-colonial: No ethnic provinces; all administered for governance efficiency.
• British (Colebrooke–Cameron reforms, 1833):
  • Northern Province = Jaffna + Mannar + Vanni (formalizing Arya Chakravarti tributary area)
  • Eastern Province = Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara (formerly Digamadulla under Sinhala kings)
• Implication:North & East as Tamil homelands” = British administrative invention, not historical reality.

7. Comparative Impact: Arya Chakravarti vs Europeans

Feature	Arya Chakravarti (1215–1505)	Europeans (1505–1948)
Origin	South Indian administrators	Foreign colonial powers
Territorial Control	Jaffna Peninsula, Mannar, Vanni fringes	Coastal forts → entire island eventually
Sovereignty	Tributary to Sinhala kings	Full political & military control
Governance	Local administration, tribute	Administrative overhaul: taxation, legal systems, plantations
Cultural Impact	Limited; Sinhala Buddhist culture persisted	Major cultural, religious, linguistic, economic transformation
Infrastructure	Minimal new hydraulic works	Some forts/ports; ancient irrigation often neglected
Duration	~300 years	Portuguese: 150 yrs; Dutch: 140 yrs; British: 152 yrs

Arya Chakravarti rule = limited tributary administration; did not replace Sinhala sovereignty.

8. Key Historical Realities

1. Continuous Sinhala sovereignty:~1,758 years (543 BCE – 1215 CE) and unbroken capitals/monarchies post-1215.
2. Unitary hydraulic civilization:Island-wide irrigation, Buddhist monastic network, central taxation.
3. No indigenous Tamil kingdom pre-1215:Tamil presence = migrants, mercenaries, tributary administrators post-1215.
4. North & East provinces = colonial constructs; Northern Tamil claims based on artificial division.
5. Post-invasion north:Limited administration, no island-wide sovereignty, Sinhalese continued in hinterlands.

Sri Lanka historically functioned as a unitary Sinhala-Buddhist civilization, with sovereignty, administration, irrigation, and culture centered under Sinhala kings. Claims of an indigenous Tamil homeland prior to European colonization are unsupported by archaeology, epigraphy, chronicles, or external records.

1. Genetic evidence of Tamils in the North and their civilization

• Modern genetic studies (e.g.,Bamshad et al., 2001; Silva et al., 2017) show that the Sri Lankan Tamil population is genetically close to Indian Tamils but also shows significant admixture with Sinhalese and other Sri Lankan populations.
• No evidence exists of a distinct, continuous Tamil civilization in northern Sri Lanka prior to historic South Indian invasions.

2. Scientific evidence connecting South Indian Tamils with present-day Sri Lankan Tamils

• Mitochondrial DNA and Y-chromosome studies confirm aSouth Indian connection among Sri Lankan Tamils.
• Linguistically,Tamil language in Sri Lanka shows strong continuity with South Indian Tamil
• Anthropological studies indicate the bulk of Tamil settlements werepost-Anuradhapura migrations, often linked to mercenaries, laborers, or colonial plantation workers.

3. Presence of Tamils before Sena & Guttika (after Anuradhapura formation)

• Historical chronicles (Mahavamsa) mentionmercenary rulers like Sena & Guttika arriving from South India.
• No evidence exists of a structured Tamil polity or autonomous Tamil rule in the North before these arrivals.
• Northern populations were predominantlySinhalese, Vedda, and minor tribal communities, according to archaeological and inscriptional evidence.

4. Did Sena Guttika, Elara, Magha, Arya Chakravarti bring South Indians to settle?

• Sena & Guttika (237–215 BCE): Mercenary rulers; no record of mass settlement.
• Elara (205–161 BCE): Military ruler;Mahavamsa mentions administration but not permanent colonization.
• Magha (1215–1236 CE): Brought troops and possibly families from Kalinga and Tamil regions (Culavamsa).
• Arya Chakravarti (13th – 14th C CE, Jaffna Kingdom): Established Tamil kingdom in the North; some immigration likely, but primarily elite political families and military personnel.

Evidence: Chronicles, inscriptions, and land grants show limited migration, mostly administrative or military, not large-scale population replacement. Even if they were, it proves they were of South Indian origin not indigenous Tamils.

5. Did South Indian rulers ruling Sri Lanka also rule South India?

• Sena & Guttika, Elara, Magha, Cholas: All retained power bases in South India.
• Implication:Sri Lanka was an extension of foreign conquest, not an independent Tamil polity.
• Legal argument:Self-determination requires indigenous, continuous political control, which was absent.

6. Evidence of South Indian rulers ruling Eastern Province

• Elara, Cholas, Magha: Mostly controlledNorth & parts of North-Central Province.
• No evidenceof control over Eastern Province before colonial administration.
• Claims for Tamil Eelam including Eastern Province are historically baseless.

7. Sinhala kings marrying South Indian Tamils

• Historical records showoccasional intermarriage for alliances, e.g., Dutugemunu’s mother or other minor alliances, but the number is small.
• Limited cultural or genetic influence; Sinhalese polity remained dominant.
• These marriages do not legitimize Tamil sovereignty claims.

8. Biggest influx of South Indians came during colonial rule

• Dutch & British periods: Large-scale migration for labor, especially forcoffee, tea, and coconut plantations in Central Highlands (1820–1930).
• Many were Tamils from Tamil Nadu (estate Tamils) brought as indentured laborers.
• Proof:Colonial census data (1871, 1921), labor records, and plantation archives.
• Major Tamil presence in North & Central areas ispost-Anuradhapura, not indigenous.

9. Foreign invader rule cannot justify Tamil Eelam

• International law recognizesself-determination only for indigenous peoples with historic sovereignty, not for settlers or post-conquest migrants.
• Sri Lanka’s North was never under indigenous Tamil rule; all Tamil rulers wereforeign invaders with short-term military control.
• Legal argument:No indigenous Tamil polity existed → no claim to independent state or internal self-determination.

10. Questioning Indo-Lanka Accord original habitat”

• The Accord (1987) suggested North-East as Tamil original habitat.”-factually incorrect
• Evidence contradiction:Archaeological, inscriptional, and genetic data show Sinhalese presence predates any significant Tamil migration while Indian rulers cannot claim original habitat”
• Therefore, Accord’s premise isfactually false.

11. Additional arguments to counter Tamil Eelam claims

• Chronology of occupations:Sena & Guttika, Elara, Magha, Cholas → all temporary foreign rulers.
• Limited territorial control:Northern and North-Central only;

Eastern Province never under independent Tamil rule.

• Colonial migration:Most Tamils settled during 19th–20th C → cannot claim historic homeland.
• Sinhala sovereignty continuity:Except brief invasions, Sinhalese kings ruled uninterruptedly for 1,400+ years.
• International law:Self-determination requires indigenous continuous political authority, which historical evidence does not support for Tamils.
• Tamils were migrants, mercenaries, and colonial laborers, not an indigenous sovereign people of Sri Lanka.
• Foreign rulers’ presencedoes not equate to indigenous Tamil sovereignty.
• Northern Tamil claim, Eastern Province claim, and Tamil Eelamhave no historical or legal basis.

Legal & International Law Framework — Why Tamil Eelam Has No Legal Standing

1. Uti Possidetis Juris
   Territory remains with the existing sovereign state unless lawfully transferred.
   → Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity isinviolable.

2. Doctrine of Effectivité (Effective Control)
   Sovereignty belongs to the authority exercising continuous, stable, and legitimate governance.
   → Sinhala monarchies exercisedcontinuous island-wide governancefor over 1,700 years.

3. Doctrine of Conquest (Modern International Law)
   Temporary military occupation does not confer sovereignty or political legitimacy.
   → Sena–Guttika, Elara, Chola, Magha, and Arya Chakravarticannot generate self-determination rights.

4. UN Charter – Article 1 (Self-Determination)
   Applies to colonized or subjugated indigenous peoples with historical sovereignty.
   → Sri Lankan Tamilsdo not meet this threshold— no prior sovereign Tamil polity existed.

5. International Court of Justice (ICJ) Jurisprudence
   Self-determination cannot override territorial integrity of sovereign states.
   → Secession requiresexceptional conditions, none of which exist in Sri Lanka.

6. Sri Lanka Citizenship Act & Constitution
   → Confirmsunitary sovereignty, indivisible territory, and equal citizenship— no legal space for ethno-territorial partition.

• Sri Lanka’sNorth and East were never indigenous Tamil homelands.
• Tamil political authority existed only asforeign occupation or tributary administration, never as sovereign statehood.
• Colonial administrative boundariescannot create legal ethnic homelands.
• Post-colonial migrationcannot generate territorial self-determination rights.
• Therefore,Tamil Eelam has ZERO standing under international law.

Responsibility of the State & Call for National Unity

Having established beyond reasonable doubt that Tamil Eelam is a fiction of political imagination unsupported by history, archaeology, genetics, or law, it becomes imperative that the Government of Sri Lanka — as:

• Custodian of the State
• Trustee of national sovereignty
• Caretaker of all citizens and resources

— ensures that all communities live together in unity, dignity, security, and equality, without permitting the creation of ethno-religious enclaves, exclusive homelands, or separatist territorial claims.

No group — whether internal political actors or external diaspora organizations operating safely from overseas — should be allowed to fracture national unity, destabilize social harmony, or resurrect divisive separatist ideologies that have already inflicted immense suffering on all communities.

Any attempt to revive ethnic territorial separatism must be firmly, lawfully, and decisively rejected.

Sri Lanka’s future lies not in ethnic division, but in mutual respect, national integration, and collective progress.

Shenali D Waduge

Walk for Peace

This is a subject worthy of deep contemplation and reflection

This is what the world in particularly the western world needs today 

The monks know what they are doing. 

The Buddha’s path cannot be wrong.

This is exactly what the Buddha did in his life and time.

Walked Walked Walked.

He was the greatest walker of all time

When people saw the Buddha walk they dropped everything they had and started walking behind him. 

So the story goes. 

The Buddha was handsome and strong and  eye-catching.

A human magnet.

History is repeating itself 2, 600 years later. 

not in India but in USA

When the Buddha walked people who saw him walk were so impressed with his physical beauty and magnetic personality that they dropped everything they had and simply followed him

It is a beautiful and evocative image—the idea of a figure so radiant that their mere presence changes the trajectory of a person’s life instantly. You’ve captured the essence of many traditional Buddhist accounts regarding the Buddha’s “magnetic” presence.

While the stories vary, they often touch on several fascinating aspects of how people reacted to him.

The “Marks of a Great Man”

In Buddhist tradition, it wasn’t just “beauty” in the modern sense, but a specific set of physical characteristics known as the Lakkhana (the 32 Major Marks of a Great Man). These included: 

• A golden complexion.
• Deep blue eyes.
• A “halo” or aura of light (Prabhashvara) that supposedly extended for some distance around him. 

These features were said to be so serene and commanding that even those who intended to argue with him often found themselves silenced by a sense of peace.

Famous “Drop Everything” Moments

There are several key stories that align perfectly with what you’ve described:

• Upaka the Ascetic: Shortly after his enlightenment, the Buddha was walking to Sarnath. He met an ascetic named Upaka. Upaka was so struck by the Buddha’s radiant appearance and clear faculties that he stopped and asked, “Friend, your clear senses are very bright. Who is your teacher?”
• The Kasyapa Brothers: They were powerful fire-ascetics with 1,000 followers. After witnessing the Buddha’s composure and wisdom, they and all their disciples famously threw their ritual implements into the river and followed him.
• Angulimala: Even a feared brigand like Angulimala was stopped in his tracks. He tried to chase the Buddha to kill him, but despite the Buddha walking at a normal pace, Angulimala could not catch up. This “miracle of the walk” led him to drop his weapons and become a monk. 

A Nuanced Reality

While many were moved by his appearance, the Pali Canon also suggests that the Buddha’s personality and speech were the real “magnets.” 

1. The “Call to Reason”: He often discouraged people from following him based on blind faith or physical attraction. He famously told a monk named Vakkali, who was obsessed with the Buddha’s physical beauty: “He who sees the Dhamma (the truth), sees me.”
2. Calmness as Power: In a world of chaos and rigid social castes, his absolute stillness and lack of ego were likely what felt most “magnetic” to the people of ancient India. 

---

May Buddhism bring Peace and usher in Non – Violence to the USA and rest of the World. 

May all living beings be well and happy. 

Song for Walk for Peace | True Story: Monks & Aloka Walk from Texas to Washington D.C.

A heartfelt, inspirational song dedicated to peace, kindness, and compassion — inspired by the real 120-day, 2,300-mile journey of Buddhist monks walking from Fort Worth, Texas to Washington D.C., accompanied by their loyal dog Aloka. Their mission:

Calming May All Beings Be Happy” Mantra | Lokah Samastah Sukhino Bhavantu with Peaceful Music

Courtesy – AI Overview

https://share.google/aimode/4GCZoPCxoK0rmMgjb

The Buddha’s “walk” refers both to his historical 45-year teaching ministry across northern India and a continuous living tradition of “Peace Walks” (Padayatra) that symbolize mindfulness and compassion

. Historically, the Buddha rejected a stationary life, traveling on foot between villages and kingdoms to share his insights, which laid the foundation for Buddhism as a missionary religion. 

The Historical Walk: Key Sacred Sites

The Buddha’s life and ministry are anchored by four primary pilgrimage sites, which he personally recommended for his followers. 

Lumbini

The birthplace of Siddhartha Gautama. According to tradition, he took seven steps immediately after birth, with lotus flowers blooming beneath his feet.

Bodh Gay

Bodh Gaya

(India): Where he attained enlightenment under the Bodhi Tree. Following this event, he spent seven weeks in meditation and “walking contemplation” around the site.

Sarnath

Sublocality1

Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, India

Where he delivered his first sermon, “Turning the Wheel of Dharma.” This site marked the official beginning of his teaching career.

Kushinagar

Town in India

(India): The site of his final steps and death (Parinirvana) at the age of 80. 

Societal and Cultural Impact

The Buddha’s journeys and teachings fundamentally transformed Asian social structures and sparked global philosophical shifts. 

• Social Equality: Buddhism challenged the rigid Indian caste system, advocating for the equality of all individuals, including women and marginalized groups (Shudras).
• Democratic Governance: The Buddha established the Sangha (monastic community) with a consensual, democratic structure, where major decisions required open discussion and common approval.
• Global Spread: Via the Silk Road and maritime trade routes, Buddhist missionaries and merchants spread the faith to China, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia by the 1st–2nd centuries CE.
• The Buddhist Missionaries from Asian Countries have disseminated the faith in Western Countries after attending the Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. Anagarika Dharmapala who attended the Parliament of Religions became the World’s First Global Buddhist Missionary. He visited Britain and established the London Vihara (the first Buddhist Temple in England) in 1926. Another Sri Lankan inspired by the Missionary life of Anagarika Dharmapala followed suit by leading the First Buddhist Mission from Sri Lanka to Germany in 1957. He was Asoka Weeraratna, founder of the German Dharmaduta Society (1952). He established the First Buddhist Vihara (Berlin Vihara with Resident Monks from Theravada Buddhist Countries especially Sri Lanka) in Germany in 1957 which is housed in Das Buddhistische Haus in Berlin – Frohnau which was founded by Dr. Paul Dahlke, a German Doctor in 1924. It celebrated its 100th year anniversary in 2024 as the First Theravada Buddhist Temple in Europe.
• Education and Science: The Buddhist tradition established the world’s first residential universities, such as

Nalanda , which taught not only philosophy but also medicine, logic, and mathematics. 

Modern Continuation: The “Walk for Peace” 

The tradition of walking continues into 2026 as a form of “spiritual offering.” In February 2026, a group of Buddhist monks completed a 108-day, 2,300-mile “Walk for Peace” across the United States, concluding at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.. This modern walk aimed to promote mindfulness and nonviolence, illustrating that the Buddha’s “walk” remains a relevant symbol of inner peace rippling outward into society. 

……………………………………………………..

The 2025–2026

Walk for Peace is a 2,300-mile (3,700-km) pilgrimage led by Vietnamese and Thai Theravada Buddhist monks from Texas to Washington, D.C., aimed at promoting mindfulness, compassion, and nonviolence. The walk, which began on October 26, 2025, and concluded in mid-February 2026, has captured national attention for its message of peace in a divided world, despite challenges including severe injuries to participants. 

The Walk and Its Origins

• Purpose: The journey is not a political protest or demonstration, but a “spiritual offering” designed to encourage inner peace and mindfulness through daily actions, say leaders.
• The Route & Duration: Led by Ven. Bhikkhu Pannakara from the Huong Dao Vipassana Bhavana Center in Fort Worth, Texas, the monks walked for 108 days through eight states, concluding at the Lincoln Memorial.
• Participants & Support: Approximately two dozen monks, accompanied by a rescue dog named Aloka, walked 20 to 30 miles per day.
• Hardships: The journey was physically demanding, with monks often walking barefoot or in socks to remain connected to the moment, even through snow and cold.
• Incident: In November 2025, a truck struck the group’s escort vehicle near Houston, Texas, resulting in the amputation of a monk’s leg. The group continued the walk after his recovery. 

Impact and Reception

• Massive Public Response: The walk drew thousands to the roadside and garnered millions of followers on social media (Facebook/Instagram), as of February 2026.
• Cultural Connection: The monks’ presence—characterized by silence, alms bowls, and calm, mindful action—prompted reflection and emotional responses from diverse groups of people.
• Interfaith Dialogue: The walk fostered unity, with many non-Buddhists joining for parts of the journey, offering aid, or participating in interfaith receptions.
• Significance of 108 Days: The 108-day duration is a sacred number in Buddhism, symbolizing spiritual completion and cosmic order.
• Message of Calm: The walk encouraged people to slow down, “put down their phones,” and cultivate inner peace to impact society. 

The journey concluded with a request to Congress to recognize Vesak (Buddha’s birthday) as a national holiday, reinforcing their message of compassion.

Courtesy – AI Overview

Nava Thakuria

As Bangladesh heads for 13th Parliamentary election and  the referendum on  July National Charter simultaneously on Thursday (12 February 2026), the interim government chief Professor Muhammad Yunus urged all participating candidates to rise above personal and party interests to prioritize greater interest of the Muslim majority nation regardless of the poll-outcomes. Addressing the nation of over 170 million people ahead of the much watched electoral exercises, Nobel peace laureate  Dr Yunus commented that victory as well as defeat is an integral part of democracy and hence after the election, they should dedicate themselves to build a new, just, democratic, and inclusive Bangladesh together. Chief adviser of the caretaker government also asked all voters to participate in the process enthusiastically in a festive spirit. Prof Yunus made a special appeal to the women and young voters, many of whom were deprived of the opportunity to exercise their franchise in earlier occasions, to come forward showing their commitment for a new beginning.

The campaigning that began on 22 January came to an end on 10 February by 7:30 pm. The electoral authorities have imposed a ban on all public rallies and processions for 96 hours before and after voting day. The polling on Thursday will begin at 7:30 am to continue till 4:30 pm. Nearly  400 foreign election observers including around 200  journalists representing 45 global media outlets  arrived in the south Asian nation. On 12^th parliamentary elections (held on 7 January 2024), there were only 158 global observers comprising a few foreign media persons. Meanwhile, a two-day government-announced general holiday began on 11 February, whereas Friday and Saturday (13,  14 February) are weekly holidays in Bangladesh.

Notably, ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s party Awami League is barred from participation in the electoral process leaving a fair space to the arch rival Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in the election. The country had the last general election in January 2024, but the overthrowing of Hasina’s government following a student-led  mass uprising just after six months necessitated the polls. The interim government in Dhaka had invited many countries including India, Nepal, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Romania, etc to send election observers. Global bodies like the European Union, Commonwealth Secretariat, SAARC Human Rights Foundation, Asian Network for Free Elections, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, SNAS Africa, Polish Institute of International Affairs, US-based International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute, etc agreed to send their  election observers.

Meanwhile, the New York-based press watchdog Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has urged all major Bangladesh political parties to protect press freedom in the troublesome country. The CPJ in a statement called for urgent steps to safeguard press freedom and journalists’ safety on the eve of national election. Sending separate letters to the office bearers of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, student-led National Citizen Party  and Jatiya Party, the global body  urged them  ‘to make public commitments to protect journalists during the election period’ by rejecting violence, intimidation and also misuse of criminal or national-security laws. Mentionable is that ousted premier  Sheikh Hasina’s party Awami League is barred from participation in the electoral process.

The CPJ statement argued that the risks to journalists intensified in the pre-election period across Bangladesh with continuing  imprisonment of scribes on unverified charges and also longstanding impunity for violence against media professionals that contributed to a climate of fear and self-censorship. Addressing  BNP chairman Tarique Rahman, the CPJ letter reminded that a free press is essential to the credibility of any election. Journalists play a critical role in informing voters, scrutinizing those in power, and enabling meaningful public debate. The BNP can demonstrate national leadership and strengthen public trust in the electoral process by committing to this foundational democratic value. It also added that  Bangladesh remains one of Asia’s leading jailers of journalists, with five currently behind bars for murder and national-security offences that appear to be in retaliation for their reporting and perceived political affiliations. At the same time, impunity for journalist murders, where usually attacks, threats and violence against scribes are rarely investigated or prosecuted, creating a climate of fear and intimidation, remains high in Bangladesh.

CPJ’s Asia-Pacific program coordinator  Kunal Majumder, while speaking to this writer indicated that risks to Bangladeshi journalists escalated sharply in the pre-election period, where the mobs attacked the offices of The Daily Star and Prothom Alo in December 2025, many reporters, editors and commentators faced intensified digital harassment and  coordinated hate campaigns and threats linking to political polarization existed. This form of abuse was enabled by the previous Hasina government to intimidate journalists and remains prevalent, despite a change in administration and promises of media reforms,” said Majumder, adding that real reform means breaking from the past, not replicating its abuses. He insisted on erasing all kinds of barriers to official information, press briefings and public records that weaken fair and accurate election coverage.

Earlier, the Geneva-based media safety & rights body Press Emblem Campaign (PEC) condemned the murder of Bengali Hindu journalist Rana Pratap Bairagi (45) in Jessore locality on 5 January and demanded a thorough probe to book the culprits and punish them under the law. Moreover, at least 12 Bangladeshi journalists sustained injuries in an attack by extortionists in Narsingdi on 26 January. Denouncing the incident, PEC chairman  Blaise Lempen urged Dhaka to bring the group of extortionists to justice. Bangladesh Editors’ Council also called on the authorities to ensure the safety and security of journalists during the election period. The council in a statement argued that the working  journalists while gathering information during elections often face various threats and hence the interim government, election commission and other responsible law enforcement agencies should take effective measures to guarantee adequate security for the media professionals.

Meanwhile, the western media outlets pour views that the BNP led alliance is the front runner in the coming election and chairman Rahman is  projected as the new premier of Bangladesh. When Rahman returned to his home country  on 25 December ending a self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom for 17 years, he was greeted by millions of people. The son of former Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman and former premier Khaleda Zia responded to the public with a visionary line ‘I have a plan’ imitating the historic speech (I Have a Dream) of Martin Luther King Jr in  1963. Bangladesh’s first female head of the government Begum Zia died on 30 December at the age of  80, following which he received pouring condolences from sympathizers amid the  government declaring three days of state mourning.

The US-based news magazine The Diplomat recently carried an analytical piece predicting the electoral progress for Rahman to become Bangladesh’s next premier. Similarly, Time magazine and Bloomberg media agency, referring to several opinion polls, projected him as the front-runner ahead of the election. Earlier, the UK-based weekly The Economist also anticipated the 60-year-old scion of a famous political family to emerge as  head of the government in Dhaka. In various election rallies,  Rahman promised to prioritize  job creation, technical education, information technology,  sports, etc. The soft spoken politician also emphasized on creating a new Bangladesh with mutual trust, respect and benefits to everyone living in a peaceful state under the rule of law and freedom of speech.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir

As the US-Iran negotiations regarding the latter’s nuclear program and the threat of attacking Iran loom high, both the Trump administration and Iran ought to consider very carefully the potentially colossal regional repercussions if they do not reach an agreement. If Netanyahu convinces Trump during their meeting, at the time of this writing, that attacking Iran now, amid Tehran’s weakened proxies and internal turmoil, will bring regime change, they’ll both be gravely mistaken. Every peaceful avenue must be explored to prevent a war because there will be no winners, only long-term regional instability, punctuated by horrific cycles of violence the war would leave in its wake.

A US attack would carry a high risk of regional war. Iran has vowed to strike US bases and Israel. The Gulf states, which host US installations, would face missile strikes, destabilizing their security. Turkey and Saudi Arabia would face pressure to balance their commitments to the US alliance with regional stability, while global energy markets would be severely disrupted.

Iran’s Retaliatory Options

Iran’s retaliatory calculus is shaped by its current weakness—a degraded proxy network, internal unrest, and economic distress that significantly constrain its options. An all-out response risks triggering escalation that could threaten regime survival, so Tehran would likely calibrate its retaliation to signal resolve while avoiding a full-scale war it cannot win. Nevertheless, Iran has multiple retaliatory options in the event of a US attack, drawing on its missile arsenal, naval capabilities, and strategic geography.

1-Iran would launch ballistic missiles and drones at American military installations across the Persian Gulf, including Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which it already struck in June 2025 after the US bombing of Iranian nuclear sites.

2-Iran could fire up to 2,000 ballistic missiles at Israel in a single assault, roughly four times what it used during the 12-day war, targeting military and strategic infrastructure, exacting a heavy price.

3-Iran would attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz using naval mines, attack boats, and submarines, disrupting over 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas and 25 percent of maritime oil trade, causing a worldwide energy price shock.

4-Iranian-backed Iraqi militias such as Kataib Hezbollah would launch drone and rocket attacks on US troops and bases in Iraq and Jordan, replicating the January 2024 strike that killed three American soldiers at a Jordanian outpost.

5-Iran would hit US installations housed within Gulf nations like Bahrain (home to the US Fifth Fleet), Kuwait, and the UAE, though Iranian officials frame these as targeting not neighboring states but US bases stationed in them” to limit blowback from Arab states.

Why Externally Imposed Regime Change Would Be Disastrous It is important to remember that although the Iranians want regime change, they are fiercely nationalistic. Foreign-imposed change would instigate nationalist backlash and unite even regime opponents behind the government. The historical precedent of the 1953 CIA-backed coup’s failure remains seared into Iranian national consciousness, fueling decades of anti-American sentiment and ultimately leading to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Destroying the regime without viable successors risks a power vacuum, civil war, and chaos. Iraq’s de-Baathification showed that dismantling entrenched security structures can create ungovernable, failed states. Military strikes could scatter weapons, empower extremists, trigger refugee crises, and destabilize neighboring states — consequences US planners have repeatedly failed to anticipate.

Finally, foreign-installed governments are perceived as puppet regimes, provoking sustained internal opposition, insurgency, and instability — as documented in the failure of over 60 percent of the US’ 64 covert regime-change operations between 1947 and 1989.

Why Internal Regime Change Has Better Prospects Iranian scholars broadly agree that the military, as I stated in my previous article—either the Artesh or the IRGC—is best positioned to lead the transition, maintaining institutional continuity and control over weapons, finances, and governance. A change driven by Iranians avoids the foreign puppet” stigma, giving a successor government far greater public acceptance and political durability.

Military insiders understand the regime’s levers of power and can manage transition without the catastrophic institutional collapse that follows external decapitation. And, contrary to the claims that Iran lacks credible successors, prominent activists, Nobel laureates, and imprisoned dissidents provide viable political alternatives.

Iran Seeks a Sustainable Deal with the US Although Iran has signaled its willingness to dilute its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile, Tehran insists enrichment is non-negotiable and refuses to discuss missiles.  However, an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program is definitely within reach. Likewise, Iran may end its support for proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah, as they’ve been degraded by Israel, and Iran now faces economic and logistical constraints to reconstitute them, especially after losing its foothold in Syria following the Assad regime’s collapse.

The limitation on the scope and range of its long-range missile program are still within reach, provided that 1) the agreement on Iran’s ballistic missiles must appear as though Iran has made no concession to save face, 2) the US commits not to attack Iran in the future and would also rein in Israel to follow suit, and 3) the US would normalize relations so long as Iran fully complies with the agreement and stops threatening Israel existentially.

To effectuate such an agreement, the US could offer comprehensive sanctions relief — lifting both primary and secondary sanctions to restore banking, oil exports, and trade ties. Additional inducements include assistance in building civilian nuclear power reactors, limited enrichment permitted under international monitoring, the gradual unfreezing of Iranian assets held abroad, security, and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.

Trump and Netanyahu must remember that Iran is a proud nation of enduring resilience steeped in thousands of years of history, with a vast cultural heritage, abundant natural resources, and a deeply ingrained sense of national dignity.  The Iranians’ collective memory of independence and defiance ensures that no pressure, US or Israeli, could force Iranian capitulation. Trump and Netanyahu must abandon their illusion of controlling Iran.

Ultimately, the US and Iran must remember that, as Sun Tzu observed, the greatest victory is achieved without fighting.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

Courtesy Hiru News

The Trincomalee High Court has granted bail to ten suspects, including the Venerable Balangoda Kassapa Thera, three other monks, and six civilians. High Court Judge N.M.M. Abdulla ordered their release under a cash bail of ten thousand rupees and two personal bails of one million rupees each per individual.

Strict conditions have been imposed on the group, including a prohibition on interfering with evidence or ongoing investigations. The suspects must appear in court on all scheduled dates and have been ordered not to disrupt any religious or public activities.

Delivering the ruling, Judge Abdulla warned that the breach of any single bail condition would result in the immediate cancellation of their bail and a return to remand custody.

Courtey Hiru News

The Gampaha High Court Trial-at-Bar today (11) sentenced 12 individuals to death after finding them guilty of the murder of former Polonnaruwa District Member of Parliament Amarakeerthi Athukorala and his security officer during the May 2022 unrest.

The three-judge bench, comprising High Court Judges Sahan Mapa Bandara, Rashmi Singappuli, and Rasantha Godawela, delivered the verdict following a lengthy trial. In addition to the death sentences, the court sentenced four other defendants to six months in prison, which was suspended for five years. The remaining 23 suspects were acquitted and released from the case due to a lack of evidence.

The Attorney General had initially filed indictments against 41 individuals in connection with the incident that took place on May 09, 2022, in Nittambuwa. During the nationwide protests, the MP and his security officer, Police Constable Jayantha Gunawardena, were surrounded by a mob and subsequently beaten to death after a confrontation.

Shenali D Waduge

https://www.facebook.com/reel/1359766255903278

You claim genocide, occupation, and structural erasure. These are serious allegations that demand serious evidence — legal proof, forensic data, documented history, and verifiable records — not slogans, flags, or emotional scripting.

1) 4 FEBRUARY 1948 – BLACK DAY FOR TAMILS”

This slogan is a deliberate distortion of history, constructed around the Indian Tamil plantation labour repatriation issue, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the so-called ‘Ceylon Tamils’ or Sinhala discrimination.

It is a political myth retroactively imposed on Independence Day to manufacture a grievance-based separatist narrative.

THERE WAS NO SUCH CATEGORY AS CEYLON TAMIL” BEFORE 1911

This is not opinion — it is documented historical fact.

The ethnic category Ceylon Tamil” did NOT exist prior to the British Census of 1911.

Portuguese, Dutch, and early British administrative records never used the term Ceylon Tamil”.

Anyone asserting otherwise must produce authenticated primary documentary evidence.

HOW TAMILS WERE CLASSIFIED BEFORE 1911

Portuguese Records (1505–1658)

• Malabars
• Malabar Moors
• Coastal Malabars
• Coromandel natives

Note: Malabar” was a broad geographic term, not an ethnic classification, and did not exclusively mean Tamils – it covered Muslims arriving from Coromandel areas of South India too.

Dutch Records (1658–1796)

• Malabaaren
• Malabaars
• Coromandel settlers
• Malabar Coolies

British Records (1796–1911)

• Malabars
• Coast Tamils
• Indian Tamils
• Cooly migrants
• Plantation labour

Nowhere in Portuguese, Dutch, or early British records is there a race or ethnic category called Ceylon Tamil”.

The term suddenly appears for the first time only in 1911 as a result of its inclusion by then Registrar General who was also a Tamil.

An ethnic identity created by colonial census classification cannot be retroactively transformed into a historical nation or homeland.

No census category has the power to manufacture sovereignty, indigeneity, or territorial entitlement.

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN 1948?

The Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 did NOT target Ceylon Tamils.”

It addressed the legal status of British-imported Indian plantation labour.

These were:

• Recent migrant workers brought in by colonials in mass numbers
• Imported exclusively forcoffee, tea, and rubber plantations
  • Withno ancestral villages in any part of Sri Lanka
  • No land ownership deeds in any part of Sri Lanka
  • No historic settlement continuity in any part of Sri Lanka.

Not a single legal provision in the 1948 Act discriminated against the long-settled Tamil population of Sri Lanka.

This is confirmed by the Act’s text, parliamentary debates, and contemporaneous administrative records

https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/srilanka/statutes/Citizenship_Act.pdf

COLONIAL DEMOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING

By independence:

Over 1.1 million Indian Tamil plantation labourers were imported to Sri Lanka from South India.

This produced one of the largest artificial demographic transformations in South Asian colonial history.

The British abandoned Sri Lanka with an unresolved demographic and citizenship crisis — a colonial time bomb.

SHOULD SRI LANKA HAVE AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED CITIZENSHIP?

No country in the world automatically naturalizes colonial-imported labor populations.

GLOBAL PRECEDENT:

• Malaysia repatriated Indian labour
• Burma expelled Indian settlers
• Fiji repatriated Indian labour

Yet Sri Lanka ultimately absorbed, settled, and later granted citizenship — one of the most humane post-colonial resolutions globally.

THIS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH SINHALESE

The Sinhalese did not bring Indian Tamils. The Colonials did.

This was entirely a British colonial labour import project.

To frame this as Sinhala discrimination is historically fraudulent.

TAMIL HOMELAND” CLAIM COLLAPSES COMPLETELY

If:

• Ceylon Tamil” identity was administratively invented in 1911
  • Tamil numbers were artificially inflated by colonial labour import
  • Demographics were engineered through plantation migration and colonial settler colonization schemes in the North & East

Then:

The claim of a timeless, sovereign Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka becomes historically and legally indefensible.

No international legal doctrine recognizes ethnicity-based territorial sovereignty without historic statehood, continuous governance, and documentary proof.

Tamil presence resulted from:

• Trade
  • Invasions & occupations
  • Colonial plantation labour importation
  • Settler colonization schemes

—not from any indigenous sovereignty.

POST-INDEPENDENCE: an Inconvenient Truth

Tamils dominated Sri Lanka’s:

• Civil Service
  • Judiciary
  • Medical profession
  • Education sector
  • Administrative elite

This is the exact opposite of ethnic oppression and completely demolishes the 4 Feb 1948 Black Day for Tamils” claim.

If 1948 was truly a Black Day” and genocide against Tamils:

Where are:

• The bodies?
  • The mass graves?
  • Refugee flows?
  • Emergency laws?
  • International protests?

They do not exist.

Because no such genocide occurred.

The slogan 4 February 1948 – Black Day for Tamils” is not history — it is political propaganda constructed decades later to justify separatist ideology.

Genocide” Claim – LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY COLLAPSES

Under international law (UN Genocide Convention, 1948), genocide requires:

• Provenintent to destroy a people
• Targeted killing of civiliansbecause of ethnicity
• Systematic annihilation

FACT:

• Sri Lanka foughta 30-year war against an armed separatist terrorist organization (LTTE).
• Armed combatants killed in battle are NOT civilian genocide
• No international court has legally proven genocide in Sri Lanka.

Even the UN itself:

• Couldnot produce verified body counts
• Relied onanonymous witnesses quoted from pro-LTTE sources
• Usedstatistical extrapolation, not forensic evidence

If genocide occurred — where are the mass graves of Tamil civilians killed by the State?

Not LTTE fighters.
Not LTTE suicide bombers.
Not armed cadres dressed in civilian clothing.

Where are the civilian bodies?

LTTE: THE GREATEST KILLER OF TAMIL CIVILIANS

You wave LTTE flags.

Do you know what that flag represents?

LTTE KILLED:

• Thousands of Tamil civilians
• Over30,000 Tamil children forcibly recruited
• Thousands of Tamils executed for:
  • Refusing recruitment
  • Voting
  • Speaking against Prabhakaran
  • Wanting peace

CHILD SOLDIERS:

• Thousands of Tamil children died wearing cyanide capsules.
• Where were your protests for them?

How many of your London youth condemned LTTE child recruitment since 1980s?

ZERO.

If child soldiers matter, why did they not matter when the LTTE used them?

THE MYTH OF TAMIL HOMELAND”

There has never existed a sovereign Tamil state in Sri Lanka.

If so name the Kings who ruled the North or even East Sri Lanka – not names of Invader Kings from South India.

Colonial British documents show:

• Mass plantation-era migration of Tamil labor
• State-sponsored Indian Tamil settlement
• Population engineering for plantation economy

ARCHAEOLOGY:

• Thousands of Buddhist ruins in North & East
• Brahmi inscriptions dating to3rd century BCE
• Ancient Sinhalese irrigation works throughout North-East

Produce one internationally recognized treaty, inscription, map, or royal charter proving a Tamil sovereign homeland.

You cannot.

LAND CLAIMS — NO DEEDS, NO OWNERSHIP

Under Roman-Dutch law (Sri Lanka’s current legal system):

Ownership exists only with legal deeds.

QUESTIONS:

• Where are your land deeds? Not affidavits but verifiable authentic deeds
• Where are your registered titles?
• Where are your colonial cadastral surveys proving Tamil exclusivity?

State land belongs to the entire nation, not one ethnicity.

Slogans cannot win land rights.

No ethnic group owns territory.

Sinhalization” – A POLITICAL BUZZWORD WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS

Sri Lanka is:

• One unitary sovereign nation
• Citizens havefreedom of movement
• Any citizen can live anywhere

Is a Tamil allowed to live, work own land/property in Colombo?

Yes.

Is a Muslim allowed to live, work and own land/property in Kandy?

Yes.

Then why cannot a Sinhalese Buddhist live, work & own land/property in Jaffna, Kilinochchi or Mullaitivu ?

Equal citizenship is NOT colonization.

Under Article 12 of the Sri Lankan Constitution, all citizens possess equal freedom of residence, movement, and property ownership across the entire island.
Therefore, the presence of Sinhalese citizens in the North & East cannot legally constitute colonization

THE TSUNAMI LIE (2004)

You claim JVP blocked tsunami aid.

• LTTEblocked aid distribution
• LTTErefused joint mechanism
• LTTEconfiscated relief supplies
• LTTEtaxed humanitarian aid

This is documented by international NGOs.

YOUR DIASPORA CREDIBILITY COLLAPSES

BASIC QUESTIONS YOU CANNOT ANSWER:

• Have you ever lived in Jaffna?
• Have you ever lived in Mullaitivu?
• Do you know 5 village names in Kilinochchi?
• Do you speak Sri Lankan Tamil dialect?
• Do you know your ancestral village boundaries?

Most of you:

• Wereborn abroad
• Havenever lived in Sri Lanka
• Never raised a voice against your Tamil brothers and sisters turned into child soldiers
• Learned history only fromLTTE propaganda networks

 

ASYLUM INDUSTRY & FABRICATED VICTIMHOOD

Thousands of false asylum claims were made using:

• Fake torture stories
• Staged photographs
• Fabricated deaths
• Documented asylum coaching networks that trained applicants to rehearse persecution narratives

Several dead Tamils” later found alive in Europe & India.

How many of your families obtained asylum using fabricated persecution stories?

THE REAL INTENT: REVIVING SEPARATISM

Your slogans prove it:

Tamil Eelam will never fall”

This is not human rights activism.

This is continuation of separatist ideology.

AS PER INTERNATIONAL LAW:

• Separatism via terrorism is illegal.
• Funding, glorifying, and promoting LTTE ideology violates:
  • UK Terrorism Act
  • EU terror financing laws
  • UN counterterrorism conventions

YOU NEVER PROTESTED LTTE CRIMES

Where were your protests when LTTE:

• Massacred over 600 police officers?
• Ethnically cleansed90,000 Muslims and Sinhalese from Jaffna in 24 hours?
• Killed Tamil dissenters?
• Used civilians ashuman shields and hostages?
• Kidnapped Tamil children from their homes & turned them into child soldiers

Selective outrage = political propaganda.

FINAL CHALLENGE TO UK-BASED PROTESTERS

If your cause is legitimate, then:

Produce:

1. Legal proof of Tamil sovereignty
2. The names of the 40,000 dead in Mullaivaikkal (not dead LTTE cadres)
3. Civilian mass grave evidence/at least skeletons
4. Land ownership deeds
5. Archaeological proof of exclusive and continuous Tamil habitation

Without these — your entire narrative collapses.

TRUTH:

• Sri Lanka didnot defeat Tamils.
• Sri Lanka defeatedthe world’s most brutal terrorist organization.
• Andsaved over 300,000 Tamil civilians from LTTE captivity – when most overseas Tamils were screaming to free LTTE.

MESSAGE TO DIASPORA YOUTH

We do not oppose any Tamil individual seeking education, safety, or opportunity overseas. What we oppose is the weaponization of victimhood narratives to demonize the Sinhalese people, distort Sri Lanka’s history, and justify a political project of territorial division.

It is contradictory to permanently live abroad, build lives and futures in Western societies, and simultaneously claim an exclusive homeland” in Sri Lanka — a land that most of you neither reside in, invest in, nor intend to return to.

If you are not seeking to live your so-called Eelam for whom exactly is this proposed separatist state being demanded?

Consider a simple reality:
Today, more Tamils choose to live among Sinhalese communities in the South than within the Northern and Eastern provinces. If systematic ethnic discrimination truly existed, this demographic pattern would not exist.

Why do Tamil families voluntarily settle in Sinhala-majority areas?
Because:

• They find safety
• They find economic opportunity
• They find social coexistence
• They find dignity and freedom

Equally important — long-standing caste-based discrimination in the North and East has pushed many Tamils to seek better social mobility outside their own traditional power structures. This is a reality rarely acknowledged in diaspora discourse.

Your inherited narrative speaks only of ethnic oppression, but remains silent on internal social hierarchies, caste exclusion, child recruitment, forced taxation, silencing of dissent, and internal Tamil suffering under the LTTE.

You were not raised on comprehensive history or its truth.
You were raised on selective memory, grievance economics, political mythology, and inherited anger.

True peace begins when truth is confronted honestly — not when history is reshaped to sustain permanent victimhood.

Justice is not achieved by rewriting a fake history

Reconciliation begins when facts replace propaganda.

Peace begins when history is accepted, not manipulated.

Shenali D Waduge

By Rohana R. Wasala

When we come to it
We, this people, on this wayward, floating body
Created on this earth, of this earth
Have the power to fashion for this earth
A climate where every man and every woman
Can live freely without sanctimonious piety
Without crippling fear

When we come to it
We must confess that we are the possible
We are the miraculous, the true wonder of this world
That is when, and only when
We come to it.

 Concluding lines of the poem ‘A brave and startling truth’ (1995) by Maya Angelou

Ven. Dr Melpitiye Wimalakitti Nayake Thera, Head Monk of the Wijesundararamaya, Asgiriya, Kandy, and the Chief Incumbent of the Gotama Viharaya Monastery, Fort Worth, Texas, USA, claims that the ongoing Texas to Washington Walk for Peace march led by the American monk of Vietnam origin Ven. Pannakara is ‘an initiative of ours’ (ape wedak). He made this claim during a recent podcast hosted by the well-known YouTuber and journalist Chamuditha Samarawickrema (CNB/February 5, 2026). The Huong Dao Monastery of Bhante Pannakara who is leading the peace walk is close to the Gotama Viharaya Monastery of Wimalakitti Thera, who tells us that he has had a strong connection with Vietnamese monks and has already collaborated with them in many Buddhist activities. 

Talking about Ven. Pannakara, Ven. Wimalakitti says that he is a pupil of senior Vietnamese bhikkhu Ven. Ratanaguna of the same Huong Dao Monastery in Fort Worth Texas. He is leading a team of 24 Buddhist monks from different countries in the (Southeast Asian) region including Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Laos, etc., taking part in the Walk for Peace (from Fort Worth in Texas to the US capital Washington D.C.). It is going to be 2723 miles long according to Wimalakitti Thera. (But the distance to be covered, as repeatedly given in various social media sources, is 2300 miles (just over 3700 kilometers). The discrepancy between the two figures here could be due to the fact that the originally scheduled distance of 2723 might have been curtailed down to 2300 due to unforeseen snags encountered on the route caused by human and natural agencies and the resultant impromptu diversions of the monks’ trek.)  The Walk for Peace started on October 26, 2025 and is due to pass through 4 time zones and 10 states, braving extremes of harsh weather and trekking through patches of difficult terrain. (By the time you read this on February 11, the monks may have just arrived in Washington, where grand preparations are reported to be underway to receive them.)

 It was 40 degrees Celsius in Texas, when they started. In 7 days, the Peace Walkers reached Georgia in Atlanta. It was raining there. Then, they arrived in South Carolina, where it was cold, the temperature usually being under 20 degrees Celsius. By the time of the podcast with Chamuditha, the Walk for Peace was proceeding through the even colder North Carolina, the temperature barely rising above 1 or 2 degrees Celsius. Then, they reached Virginia with heavy snowfall, but the Walk went ahead nonstop. 

The original plan was to walk 8 hours and cover 20 miles in a day. Now they want to do 10 hours a day and cover a targeted 40 miles. They hoped to have at least 20 participants in the Walk at any time. The whole Walk is expected to take 120 days and end on February 13, 2026. 

America is a big democratic country, the monk says. The ordinary Americans are more interested in inner peace than in politics. There are 125 Sri Lankan Buddhist pansalas in America, 15 of which stand on the route of the continuing Walk for Peace procession. Sri Lankan monks resident in these monasteries, in partnership with monks from other countries, provide the Walkers with essential food, temporary lodgings, and hygiene facilities. They also work out security arrangements for the peace-walking monks in coordination with government and municipal authorities and Police. 

Ven. Wimalakitti provides this information as a member and a director of the organizing committee responsible for the Walk for Peace project. According to him, Ven. Pannakara takes part in an annual walk in India from Buddha Gaya to Kolkata (the capital city of India’s West Bengal state) as a dhutanga practice (one of the 13 strict ascetic practices recommended for bhikkhus in Theravada Buddhism that aim at perfecting austerity, mental purification, and renunciation). About 200 Buddhist monks join Bhikkhu Pannakara on this walk.

The street dog now celebrated as Aloka started following Ven. Pannakara at Buddha Gaya and  reached Kolkata with him. He followed the monk even to the airport. Bhikkhu Pannakara could not leave the dog behind in India and fly back to America. So he canceled his flight and stayed back in India for eight months, during which he trained the dog and completed the paperwork necessary to take him to America with him. Once in America, Aloka started growling sometimes at people at first, because he was not used to the new environment. So they put a pet cone around his neck to calm him while on the move. Now he participates in the Walk without the pet cone and walks beside Bhikkhu Pannakara at the head of the column of Walkers. The monk usually takes Aloka on a leash and occasionally, off-leash. Aloka had a paw injury during the walk and had to be hospitalized for a few days for surgery. He has rejoined the walk now. The dog has a car reserved for him to move with the walking party whenever he is unable to walk. 

Ven. Wimalakitti Thera says he took part in six discussions held at the Huong Dao pansala when the peace walk was being planned. They had to discuss security matters with the Police. Concerns were raised about possible assassination attempts on Bhikkhu Pannakara. The dedicated monk said that he was ready to lay down his life for the cause of the Walk. Wimalakitti Thera said Bhikkhu Pannakara is only 37 years old. (But in some online accounts, he is said to be 44 years old.)

At the beginning of the 4th week into the Walk, there was a serious traffic accident. The monks were walking along the shoulder of the road (near Dayton, Texas, east of Houston, on November 19, 2025) guided by a slow-moving escort vehicle (with hazard lights on). A truck hit the rear of the pilot car pushing it into the monks. The impact left two monks injured, one of them (Phra Ajarn Maha Dam Phommasan, aka Bhante Dam Phommasan) very seriously. The injured monks were airlifted to Houston for medical attention. Bhante Dam Phommasan had to undergo multiple surgeries, including the amputation of his leg. (The information given within parentheses in this piece of writing is added by me for clarity.)

On another occasion (in early January 2026, in Walton County, near Good Hope, Georgia) an unidentified protestor accompanied by a group of his supporters blocked the monks’ path (holding signs like ‘JESUS SAVES’, ‘Turn to Christ’; WARNING: ‘walking to hell’, ‘Hell awaits’, etc., but the people gathered there cheered on the monks, and asked the protestors to just move on). Ven. Wimalakitti (who was presumably on the scene) says that the police diverted them onto an alternative route. The unperturbed monks did not react to the disruptors and continued their walk in silence. The night routes were decided by the Police. The initial hostility petered out gradually, as thousands gathered on the roadsides to watch the monks walking and to listen to the sermons in the night.

(On Christmas Day 2025, the monks stopped at a church in Alabama, before entering into Georgia the next day.) Ven. Wimalakitti says that when Bhikkhu Pannakara made an address in the church that evening, it was filled to capacity, and his speech had to be broadcast on outdoor screens.

The Walk actually began as a dhutanga (please, see above) observance as Ven. Wimalakitti explains during the discursive podcast, which forms the basis of this essay. But, on the third day, the name was changed to ‘Walk for Peace’. Its purpose is non-religious and non-political. ‘Today is my day of peace’ is the theme. (Ven. Pannakara exhorts) When you get up in the morning, say to yourself ‘Today is going to be my day of peace’”.  When Wimalakitti Thera says Ordinary Americans are really interested in Meditation (bhavana). They are much less interested in the dhamma”, he is making an obvious oversimplification that seems to be limited exclusively to the current Walk for Peace context.

 WimalakittiThera claims that a single Pakistani individual from Texas ‘provides security for the Walk’. However much I tried, I couldn’t catch his name as the monk pronounced it. So I sought AI help. AI clarifies that ‘Based on the results of the 2025-2026 Walk for Peace from Texas to Washington D.C., the security and the logistics for the Buddhist monks are primarily handled by local law enforcement agencies (sheriffs and police departments) who secure the roads as the group walks’.(So, there is no mention of a Pakistani (American) providing security for the walk). The monk might be mistaken about the matter. But that piece of information is not so important. Though the monks have absolutely no political motives, the Sri Lankan monk thinks they expect (US President Donald) Trump to be there when they reach Washington, near the White House. A reception for the monks is scheduled to take place on that occasion with the participation of the Sri Lankan ambassador.

The highlight of the Chamuditha News Brief (CNB) podcast featuring Ven. Dr Melpitiye Wimalakitti uploaded on February 5, 2026 is his revelation of a well kept secret, which is that the Sri Lankan monks living in America played the major pioneering role in organizing the Walk for Peace across America project and that they wanted the Sri Lankan government to support it. The 17-member organizing committee under the leadership of Ven. Wimalakitti, including the Vietnamese American bhikkhu Ven. Pannakara (who is now leading the Walk for Peace march) visited Sri Lanka in this connection in May 2025, that is, nine months ago. Ven. Wimalakitti showed the group photographs that the visiting monks took with prime minister Harini Amarasuriya,  some ministers and other dignitaries. Still, ordinary Sri Lankans are unaware of this momentous event, it seems.

Unfortunately, there had not been any response to the monks’ request up to the day that Chamuditha did the podcast with Ven. Wimalakitti. The monk said that he broke off his participation in the Walk in order to visit Sri Lanka again for the express purpose of urging the Sri Lankan government’s participation in the Vesak celebration at Walk team leader Ven. Pannakara’s monastery in Texas in May. Ven. Wimalakitti said he gave the president and the prime minister (as I think he claimed) formal invitation cards requesting them to arrange for government delegates to attend the Vesak ceremony set to be held at the Huong Dao Monastery of Ven. Bhante Pannakara in Dallas, Fort Worth, Texas on May 26 this year (2026). He also wants them to grace the transport of relics from Sri Lanka. The monk was due to leave for America the night following the day of the programme with Chamuditha; but he had still got no reply from those important invitees. However,the Sri Lankan Ambassador in Washington is taking a great interest in this event, according to Ven. Wimalakitti.

At the end of the podcast, Ven. Wimalakitti voiced two important messages: I want to say a word of diplomatic importance. This is a great opportunity for Sri Lanka, diplomatically speaking. This is a moment of awakening, not only for America but also for the whole world. All of you citizens of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka as a Theravada Buddhist state, can make your contribution to this global awakening. I urgently request that this great opportunity be not missed”. (The Walk for Peace, the peace pilgrimage across America, from Texas to Washington D.C., is performed by a group of Theravada Buddhist monks. It showcases the key Buddhist spiritual values of compassion, loving-kindness, non-violence, and peace that underlie Sri Lanka’s dominant religious culture. These values are a source of soft power for Sri Lanka in its diplomatic and cultural relations with the powerful United States of America.)

Secondly, as Buddhists of Sri Lanka, please don’t criticise our monks or the Buddhist religion, simply because others do so. Please, think about this (insulting the monks and the Dhamma) with great equanimity. Both Buddhist monks and laypersons must keep updated about current trends. Some of our monks often attract criticism because they fail to adjust to changing times.”

There is a stark contradiction between the harsh treatment of some protesting Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka by the government and the positive image that their counterparts in America are projecting to the whole world.  

Is it going to be loketa parakaase, gedarata maragaate” All fur coats and no knickers” ?

Let’s keep our fingers crossed.

Sasanka De Silva Makumbura.

When the new regime announced the cancellation of pension payments for parliamentarians, the public reaction was electric. The majority went “Gaga,” seeing it as a righteous strike against a privileged class. It is a populistically brilliant move, cutting costs and punishing an unpopular elite. However, while the public cheers, few pause to calculate the long-term adverse ramifications.

By stripping financial security from public office, we risk creating a paradox where a move intended to punish elites actually entrenches them, dragging us back toward a feudal structure that modern democracies, and indeed, socialist movements, fought tirelessly to destroy.

The Return to Feudalism

The most dangerous consequence of abolishing parliamentary benefits is the “gentrification” of politics.

In the 19th century, the British Chartist movement demanded payment for Members of Parliament (MPs) not to enrich politicians, but to enable the working class to serve. Before salaries and pensions were introduced, only the independently wealthy, landowners, feudal lords, and industrial tycoons, could afford to sit in parliament.

If we remove the financial safety net of a pension, we inadvertently erect a “wealth barrier” to entry. A middle-class professional, a teacher, or a union leader cannot afford to derail their career for five years of public service if they face financial ruin afterward. The only people who can afford to take that risk are those who already possess generational wealth.

We effectively tell the public: “You may govern, but only if you can afford to pay for the privilege.”

The “Make Hay” Effect: Incentivizing Corruption

You cannot expect a person to oversee millions in public funds while worrying about their own future grocery bills. This touches upon the economic concept of Efficiency Wages. When public officials feel financially insecure or undercompensated relative to their power, the incentive to utilize their office for private gain skyrockets.

This is the “Make Hay While the Sun Shines” phenomenon. If an MP knows their time is limited and there is no pension waiting for them at the end, the rational economic actor will maximize their earnings now.

This leads to:

• Rent-seeking: Creating policies that favor specific businesses in exchange for future board seats.
• Kickbacks: demanding immediate payouts for approving projects.
• Short-termism: Prioritizing quick, flashy wins over long-term stability because they won’t be around (or paid) to see the long-term results.

Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, famously argued against the “hairshirt” concept of politics. He posited that to prevent corruption; you must pay market rates. If you pay peanuts, you not only get monkeys, you get monkeys who steal the bananas.

The Socialist Irony

The supreme irony is that this move often comes from regimes claiming to represent the common man. Yet, by dismantling the compensation structure, they destroy the very ladder that allows the common man to climb into leadership.

True progressive governance requires that political office be treated as a profession, not a hobby for the rich. A pension is not merely a reward; it is a deferred compensation that ensures an MP can leave office with dignity, without having had to sell their vote to the highest bidder during their term.

Conclusion

Cheering for the abolition of MP pensions is emotionally satisfying but structurally suicidal for a democracy. It creates a legislature that is either exclusively rich (and out of touch) or desperately corrupt (and for sale).

If we want honest representatives who look like the people they serve, we must be willing to pay for them. The cost of a few hundred pensions is a rounding error compared to the cost of systemic corruption and the loss of inclusive governance. We must be careful not to applaud the very chains that will bind us to a new feudalism.

Sasanka De Silva
Makumbura.

Sam Ben-Meir – February 10, 2024

Every February, on Abraham Lincoln’s birthday, Americans rehearse a familiar liturgy. Lincoln is praised as the Great Emancipator, the savior of the Union, the embodiment of moral clarity and constitutional restraint. He stands as the reassuring proof that democracy can survive its gravest crises without stepping outside its own principles.

There is truth in this image—but it is an incomplete truth, and in our own moment, a potentially dangerous one. For Lincoln’s greatness did not consist in a simple fidelity to law. It consisted in something far more unsettling: his recognition that when a social order has already collapsed under the weight of its contradictions, legality itself can become an obstacle to justice.

To understand Lincoln fully, we must recover him not as a marble saint of liberal constitutionalism, but as a political actor who grasped—often painfully—that slavery was not merely a moral wrong but a structural system of exploitation, and that dismantling it would require acting beyond the normal boundaries of law. This does not make Lincoln an authoritarian. It makes him something far rarer: a statesman who understood the difference between emergency power exercised to preserve domination and emergency power exercised to destroy it.

One of the most persistent myths in American political thought is that slavery was a pre-modern anomaly—a regrettable holdover from a less enlightened age, incompatible with capitalism and destined to wither away under its advance. On this view, emancipation appears as a moral correction rather than a structural rupture.

The historical reality is far harsher. American slavery was not external to capitalism; it was one of its most advanced laboratories. The plantation was not a feudal remnant but a highly rationalized system of labor extraction. Enslaved people were measured, monitored, disciplined, and coerced with extraordinary precision. Output quotas, time discipline, surveillance, and punishment were not incidental features of slavery; they were its operational logic.

Long before the factory perfected these techniques under the guise of free labor,” the plantation had already demonstrated how human beings could be transformed into units of productive capacity, driven beyond endurance in the name of profit. Violence was not a breakdown of order; it was a managerial tool. The whip and the clock went hand in hand. Violence and measurement functioned together as instruments of rationality, enforcing time discipline, optimizing output, and transforming human beings into units of productive capacity.

Seen in this light, slavery appears not as capitalism’s opposite but as its naked form—capital accumulation stripped of ideological disguise. The Southern ruling class was not merely defending a cultural way of life; it was defending a highly profitable system of labor control that would later reappear, in modified form, across industrial society.

Abraham Lincoln may never have articulated this analysis in the language of political economy, but he understood its implications with increasing clarity. His early moderation on slavery—his willingness to tolerate it where it already existed—was not the product of moral indifference but of political realism within a system that still appeared governable by compromise.

What changed was not Lincoln’s conscience so much as his assessment of the situation. By the late 1850s and early 1860s, it became unmistakable that slavery could not be contained. Its expansion was not an accident but a necessity for the ruling class that depended on it. The Union was already hollowed out from within by this contradiction. The law had not prevented crisis; it had helped manage it.

When legality protects an exploitative order, obedience becomes a form of collaboration.

Once secession occurred, Lincoln grasped something that many constitutionalists still resist today: the emergency was not procedural but existential. The political order he was sworn to preserve no longer existed in any meaningful sense. To pretend otherwise—to insist on perfect legal regularity while the system collapsed—would have guaranteed defeat.

This is the context in which Lincoln’s most controversial actions must be understood: the suspension of habeas corpus, the arrest of civilians, the suppression of hostile newspapers, the unprecedented expansion of executive power. These were not minor deviations. They were decisive breaks with normal legal practice. The temptation is to treat these measures as either heroic or unforgivable. Both responses miss the point. Lincoln himself understood them as tragic necessities—acts undertaken not because they were desirable, but because the alternative was the triumph of an order built on human bondage.

What matters ethically is not that Lincoln stepped outside the law, but why he did so and what his actions were oriented toward. Emergency power does not carry its justification within itself. Its moral content depends on the social relations it serves. Lincoln did not suspend legal norms to entrench personal power, evade accountability, or protect an existing hierarchy. He suspended them in order to confront a ruling class whose economic system had already rendered constitutional order meaningless. His use of emergency power aimed at dismantling domination, not preserving it.

This distinction is crucial—especially now.

We live in a moment when appeals to emergency are routinely invoked in the service of reaction. Leaders suspend norms not to expand freedom but to consolidate authority, protect capital, and shield themselves from consequence. The danger, then, is obvious: praising Lincoln’s willingness to override legal constraints risks legitimizing authoritarian opportunism. But only if we erase the difference between emancipatory rupture and reactionary manipulation.

Emergency power exercised to preserve hierarchy is authoritarianism. Emergency power exercised to dismantle it is something else entirely. The difference lies not in legality but in material direction. Lincoln did not treat law as a personal instrument; he treated it as historically conditioned—capable of becoming complicit in injustice when social reality had outpaced it.

The lesson of Lincoln is not that leaders may suspend law whenever they declare necessity. It is that law cannot be treated as sacred when it has been captured by an exploitative system. To fetishize legality in such moments is not principled; it is evasive.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the Emancipation Proclamation itself. Lincoln framed emancipation explicitly as a war measure—not because he lacked moral conviction, but because he understood that freedom would be won not through abstract rights but through force, disruption, and reorganization.

However, any account of emancipation that centers exclusively on presidential decisions risks reproducing the very illusion this history should dispel. One of the most persistent distortions in American historiography is the tendency to treat enslaved people as passive recipients of freedom rather than as agents who forced emancipation onto the political agenda. Long before emancipation was declared, enslaved people were already dismantling slavery from within. They fled plantations in vast numbers, sabotaged production, withheld labor, transmitted intelligence to Union forces, and transformed enslaved space into contested terrain. These were not isolated acts of desperation but sustained, collective practices that exposed slavery’s dependence on constant coercion. In effect, enslaved people made slavery increasingly ungovernable.

It is no accident that emancipation emerged as a war measure.” The war itself had been radically reshaped by these acts of self-emancipation. Union commanders were confronted with collapsing plantation discipline, swelling camps of fugitives, and an economic system unraveling under pressure from below. The state did not initiate this transformation; it responded to it. Law followed struggle, not the reverse. By 1862, Union commanders were no longer debating abolition in theory. They were managing thousands of self-emancipated people crowding army camps, draining plantation labor systems, and forcing decisions the law had postponed.

Recognizing enslaved agency does not diminish Lincoln’s role; it clarifies it. His political brilliance lay not in unilateral moral resolve but in his capacity to respond to a rupture he did not control. The emergency he confronted was not abstract or self-declared. It was produced by millions who refused to remain property. Lincoln’s suspension of law was therefore not an arbitrary assertion of sovereignty, but a belated attempt to reckon with a transformation already underway—one that demanded a new social order or none at all.

In this sense, emancipation was not merely a moral victory. It was a reconstitution of American political economy. The destruction of slavery meant the destruction of a ruling class and the labor system it commanded. Anything less would have left the foundations of domination intact. What makes Lincoln unsettling—and enduringly relevant—is that he refused the comforts of liberal innocence. He did not imagine that history moves smoothly through persuasion and reform. He did not confuse moral clarity with political purity. He accepted that justice sometimes emerges only through rupture, coercion, and irreversibility.

This does not make him a model for authoritarian governance. It makes him a rebuke to those who believe that procedural fidelity alone can redeem unjust systems. Lincoln understood that when legality becomes a shield for exploitation, obedience to it becomes a form of complicity. Lincoln’s greatness lies not in his reverence for the Constitution, but in his willingness to confront the fact that the Constitution had been shaped by—and compromised by—a system of exploitation that could not be reformed away. He did not glorify emergency power; he bore its burden. That distinction matters now more than ever. The lesson of Lincoln is not comfort but responsibility: the responsibility to recognize when a social order has exhausted its moral legitimacy, and to act accordingly—not for personal gain, not for spectacle, but for the expansion of freedom.

History does not wait for legality to authorize justice. By the time law catches up, the work has already been done—by those who refused to remain governable under an unjust order. Lincoln’s greatness lay in his willingness to recognize this fact and act in its wake, rather than hiding behind procedural innocence. The question his legacy poses is therefore not whether emergency power can be abused—it can and often is—but whether we are willing to recognize when legality itself has become a form of protection for domination. To cling to law in such moments is not to defend democracy; it is to defend the conditions that make injustice durable. The violence of justice is not that it breaks the law, but that it exposes who has been relying on the law to avoid acting at all.

වෛද්‍ය තිලක පද්මා සුබසිංහ අනුස්මරණ නීති අධ්‍යාපන වැඩසටහන

(ලිපිය දීර්ඝවීම වැළක්වීමට පැහැදිලි කිරීම් අඩුකර ඇත)

1. 13වන ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථා සංශෝධනය මගින් ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 154 (උ) අනු ව්‍යවස්ථාව ඇති කර එක් එක් පළාත් සභාවට  ප්‍රඥ්ප්ති සෑදිය හැකි බවත් එම සංශෝධනය මගින් හඳුන්වාදුන් 9වන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවට අදාලව පුළුල් බලතල පළාත් සභාවලට ලබා දී ඇත.

2. ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 9වන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවට අදාලව එක් එක් පළාත් සභාවට ප්‍රඥ්ප්ති සෑදීමට පුළුල් බලතල හිමි වුවද පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ ව්‍යවස්ථාදායක උත්තරීතරත්වය අනුව පාර්ලිමේන්තුවටද ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 9වන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවට අදාලව විශේෂ ආකාරකින් නීති සෑදිය හැකිය.

3. ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 9වන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවට අදාලව පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසින් නීති පැනවීමේදී ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 154(උ) අනුව්‍යවස්ථාව අනුගමනය කළ යුතු වන අතර ඒ බව කොළඹ වරාය නගරය ආර්ථික කොමිෂන් සභාව පනත් කෙටුම්පත, දිවිනැගුම පනත් කෙටුම්පත, ගොවිජන සේවා (සංශෝධන පනත් කෙටුම්පත, ජල සේවා කෙටුම්පත වැනි පනත් කෙටුම්පත් වල ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථානුකූලත්වය අදාලව ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණ තීරණවලදී තීරණය කර ඇත.

4. ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 9වන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවට අදාලව පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසින් නීති පැනවීමේදී විශේෂ ආකාරයක් අනුගමනය කළ යුත්තේ 13වන ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථා සංශෝධනය මගින් විධායක, ව්‍යවස්ථාදායක සහ අධිකරණ බලය ( පාලන බලතල) විමධ්‍යගත කිරීමක් කර ඇති හෙයින් ය.

5. ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 9වන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවට අදාලව පාර්ලිමේන්තුව විසින් නීති පැනවීමේදී පාක්‍යසෝති, සුමන්තිරන්, ජයම්පතී කණ්ඩායම පවනට බඳු වේගයෙන් ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණයට පැමිණ ඒ සම්බන්ධයෙන් කරුණු කියාපාමින් ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 9වන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවට අදාල විෂයන් සම්බන්ධයෙන් පළාත් සභා අයිතිවාසිකම් ආරක්ෂා කර ගන්නා අතීතයක් දක්නට තිබුණි.

6. එසේ වුවත් ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 9වන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවේ අංක 5 යටතේ වන පළාත්වල නිවාස සහ ඉදිකිරීම් යටතේ අංක 5:2 යටතේ ඇතුළත් කර ඇති ගෙවල් කුලී පනත පළාත තුළ ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට අදාල විධිවිධානය අධිකරණ විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් 2026 ජනවාරි 20 දින පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පළමුවර කියවූ  1972 අංක 7 දරන ගෙවල් කුලී පනත ඉවත් කිරීම සදහා වූ පනත් කෙටුම්පත මගින් ඉවත් වෙද්දී, පරිච්චින්න වෙද්දී, සංශෝධන වෙද්දී පළාත් සභාවල ආරක්ෂකයන් ලෙස රූපාන්තරණකරුවන් වී සිටින පාක්‍යසෝති, සුමන්තිරන්, ජයම්පතී කණ්ඩායම නිහඬ පිළිවෙතක් අනුගමනය කළේය.

7. 1972 අංක 7 දරන ගෙවල් කුලී පනත ඉවත් කිරීම සදහා වූ පනත් කෙටුම්පත මගින් ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 9වන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවේ අංක 5 යටතේ වන පළාත්වල නිවාස සහ ඉදිකිරීම් යටතේ අංක 5:2 යටතේ ඇතුළත් කර ඇති ගෙවල් කුලී පනත පළාත තුළ ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට අදාල විධිවිධානය ඉවත් කිරීමට, පරිච්චින්න කිරීමට, සංශෝධන කිරීමට කටයුතු සකස් වෙද්දී පාක්‍යසෝති, සුමන්තිරන්, ජයම්පතී කණ්ඩායම එකී පනත් කෙටුම්පතට එරෙහිව ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 121 ව්‍යවස්ථාව යටතේ ඉල්ලීමක් ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණය වෙත ඉදිරිපත් කළේ නැත.

8. ඒ කෙසේ වෙතත් 1972 අංක 7 දරන ගෙවල් කුලී පනත ඉවත් කිරීම සදහා වූ පනත් කෙටුම්පත මගින් නීති පැනවීමේදී ජනතාවගේ පරමාධිපත්‍යය, බුද්ධාගමට ප්‍රමුඛස්ථානය පිරිනැමීම සහ බුද්ධ ශාසනය සුරක්ෂිත කර පෝෂණය කිරීමේ රජයේ වගකීම, නීතිය පසිදලීම සහ නීතියේ රැකවරණය, බලවත් තැනැත්තන්ගෙන් අබල තැනැත්තන් අරක්ෂා කිරීම, එකලාව හෝ අන් අය සමග යම් නීත්‍යානුකූල රැකියාවක, වෘත්තියක, කර්මාන්තයක, වෙළද ව්‍යාපාරයක හෝ ව්‍යවසායක නියුක්ත වීමේ නිදහසට, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව තුළ අභිමත ස්ථානයක වාසය කිරීමේ නිදහසට, රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රතිපත්තිය මෙහෙය වීමේ මූලධර්ම සහ යුතුකම් වලට, ජනාධිපතිවරයාගේ බලතල හා කාර්යයට, පළාත් සභා ප්‍රඥප්ති සෑදීම සහ ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ නවවන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවේ විධිවිධාන වලට අදාල ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාමය ප්‍රතිපාදන වලට පටහැනි බවත්, ඒ් අනුව ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ 3, 4.ඇ, 9, 12.4, 14.1උ, 14.1ඌ, 27, 28, 33ඊ, 154උ. ව්‍යවස්ථා උල්ලංඝණය කරන බවත් 1972 අංක 7 දරන ගෙවල් කුලී පනත ඉවත් කිරීමට එරෙහිව නීතීඥ අරුණ ලක්සිරි උණවටුන ශ්‍රේෂ්ඨාධිකරණයට 2026.02.03 දින පෙත්සමක් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණි.

9. ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාවේ නවවන උපලේඛනයේ 1වන ලැයිස්තුවේ විධිවිධාන වලට අදාල ආණ්ඩුක්‍රම ව්‍යවස්ථාමය ප්‍රතිපාදන වලට පටහැනිව 1972 අංක 7 දරන ගෙවල් කුලී පනත ඉවත් කිරීම සදහා වූ පනත් කෙටුම්පත ගෙනවිත් ඇති බව අනාවරණය වීමත් සමඟම පළාත් සභා ආරක්ෂකයන් ලෙස පෙනී සිටින පාක්‍යසෝති, සුමන්තිරන්, ජයම්පතී කණ්ඩායමේ දුර්වලතාවය සහ ගැඹුරු දාර්ශනික හැදෑරීම ප්‍රශ්නයට ලක් වී ඇති බව සාමාන්‍ය  ජනතාව අතරද සාකච්චාවට ලක් විය.

10. ඒ සමඟම 1972 අංක 7 දරන ගෙවල් කුලී පනත ඉවත් කිරීම සදහා වූ පනත් කෙටුම්පත සහ තවත් පනත් කෙටුම්පතක් සම්බන්ධයෙන් අදහස් හා යෝජනා ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා අධිකරණ අමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් 2026 පෙබරවාරි මස 03 වනදා සිට මාසයක කාලයක් ලබා දී තිබෙන බවට නීතිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව මගින් ප්‍රකාශ නිකුත් විය.

11. ඉහත තත්ත්වය සහ සිදුවීම් තුළ ජනතාවට මතු වන ප්‍රශ්නය වන්නේ පළාත් සභා විෂයන් උදුරා ගනිමින් ගෙවල් කුලී පනත ඉවත් කිරීමට යද්දී පළාත් සභා ඕනෑ කියන පාක්‍යසෝති, සුමන්තිරන්, ජයම්පතී කණ්ඩායම නිහඩ වීම යට ගැසීමට එම කෙටුම්පත අකුලා ගන්නා තැනට නීතිපති පත් වුණාද යන්නය.

https://neethiyalk.blogspot.com/2026/02/blog-post_10.html?m=1
වෛද්‍ය තිලක පද්මා සුබසිංහ අනුස්මරණ නීති අධ්‍යාපන වැඩසටහන

MTA News

Nava Thakuria

Bangladesh, a Muslim majority nation of over 170 million people, goes for general election on 12 February 2026 to elect its 13^th Jatiya Sansad in Dhaka. According to the Bangladesh Election Commission altogether 12,77,11,895 electorates are eligible for voting where  over 4.5 million are newly registered young voters (after attaining 18 years). The voting will take place at 42,766 polling stations across the country where  785,225 presiding and polling officers will be deployed. Over 900,000 security personnel are expected to monitor and ensure safety & security of the candidates and voters during the election. Altogether 2,034 candidates representing 51 political parties along with 275 independent contenders are in the fray for 299 Parliamentary seats (poll- procedure postponed in one constituency due death of a candidate belonging to Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh). Only  78 women including 17 independent candidates are fighting in the battle of ballots. However 50 additional  seats in the Parliament are reserved for women and they will be elected through indirect voting.

The campaigning that began on 22 January came to an end at 7:30 pm on 10 February. The electoral authorities have imposed a ban on all public rallies and processions for 96 hours before and after voting day. The polling on Thursday will begin at 7:30 am to continue till 4:30 pm. Nearly 500 foreign election observers including over  150  journalists representing 45 global media outlets have arrived in the south Asian nation. Notably, ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s party Awami League is barred from participation in the electoral process leaving a fair space to the arch rival Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in the election. The country had the last general election in January 2024, but the overthrowing of Hasina’s government following a student-led  mass uprising just after six months necessitated the polls.

Hasina, who was ruling the country since 2009 after winning consecutive polls, escaped a mass rebellion on 5 August 2024 to take a temporary shelter in neighboring India and continues her refuge somewhere in Delhi locality of the largest democracy on the globe.  The septuagenarian leader, widely seen as  pro-India in Bangladesh,  was recently convicted by a local court and sentenced to death in absentia for crimes against humanity. The massive July-August 2024 unrest led to the killing of over 1,400 people including minors and paved the way for an interim government led by Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus. Lately, the Yunus administration pursued her urgent extradition only to deteriorate the diplomatic relations with the giant neighbour ahead of the election.

Meanwhile, the path to electoral battles remains bumpy since the beginning  for the Yunus administration.  The situation went volatile after the shooting of Sharif Osman Bin Hadi, a young leader emerged during July 2024 unrest targeting the Hasina regime by masked assailants, and subsequent death of the radical leader in Singapore on 18 December while undergoing medical treatment. Rumours spread that Hadi’s  killers sneaked to India and it was enough to revitalize the anti-India (read anti-Hindu) sentiments in the country. Thousands of incidents reported where the fanatic Islamic elements attacked non-Muslims across Bangladesh compelling the Hindu majority India to react sharply. Public protests also erupted in front of Indian missions and later counter demonstrations took place outside the Bangladeshi missions. With the backdrop of diplomatic tensions between Dhaka and New Delhi, both the countries have restricted tourist visas after summoning each other’s high commissioners to lodge protests on multiple occasions.

India’s foreign ministry recently claimed that over  2,900 incidents of attacks on religious minorities were reported in Bangladesh under the Yunus-led interim government and the unremitting hostility against Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists at the hands of extremists was a matter of grave concern for New Delhi. Various independent sources recorded that nearly 200 people were killed in mob violence in the last year. Bangladesh Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian Unity Council also claimed that there was a sharp spike in incidents targeting minorities amid political instability following the ouster of  Hasina’s regime.

The international media reported with shocks on 18 December as  Deepu Chandra Das, 29, was lynched and his body was hanged to set on fire by a Muslim mob in Mymensingh locality over an alleged blasphemy (allegedly of insulting Islam) charge. It was immediately followed by the lynching of Amrit Mondal, 30, on 24 December in Rajbari area. Bajendra Biswas, 42, a garment factory worker was shot dead in Mymensingh by a colleague on 29 December. Similarly, businessman Khokon Chandra Das, 50, was hacked and set on fire by a mob in Shariatpur locality leading to his death in the hospital on 3 January. It was followed by the killing of  Samir Kumar Das, 28, an auto-rickshaw driver, who was stabbed to death in Chittagong locality on 11 January. Mysterious deaths of Akash Sarkar, a student of Jagannath University in Dhaka along with Mithun Sarkar, Proloy Chaki, Sarat Chakraborty Mani, etc also added to the number of minority victims.

New Delhi-based Rights & Risks Analysis Group (RRAG) documented a surge in targeted attacks against Bangladesh’s Hindu minority community attributing to Islamist forces under the guise of election-related unrest. RRAG director Suhas Chakma asserted that deliberate setting the temples on fire, vandalism on residential properties and also physical assaults on minorities continues in the neighboring country. Mentionable is that Bangladesh recorded over 520 communal attacks in a year (2025), where over 60 non-Muslims were killed and 28 cases of rape and other forms of violence against women took place. Attacks on religious sites and desecration of Hindu deities were reported in several cases. 

Speaking to this writer Chakma stated that continued denials of any religious angles  by the authorities simply emboldened the religious fundamentalists. The victims out of fear of reprisal often described the targeted burning down of the houses as ‘accidents or foul play’ despite attempts to burn them alive to death or being made destitute after burning all their assets and belongings, he added. Even the Bangla government press wing admitted at least  274 violent incidents took place following the killing of Hadi, convener of Inqilab Mancha, in Dhaka during the second half of December last year.

The situation turned fragile when Hasina made a public speech on 23 January lambasting Yunus as ‘presiding over an illegal and violent regime’ to plunge  Bangladesh into lawlessness.  Addressing the media at Foreign Correspondents’ Club in New Delhi through an audio message for the first time after her departure from Dhaka, Hasina attacked Yunus personally terming the octogenarian caretaker regime head ‘a murderous fascist, money launderer and traitor’. The daughter of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, often preached as Father of the Nation (Bangladesh), also denied all charges framed against her stating that she was not personally involved in any crime against humanity.  Hasina’s views were sharply reacted by Dhaka accusing New Delhi of providing her undue space only to create more tensions between the two neighbours.

Speaking to this writer from Dhaka, a local trader argued that the elections in Bangladesh remained controversial for decades when the BNP used to avoid the last there national polling. He reminded that if the absence of  Awami League in the forthcoming elections becomes too important, what happened when BNP was not in the scene (national elections in 2024, 2018 and 2014) and voters’ turnout was too low.  He admitted that Hasina’s presence in Delhi continues to create trouble in bilateral relations between the two countries. The problem with India was that both the ruling and opposition parties preferred to look at Bangladesh through the eyes of Hasina only. The trader also posed a pertinent question, if at all Hasina deserves a refuge, but what is the reason that thousands of her party leaders are allowed to stay in India, precisely in New Delhi and Kolkata.

National Development Bank PLC

NDB Bank has renewed its membership with the Parenthood Global Association for the second consecutive year, reaffirming its strong commitment to fostering a workplace culture that supports, empowers, and understands the needs of working parents. This renewed partnership underscores NDB’s belief that an inclusive and equitable work environment must make space for the realities and responsibilities of modern parenthood.

The Parenthood Global Association is dedicated to helping organisations build family-friendly workplaces that nurture well-being, productivity, and work-life integration. NDB’s continued affiliation with this prestigious body reflects the Bank’s sustained efforts to enhance the support systems available to employees navigating both professional responsibilities and parental duties.

For NDB, supporting working parents goes beyond policy, it is an extension of the Bank’s human-centric philosophy and its commitment to creating an environment where every employee feels valued and understood. Through this partnership, the Bank continues to strengthen structures that enable parents to thrive, including flexibility initiatives, parental support mechanisms, wellness resources, and awareness-building across the organisation.

These efforts reinforce NDB’s broader Diversity & Inclusion agenda, which seeks to champion equality across all demographics while cultivating a workplace built on empathy, understanding, and opportunity. By renewing its membership with the Parenthood Global Association, NDB reiterates its dedication to ensuring that its employees—especially those juggling multiple roles—have access to the tools, support, and inclusive culture they need to succeed both at work and at home.

Commenting on the renewal, Lasantha Dasanayaka, Vice President – Human Resources at NDB stated, Our continued partnership with the Parenthood Global Association signifies our commitment to supporting employees through every stage of life. We believe that when parents are empowered with the right systems and resources, they are better equipped to excel—professionally and personally. This renewal strengthens our journey toward building a workplace that is inclusive, compassionate, and responsive to the evolving needs of our people.”

NDB remains dedicated to nurturing a progressive organisational culture where employees are encouraged to bring their whole selves to work. By prioritising inclusive initiatives such as this, the Bank continues to lead the way in advancing the well-being of its people while upholding the values of empathy, equity, and shared success.

NDB Bank is the fourth-largest listed commercial bank in Sri Lanka. NDB was named Sri Lanka’s Best Digital Bank for SMEs at Euromoney Awards for Excellence 2025 and was awarded awards Domestic Retail Bank of the Year – Sri Lanka and Islamic Banking Initiative of the Year – Sri Lanka at the Asian Banking & Finance Retail Banking Awards 2025. NDB is the parent company of the NDB Group, comprising capital market subsidiary companies, together forming a unique banking and capital market services group. The Bank is committed to empowering the nation and its people through meaningful financial and advisory services powered by digital banking solutions.

බ්ලැක් ඩොට් / blac dot

Courtesy Hiru News

Former President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga has expressed serious concern over what she called the decline of Sri Lanka’s professional public service, warning that selective application of justice and politically motivated governance are undermining the foundations of the State.

In a statement posted on her Facebook page, Kumaratunga said she was sharing excerpts from an article titled When Justice Becomes Selective,” noting that the issues discussed in it have a significant impact on the country’s system of governance.

She said she strongly agreed with the article’s arguments, describing it as thoughtful and balanced, especially in its focus on integrity within the public service.

Referring to former Presidential Secretary Saman Ekanayake, who is currently in remand custody over the approval of funds for a foreign visit by then President Ranil Wickremesinghe in 2023, Kumaratunga said she knows him personally and considers him an exceptionally honest and highly professional public official.

Kumaratunga stressed that no government can operate effectively without a capable, efficient and principled public service. While political leaders may not always have extensive administrative experience, she said, they must uphold strong integrity and depend on experienced career officials to run the country properly.

She cautioned that the current administration appears to be weakening the existing public service structure by replacing experienced officials with party loyalists who lack proper qualifications and experience, a move she warned could further damage democratic governance.

Kumaratunga also connected the 2022 Aragalaya protest movement to increased public awareness of governance failures, saying people took to the streets only after recognising the serious decline in standards.

She said Sri Lanka is still facing the effects of nearly 20 years of mismanagement and warned that the country risks further instability unless there is a shift in the way it is governed.

Echoing the views expressed in the Vox Civis article, Kumaratunga said it is ultimately up to the public to reverse this trend, urging citizens to critically examine decisions, consider their long-term impact, and make informed democratic choices to help rebuild the nation.

Courtesy Hiru News

The government-led intervention involving allegations over the placement of a Buddha statue at the Trincomalee Bodhirajarama Temple is a deliberate crime against the Sasana.

Most Venerable Dr. Ittapane Dhammalankara Thera, the Chief Prelate of the Kotte Sri Kalyani Samagri Dharma Maha Sangha Sabha, conveyed this view in a letter addressed to the President.

The Chief Prelate points out that the opposition to the statue’s placement originated from a group including a member of the Tamil Diaspora and a member of the current government, rather than from any other ethnic or religious community.

He believes the issue arose because the police acted arbitrarily and followed certain political instructions.

The letter expresses deep regret regarding the imprisonment of ten individuals, including Buddhist monks, in connection with the incident.

Placing a very small Buddha statue on the foundation of the old sermon hall destroyed by the Tsunami does not cause any harm to the location.

Describing the reconstruction of a building on the original site as a “new construction” is an ignorant act.

The monks placed the statue on sacred land protected and offered to the Sasana by ancient kings; they faced assault for attempting to place a Buddha statue and not for committing any crime.

The details in the letter are based on media reports and information gathered by a delegation from the Kotte Sri Kalyani Samagri Dharma Maha Sangha Sabha sent to the site.

While national and religious issues existed in Sri Lanka during certain eras in the past, such problems are non-existent today.

Therefore, the Chief Prelate requests the President to intervene and take steps to immediately release the ten individuals, including the monks.

Madubashana Prabath Ranahansa

DARK ROOM ඩාක් රූම්

Shenali D Waduge

Sri Lanka’s political history cannot be understood without confronting the forces that repeatedly reshape public anger, class conflict, and ideological rebellion. Among these forces, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) stands out as a movement that began as a radical Marxist uprising of the oppressed, yet today operates within a political alliance aligned with ultra-capitalist, liberal global frameworks under the banner of the National People’s Power (NPP). This dramatic transformation raises a fundamental question: Did the JVP evolve naturally, or was it strategically redirected by internal wanna-be elites and external geopolitical forces?

To answer this, we must examine the JVP’s origins, ideological shifts, geopolitical entanglements, the post-2015 political re-engineering of Sri Lanka, and the resulting transformation of both leadership and support base.

The JVP emerged at a time when Sri Lanka faced socio-economic changes, ideological infiltration, Cold War geopolitics and youth became a tool of manipulation.

Youth are prone to manipulation when they are vulnerable:

• Educated but unemployed youth. Universities became hotbeds of frustration.
• Rural poverty & inequality – national policies failed to deliver rural development, structural inequalities were not dealt by the traditional parties (UNP / SLFP)
• Collapse of faith in political elites
• Language marginalisation
• Educational bottlenecks
• Blocked social mobility

These factors converged, could easily sway sentiments of the educated but unemployed youth and fuel anger sufficient enough to rebel.

The Cold War years turned nations like Sri Lanka into an ideological battleground (1960s-1970s)

• USSR & China aggressively exported Marxist ideology
• India hosted multiple Marxist revolutionary movements
• Cuba exported insurgency models worldwide
• Vietnam War era radicalised global youth culture

These ideals were imported or plugged into the minds of Sri Lanka’s youth via

• Foreign scholarships
• Political training camps
• Literature networks
• University student exchanges
• Underground printing & propaganda supply

Thus, revolutionary doctrines became part and parcel of Sri Lankan student politics.

While this change was taking place in the minds of Sri Lanka’s youth, India viewed Sri Lanka through a security-dominance lens. This dominance was to prevent Sri Lanka

• Aligning with Western or Chinese military blocs
• Maintain regional dominance
• Ensure Colombo remains politically unstable enough to be manageable

When objectives are clear the next is to execute how to politically make Sri Lanka unstable.

Youth was key.

• Internal rebellion weakens central authority
• Keeps security forces inward-focused
• Prevents external military alliances

Internal destabilization indirectly served Indian strategic leverage — even without direct operational control.

India did not require formal sponsorship – simply soft facilitation and political shielding.

Tamil youth taken and trained in various camps across India created the Eelam separatist movement.

Was JVP handled in the same manner? If so by whom & for what reasons?

The transformation of the JVP came post-2015 – a period that saw

• Intelligence services weakened
• Military politically constrained
• Strategic paralysis induced
• Foreign security integration expanded

It was after security neutralization that political engineering of minds took shape and place.

Interlinked with this has been the diaspora-transnational” advocacies in the form of

1. Pro-LTTE groups living overseas
2. JVP runaways and JVP ideological sharing support-base living overseas.

There is an uncanny alliance in the manner both integrate against the State:

• Tamil diaspora lobbying
• Western NGO legal attacks
• UNHRC pressure
• Sanctions threat

This external pressure is a mechanism to maintain constant political vulnerability and keep every government on toes.

How many of Sri Lanka’s post-independence leaders have actually understood Sri Lanka’s geopolitical importance and its impact on internal and external affairs and the dynamics at play and protecting what external elements are out to grab?

Why Sri Lanka mattered then and now:

• Shipping lanes
• Naval access
• Intelligence positioning
• Cold War containment strategies

Every nation that had some form of geopolitical importance experienced proxy insurgencies to

• Pressure governments
• Influence alignments
• Force economic dependency
• Prevent nationalist consolidation

Every revolutionary movement use psychological engineering to win support:

Techniques used to convert personal frustration into ideological rage:

• Victimhood narrative building
• Elite demonization
• State oppression framing
• Heroic martyr creation
• Romanticising armed struggle

The JVP mastered this psychological conversion process.

Weaponization Youth Idealism

The JVP leadership channeled legitimate grievances into violent revolutionary ideology that permanently laid to rest thousands of youth both in the 1970s and 1980s, while the LTTE also stands guilty of.

What could these youth have become had they not fallen prey to romanticized revolutionary mind-control.

This is a classic youth weaponization strategy and a cut and paste from other movements.

Youth Emotion	Ideological Reframing
Unemployment	Systemic oppression
Poverty	Class warfare
Injustice	Armed liberation
Frustration	Revolutionary duty
Identity loss	Marxist nationalism

We have unanswered questions:

• Why the JVP rose
• Why it gained rapid growth
• Why it was intensely violent
• Why external silence surrounded its growth

The converted Youth became ideological foot soldiers of a geopolitical struggle which the youth themselves were oblivious of.

Sri Lankan youth died for geopolitical games they never understood.

JVP youth

LTTE youth all fell prey.

They believed they were fighting:

• Injustice
• Oppression
• Exploitation

They were merely:

• Instruments of destabilization
• Disposable revolutionary assets

Let us compare the JVP with other revolutionary movements

1. Nepal Maoists (CPN-M)

Feature	JVP (Sri Lanka)	Nepal Maoists
Youth Base	Rural educated unemployed	Rural educated unemployed
Ideology	Marxist–Leninist–Maoist	Marxist–Leninist–Maoist
Recruitment	Student cells + villages	Student cells + villages
Structure	Hybrid political–militant	Hybrid political–militant
Tactics	Sudden mass uprising	Prolonged people’s war
India Factor	Strategic tolerance	Strategic facilitation
Outcome	Military defeat → political reintegration	Military stalemate → political takeover

2. Naxalite Movement (India)

Component	JVP	Naxalites
Target	Rural youth	Tribal & rural youth
Method	Underground cells	Guerrilla zones
Narrative	State oppression	State exploitation
Ideology	Maoism	Maoism
Recruitment	Universities + villages	Universities + villages

3. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) — Peru

Feature	JVP	Shining Path
Leadership	Educated ideologues	University professor
Base	Rural youth	Rural peasants
Ideology	Maoist	Maoist
Violence	High	Extreme
Indoctrination	Heavy	Total

4. FARC (Colombia)

FARC shows how hybrid insurgent-political movements sustain themselves for decades once embedded in social grievances.

The Insurgency Template

All these movements followed the same five-stage evolutionary template:

Stage 1 — Social Grievance Accumulation

Stage 2 — Ideological Injection

Stage 3 — Hybrid Party Formation

Stage 4 — Clandestine Militarization

Stage 5 — Revolutionary Escalation

Now that we have understood the pattern in youth-centred revolutionary movements let us proceed to understand the dynamics that merged JVP with neo-liberal NPP, an ideology that the JVP sustained its wrath against.

To understand this status quo we must return to 2015 regime change after which the 3 main political parties were split. SLFP split to create SLPP, UNP split to create SJB and JVP split to create NPP.

Other than Tilwin the General Secretary of the JVP, all top brass of the JVP are members of the NPP.

After 2015:

• 19A dismantled executive concentration
• Judicial activism expanded
• Independent commissions multiplied
• Governance NGO architecture embedded

This created: Permanent institutional leverage over elected authority – political capture without institutional control is temporary.

Who actually wanted to weaken the institutions & why is a clue to the minds behind these changes.

Historically, JVP ideology was rooted in:

• Anti-imperialism
• Anti-capitalism
• Anti-elite politics
• Anti-Western influence
• State-centered economic thinking
• Revolutionary populism

Yet today, the NPP platform exhibits:

• Neoliberal economic accommodation
• Western diplomatic alignment
• IMF-friendly macroeconomic positioning
• Global governance language
• NGO-compatible human rights framing
• Technocratic economic discourse

This represents a sharp ideological pivot, not gradual evolution and questions how many in the traditional JVP camp are agreeable with this pivot/shift.

More importantly, we must ask Can such a transformation emerge purely from internal strategic recalibration — or does it usually require external facilitation?”

Let us assume that the pivot came from an internal strategic evolution: yet for such to happen the leadership has to take stock of:

1. Electoral Realism

• Armed struggle failed.
• Revolutionary politics failed.
• Only electoral legitimacy could deliver power.

2. Middle-Class Capture

• Leadership increasingly drawn from:
  • Urban professionals
  • NGO circles
  • Academia
• International exposure groups
• Class orientation gradually shifted.

3. Generational Ideological Dilution

• New cadres lack revolutionary conditioning.
• Ideology replaced by technocratic pragmatism.

4. Survival Strategy

• To gain legitimacy:
  • Moderate language
  • Accept global economic frameworks
  • Rebrand as governance-capable
  • Fed-up with the failed format followed since inception!

However, this does not fully explain:

• Speed of transformation
• Diplomatic acceptance
• Media normalization
• International policy alignment
• Rapid external legitimacy

All of the above elements usually accompany external reinforcement.

The second scenario is the merger/shift as an outcome of external strategic facilitation.

This appears highly plausible.

Foreign sponsorship is not required, only externally influenced validation, narrative alignment and boosting them via social media channels. This is exactly what took place.

Such scenarios are externally operated using:

1. NGO & Civil Society Ecosystem
   • Training
   • Policy workshops
   • Governance programs
   • Leadership fellowships
   • Exposure visits

2. Diplomatic Grooming

• Selective diplomatic engagement
• Western embassy interactions
• Think-tank exposure
• Strategic dialogue forums

3. International Economic Institutions invitations
   • IMF / World Bank ideological normalization
   • Market reform framing
   • Technocratic capacity-building

4. Media Narrative Engineering

• Rebranding of revolutionary past – new hero/heart-throb
• Legitimization of new political identity
• Image normalization in international press

5. Elite Political Legitimization

• Academic endorsement
• Policy advisory incorporation
• Western-aligned intellectual support

Revolutions change rulers — not ruling classes. This understanding is important to understand how easy it is for so-called revolutionary leaders living unluxurious  lifestyles to be swayed into a life of ultra-luxuries and to compromise the support base to enjoy those luxuries in their final years of holding power, fully aware that their control is approaching full circle.

The leaders who used psychological engineering to capture youth, themselves have been psychologically programmed to embrace a life of luxuries compromising those youth & the ideals their party originally stood for.

This change became with the emergence of the NPP and the marriage of convenience with the JVP.

Post-2015 and post-NPP:

• Same elite families
• Same corporate networks
• Same NGO circuits
• Same international policy handlers

It is important to understand that class structure never changed with regime change. The same class circles rebranded.

That rebranding did not change

• Why frustration persists
• Why inequality deepens
• Why disillusionment accelerates

Let’s now ask – Did external actors support such a transformation & why”

From a geopolitical standpoint: When a radical nationalist-left movement becomes a liberal, IMF-aligned, globally compliant political force it becomes an extraordinary strategic victory.

This change has converted:

• A system challenger (JVP) into a system changer aligned with liberal policies.
• A nationalist disruptor (JVP) now silencing opposition and aligning as global order participant
• A revolutionary force (JVP) using clout to peddle western/indian economic compliance

For the minds that control – This:

• Ensures political stability as per foreign dictates
• Protects external economic interests not necessarily national
• Guarantees debt discipline as per external dictates without internal opposition
• Neutralizes nationalist resistance making government authority superior

JVP-NPP is not the only party that has been subverted into compliance.

1. Nepal Maoists → IMF-compliant government
2. ANC (South Africa) → Neoliberal economic custodian
3. Sandinistas (Nicaragua) → Electoral-liberal hybrid
4. FMLN (El Salvador) → Market accommodation
5. Former Eastern Bloc Communists → EU liberal integration

Ironically, every revolutionary movement eventually became neoliberal administrators — following external institutional integration.

So much for Lenin, Stalin and Marx.

These are mere cosmetic ornaments in party offices now.

If we are to understand the marriage of convenience between the JVP and NPP the hybrid set up appears the merging of internal brains + external strategic facilitation to bring about a rapid political transformation that is not in the interest of the Nation or rather to dismantle every pillar that keeps the nation together.

This shift came as a result of

• Internal leadership converted into power opportunity (when people saw no alternative)
• External systems offered pathway legitimacy (international PR props)
• Both converged into a mutually beneficial alignment (not for the JVP traditional support base or even the disgruntled supporters that left the traditional parties thinking NPP would provide political relief)

This alliance resulted in electoral victory with supporters falsely thinking they created a memorable change.

Memorable no doubt, when with guilt they witness every pillar being dismantled before their very eyes.

The JVP ideology of pre 2015 which could never win:

• Urban elites
• Business sector
• International acceptance
• Financial system trust
• Media legitimacy
• Diplomatic comfort

Yet, the post-2015 JVP-NPP liberal alliance supplied:

• Middle-class credibility
• Global legitimacy
• Economic governance framing
• Institutional acceptability

Without this there would have been no electoral victory.

Therefore, those that provided the props to bring that victory must realize that the artificial nature of the alliance is unlikely to be long lasting especially when the pillars that have enabled victory are now dithering towards collapse.

A controlled ideological migration — from revolutionary nationalism to managed liberal governance — enabled by both internal pivot and external strategic facilitation is never long-term.

The cracks are already appearing.

The collapse comes from the very downtrodden classes the party assured to represent but has now neglected and politically disempowered after coming to power.

Every political system contains two structurally opposed forces:

1) Those who benefit from the system

• Economic elites
• Political elites
• Bureaucratic classes
• Corporate and financial interests
• Institutional beneficiaries

They wish to preserve what they enjoy

2) Those who feel excluded or trapped by the system

• Unemployed youth
• Marginalized workers
• Rural populations
• Lower-middle classes
• Displaced or downwardly mobile groups

They demand change & redistribution.

Structural inequality is permanent which means political conflict is permanent.

What periodically changes are

• Elections
• Protests
• Trade union action
• Identity politics
• Culture wars
• Revolutions

Political systems survive by managing, not eliminating, this tension by

• Allowing limited protest
• Creating opposition parties
• Channeling anger into elections
• Offering symbolic reforms
• Periodically reshuffling elites

This keeps the dissatisfied hopeful enough not to revolt, and the elites secure enough not to repress totally.

In this set up Youth are easy to manipulate.

Every major political upheaval — French Revolution, Russian Revolution, Chinese Revolution, Arab Spring, JVP, Nepal Maoists — followed this pattern.

Youth sit between classes:

• Not yet beneficiaries
• No accumulated security
• High expectations
• High frustration
• High energy

External powers exploit this structure

Because class tension already exists, external actors do not need to create it —  they only need to:

• Amplify it
• Channel it
• Reframe it
• Redirect it

Foreign influence always works through domestic grievance, never against it.

Movements like:

• JVP → NPP
• Maoists → Liberal democrats
• Islamists → Technocratic reformers

work because they:

• Speak to the anger of the excluded
• While reassuring the interests of the elite

Politics is not a moral battle.
It is a structural class management system.

The answer is found in who controls the direction of dissatisfaction?

Sri Lanka’s instability persists because:

• The excluded classes are expanding
• The elite system remains structurally unchanged
• External economic pressure intensifies class stress
• Political movements continuously repackage grievance without resolving structure

This provides permanent political turbulence.

Political systems don’t collapse when people are poor.

They collapse when people believe the system is rigged permanently against them.

That belief — whether fully true or partially constructed — is the real fuel of political change.

JVP began as a revolutionary movement seeking system overthrow

JVP-NPP became a hybrid political actor seeking a global pat on back for compliance.

Movements born to destroy systems often end up becoming the system’s most effective managers.

The journey of the JVP from armed Marxist rebellion to parliamentary neoliberal alliance is not merely a story of political evolution. It is a textbook example of how revolutionary energy is neutralized, redirected, and absorbed into global power systems.

What began as a movement to overthrow elite domination now functions within the very structures it once sought to dismantle. This transformation reflects not only leadership ambition but also a deeper geopolitical strategy that systematically reshapes political landscapes through fragmentation, ideological realignment, and regime engineering.

Political rebranding without structural reform simply recycles discontent, it does not resolve it.

Sri Lanka’s crisis is rooted in the capture of political systems, leadership pipelines, and national narratives by external interests, aided by internal elite complicity. Recognizing this, neutralizing this, is the first step toward reclaiming national agency.

The solution does not lie in outdated ideologies or imported neoliberal frameworks, but in forging a new national political synthesis grounded in:

• Ethical leadership
• Economic sovereignty
• Productive nationalism
• Social justice through opportunity
• Strategic global engagement without surrender

This demands a new political culture, built on pride in the past historically/heritage, civic education, national narrative restoration, and leadership renewal.

Sri Lanka’s future will not be secured by those who exploit class anger or preserve privilege, but by those capable of reawakening national consciousness, rebuilding institutional integrity, and restoring sovereign self-governance.

Shenali D Waduge