Courtesy The Daily Mirror

Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay (Retd.)

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There is growing realisation that the allegations made by Azad Maulana would be worthless in practical terms in a court of law until and unless Azad Maulana himself backs it up by testifying himself in a Sri Lankan tribunal and being cross examined by lawyers. He could even do this from afar by electronic methods too

Let me begin this article with an apology and explanation to readers. This week’s column should have been the second and final part of last week’s article (‘Is JVP Gen-Sec Tilvin, the power behind President Dissanayake’s throne?’). However this week’s column would be about the sensational arrest and detention of former Intelligence chief Major General Suresh Sallay. The Tilvin Silva article will be published next week.

Former head of the State Intelligence Service (SIS) and ex-chief of Military Intelligence, Major General Suresh Sallay (Retd.) was arrested by a special team of police officers from the  Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Peliyagoda at 8.10 a.m. on Wednesday, February 25, 2026. Provisions of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) were invoked to detain him for questioning for a 72 hour period. Thereafter he may be either released or held further for a period of 90 days on a detention order under the PTA.

Meera Srinivasan, the Colombo Correspondent of ‘The Hindu’, quoted an unnamed senior official who stated that the arrest was made under the PTA based on adequate evidence” and described it as a major breakthrough”in the on going investigation into the dastardly Easter Sunday attacks.

Three churches and four hotels in Colombo, Negombo and Batticaloa were attacked  in the morning of  April 21, 2019 (Easter Sunday) by suicide bombers belonging to an Islamic radical group. 270 persons including 45 foreign nationals were killed and over 500 injured in the attacks.

Media briefing

According to newspaper reports, Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) in charge of the Legal Division, Jaliya Senaratne speaking at a special media briefing said that since Sallay has been arrested under the provisions of the PTA, he could be held for 72 hours (three days) for questioning. Thereafter, based on the evidence, steps can be taken to obtain a detention order, and that legal provisions exist for this purpose,” he added. Senaratne also said the public will be informed in due course about the facts that they need to know regarding Sallay’s arrest.

The Senior DIG in charge of the Western Province, Sajeewa Medawatte, also addressing the same press conference, stated that Sallay was arrested based on evidence related to the 2019 Easter attacks bombings. Medawatte further mentioned that a lengthy investigation needs to be conducted in this regard and that more information will be revealed in due course. 

He also noted that it is difficult to disclose further information within a few hours and emphasised that the Police have carried out their duties properly. Responding to journalists’ questions about allegations that a campaign has been launched against the Police for arresting Sallay without properly disclosing the reason, he stated that if the arrest had not been made, there would have been a campaign against the Police for failing to act. Medawatte further said that during further  interrogation of Sallay, information about the mastermind behind the 2019 Easter attacks may be uncovered.

One of the key promises made by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake was to carry out a full investigation into the Easter Sunday attacks. The arrest of Suresh Sallay is the first high profile arrest of a defence official  after President Dissanayake became President in September 2024. The arrest of a former intelligence chief in connection with the Easter bombings has received wide coverage in the national and international media.

High-ranking positions

Major General Sallay (Retd.) has held several high-ranking positions within Sri Lanka’s security and diplomatic spheres in a career spanning more than three decades. 1987: Joined the Sri Lanka Army (Infantry and Signals). 2006-2009: First Secretary, Sri Lankan Embassy in Paris. 2012-2016: Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) 2016-2018: Minister Counsellor, Sri Lankan High Commission in Malaysia. 2019 (Jan.-Nov.): Student, National Defence College, New Delhi 2019–2024: Director, State Intelligence Service (SIS). Following his removal as SIS chief in late 2024, Sallay joined the Pathfinder Foundation, a prominent think tank  in a senior capacity.

‘Channel 4’ TV

This writer is not aware of the  available evidence in the hands of the Police or  whether ‘new’ evidence has been acquired concerning Suresh Sallay’s alleged involvement in the Easter attacks. However the alleged involvement of Sallay was first made in the public domain by  Mohammed Hanzeer alias Azad Maulana in a ‘Channel 4’ TV programme. Azad Maulana was formerly a close aide of TMVP leader and former Eastern Chief Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pillaiyaan.

The chief allegation by Azad Maulana regarding Suresh Sallay was that he had got him (Azad Maulana) to arrange a meeting between the head of the National Thowheed Jamath head and chief suicide bomber Zahran Hashim and Suresh Sallay in the Puttalam District. Suresh Sallay responded then to this by proving that he was in Malaysia at the time this alleged meeting took place. Sallay also stated that he was in New Delhi when the Easter bombings occurred.

Interaction

To strike a personal note, I have never met Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. However I did interact with him by electronic mail and telephone from Canada in early 2014 when Sallay was head of Military Intelligence. This was to get some information for a series of articles about an aborted attempt to revive the LTTE. Sallay was very frank and forthright in disclosing details.  My impression of Suresh Sallay through that brief long-distance interaction was that he was an efficient, capable and knowledgeable intelligence chief.

It is against this backdrop that this column focuses on the arrest of Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay and his alleged connection to the April 2019 bombings with emphasis on the allegations made by Azad Maulana. I shall re-visit the past with the aid of some earlier writings of mine in this respect.

Conspiracy theories

The coordinated suicide bomber attacks by a group of misguided Muslim zealots against three churches and four luxury hotels in Colombo, Negombo and Batticaloa on Easter Sunday (21 April) in 2019 brought in its wake several conspiracy theories. Chief among these was the one which suspected that an official or officials of Sri Lanka’s intelligence services had manipulated the Muslim youths into launching the attacks with the objective of facilitating the return to power of former defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa as President. This conspiracy theory received a tremendous boost in 2023 when Britain’s ‘Channel 4’ TV aired the documentary ‘Sri Lanka’s Easter bombings’ in its ‘Dispatches’ programme on Tuesday September 5, 2023. Tamil Makkal Viduthalaip Puligal (TMVP) leader Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pillaiyaan’s former secretary and ex-TMVP spokesperson Mohammed Milhilar Mohammed Hanzeer alias Azad Maulana was the whistleblower who made the controversial disclosures.

The documentary aired on ‘Dispatches’ by ‘Channel 4’ on September 5 titled Sri Lanka’s Easter bombings, was screened by the Universal Human Rights Council (UHRC) on the evening of Thursday, September 21, 2023 in Geneva. The venue was the Octagon Campus 2, Chemin du Pavillon 1218 Grand Saconne. 

Azad Maulana’s statementThere was a discussion after the screening. Prior to the discussion, copies of a detailed statement issued by Azad Maulana were distributed to those present. Azad Maulana who was not present physically answered questions via video link later. The statement issued by Azad Maulana was a clarification and amplification of the comments made by him in the documentary. The information he divulged in the film was placed in perspective by providing more details in the statement. Here are some relevant excerpts:

Relevant excerpts: 

On 21 April 2019 on Easter Sunday a terror attack killed 269 persons including 45 children, and 40 foreigners and injured more than 500 others. Only when the media revealed the identity of the suicide bombers after the attack did I realise that I had strong evidence about the masterminds and other perpetrators and also the motivation for this terror attack. I have in no way been involved in preparing or carrying out these terrible and devastating attacks.” 

Following the defeat of the Mahinda Rajapaksa Government in 2015, Pillaiyaan was arrested and imprisoned in the Batticaloa prison under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in connection with the murder of former Tamil National Alliance Member of Parliament Joseph Pararajasingham, who was shot dead on the Christmas Day of 2005 at the St. Mary’s Cathedral, Batticaloa.”

As a Secretary to Pillaiyaan, the court had granted me permission, along with his lawyers, to meet Pillaiyaan to discuss legal matters. During a visit in September 2017, Pillaiyaan told me that some Muslim prisoners from Kattankudy were with him in the same cell. A father, his son and six others had been remanded for extremist activities and attacks on another Muslim group in Kattankudy. They were from an organisation called National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ).” 

On Pillaiyaan’s request, I met Sainy Moulavi. Later, Pillaiyaan asked me to contact the Military Intelligence (MI) to arrange funds for these prisoners’ relatives to pay their bail. They were released on October 24, 2017. At the end of January 2018, Pillaiyaan told me to arrange a secret meeting between Suresh Sallay, who was then a Brigadier, and Sainy Moulavi’s group. Pillaiyaan said that Suresh Sallay would inform me about the meeting place and time.”

A few days later Suresh Sallay contacted me and asked me to request Sainy Moulavi to come to the Puttalam Vanaththavillu area. The next day I travelled with an MI officer from Colombo to Puttalam, Sainy Moulavi’s group came from Kurunegala. Pillaiyaan advised us not to use my own vehicle or driver for this meeting and said that the transport would be facilitated by the MI.” 

The meeting took place in early February 2018 at a large coconut farm of 50 to 60 acres, located outside of Puttalam. Suresh Sallay arrived in a grey colour Toyota car with a driver. Sainy Moulavi arrived 30 minutes later with a group of six persons in a white van. Sainy Moulavi introduced his elder brother Moulavi Zaharan as the leader of the group. The meeting lasted for more than two hours. I did not participate in the meeting but waited outside.” 

After the meeting, I travelled to Batticaloa and on the next day updated Pillaiyaan about the meeting. Pillaiyaan said that Suresh Sallay had a big plan and a deal with Zahran’s group like the one with TMVP. He told me to keep the information about this meeting secret and to assist if they asked for any help. Besides the meeting with Sainy Moulavi in prison in September 2017, I met Zahran and his group only one time in February 2018 during the meeting with Suresh Sallay. Apart from this, I had no connection or relationship with them. I was not aware of their terrorist intent or plan until after the terror attack.” 

On Easter Sunday, 21st April 2019, Suresh Sallay contacted me at around 7 a.m. and told me to go immediately to the Taj Samudra Hotel in Colombo, to pick up a person who was waiting there and take the person’s phone. I told him that I was currently in Batticaloa and not in Colombo.” 

About an hour after this conversation, simultaneous terrorist attacks took place across the country. Immediately after the attacks Pillaiyaan sent a message through a prison guard and asked me to meet him urgently. When I saw him in prison at about 11 a.m. on Easter Sunday he told me that the mastermind behind the Easter attack was Suresh Sallay and that he had assumed that an attack like this would happen.” 

He asked me to call Sainy Moulavi to find out, there was, however, no response. It was only because of media reports in the evening that I realised that the participants in the meeting that I had organised at the request of Pillaiyan were indeed suicide bombers involved in the Easter attack.”

Through the President’s Investigation Commission and the inquiries of the CID I also learned that the person whom Suresh Sallay had wanted me to meet was Jameel, the bomber who had been tasked to carry out a suicide attack at the Taj Samudra Hotel but then, in a last-minute change of plans, left the Taj and later exploded himself in a small hotel in Dehiwala.”

Political asylum

After fleeing from Sri Lanka via India  to Europe, Azad Maulana  applied for political asylum in Switzerland. Thereafter he went to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and made a detailed statement to a panel from the OHCHR Sri Lanka Accountability project. He took five days to testify. 

Apart from the OHCHR, Maulana has also made statements to several other human rights organisations and international NGOs. It could be seen therefore that Azad Maulana has the capacity and potential to provide much information regarding April 21, 2019 attacks. 

At the same time there is growing realisation that the allegations made by Azad Maulana would be worthless in practical terms in a court of law until and unless Azad Maulana himself backs it up by testifying himself in a Sri Lankan tribunal and being cross examined by lawyers. He could even do this from afar by electronic methods too. 

Maulana’s reluctance

The problem was Azad Maulana’s reluctance to cooperate with the Sri Lankan judicial system alone. He was willing to testify only before an independent international investigation. The statements made by Azad Maulana on ‘Channel 4’ and at a public meeting in Geneva indicated this state of mind.This is what Azad Maulana  said: As a witness to the planning of several terrorist attacks, political assassinations and kidnappings in Sri Lanka, I am willing to testify in investigations into these crimes. I do not believe, however, that the authorities in Sri Lanka have an interest in revealing the truth. I will therefore only bear witness before an international independent investigation.”

The key question therefore is whether Azad Maulana has  now changed his mind and is prepared to testify in open court. Has the advent of a new JVP-led NPP Government headed by President Dissanayake  resulted in Maulana cooperating with the investigation?  If so has this enabled Sri Lankan sleuths to gain more information about the Eastern bombings?

Pillaiyaan

Furthermore TMVP leader Pillaiyaan too has been detained under the PTA since April 2025. Media reports have stated that he is being interrogated about the April bombings. Has that interrogation yielded information leading to Suresh Sallay’s arrest? We do not know at this juncture and have to wait for the Police to reveal more details at the appropriate time as promised by senior DIG’s at the media conference.

However it must be emphasised that all allegations made by Azad Maulana are yet to be verified and authenticated. Moreover, they have been denied as falsehoods by those whom the allegations were levelled against especially Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay.

Conjecture and inference

The primary charge made against Sallay by Maulana hinges around an alleged meeting at Karadippooval in Puttalam between the intelligence chief and Zahran Hashim the National Thowheeth Jamaath (NTJ) leader and livewire behind the Easter bombings.Maulana’s allegation is essentially conjecture and inference based on that meeting.

However, it must be said in fairness to Suresh Sallay that he has denied being in Sri Lanka at the time of the  purported meeting. Has the Police received further information on this matter now? Will the  arrest,detention and interrogation of Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay lead to a breakthrough in the ongoing investigation into the April 2019 Bombings?

(D.B.S.Jeyaraj can be reached at dbsjeyaraj@yahoo.com) 

Courtesy Adaderana

Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa says the government must reveal the truth to the country regarding the alleged mastermind behind the substandard coal fraud.

He made these remarks today after meeting Ven. Wilanagama Chandrarathana Thero at the Sri Hewasingharama Temple in Aranayake, Kegalle, and addressing the media thereafter.

Premadasa stated that there are serious issues concerning the quality of coal currently being imported, as well as problems related to the quantity and delays in shipments. 

He alleged that these issues stem from an inefficient, irregular, and failed procurement process adopted in purchasing coal, claiming that a fraudulent scheme had operated to import substandard coal.

He further noted that although Sri Lanka requires 36 coal shipments annually, only 11 high-quality Russian shipments had been received, while the remaining 25 shipments were imported through a separate tender process. Of the 10 shipments brought in under that process, nine have reportedly been proven to be substandard, he claimed.

The Opposition Leader pointed out that emergency purchases are made when the required quantity and standard of coal are not received on time, adding that such emergency procurement methods could result in significant financial losses to the country, the public, and electricity consumers.

He also stated that as it takes around 40 days for a coal shipment to arrive in the country, the relevant tender has been implemented between April 20 and May 15. 

He alleged that the government has placed orders for five additional ships during this period due to the poor quality of previously imported coal.

Premadasa further claimed that the nine coal shipments imported by the government are incapable of generating 300 megawatts of electricity, stressing that a large-scale fraud has taken place as a result of the substandard coal imports, causing substantial losses to the country, the public, and the government.

He further added that the government must disclose who the masterminds behind the alleged coal fraud are, reveal the full truth, and clarify what action will be taken against those responsible.

Courtesy Adaderana

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) has obtained a 90-day detention order to question former state intelligence chief Major General (Retd) Suresh Sallay, the police said. 

Former Head of the State Intelligence Service (SIS) Major General (Retired) Suresh Sallay was arrested on Wednesday (25) morning by CID officers in connection with the investigations into the Easter Sunday terror attacks. 

Police said he was arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) based on evidence related to the 2019 Easter Attacks Bombings.

Coordinated suicide bombings carried out by a group of Islamic extremists led by Zahran Hashim on April 21, 2019, targeted eight locations including churches and hotels, killing at least 273 people.

Following the bombings, a number of investigations were launched including probes by a Parliamentary Select Committee and a Presidential Commission of Inquiry.

Based on the findings from those investigations, indictments were filed before a permanent three-judge bench of the Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar against 25 accused, including Naufar Moulavi, over alleged direct links to the terror group. The trial is currently being heard on a daily basis.

Amid continued allegations by various parties that there was a political hand behind the attacks, investigations were expedited following appointment of the new government.

Controversy also intensified after the British television network Channel 4 aired a documentary titled Sri Lanka’s Easter Bombings: Dispatches”, which alleged that a meeting involving Maj. Gen. Sallay and members of the Thowheed Jamath organization discussed creating instability in the country to facilitate the return to power of the Rajapaksas. The allegations were linked to claims made by Azad Maulana, a former media spokesman for Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pillayan, who is currently seeking political asylum in Switzerland.

The CID had also informed the Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court on several occasions about a confidential investigation being conducted into the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings.

Shenali D Waduge

On 21 April 2019, Sri Lanka was struck by coordinated suicide bombings targeting three churches and three luxury hotels, killing at least 270 people and injuring around 500. The attackers were linked to National Thowheed Jama’ath (NTJ), an extremist group previously under the radar of Sri Lankan security services. Intelligence warnings of an imminent attack — including specific threats to churches and the Indian High Commission — were reportedly issued in the weeks before the incident but were not acted upon effectively.

This systemic failure would become central to every major inquiry that followed — including the Parliamentary Select Committee Report (PSC, 2019) and the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI, 2021) — and eventually the De Alwis Committee Report (2024).

The De Alwis Committee & Its Mandate

https://srilankabrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/A-N-J-DE-ALWIS-report-.pdf

https://www.shenaliwaduge.com/easter-sunday-attacks-justice-de-alwis-report-sept-2024/ (Committee Findings & Recommendations)

In June 2024, then President Ranil Wickremesinghe appointed a three‑member inquiry committee chaired by retired High Court Judge A.N.J. de Alwis. Its brief was narrower than earlier inquiries:

To explore specific actions and measures taken by the State Intelligence Service (SIS), Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and other relevant authorities on prior information or intelligence relating to the impending attack on 21 April 2019; and to assess the adequacy of those actions”

(Direct from report text under Chapter 2: Mandates of Inquiry.)

The committee received documents including the Final Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (31 January 2021) for reference and began hearing evidence on 3 July 2024, concluding on 2 September 2024.

However, the government did not officially publish the De Alwis Report.

It was leaked publicly in October 2024 by former MP Udaya Gammanpila, who held a press briefing and released it because official channels withheld it.

Reported Quotes & Expanded Findings from the Leak

Because the government never officially published the full text, journalists and researchers have relied on the leaked copy and excerpts cited in media.

Intelligence Dissemination by the Director, SIS (Nilantha Jayawardena)

From report text:

• The Director, SIS received intelligence on 4 April 2019from his Indian counterpart regarding attacks by members of NTJ, including threats against churches and the Indian High Commission.”

• He disseminated the WhatsApp message and a written report to the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, SDIG‑CID, CNI and IGP.” (the names of those who held these positions are given below)

Abbreviation / Role	Person at the Time
Secretary, Ministry of Defence	P. B. Jayasundara – Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and former Treasury Secretary
SDIG – CID (Senior Deputy Inspector General, Criminal Investigation Department)	Ravi Seneviratne – Senior DIG overseeing CID
CNI (Chief of National Intelligence)	Sisira Mendis – Head of National Intelligence (coordinating intelligence from SIS, police, and military)
IGP (Inspector General of Police)	Pujith Jayasundara – Head of the Sri Lanka Police Service

The report notes that he even identified a dry‑run motorbike explosion on 16 April 2019 and shared this with senior police officials.

Committee Finding: (He = Nilantha Jayawardena Head of SIS) (former President = Maithripala Sirisena)

He had considered his role being fulfilled upon disseminating the information… However, he had not been able to inform the former President regarding the impending attack… He had not shared the information with the Tri‑forces … he failed to exercise caution by sharing the information which would have assisted a more cohesive investigation…”

Committee Recommendation (quoted):

The Committee recommends that the Director, SIS should be prosecuted under a suitable provision in the Penal Code by the relevant authority.”

The Chief of National Intelligence (CNI)

From the report:

The CNI was informed of intelligence but did not check his mobile on 20 April 2019, allegedly because it was kept in his car, and he accompanied his wife to church on 21 April — even though credible warnings existed”

Committee Conclusion:

The CNI … failed to take adequate measures and/or steps to disseminate the information as well as take steps to monitor and follow up on the intelligence.”

Committee Recommendation:

Criminal action should be instituted against him for negligence under suitable provisions in the Penal Code.”

The Secretary, Ministry of Defence

From report text:

Though he acknowledged seeing intelligence on 20 April 2019 and instructed the IGP to take action, he failed to convene the NSC or alert the President”

Committee Finding:

The lack of seriousness given to the information is attributable for not taking steps to inform the president regarding the developments… The Secretary had failed to take diligent action regarding the attacks and his conduct had not been adequate.”

Committee Recommendation:

The Committee recommends that the former Secretary, MoD should be prosecuted under suitable provisions in the Penal Code for negligence.”

The Inspector General of Police (IGP)

From report text:

The IGP had been aware of prior extremist incidents involving Zahran and associates. Official letters and WhatsApp warnings were received but he waited to assemble a special team rather than issuing a nationwide alert.”

Committee Finding (direct):

Although the former IGP mentioned there was a rift with the former President, this does not justify complete disregard of the intelligence… The lackadaisical approach ultimately resulted in missing reports until after the incident.”

Committee Recommendation:

The Committee recommends that the former IGP should be indicted under relevant provisions of the Penal Code.”

Other Police Officials

The report goes on to assess dozens of mid‑level police officers — from SDIGs to DIGs, SSPs, OICs and ASPs — and found that many received intelligence instructions but failed to ensure coordinated security measures or take proactive steps.

Examples of direct findings include:

• Multiple officers received instructions to tighten security, but no special measures were taken to strengthen security around churches.”
• In several cases, officers failed to follow upon written directives or simply went on leave despite imminent threat notifications.

Committee Recommendations for these ranks repeatedly included:

He should be prosecuted for negligence under suitable provisions of the Penal Code by the relevant authority.”

Finding on President Maithripala Sirisena

The report states explicitly:

The Committee observed that the aforesaid intelligence had not reached President Maithripala Sirisena. As such the Committee decided that it was beyond their mandate to consider culpability regarding his conduct… However, the Committee is mindful that his actions overall had contributed to the deterioration of security in the country…”

So although the report declined to assign direct legal responsibility due to its limited mandate, it recognized a structural failure in how the intelligence apparatus was positioned under executive command.

The Importance of the Leak

The Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) Report (2019) identified systemic intelligence failures, including that SIS did not effectively share external warnings. It noted:

Intelligence information received indicated that the Indian High Commission was targeted, yet proper dissemination was not made by the SIS.”

By contrast, the De Alwis leaked findings go further by assigning specific actions (or inaction), timelines, and responsible officials — something the PSC report did not do in named terms.

From Systemic Failure to Personal Accountability

The De Alwis report — through its own words — found repeatedly that:

• Actions and measures taken by senior officials were inadequate…”
  …failure to take diligent action…”
  …conduct had not been adequate…”
  …crimes of negligence should be prosecuted…”

These repeated findings represent a shift away from institutional critique to personal accountability.

Udaya Gammanpila’s Role and Concerns

Udaya Gammanpila publicly released the report and consistently argued:

• The public has the right to see official inquiries conducted in their name.
• If the government refuses to release these reports, he will.
• He promoted the finding that criminal cases should be filed against at least 17 officialsfor negligence — a claim derived from the report’s own recommendations.

Gammanpila’s actions turned the document from a confidential government briefing into a public discourse on accountability.

Why the Leak Matters Today

1. Complements the PSC Findings
   Where the PSC spoke in general systemic terms, the De Alwis leak names who— and how — they allegedly failed.

2. Highlights Withheld Accountability
   Despite these clear recommendations for prosecution, major prosecutions have not been launched— feeding ongoing public frustration.

3. Pushes Debate to Legal Accountability
   The report itself recommended criminal prosecution under the Penal Code — not just policy reform — bridging inquiry outcomes with real legal consequences.
4. Connects with Ongoing Terror Probes
   Recent high‑profile arrest (2026) of a former intelligence chief not holding position during the attacks signify that unresolved inquiry findings continue to shape law enforcement action.

What the De Alwis Leak Reported

Aspect	What the Report Says (Leaked Text)
Intelligence Warning	SIS informed SDIG Ravi Seneviratne on 9 April 2019… warning letter remained unopened.”
Repeated Alerts Ignored	Multiple alerts on extremist activity, including NTJ dry‑run evidence and church threats.
Inadequate Measures by SIS	He had not shared information with the Tri‑forces… actions were inadequate.”
Inadequate Action by CNI	Failed to disseminate and follow up on intelligence.”
Inadequate Actions by IGP	Lackadaisical approach… failed to prevent or mitigate the attacks.”
Recommendations	Criminal prosecution should be instituted under Penal Code provisions.”
No Official Publication	Government withheld report — leaked by Udaya Gammanpila.

The leaked De Alwis Committee Report is significant because it:

• Names specific individuals and datestied to intelligence failures;
• Quotes authoritative findingsof inadequate intelligence action;
• Directly recommends criminal prosecutionfor negligence;
• Casts new light on previously known inquiry gaps;
• Continues to shape legal, political, and public debates about accountability for one of Sri Lanka’s worst terror tragedies.

1️. State Intelligence Service (SIS)

• Mandate:Collect, analyze, and report intelligence on internal and external threats to national security.
• Authority:Advisory only — cannot arrest, detain, or execute operations.
• Output:Reports, alerts, and recommendations to enforcement authorities (e.g., IGP, CNI, Defence Secretary).

2. Chief of National Intelligence (CNI)

• Mandate:Coordinate all national intelligence agencies, consolidate intelligence, advise top government leadership.
• Authority:Coordination and recommendation — cannot implement operations.

3️. Inspector General of Police (IGP)

• Mandate:Head of all police forces; responsible for public safety, law enforcement, and operational decisions.
• Authority:Can order investigations, raids, arrests, and preventive actions.

4️. Senior DIG – CID

• Mandate:Lead Criminal Investigation Department; investigate crimes, coordinate with intelligence, execute preventive and legal measures.
• Authority:Directs CID officers; implements operational actions based on intelligence.

5️. Secretary, Ministry of Defence

• Mandate:Oversee national defence and coordinate security policy; ensure agencies implement government security directives.
• Authority:Administrative and strategic approval — can authorize police/military action but does not execute investigations personally.

6️. Military Units

• Mandate:National defence and emergency support.
• Authority:Only acts when formally deployed by Defence Ministry or requested by law enforcement.

Key Distinction:

• Collection & Reporting:SIS, CNI → cannot act operationally
• Action & Enforcement:IGP, SDIG/CID, Ministry of Defence, Military → responsible for preventive action

This makes it crystal clear: negligence in responding to warnings is on the enforcement chain, not the intelligence collectors.

Accountability must follow Authority

The De Alwis Committee Report, when read alongside the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) Report and the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI), leads to one unavoidable conclusion: the Easter Sunday tragedy was not the result of intelligence failure, but of institutional paralysis and executive breakdown in the enforcement chain.

The evidence clearly establishes that actionable intelligence was received, documented, and disseminated through formal channels. The failure occurred after dissemination, within the agencies vested with legal authority to act — namely the Ministry of Defence, the Chief of National Intelligence, and the Sri Lanka Police hierarchy.

The Committee’s own findings demonstrate that:

• The State Intelligence Service (SIS) fulfilled its statutory role by collecting and transmitting intelligence.
• The Chief of National Intelligence (CNI) failed to coordinate, monitor, and escalate urgent threat warnings.
• The Secretary to the Ministry of Defence failed to activate the National Security Council or issue emergency security directives.
• The Inspector General of Police and senior police command failed to execute preventive security measures despite repeated alerts.

These failures were not abstract administrative lapses.

They constituted criminal negligence, as explicitly identified by the Committee, warranting prosecution under relevant provisions of the Penal Code.

Yet, nearly years after the attacks, systemic accountability remains absent, while selective legal action risks distorting the true chain of responsibility.

The deliberate withholding of the De Alwis Committee Report, followed by its public leak, underscores a deeper institutional reluctance to confront where real authority — and therefore real liability — resided on the eve of the attacks.

Transparency was not denied due to national security concerns, but because the findings directly implicated senior decision-makers within the enforcement and executive command structure.

For justice to be meaningful, accountability must follow authority, not convenience.

Failure to uphold this principle:

• Weakens public trust,
• Undermines national security credibility,
• Distorts future counter-terrorism policy,
• And leaves the country vulnerable to repeat failures.

True justice for the victims of Easter Sunday does not lie in symbolic prosecutions or political scapegoating. It lies in faithfully implementing the findings of Sri Lanka’s own official inquiries, without fear, favour, or selective omission.

Until that occurs, the Easter Sunday tragedy will remain not only a story of terror, but of unresolved state failure.

Shenali D Waduge

Chandre Dharmawardana

If it was a bird’s foot, (as said by some writers – who are they?), why was it called “Sigiriya” and identified all along the centuries with a lion foot?

There is great readiness among some  recent writers to downplay their heritage in the name of “reconciliation”, and even claim Sigiriya to be a Chola monument built by the ruler “Kasi-Appan”?

 A well known Peradeniya historian ignored everything in Sigiri Griffiti (written in 8th century Sinhala, and some of it by pilgrims from Valikkamam of the North, but not a word of Tamil in Sigiri Griffiti). He  claimed that Sinhala was a language that started in the middle ages. The claims that the lion claws may be “Garunda” claws, or “Griffin Claws” as in Greek symbolism,  do not fit in with known iconography.

: The design of the paws aligns with other ancient Sinhalese lion sculptures, which often used stylized, powerful claws to symbolize royal authority.  

The Chulawamsa explicitly mentions the LionGate. It records that King Kashyapa (477–495 CE) built a gateway in the form of an enormous lion on a small plateau about halfway up the side of the rock.

The chronicle explains that the name of the site, Sīnhāgiri (Lion Rock), is directly derived from this monumental structure.

While only the massive brick and plaster paws remain today, the text implies a more complete figure; historians believe visitors originally entered the summit through the lion’s mouth.

Purpose of the Site: The Culavamsa describes Sigiriya as a royal capital and palace built by Kashyapa to serve as an impregnable stronghold after he seized the throne from his father.

It records that King Kashyapa (477–495 CE) chose the site specifically for its natural defenses. : The text describes the construction of moats and ramparts surrounding the rock to further secure it.

UNESCO World Heritage Designation: UNESCO officially recognizes the site as an “ancient rock fortress” and a “fortified city,” noting it as one of the best-preserved examples of ancient urban planning in Asia.

Military Features: Documentation by 19th-century British explorers and contemporary archaeologists highlights defensive elements such as elevated pathways, guarded gateways (the Lion Gate), and massive walls.

National Geographic and Academic Sources: These documents refer to it as a “sky fortress” or “royal stronghold,” emphasizing its role as a defensive seat of power during Kashyapa’s 18-year reign.

 It is further noted that after Kashyapa’s death, the site was abandoned as a capital and given to the Buddhist monk community, serving as a monastery until the 14th century. 

However, it seemed to have been a Mahayana forest hermitage before King Kasyapa’s redoing of the rock, and this was taken in isolation by Rajah de Silva to make his claim in trying to create a new hypothesis countering the views of HCP Bell and Senerath Paranavitana.

The Reality is, BOTH views are correct and they apply to a site that evolved with time. This has been emphasized by modern writers like Tudor de Silva and Senaka Bandaranayake. Originally, it was a Mahayana Hermitage. King Kashyapa took it over, and it became a pleasure palace of a king in a safe location  as stated by the Pali Chronicles;  this view is supported overwhelmingly by the archeological and epigraphic evidence.

Chandre Dharmawardana

On Thursday, February 26, 2026 at 12:01:00 a.m. EST, Yahoo <sriyanjanaka@yahoo.com> wrote:

There’s a controversy about the lion’s foot at the entrance. Some say it is a huge bird’s foot. 

In any case, it was never a fortress, contrary to what was previously claimed.

On Wednesday, 25 February 2026 at 09:26:36 pm GMT+5:30, Chandre dharma-wardana <chandre.dharma@yahoo.ca> wrote:

Raja de Silva claimed that Sigiriya was a mahayana Vihara and Not a place of a King. He claimed that the Sirigi Apsara were paintings of Mahayana Godess Tara, based on iocongraphic details and also based on the chemistry of the paint and what had been used in Ajantha. Rajah argued that the very plain “Asana” on the top were medidation seats.

However, modern excavations have found more sumptious

quaters even in the upper areas.

Paranavitana and others (HCP Bell) had argued that the hugh Lion-foot entrence (the lon symobol was a Royal emblem), the complex of pleasure gardens, pumped water systems and sumptious living areas at lower lowel did not indicated monstic living. Also, the Chulawamsa clearly states what it was used for.

The Raja de Silva view did not agree with what could be gleaned from the “sigiri Griffit” either.

The more modern view is that Sigiriya was BOTH a Mahayana temple AND a kings pleasure palce. In pre-Kasyapa times, sigirya was a Vihara. Kasyapa took it over and converted it to a pleasure palace.   

On Wednesday, February 25, 2026 at 08:28:26 a.m. EST, Yahoo <sriyanjanaka@yahoo.com> wrote:

ඔව් මේ කතාව මම අහල, කියවල තියෙනව.

එතුමාගේ නිගමනය නිවැරදියි.    

 එතුමන්ට නිවන් සැප ලැබේවා 

On Wednesday, 25 February 2026 at 05:32:06 pm GMT+5:30, Daya Ranasinghe <daya.ranasing7@gmail.com> wrote:

                                               සීගිරියේ රාජා ද සිල්වා

                                              අරුණ –  කතුවැකිය  25/02/2026

තමන් සිය මුළු කාලයම දේශපාලනයට කැපකිරීම නිසා කවදාවත් සීගිරිය නගින්නටවත් ඉස්පාසුවක් ලැබුණේ නැතැයි කලකට පෙර වතාවක් විමල් වීරවංශ ප්‍රසිද්ධියේ කිව්වේය. අපේ මිනිස්සුන්ට පුරුදු හඳ පෙන්වූ විට ඇඟිල්ල දිහා බැලීම නිසා මේ කතාවෙන් කථකයා රටේ හාස්‍යයට ලක්වූ බව අපට මතකය. එහෙත් සීගිරිය යනු අපේ රටේ ඕනෑම කෙනෙක් ජීවිතයේ එක වතාවක්වත් යායුතු තැනකැයි යන්නද ඔහුගේ කතාවෙන් කියවුණු බව රටට ග්‍රහණය වූ⁣යේ නැත.

එබඳු තැනක් වූ සීගිරිය ගැන කතා කරන විට කතා නොකරම බැරි සීගිරි බිතුසිතුවම්, මතු පරම්පරාවන්ටද දැකගත හැකිවන ලෙස රැකදීමට ඉමහත් දායකත්වයක් දැක්වූ දැවැන්තයෙක් පෙබරවාරි 22 වැනිදා මිය ගියේය. ඒ මියෙන විට අවුරුදු එකසිය එකක් පිරී සිටි කුරුකුලසූරිය පටබැඳිගේ ශ්‍රී රාජේන්ද්‍ර හේමපාල නොහොත් ආචාර්ය රාජා ද සිල්වාය. ලංකා විශ්වවිද්‍යාලයෙන් හා ලන්ඩන් විශ්වවිද්‍යාලයෙන් රසායන විද්‍යාව පිළිබඳ B.Sc උපාධිධරයකු හා ඔක්ස්ෆර්ඩ් විශ්වවිද්‍යාලයේ D.Phil උපාධිධරයකු වූ රාජා ද සිල්වා සහකාර කොමසාරිස්වරයෙකු හැටියට පුරාවිද්‍යා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවට බැඳුණේ 1949 දීය. 1967 සිට වසර එකොළහක් පුරාවිද්‍යා කොමසාරිස්ව සිටි ඔහු ඒ තනතුරට පත්වීමට ටික දිනකට කලින් අපේ රටේ මහා විනාශයක් සිදු වූ⁣යේය. ඒ 1967 ඔක්තෝබර් 14 වැනිදා රාත්‍රියේ කවුරුන් හෝ විසින් සීගිරි බිතුසිතුවම්වල කොළ පාට තීන්ත වර්ගයක් උළා තිබීමයි. ඒ පිළිබඳ අවශ්‍ය කටයුතු කිරීමට පැවරුණේ අපේ කථානායකයාටය.

ඒ සඳහා අපේ රටට එවකට නොතිබුණු තාක්ෂණික දැනුමක් අවශ්‍ය බව ඔහු විසින් වාර්තා කිරීමෙන් අනතුරුව යුනෙස්කෝ සංවිධානයේ හා ස්මිත්සෝන් ආයතනයේ අනුග්‍රහයෙන් ඉතාලි ජාතික විද්‍යාඥයෙකු වූ ආචාර්ය ලුසියානෝ මරන්සි මෙහි පැමි⁣ණියේය. මුල් චිත්‍රවලට හානි නොවන පරිද්දෙන් උළා තිබූ තීන්ත ඉවත් කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය තාක්ෂණික උපදෙස් ලබාදුන් ඔහු සති කිහිපයකින් පෙරළා සිය රට ගියේය. ඉන් ඔබ්බට බිතුසිතුවම් ප්‍රතිසංස්කරණය කිරීමේ කාර්යභාරය අපේ මිනිහාට පැවරුණු අතර චිත්‍ර දෙකක් හැර ඉතිරි සියල්ල යථා තත්ත්වයට ගෙන ඒමට ඔහු ඇතුළු පිරිසට හැකි විය. ඉන් අවුරුදු හැටකට පසු සීගිරි නැග බිතු සිතුවම් නරඹන පිරිස් නොදන්නේ වුවද ඔවුන්⁣ට අද ඒ මහඟු අවස්ථාව ලැබී ඇත්තේ ලුසියානෝ මරන්සි හා රාජා ද සිල්වා ඇතුළු ප්‍රතිසංස්කරණ කණ්ඩායමේ උත්සාහයෙනි.

සීගිරිය හා රාජා ද සිල්වාගේ සම්බන්ධය එතැනින් කෙළවර වන්නේ නැත. සීගිරිය යනු පළමුවැනි කාශ්‍යපගේ රාජධානිය බවත්, සීගිරි බිතුසිතුවම්වල සිටින්නේ ඔහුගේ බිසෝවරුන් බවත් යන මහාවංශකරුවාගේ මතය ඔහු ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කළේය. අපේ රටේ සිටි අනෙකුත් පුරාවිද්‍යා කොමසාරිස්වරුන් මහාවංශ මතයට විරුද්ධව නොගියද රාජා ද සිල්වා සහකාර කොමසාරිස්වරයෙකුව සිටියදීද සිය ප්‍රධානීන්ගේ අදහසට එකඟ නොවූයේය. ඔහු පෙන්වා දුන්නේ සීගිරිය යනු කාශ්‍යප රජුගේ අනුග්‍රහය ලැබූ මහායාන ආශ්‍රමයක් බවය. සීගිරි බිතුසිතුවම්වල සිටින්නේ කාශ්‍යපගේ බිසෝවරුන් නොව මහායානිකයන්ගේ දේවතාවියක හැටියට සැලකෙන තාරා දේවී බව ඔහුගේ අදහස විය. තාරා දේවියගේ එක වැනි රූප ගණනාවක් දකින්නට සැලැස්වීමෙන් දකින්නන්ට ශ්‍රද්ධාව ඇති කිරීම මේ බිතුසිතුවම්වල අරමුණ බව ඔහු පෙන්වා දුන්නේය. කාශ්‍යප රාජ්‍ය සමයෙන් ශතවර්ෂ හතකට පසු රචනා කෙරුණු මහාවංසය මහාවිහාරවාසී ථෙරවාද භික්ෂුවක විසින් ලියන ලද්දක් බැවින් එහි කරුණු විකෘති වී ලියවී ඇති බව ඔහුගේ අදහස විය. අදටත් රටේ ප්‍රචලිතව පවතින්නේ මහාවංස කර්තෘවරයාගේ මතය වුවද කරුණු කාරණා සහිතව රාජා ද සිල්වා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද අදහස කිසිවෙකු විසින් මේ වන තෙක් නිෂ්ප්‍රභ කෙරීද නැත.

සීගිරිය හා පුරාවිද්‍යාව පිළිබඳ රාජා ද සිල්වාගේ සම්බන්ධය ගැන ලියන්නට බොහෝදේ ඇතත්⁣ මෙතැන ඊට නොතැනය. එහෙත් මිථ්‍යාවට විරුද්ධව ඔහු එකලාව නැගී සිටි අවස්ථාවක් ගැන නම් සඳහන් නොකරම බැරිය. ඒ රාජ්‍ය අනුග්‍රහය ඇතිව දුටුගැමුණු රජුගේ භෂ්මාවශේෂ ප්‍රදර්ශනයක් රට පුරා ගෙන යන්නට කෙරුණු සූදානමක් ඔහු වළක්වාලීමය. ඒ අඟුරු ගොඩක් මිස අනෙකක් නොවේ යැයි රාජා ද සිල්වා තරයේ කියා සිටි හෙයින් ප්‍රදර්ශනය නතර කර ඒ පරීක්ෂණය සඳහා ප්‍රංශයට යවන ලදී. එහෙත් එහි ප්‍රතිඵලය කවදාවත් ප්‍රසිද්ධ කෙරුණේ නැත.

සීගිරිය සමග ඔහුගේ තිබුණු බැඳීම කොතෙක්දැයි කියතොත් ඔහු නිවාඩු කාලය ගෙවීම සඳහා සීගිරිය පෙනෙන මානයේ කුඩා නිවෙසක්ද තනාගෙන තිබුණේය. ඔහුට අවුරුදු සියයක් පිරුණු අවස්ථාවේ ඔහුගේ ඥාතිවරියක වන මහාචාර්ය සාවිත්‍රි කුමාර් ද සිල්වා මෙසේ ලියා තිබුණාය. “කාශ්‍යපගේ පියා වූ ධාතුසේන කලාවැව පෙන්වා මේ මාගේ ධනයයි කීවා සේ, රාජා ද සිල්වාටද ඔහුගේ ධනය වූ⁣යේ සීගිරියයි”          =======================   

History Undug

Long before modern hospitals and surgical science, ancient Sri Lanka developed one of the world’s most advanced medical systems. This documentary explores the Mihintale Hospital Complex, believed to be the oldest known hospital in the world, revealing how advanced healthcare, surgery, pharmacology, and public medicine existed over 1,000 years ago. We also uncover the remarkable story of King Buddhadasa, the legendary physician-king who personally performed complex surgeries, treated animals, wrote advanced medical texts, and created a nationwide healthcare system built on compassion and scientific understanding. Through archaeology, ancient texts, and historical evidence, this film reveals a forgotten medical civilization that challenges everything we think we know about ancient science.

BY J.A.A.S. Ranasinghe

26 Feb 2026 |

The shipbuilding sector is vital to the global economy, influencing international trade, transportation, and defense. As global trade and the need for energy-efficient vessels rise, these nations are set to expand their influence. Their success hinges on advanced technology, skilled labour, and a dedication to innovation, keeping them competitive in a fast-paced market.

The US shipbuilding industry requires about 200,000 to 250,000 additional maritime workers in critical occupations, such as welding, fabricating, soldering, and front-line management, to satisfy the demand over the next decade. If the demand for ships increases, the labour gap will be even wider.  

Nations excelling in these areas capture a larger share of the global market. For instance, China has become a dominant force, using Government subsidies and strategic initiatives to increase its capacity. This has lowered production costs and enhanced its global competitiveness. South Korea and Japan have focused on advanced technologies and high-value vessels like liquefied natural gas carriers and cruise ships. Their expertise and reputation for quality have kept them strong in the global market. Japan’s success hinges on the efficiency, quality and specialised vessels.

US Naval and commercial shipbuilding expertise

The US boasts a long-standing tradition in naval and commercial shipbuilding. American shipyards are pivotal in bolstering the nation’s maritime defense and economic vitality. They excel in crafting a diverse range of vessels, from cutting-edge aircraft carriers and submarines to massive commercial ships like tankers and container vessels. Shipbuilding in the US supports around 110,000 jobs nationwide and adds Dollars ($) 37.3 billion to the gross domestic product (GDP) annually. The country boasts 154 private shipyards actively engaged in construction, spread across 29 States and the US Virgin Islands. Moreover, over 300 shipyards focus on repairs, capable of constructing ships, even if not currently doing so.

The US is known for its excellence in naval and commercial shipbuilding. American shipyards are equipped with advanced technology and skilled workforces. They focus on complex projects, such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and large commercial ships like tankers and container vessels. Yet, its dominance over the years has seen a gradual decline, mainly due to the paucity of skilled labour due to massive retirement.

Building the future workforce for US shipbuilding

A veteran chief executive officer of the shipbuilding and repair industry and a former Managing Director of the Colombo Dockyard, Dr. Sarath Obeysekera says  the US is confronted with a huge shortage of skilled labour such as welders, fabricators, pipe fitters, electricians, naval architects, outfitters, and planners. The resultant situation is clear in that the US which enjoyed a five per cent share in global shipbuilding has now plummeted to barely 0.25%.

This scenario creates an uncomfortable truth: the US cannot rebuild the globally competitive shipbuilding industry relying solely on its domestic labour pool in that demographics, skills mismatches and lifestyle expectations make that mathematically improbable. 

Key opportunities for SL

Undoubtedly, the recession of the US shipbuilding industries has opened a myriad of opportunities for Sri Lanka to develop its shipbuilding industry, vocational training (VT) institutes and universities, job opportunities for skilled labour, the generation of foreign exchange, the building of collaboration with the universities and the VT centres, the training of skilled manpower, the revision of training modules, new institutional arrangements, etc. 

The question is whether the proposed remedies — reassessing vocational, maritime and nautical education, creating new maritime academies, and modest private-sector incentives — are anywhere near sufficient.

Strategic export of skilled labour 

The crisis in the US shipbuilding industry has created an extraordinary, time-sensitive demand for skilled maritime and industrial labour. Sri Lanka is uniquely positioned to respond due to its long maritime tradition, English proficiency, and existing vocational infrastructure. However, without State-led coordination, this opportunity will be lost to competing labour-supplying nations. The export of ship engineers, marine engineers, skilled welders, fabricators, ship fitters, marine engineers, and naval architects must be treated as a strategic foreign exchange industry, not an ad-hoc migration exercise. Government-to-Government agreements, led by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, with defined skill categories, certification standards, numbers, and timelines is a key priority area in this direction.

Foreign Affairs Ministry as an economic enabler

The Ministry must move beyond traditional diplomacy and assume the role of an economic and labour-market negotiator. By entering into bilateral memorandums of understanding (MOUs) directly with major US shipyards and the relevant US authorities, Sri Lanka can secure predictable overseas employment pipelines, protect worker rights and wage standards, and align domestic training systems with the international demand. Establishing a high-level private-sector–led advisory board to guide negotiations, skill forecasting, and international benchmarking is again a key priority area.

New institutional arrangement for the VT sector

The Tertiary and Vocational Education Commission (TVEC) currently operates as a regulatory body focused on compliance rather than national manpower planning. This is a fundamental misalignment. With nearly half of Sri Lanka’s youth excluded from university education, the TEVC should function as the country’s primary engine for skills-based social mobility.  Hence, a radical shift from institution accreditation to labour-market-driven training and from passive regulation to proactive workforce development is thoroughly advocated.

 Urgent overhaul of the VT architecture

Sri Lanka’s VT system is structurally incapable of responding quickly to global labour shocks. Fragmented authority, limited Ministerial empowerment, and bureaucratic inertia have rendered the system reactive rather than strategic and pragmatic. The VT function must be elevated in status and authority, with clear accountability for outcomes such as the numbers trained, the employability rates, and the foreign exchange generated.  

Currently, the VT aspect comes under a Deputy Minister and he should be given more powers to build up a strong VT sector. The present institutional arrangement is woefully not efficient and dynamic. 

The mere proposal for the establishment of an advisory board exclusively for the welding vocational sector has been relegated to the backseat for the last few months despite repeated requests being made and the publication of numerous paper articles. This is a case in point. Whilst the Industry Ministry has established 26 sectorial advisory councils, the Vocational Education Ministry’s reticence raises many eyebrows. A question to be raised is whether the VT sector has declined and deteriorated or whether it has been allowed to collapse.

The TVEC that comes under the purview of the Vocational Education Ministry has been in a complacent mood despite the enormity of issues coming with the vocational industry sector. Recently, the Chamber of the Construction Industry sought the intervention of the Government to import masons, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, etc. The construction industry is severely handicapped in the context of the cyclonic damages. Another disturbing factor is the local manufacturing sector today is surviving because of the immigrant Indian welders. According to a survey, only 5% of the students who followed welding courses at VT centres get qualified when their competency standards are screened by the foreign job companies. 

VT centres have failed to enroll children of Samurdhi recipient families for their vocational programs despite the fact he Samurdhi Department releases a grant of Rs. 50,000 (in selected programs up to Rs. 100,000) for each student.  These specific instances are only the tip of the iceberg and they speak volumes of the pathetic situation of the vocational sector. 

Sri Lanka’s dependence on foreign welders and skilled construction workers is a policy failure, not a labour-market inevitability. The current situation — where industries survive on imported skills while local youth remain unemployed — represents a structural contradiction that erodes national resilience. There has to be a strategic objective to achieve self-sufficiency in critical trades while exporting surplus high-value skill.

Integrating the SLBFE and TVEC 

The Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) and the TVEC have a cardinal duty to generate foreign exchange by providing skilled labour to foreign countries. The SLBFE and the TVEC operate with overlapping mandates but without strategic direction and coordination. This institutional fragmentation results in poor utilisation, weak and missed opportunities. This integration is essential if Sri Lanka is to respond credibly to the US shipbuilding crises.

Universities as future shipbuilding talent incubators

Across the US, maritime organisations and educational institutions have long provided future nautical workers, including engineers, naval architects, and shipyard managers required to plan, supervise, and perform complex shipbuilding work. In light of the US dilemma, the time has come for the Sri Lankan universities and VT institutions to design and formulate appropriate courses for the benefit of the students and the country.

Sri Lankan universities – particularly technology faculties are underutilised in national workforce planning. By embedding shipbuilding, marine systems, welding technology and production engineering modules in to the degree and diploma programs, universities and vocational institutions can directly support the global labour demand while upgrading the country’s human capital  

Conclusion

The US shipbuilding dilemma is not merely an external crisis – it is a stress test of Sri Lanka’s institutional readiness. Without decisive reforms in governance, VT and foreign labour diplomacy, this opportunity will pass, leaving structural weaknesses intact. With political will, inter-agency coordination and private sector engagement, Sri Lanka can convert this moment into sustained foreign exchange inflows, youth employment at scale and long-term industrial upgrading.

The writer is a productivity and management consultant

——–

The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication

Dilrook Kannangara

Sri Lanka concludes another cricket tournament that won’t be missed. As usual fans are angry and want wholesale changes from players to coaches, selectors to the administration. However, none of that can fix Sri Lanka cricket because the problem is far deeper than that. Things have changed from the era of 1970s to 1990s.

Blaming the conduct of players and others is misplaced. Best players in the world are not ranked by their conduct outside the field. Commercialization though is partly to be blamed, has affected all countries and Sri Lanka is not alone.

When cricket was riding high in the 1980s and 1990s there were a number of additional challenges including political considerations, absurd considerations in cricket clubs when choosing players, ethnic tensions and war that shut out a large section of the potential talent pool. Technology was far behind than now. After the South Africa tour in 1982 Sri Lanka lost the largest number of players in its history in a moment. But there was sufficient available talent to overcome those obstacles.

Economic Reasons

In the 1970s to 1990s economically capable families encouraged their sport-savvy children to play cricket. Not anymore. Since the 1990s they encourage their children to take up rugby, swimming and other sports. This has collapsed the depth of talent Sri Lanka has in the cricketing space. Unlike in the past, a significant percentage of students today study at international schools. Cricket is not the most popular extra-curricular activity or the fancy sport there. In fact, cricket takes a back seat. Private local schools and top government schools in cities have also changed. Rugby and other sports have taken over the limelight from cricket.

Club and mercantile matches do not attract the crowds they used to attract. As a result, sponsorships and patronage by businesses have dropped. In contrast, other sports get far more enthusiasm especially from well-to-do crowds.

Another reason is the economic collapse of Sri Lanka relative to other countries since 2010 which has driven students generally away from sport and seriously affected nutrition. Since 2012 Sri Lanka is ranked the second worst nation in malnutrition rate among under-fives in Asia. This is taking a toll on productivity, strength and development. Weakened sports persons cannot compete against well-nourished competitors. India has come a long way in improving overall nutrition of its population thanks to rapid development.

A comparison of total weight of the Sri Lankan team and teams from other countries, and, even between Sri Lankan team of the golden era and today will be telling evidence of the impact of nutrition in this cohort of sportsmen.

Social Reasons

An increasing number of people are aware of skin damage and the potential for skin cancer due to long exposure to sunlight. It has a social element in a society where fairer skin colour is preferred, and also a health element. Indoor facilities are inadequate and climatic conditions don’t help either.

Coupled with economic and social preferences that tend to impact youngsters more than others, the attractiveness of cricket and cricketers has drastically reduced over the years. The number of capable players who could be pooled to draw out from has reduced. SLC has to make do with available talent from a smaller cricketing talent pool. Meanwhile the economic and social attractiveness of rugby, swimming, squash, soccer, etc. has grown.

Conclusion

Considering broader structural changes in the society and the economy, cricket fans should lower their expectations. Exceptions are possible but infrequent. There comes a time when everything falls into place. But these are exceptions. Those good times cannot be sustained. The best of times of Sri Lanka cricket seems to be behind us. It is nobody’s fault. It’s what the society in general wants. The society can change its preferences and that will change the fortunes of the game, but it takes time.

Richard D. Wolff Courtesy Counterpunch.org

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The SCOTUS rejection of Trump’s tariffs changes little. The empire’s decline persists, and with it, its extension to the US economy as a whole. And it will continue whether or not Trump finds another law to use to justify tariffs (at higher, lower, or the same levels as now) and whether or not SCOTUS invalidates it. The tariffs of 2025 exposed the basic decline situation, including some of the costs of having denied and kicked that problem down the road so many times. The SCOTUS decision merely quibbles about the tariffs’ legal justification. Nor is that surprising given the GOP’s domination of SCOTUS. The class that has long dominated the GOP – employers – has always hated and opposed taxes. And tariffs are taxes that fall chiefly on US employers who buy imported inputs and may or may not be able to pass them on to retail consumers.

A deep ignorance is attached to Trump’s imposing a tariff regime in which he irregularly raised, lowered, suspended, and re-imposed tariffs. Such a regime imposed uncertainty by wrapping it around each tariff. That made it irrational for any CEO to take the steps the tariffs were intended to induce. Why spend millions, lose time, and risk a relocation to adjust to a tariff that might be higher or lower or disappear before, during, or shortly after your move? It was much safer for the CEO’s company and for the CEO’s personal career to stay put. Wait and see and conserve resources became corporate watchwords. Manufacturing jobs in the US across the first year of Trump’s second presidency thus fell by over 70,000.

If Trump finds another law to use to justify his tariffs, old or new, it will surely be tested, and the eventual SCOTUS decision may well be the same. Enhanced uncertainty dogs whatever tariffs Trump attempts. If instead he demands congressional action, traditional GOP hostility to taxes there makes it quite likely to suffer the same defeat that SCOTUS just rendered. As uncertainty now hovers over Trump’s use of executive orders, it becomes clear that Trump’s tariff regime took him deep into a dead end.

He could, of course, simply ignore domestic laws, the Congress that writes them, and the courts that are supposed to enforce them. He did that originally by imposing the tariffs via executive order before the SCOTUS decision, and he can continue to do so afterward. Is that not likewise the approach presented by the US government’s summary execution of over 135 persons in boats in international waters (Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean)? The president’s labeling of them as narco-terrorists” and combatants” in a drug war” is an even thinner rationale than what was offered to support tariffs in 2025. Disregarding existing international and domestic laws has become a source of pride. Trump, Vance, and Rubio have rechristened that disregard as the long-overdue emergence of an America First commitment, from subordination to an old rules-based order.” During that order, we are asked to believe that trading partners, allies and friends” exploited and humiliated the US. Trump, Vance, and Rubio will now stop all that. Perhaps they borrowed the concept of a period of sustained humiliation used by Xi Jinping for China before 1949, a far more apt usage of the term.

Ignoring laws, too, in the context of a declining empire and economy, only exacerbates uncertainties. They will produce policy failures and reversals in 2026 similar to those the Trump regime suffered in 2025. Already well underway, the decline sweeps away the few obstacles still in its path. Its economic, political, and cultural power already reduced, a desperate US turns on its erstwhile allies, semi-colonies, and remaining trading partners seeking tribute to offset its decline. Only its global military power seems still formidable. Yet there too, the Russian-Chinese alliance and its BRICS allies are catching up quickly.

The last piece of the puzzle, entitled How will all this end?” concerns domestic conditions in the US. The decline appears to stem from deepening social divisions. Earlier, when less developed, divisions were papered over by the relatively untroubled oscillation between traditional Democrats and Republicans. Now they have become extremely aggravated, producing Trump and his MAGA base. Both of them, in turn, provoke ever more divisions. They battle Republicans decried as RINOs, but also Democratic centrists, Democratic progressives, and those they denounce synonymously as socialists, Marxists, terrorists, radical leftists, anarchists, communists, and so on. Meanwhile, the rest of the world reacts to the trade and tariff wars by retaliating against specific groups inside the US (farmers, energy producers, alcohol exporters, winter wheat importers, and so on). Those groups turn against specific tariffs. From there, it is a short step to questioning the entire global strategy, etc. Trump’s domestic support erodes.

Lastly, there are the self-inflicted wounds of mass disaffection. The ICEcapades in Minneapolis strengthened animosity toward Trump’s government around the immigration issue and how to deal with it. Trump’s transparent efforts to keep the public from knowing the full extent of his (and his friends’ and colleagues’) involvement with Jeffrey Epstein’s horrors are crumpling support.  Least recognized but perhaps most important is the growing awareness among all employees – but especially at all government levels – that Trump’s policies threaten jobs. Their unions are striking, and the total US unionized labor force grew by 500,000 in 2025. When several unions joined the people of Minneapolis in organizing effective, mass opposition to ICE, a coalition undertook a renewal that can change US politics.

An old debate stresses that both objective” and subjective” conditions must be ripe for revolution to be possible. Empire decline, now abetted by self-isolating economic, political, and cultural policies, is maturing the objective conditions. Subjectively, denial of the decline as official policy in both major parties combines with the demonization of scapegoats (first immigrants, then the expanding numbers of Americans who oppose scapegoating them). What results are fast-deepening social divisions across the US? Ever more of the population senses deepening social problems. Ever more of that population sees mounting failure of dominant political parties and institutions to solve those problems. The need for basic social change becomes urgent.

Richard Wolff is the author of Capitalism Hits the Fan and Capitalism’s Crisis Deepens. He is founder of Democracy at Work.

The Mahavamsa

https://share.google/aimode/59EP5UjiM89yn9tDn

(“Great Chronicle”) is one of the world’s most significant and longest unbroken historical records, chronicling over 2,500 years of Sri Lankan history. Written as an epic poem in the Pali language, it is recognized for initiating a mature historiographic tradition in South Asia.

Key Significance and Legacy

• Global Recognition: In 2023, the Mahavamsa was officially inscribed on the UNESCO Memory of the World International Register, cementing its status as a piece of globally important documentary heritage.
• Historical Accuracy: While it contains legendary and religious elements, its descriptions of ancient cities, kings, and engineering marvels like Ruwanwelisaya have been repeatedly verified by archaeological excavations in both Sri Lanka and India.
• South Asian Linkages: The text is an indispensable source for dating the Indian Emperor Ashoka and the rise of Buddhism as a world religion, providing crucial historical synchronicity with the era of Alexander the Great.
• Living Document: Originally composed by the monk Mahanama in the 5th or 6th century CE, the chronicle was extended by successive authors in works known as the Culavamsa, continuing the record up until the British takeover in 1815.
• Literary Achievement: It is considered the most important epic poem in Pali. Its elegant verse was designed for memorization, allowing the history to survive even if physical manuscripts were lost. 
• Structure of the Chronicle
• Mahavamsa (Part I): Covers the period from 543 BCE (the arrival of Prince Vijaya) to 361 CE (the reign of King Mahasena).
• Culavamsa (Lesser Chronicle): Continues the record from the 4th century CE through the medieval period and ends with the British occupation in 1815.
• Modern Extensions: Some scholars and monks have added later chapters to bring the record into the 20th century. 

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir

Trump’s rhetoric and policies on immigration and citizenship consistently elevate white, especially European, migrants while targeting non-white communities for exclusion, removal, or diminished political power. His efforts collectively push a racial hierarchy embedded in state policy. Framed as security,” merit,” or rule of law,” these measures function to narrow the American electorate and safeguard long-term white Republican dominance. A historical and civil rights-informed assessment of Trump’s record characterizes his immigration agenda—Muslim bans, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) terminations, birthright citizenship attacks, and selective refugee admissions—as advancing a racialized vision of US society.

His slogan, Make America Great Again,” coined to portray himself as the great savior of America, is being used to promote a white supremacist agenda, reflecting the views and desires of the majority of white conservative Republicans. As a deceitful, vindictive, narcissistic, divisive, self-aggrandizing, unpredictable, racist and authoritarian, he is the perfect conduit to implement it. Indeed, white supremacists cannot achieve their ultimate goal with a president who fully adheres to the rule of law and his oath of office to defend and protect the Constitution.

Trump fits the bill. As early as 1973, the Justice Department sued Trump Management for systematically denying apartments to Black and Puerto Rican renters; FBI files document instructions to mislead Black applicants on availability and price, reinforcing racial exclusion in housing.

Trump needs MAGA to realize his authoritarian ambitions, and MAGA needs him to prevent what it perceives as fateful developments that America is poised to face in less than two decades, which explains why MAGA sticks to Trump.

Rooted in MAGA’s concerns is the fear that, in less than 20 years, white Americans will become a minority, and it would be nearly impossible for the Republicans to win either the electoral college or the popular vote to win a presidential election. Census-based projections show that non-Hispanic whites are expected to fall below 50 percent of the US population around the mid 2040s, with minorities driving virtually all population growth. These projections, widely circulated in conservative media and politics, have fueled anxieties about losing white, and implicitly Republican, political dominance.

To prevent the prospect of non-whites becoming a majority, Trump and his MAGA operatives are scheming and taking concrete action, while he is still in power, to advance their cause. The notion that such a campaign may not succeed, and that it runs counter to every provision of the US Constitution, is of no concern to them. Trump is charging full speed ahead, believing, as is customary for him, that, regardless of all odds, he will succeed and that this will be his legacy.

The following demonstrates how systematic and barefaced he is in implementing his agenda.

                In an Oval Office immigration meeting, Trump asked why the US should take people from shithole countries” like Haiti and African nations and said the US should instead bring in more immigrants from Norway, demonstrating his desire to stop the flow of non-white immigrants and deport existing ones. He further demanded that Haitians be excluded from any immigration deal, directly targeting a predominantly Black population for exclusion.     Once he assumed office, Trump issued an executive order to end birthright citizenship, especially for US-born children of undocumented immigrants (overwhelmingly Black and Latino), completely violating the 14th Amendment.                 Trump signed Executive Order 13769 during his first term, banning entry for nationals of seven predominantly Muslim countries and halting Syrian refugee resettlement, codifying religion- and race-based discrimination.          The first Trump administration moved to terminate TPS for immigrants from Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Nepal, and Honduras, disproportionately affecting long-settled, non-white communities from Latin America and Africa. This list expanded in his second term, predominantly affecting further Latin American and African immigrants.                Trump publicly expressed special concern for white farmers in South Africa, directing the State Department to study land and farm seizures and large-scale killing of farmers,” aligning himself with a white genocide narrative to justify white refugee admissions. He allowed nearly 60 white Afrikaner farmers to resettle in the US as refugees, favoring a specifically white population. Trump told four US congresswomen of color to go back” to the crime-infested” countries they came from (three of whom were born in the US), weaponizing a classic racist taunt against elected women challenging his MAGA agenda. Regardless of how many immigrants Trump deports and how far he will go to manipulate elections, he will still be unable to change the ultimate outcome that, in 20 years, non-white Americans will be the majority. Hispanic and Black Americans’ fertility and birth rates are higher than those of non-Hispanic whites, whose fertility is below replacement.  Deportations or voter manipulation cannot reverse aging white cohorts, lower white fertility, and ongoing diversity among US-born youth.

The real awakening of the hard-core white supremacists came when Obama was elected president in 2008. Trump was quick to capitalize on Obama’s rise to power, prompting him to a significant degree to run for president in 2015. His campaign slogan, Make America Great Again,” meant exactly that: America cannot be a great country if it is to be governed by a non-white American. Thus, for MAGA’s hard-core white supremacists, it is a do-or-die battle. They will go to any length and take any measure, however sinister, unconventional, or even illegal, to prevent non-white Americans from rising to power.

So long as Trump is in power, it can be expected that this ‘battle’ for the survival of white rule in America will become ever nastier and even more violent. The Democrats cannot reverse MAGA’s course alone. They must be joined by many patriotic Republicans who see the writing on the wall.  Many will put country before party, knowing that in trying to prevent the inevitable, they would plunge America into a social turmoil unseen since the Civil War.

Time is of the essence. If there is a moment in time when patriots—Democrats and Republicans—must unite to safeguard America’s democracy and ensure the enduring strength of the republic, that moment is now.

____________

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.alon@alonben-meir.com

Courtesy Hiru News

Former Member of Parliament Sarath Weerasekara stated that the arrest of retired Major General Suresh Sallay, former head of the State Intelligence Service, is a calculated move to mislead the public.

Speaking at a press conference in Colombo, he claimed the arrest serves as a deceptive measure intended to appease the Cardinal, the Catholic Church, and the victims of the Easter Sunday attacks while diverting public attention.

He further noted that even the Police Media Unit appeared to lack clarity regarding the specific grounds for the retired officer’s arrest.

The former MP addressed allegations made by Azad Maulana, the former media secretary to Pillayan, in a Channel 4 documentary.

Maulana claimed Sallay met with ringleader Zahran Hashim in 2018 to discuss creating instability to favor Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidential bid.

Weerasekara dismissed these as false statements from a channel he described as consistently anti-military, suggesting this narrative likely prompted the arrest.

He highlighted that Sallay served at the Sri Lanka High Commission in Malaysia from December 2016 to December 2018 and attended the National Defence College in India throughout 2019.

He argued that Sallay was not in the country during the periods the alleged meetings occurred and questioned how such a meeting could be possible.

Additionally, he cited Pillayan’s assertions that Azad Maulana fled the country to seek political asylum and pointed to Maulana’s links with a doctor who treated Zahran’s brother after a pre-attack accidental explosion as a reason for their current absence from the country.

Karma

Shenali D Waduge

Sri Lanka reveres the Mahāvamsa as its foundational chronicle — and rightly so. Without it, much of our early history would be lost to time or victim of fake narratives as seen in the present. Yet reverence must never replace reasoning. Respect must not suspend inquiry— especially when the figure at the heart of the story, Prince Vijaya, appears at the intersection of myth, politics, and symbolic storytelling.

One figure sits at the heart of our origin story:

Prince Vijaya — the supposed founder of the Sinhala people.

And yet, when we examine this story carefully, profound questions emerges:

• Did Vijaya exist?
• Was he truly a prince?
• Where are the Indian texts to support that his father ruled as a king
• Where is his administration recorded?
• And crucially, how does this narrative align with the historical fact that Buddhism, which the Mahāvamsa itself frames as the civilizational anchor, only arrived in Sri Lanka centuries later around 247 BCE with Mahinda, nearly 300 years after Vijaya’s supposed landing in 543 BCE?
• This raises the question: was the story of Vijaya retroactively constructed to link indigenous kingship to Buddhist legitimacy?

What if Vijaya never existed — not as a real historical person, but only as a necessary political idea?

How could Vijaya have found” the Sinhalese when there is no evidence of Sinhalese communities, language or culture where he came from.

So he has no lineage to the Sinhalese.

This is not an attack on the Mahāvamsa. It is a deeper reading of it

If the story of Vijaya was symbolic, does this mean the Sinhalese people themselves only began with Buddhism?

Far from it.

Archaeology, anthropology, and early chronicles show that the Sinhalese — as a distinct population with language, culture, and social organization — existed centuries before the arrival of Buddhism.

Understanding this is crucial: it establishes the continuity and sovereignty of the people independent of any mythical founder.

Some may next ask:

how do we know these communities were ‘Sinhalese’?

While the term ‘Sinhalese’ as an ethnic label comes later, archaeology, language evolution, and cultural continuity clearly link these pre-Buddhist populations to the ancestors of the modern Sinhalese.

Practices such as irrigation, weaving, local governance, and settlement continuity indicate a population evolving not imported from elsewhere.

Buddhism later codified and expanded their social and religious framework, but it did not create the people themselves. The Sinhalese people already existed.

Thus, even if Vijaya was never a historical figure, the Sinhalese people already existed as a thriving population, managing land, producing culture, and forming local governance.

Kuveni, weaving and ruling her territory, embodies the complexity and sophistication of pre-Buddhist Sri Lankan civilization.

Another critical point emerges when we consider Kuveni.

If she was the ruling queen of her territory, this implies there was no male founder or dynastic father figure to anchor the Sinhalese lineage.

Could this absence have been a reason for creating Vijaya?

By inventing a male prince from India, the Mahāvamsa could provide:

• A patriarchal founder to legitimize kingship in a male-centric royal framework
• A symbolic connection to North Indian Aryan-Buddhist lineage
• A narrative that aligns the founding of the Sinhalese people with religious milestones like the Buddha’s Parinirvana.

In this sense, Vijaya may have been less a historical person and more a literary and political construct, designed to reconcile the reality of female leadership with the need for a male dynastic narrative.

While some may argue that Kuweni was not a direct genealogical ancestor of the Sinhalese, Kuveni represents the indigenous population from which the Sinhalese later emerged, inheriting their social organization, agricultural practices, and cultural skills.

Kuveni’s story illustrates that the Sinhalese did not need a foreign prince to become a people; their civilization evolved naturally, and Buddhism later became a civilizational anchor, solidifying but not creating their identity.

Kuveni, as a ruler and organizer, had children — yet their line fades from the chronicles. We need to understand that there are likely to have been leaders before her who are now lost to history.

The Mahāvamsa, however, chooses to spotlight Vijaya and his symbolic descendants. This suggests that the chroniclers were more interested in crafting a political and religious narrative than preserving local genealogies that existed before Kuweni.

The Sinhalese people, and their civilization, existed long before any legendary prince.

If the people already had governance, trade, agriculture, and social cohesion, why was Vijaya introduced?

Perhaps not to found a people, but to create a narrative anchor linking indigenous kingship to Buddhist legitimacy — a literary tool, not a historical necessity.

The civilization that existed before so-called Vijaya’s arrival

1. Archaeology

Settlements at Anuradhapura, Aligala, Mantai, and other prehistoric sites show continuous human habitation from >125,000 years ago.

Iron tools, farming implements, and early urban planning predate Vijaya by centuries.

Megalithic culture (dolmens, stone burial sites) indicates social hierarchy and organized communities.

1. Language and Culture

Sinhala language evolved from Prakrit, likely influenced by northern India, but local forms were already developing before widespread Buddhist influence.

Oral traditions, weaving practices (Kuveni), and local governance indicate organized social structures.

1. Early Political Structures

Before Buddhism, there were local chieftains and tribal leaders (like Kuveni) who managed land, agriculture, and trade — showing political continuity.

These communities had territorial and cultural cohesion, which later Buddhist kingship codified, but did not invent.

The Thousand-Year Silence

According to the Mahāvamsa, Vijaya landed in Sri Lanka around 543 BCE.
But the Mahāvamsa itself was composed around the 5th century CE.

That is a time gap of nearly 1,000 years — plenty of time for oral legend, political need, and symbolic storytelling to crystalize into the ‘perfect prince’ narrative.

There are:

• No contemporary inscriptions
• No archaeological records
• No Indian chronicles
• No foreign accounts
• No material evidence

to independently verify Vijaya’s existence or even that of his father or forefathers.

For comparison:

• We possess inscriptions, coins, trade records, and archaeological remains for rulers who lived hundreds of years later, yet not a single contemporary trace of Vijaya exists.
• How did the name Vijaya” travel unbroken across a millennium of oral memory — in a pre-print, pre-archive world — without distortion, duplication, or transformation?

That alone should make us pause and wonder.

Could it be that the name Vijaya” was created or selected to serve a political purpose centuries later, rather than faithfully transmitted from history?

With the manner stories are churned in the present – we cannot rule out this possibility, can we?

We need a eureka moment!

The story of Vijaya is almost too perfect.

• He is the son of a lion-slayer — a universal heroic archetype.
• His name, Vijaya, literally means victory”.
• He arrives on the exact day of the Buddha’s Parinirvana — a deeply symbolic alignment. (ironically compared to the manner Prabakaran created the TNT on the same day as Sri Lanka’s Republican Constitution – 22 May 1972)
• His landing marks the birth of kingship, civilization, and order.
• Just as modern political actors sometimes use symbolic dates or acts to create legitimacy, the Mahāvamsa may have used Vijaya as a retroactive symbol, aligning the founding of kingship with cosmic or religious milestones rather than recording a literal historical event

We must be wise enough to fit the puzzle together critically, using evidence and logic, and not dismiss ancient documents merely to serve modern narratives or ideological agendas.

Vijaya’s landing is meant to mark the birth of kingship, civilization, and order — a classic marker of foundation myth rather than messy human history.

Every detail aligns with symbolic timing and moral-political messaging, suggesting careful design.

Every civilization has them:

• Rome had Romulus
• Persia had heroic progenitors
• India had divine lineages
• China had Yellow Emperors

Sri Lanka, too, needed a sacred beginning.

— was the story of Vijaya a created one to fit this purpose?

The Political need for Vijaya

By the 5th century CE, Sri Lanka had become a Buddhist theocratic state.

Kingship needed:

• Sacred legitimacy
• Moral authority
• Civilizational pedigree
• Connection to the Buddha’s world

Notice the gap:

Vijaya is placed centuries before Buddhism actually arrived (3rd century BCE). Could this timing have been deliberate — a way to retroactively link indigenous kingship to Buddhist cosmology?

Why did the author of the Mahavamsa omit, the indigenous reality of Kuveni, her people, and the generations before and after her was already fully organized, culturally rich, and politically functional. They had agriculture, weaving, trade, irrigation systems, and social hierarchy — a civilization capable of sustaining itself.

So why were they not fully represented in the Mahāvamsa as the true originators of the Sinhalese?

Is it because the chroniclers needed a symbolic ancestor to sanctify kingship, unify the narrative, and align the story with religious and cosmic milestones — rather than merely recording the historical, indigenous continuity that already existed?

Fascinating thoughts!

We must also ask: who wrote the Mahāvamsa, and why?

Was it purely a monk’s personal record, or was it composed under royal direction to serve a political and religious agenda? Likely both.

The chronicler curated events, selected which stories to highlight, and shaped narratives — like that of Vijaya — to legitimize kingship, reinforce Buddhist authority, and create an unbroken civilizational pedigree.

Recognizing this intent allows us to read the text critically: not as literal history, but as a carefully crafted moral and political narrative but not to dismiss or disregard it.

Vijaya solves multiple political problems at once:

• He provides a founder king
• He links Sri Lanka to North Indian Aryan-Buddhist lineage
• He sanctifies territory
• He establishes divine timing
• He constructs an unbroken royal genealogy

In short:

Vijaya solves multiple political problems at once, not necessarily by existing as a real person, but by providing a symbolic anchor for the state.

In short: Vijaya is the perfect political ancestor — designed, not discovered

Which raises the unsettling question:

Was Vijaya discovered — or designed?

What If Vijaya is a Name, not a Man?

What if Vijaya” was not a person, but a title?

Across ancient civilizations, founders are often named:

• The Victor”
• The Conqueror”
• The Chosen”
• The First”

Vijaya” fits perfectly into this pattern.

Rather than a historical prince, Vijaya may represent the moment when local leadership was reorganized into a centralized Buddhist kingship model.

In other words:

Could Vijaya” version have been used to symbolize a political transformation, rather than any physical arrival.

The Deeper Question we avoid asking

If Vijaya did not arrive from India, then something more profound emerges:

Sri Lanka’s civilization was already flourishing: human settlements, agriculture, iron technology, and urban planning long predated Vijaya.

These are facts that no one can deny & is backed by evidence.

Archaeology already supports this:

• Continuous human settlement for over 125,000 years
• Advanced irrigation systems
• Iron technology
• Urban planning
• Megalithic cultures predating Vijaya by centuries

Kuveni, weaving, ruling, and managing her polity, embodies the reality of local agency, social organization, and an active civilization — demonstrated that governance, technology, and culture did not require imported legitimacy or foreign founders.

These two facts by themselves underlines that the Mahāvamsa story may not have reported a historical arrival, but crafted a moral-political origin myth.

So why insert an external founder?

Because civilizations once believed that greatness must come from elsewhere.

But what if Sri Lanka’s greatness rose from within?

Rethinking Origins is not Rejection — it is Maturity – It is what we need to regain our lost pride.

To question Vijaya is not to reject the Mahāvamsa.

It is to read it intelligently — as a civilizational text, not a literal historical record — and certainly not as an opportunity for foreign-funded NGOs, activists, or ideologues to exploit it to cast doubt on Sri Lanka’s indigenous heritage or political agency.

The Mahāvamsa preserved:

• Royal chronologies
• Political transitions
• Religious developments
• Cultural memory

This is a far cry from histories that rely only on myths.

Mature civilizations do not fear questioning their beginnings.

They refine them.

Perhaps the most revolutionary shift in Sri Lankan thinking would be this:

THE SINHALESE do not descend from Vijaya.

Vijaya may have been invented, but the people were real.
Vijaya descends from us — as a story created to explain who we already were.

And when a civilization begins to see itself not as imported, but as indigenously evolved, something profound happens:

It stops looking outward for validation, and begins standing firmly on its own soil.

The most revolutionary shift in Sri Lankan historical thinking is to recognize that the Sinhalese do not descend from Vijaya; rather, the story of Vijaya descends from the people themselves.

By seeing the origins of governance, culture, and civilization as indigenously evolved, we reclaim our own and understand Sri Lanka’s history as continuous, self-legitimizing, and independent — a narrative that no foreign script or retrofitted legend can overwrite

This is the moment to rethink the very roots of our national imagination

I am not a historian or archaeologist.

This article does not claim to rewrite history, but to ask practical, evidence-based questions about the story of Vijaya and the origins of the Sinhalese people.

I invite scholars, historians, and archaeologists who maintain that the Sinhalese descend from Vijaya to present contemporary evidence — inscriptions, coins, archaeological findings, or historical texts — that can independently verify his existence.

Until such evidence is produced, it is reasonable to consider that the Mahāvamsa may have crafted Vijaya as a symbolic ancestor, while the Sinhalese civilization and identity evolved indigenously, long before any mythological arrival.

Let this serve as an invitation for serious scholarly debate, not a dismissal of cultural memory.

Shenali D Waduge

KAMALIKA PIERIS

The term Genocide”  was invented by  the lawyer Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew. The word came into use after the  wholesale massacre of Jews in World War II. I  The word  was recognized in the  Nuremberg  trials  which  took place at the end of World War II.

 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,   (Genocide Convention )  was ratified in 1948.   The Genocide Convention has been accepted by 153 States , including Sri Lanka .Signatories  to the Convention are obliged  to  pass domestic legislation  on Genocide but   Genocide is  considered a part of international law and  is  binding  on all  States, whether or not they have ratified the  Convention. 

Genocide Convention  defines genocide as any of five “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”. These five acts include killing members of the group, causing them serious bodily or mental harm, imposing living conditions intended to destroy the group, preventing births, and forcibly transferring children out of the group.

Those charged with genocide must be tried either in international court or where the act of genocide took place. Genocides of Rwanda  and Cambodia   were heard by   ad hoc tribunals in Tanzania and Cambodia respectively.

Genocide  is included in the  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It  is  extremely hard to prove Genocide  in the international courts  because  international courts have set the standard of proof  very  high.  International  Court of Justice  wants  conclusive evidence that there was a special intent” to commit genocide. There must be evidence of  the specific intent to destroy  the whole group. International  Court of Justice  has not found  any country guilty of genocide. It  said that  Croatia  and  Bosnia   failed to prove that Serbia had committed genocide against them .

Sri Lanka government has    challenged the use of the word Genocide for the Eelam war. The term has specific legal connotations, and the United Nations, which has codified the concept of ‘genocide’, has never used it in relation to the Sri Lankan conflict, nor has the term been used by any of the UN’s subsidiary bodies, including the UN Human Rights Council,  for  Sri Lanka . The so-called allegation of a genocide in Sri Lanka is a fabrication and is not substantiated by any responsible authority, nationally or internationally.[1]

The Paranagama Commission (2015) stated firmly that after many months of investigation and after consulting top legal experts, it had concluded that there is no     evidence to support the charge of Genocide. The Paranagama Commission rejected the suggestion that civilians were targeted by the Sri Lanka Army as part of an alleged genocidal plan.

 William Schabas, a leading authority on genocide and international criminal law,  was on a panel of inquiry set up by   Public Interest Advocacy Centre , an NGO in Australia , to assess the final stage of  Eelam War IV. He reviewed reports of United Nations investigations and  those of major international human rights  NGOs about the events and found no evidence  that the Government of Sri Lanka intended to destroy the Tamil population of Sri Lanka.

WikiLeaks revealed a US dispatch that quoted ICRC Head of Operations for South Asia Jacques de Maio as having told US Ambassador in Geneva  that though there had been serious violations of International Humanitarian Law, there was no genocide.

Census data  indicates that between 1981 and 2001 (the period of the war) there was a substantial increase in the Tamil population in the Sinhalese-majority areas due to the migration of Tamils from the North-East to that area. Such a movement of Tamils could not have occurred if the Tamils were being subject to genocide.[2]

The Census and Statistics Department  carried out  an Enumeration of Vital Events” census in the Northern Province  in 2011 on the deaths occurred in the five districts of Northern Province for the last four years of the conflict ending May 2009.[3]

The five districts of the Province recorded 22,239 deaths due to all causes during the period 2005-2009 and over half of those, 11,172 were in 2009. In 2009, a total of 7,934 died due to ‘other deaths’ and 2,523 died natural deaths.[4]The field data collection was carried out by Tamil government employees serving in the Northern Province.[5]

 In addition there  are several common sense arguments against the charge of Genocide in the Eelam war. Throughout the 30-year civil war, the government  provided food and medicines to the  north and east, it kept the  health and education services going, paid the salaries of teachers and doctors. In the final stage of the war, security forces rescued approximately 350,000 Tamils  who ran to them  for shelter from the war zone.  

If 40,000 were killed at Nanthikadal in the last weeks of Eelam War IV, where are the bodies? If genocide of 40,000 occurred in the last weeks of Eelam IV, mass graves of 40,000 killed must emerge in that locality. Lastly, Ceylon Tamils are resident in all 9 provinces of Sri Lanka. For genocide  to take place the government of Sri Lanka must  go from province to province on a killing mission.( continued)

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[1] https://www.dailynews.lk/2024/08/16/local/610161/foreign-minister-summons-canadian-hc-to-register-sls-objections-on-construction-of-a-tamil-genocide-monument-in-canada/#google_vignette

[2] https://island.lk/ontarios-bill-104-tamil-genocide-education-or-miseducation-week/

[3]https://www.statistics.gov.lk/Resource/en/Population/Vital_Statistics/EVE2011_FinalReport.pdf

[4]  27.2.22 https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/enumeration-vital-events-2011-%E2%80%90-northern-province-sri-lanka

[5] island 7.2.22 p 1   .

KAMALIKA PIERIS

Tamil Separatist Movement has successfully embedded the notion of  Tamil Genocide  in Canada, starting with  the Legislative assembly of Ontario. Tamil diaspora has a presence in this Assembly and a  private member’s bill (Bill 104)  by  Vijay Thanigasalam [1] In May 2021, the Legislative Assembly of Ontario unanimously passed   Bill 104  and  created the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act (TGEWA).

The stated purpose of the Bill is to, a) designate the week following May 18 each year as ‘Tamil Genocide Education Week’ and b) educate Ontarians about ‘Tamil Genocide and other genocides that have occurred in world history.’

The Legislative Assembly  designated the week of May 18 each year as Tamil Genocide Education Week in Ontario,[2] where Ontarians are encouraged to educate themselves about  Tamil genocide and other genocides that have occurred in world history.”[3] In 2022 five Ontario school boards  introduced Tamil Genocide Education Week .[4]

Sri Lankan Canadian Action Coalition took the matter  to court, led by Dr Neville Hewage.  They said that the main purpose  of the Act was to declare a genocide”.  They pointed out that  it was impossible to educate about a genocide that has not yet been declared, [5]  that no Tamil genocide has been recognized in Sri Lanka under international law  and that the Provincial government of  Ontario  did not have the authority to adopt the term genocide” .[6] For a full account of this case see Reports of Cases Determined in Ontario Courtshttps://digital.ontarioreports.ca/ontarioreports/20241206/MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=2027067#articleId2027067

Justice Akbarali  who heard the case said she was not going to decide whether it was wise for the Ontario Legislature to pass the TGEWA. That responsibility lies with the Legislature. The court heard evidence from dueling witnesses   whether or not there was Genocide of the Tamils in the Sri Lankan civil war. She decided that TGEWA is to educate the public about  Tamil genocide,  caused by the government of Sri Lanka. This is similar to legislation  on the Holocaust,  and it fits with the Canadian provincial education policy  on international aspects of world wars or any other international conflict.[7]( see below)

The Sinhala groups failed to get   provincial and federal courts to strike down the legislation. But there was one gain at the Ontario Appeal Court. The Appeal Court of Ontario found that Bill 104 has no educational purposes.it said that Bill 104 cannot be used for the purpose of education in Ontario. It can be used for self-awareness and commemorative purposes only.[8]

 The Sri Lanka Canada Association of Brampton  finally  went to Supreme Court asking that  the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act be repealed. The Supreme Court of Canada   dismissed the appeal. Tamil Separatist Movement  was triumphant. The Supreme Court’s decision marks the final legal obstacle in Canada  against Bill 104,  said the Tamil Separatist Movement .This legal victory comes at a time when Tamils globally are intensifying calls for international accountability and justice for war crimes and genocide committed by the Sri Lankan state, said Tamil Guardian.[9]

The Tamil Separatist Movement did not find it easy to win  the appeal , despite the fact that  there were 237,890  Tamil immigrants  against    a mere 30,000 Sinhalese  living in Canada. They admitted that they had to work hard to win the  case.

Tamil Separatist Movement  said  that  the Tamil Canadian community, backed by over 60 organizations, and the  tireless efforts   of Tamil youth helped  them to win. Over $100,000 was raised  for the purpose. Ontario’s legal community, including prominent Tamil lawyers, played a key role .[10]The law firm Goldblattparners were the interveners on behalf of National Council of Canadian Tamils. .[11]  

The main Tamil organizations active in  the matter were the National Council of Canadian Tamils, the Canadian Tamil Academy, the Canadian Tamil Youth Alliance  and the Tamil Rights Group..[12] it was noted later that  National Council of Canadian Tamils  was listed as terrorist organization under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373. [13]

Sri Lankan government  objected, soon after the law was enacted.  Sri Lanka’s foreign minister met with the High Commissioner of Canada to Sri Lanka  to convey Sri Lanka’s opposition to the Act.  Canadian embassy in Sri Lanka  stated that under Canada’s federal system, provincial and municipal governments can pass their own laws but their decisions  do not represent  government policy.. Canada’s Official position as stated in 2021   is that the Government of Canada has not  found evidence of Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka.[14]

Canada’s  Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development  of Canada in a Diplomatic Note dated 7 th April 2021 responding to a clarification  had stated that the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development clarify Canada’s official position with regard to allegations of genocide in Sri Lanka, the department can officially confirm that the Government of Canada has not made a finding that there was genocide in Sri Lanka. [15]

On February 5, 2022, the Sri Lanka High Commission in Ottawa issued a press release saying there is absolutely no evidence to suggest any act and/or intent of the spurious allegations of genocide” during the military engagement with the LTTE. Neither was there a pattern of events even to suggest genocide”. [16]

Tamil Separatist Movement  wanted a national declaration of Genocide. The Ontario  Assembly  was a  provincial body, it did not   carry the same weight as a national  body.On 18 May 2022, the Canadian House of Commons adopted, without opposition ,a motion introduced by  Gary Anandasangaree,[17] MP for Scarborough-Rouge Park, Ontario . The motion was introduced on the 13^th anniversary of the ‘Mullavaikkal genocide’[18]

The motion states  “this House acknowledges the Genocide of Tamils in Sri Lanka, and recognizes May 18th of each year as Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day”.[19]Canada was the first national Parliament in the world to recognize May 18th of each year as Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day, noted critics.  MPs who spoke in support, acknowledged that they had to please their Tamil constituents. Ontario has one of the largest concentrations of Tamils, mainly in Toronto, and the Tamil youth were very insistent on  this motion, they said.[20] 

There was another petition,( e5058) initiated by Nirujan Gnanagunalan.. The petition requested that Canada should refer Sri Lanka to the International Court of Justice to investigate the alleged Tamil genocide. Ontario Centre for Policy Research  informed  Canada’s  Minister of Foreign Affairs that the petition had no legal basis and  no action should be taken.[21]Canada’s House of Commons  turned it down.

 Sri Lanka protested.[22] Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in Ottawa   issued a statement ‘Refuting the allegation of ‘Tamil Genocide’ in the final phase of the conflict in Sri Lanka .[23] In Colombo  the government was told that  MP Gary Anandasangaree’s private member’s motion regarding the Tamil genocide is non-binding, non-legislative,and does not reflect Canada’s Official foreign policy.[24]

The fact that  ‘Tamil genocide’ in Sri Lanka has been recognized by the Canadian national legislature carries international implications. recognition by the national legislature of a foreign county that genocide is taking place in Sri Lanka has very serious consequences to this country, said Darshan Weerasekera.

The House of Commons, Canada,  represents the entire people of Canada, not different interest groups. So, such a body has now placed on record that conditions exist in Sri Lanka for the Tamils to arguably invoke a right to self-determination under international law. It sets a precedent for other countries to also adopt motions or even resolutions unilaterally alleging Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka with scant regard for the truth.

The Canadian legislature has failed to submit their allegations to any international forum whatsoever and give Sri Lanka a chance to respond. .The national legislature of a country should not get a free pass to flout international law at will. If the national legislatures of other countries also start adopting motions alleging ‘Tamil genocide’ with scant regard to the facts, it would pose a danger not just to Sri Lanka but to all countries facing the threat of separatism. It is in the interest of Sri Lankans as well as all friends of international law to vigorously challenge this Act and prevent it from setting a precedent , concluded Darshan.[25]

 Following on the House of Commons decision, Canada’s Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau   issued statements  on May 18^th  2023, and May 18^th  2024, recognizing  Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day. In 2025 Prime Minister Mark Carney  did the same.[26]

Colombo objected to all three statements .Colombo   condemned  the unfounded allegations by Prime Minister  Trudeau  and his outrageous claim of genocide” pertaining to the past conflict in Sri Lanka.it was politically motivated and purely for domestic political consumption in Canada..[27] For the statement objecting to the speech in 2023    see https://www.lankamission.org/index.php/archives/8-news/79-other-statements/3423-sri-lanka-rejects-the-reference-to-tamil-genocide-remembrance-day-by-the-canadian-prime-minister.html

The media reported that  in Canada an application was brought  against Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for judicial review, challenging his message on Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day, issued on May 18, 2023. The primary intention of this Application is to obtain a legal position regarding the alleged Tamil genocide, whether the  Prime Minister  declared or recognized it. Federal Court,  said that  there was no such declaration or recognition of Tamil genocide. Trudeau’s statement and MP Anandasangaree’s motion arenon-binding and, therefore, have no legal impact on Canada’s official position . which is,  no Genocide in Sri Lanka. Federal Court  rejected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s statement,  and said there was no Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka.[28]

In 2025 Brampton City Council declared November 21 2025  as Tamil Eelam National Flag Day”, with Mayor Patrick Brown issuing a proclamation. The proclamation reads: On this day, the Tamil Eelam National Flag is ceremonially hoisted, and a series of events and workshops are held to honour the resistance against genocide, while fostering a dialogue on Tamil history, culture and identity.”[29]

 In May 2025, City of Toronto approved a motion to build a Tamil genocide monument. The motion has requested the city to identify a site in the City of Toronto Park in Scarborough to house the monument under the provisions of the City’s Public Art and Monument Donations Policy. Toronto  had  a vibrant and thriving Tamil community, located primarily in Scarborough. the motion seeks to follow in the footsteps of other levels of government and jurisdictions by recognising the Tamil Genocide.” [30]

A Tamil Genocide Monument, dedicated to the victims and survivors of the  final phase of the  Eelam war IV, was inaugurated in Chinguacousy Park , Brampton, Canada on May 10 2025. The monument is a  4.8-metre tall stainless steel structure featuring an outline of the historic homeland of Tamil people in Sri Lanka. The design is a book shaped structure symbolizing educating the history of the Tamil genocide with a map of Tamil Eelam that signifies the ancestral Tamil homeland. The nine panels, which symbolise the nine districts of the North-East,  details the acts of genocide perpetrated by Sri Lanka since 1948.[31]    The National Council of Canadian Tamils will have ownership of the monument and will be responsible for maintaining it. [32]

This monument, in my view ,is not a monument to genocide, it is a monument to   Eelam. It is intended to influence those visiting Brampton’s  Chinguacousy Park   to  believe in an  Eelam in far away Sri Lanka .

After a three-year delay, the Tamil Genocide Memorial, meant to honor lives lost in the Sri Lankan civil war, was unveiled in Brampton Saturday night to the sound of applause, cheers and cannons of confetti, reported the media.[33]

The opening ceremony was attended by Tamil activists and politicians, including Mayor of Brampton Patrick Brown. The National Council of Canadian Tamils  thanked Brampton Council for their unanimous support” in building the monument.

The inspiration for the memorial came after the Mullivaikkal memorial at Jaffna University, which was erected in 2019 to honour the Tamil lives lost in the genocide, was bulldozed by Sri Lanka’s authorities. This act of destruction led to widespread outrage within the Tamil homeland and globally. Backed by city leaders, two local organisations, the Brampton Tamil Association and Brampton Tamil Seniors Association, joined hands to spearhead the project.

Vijay Thanigasalam, MPP for Scarborough-Rouge Park, said that the monument serves as a “powerful symbol that ensures that our history will never be erased. “We remember May 2009, we remember the No Fire Zones being shelled, we remember the devastation of the bombardment of cluster bombs and chemical bombs being used against Tamil people,” “We remember the 169,796 people who are unaccounted for to this day. We will never forget that.”[34]

it later transpired that Rudrakumaran ( TGTE) and W. Wigneswaran, former Chief Minister of Northern Province had written to the Brampton Mayor offering business support in return for setting up a Tamil Genocide Monument   [35]

Sri Lanka had repeatedly complained to the Canadian High Commission in Colombo  regarding this monument.  Sri Lanka urged the Federal Government of Canada to intervene and prevent this regrettable initiative by the Brampton City Council[36]

Thushara Rodrigo, Sri Lanka Consular General in Toronto, sent a letter  to the Mayor, objecting to the monument, outlining the negative impacts on the Sri Lankan community in installing a Tamil Genocide Monument..[37] Those supporting the project declared this to be foreign interference.” [38] 

Legal proceedings were  started  against the  monument. Applicants alleged that the City of Brampton violated their Charter Rights and Freedoms, the Constitution Act of 1867, and the Ontario Municipal Act, 2001.[39]

 Opposition to the monument is continuing. General Secretary of the Sinhaladeepa National Front (Canada), Jayantha Liyanage, said  in February 2026, that a request had been made to the Mayor of Brampton, Patrick Brown, seeking the removal of the Tamil Genocide Monument constructed in the city of Brampton, Canada.[40] ( continued)

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[1] https://colombogazette.com/2022/06/29/ontario-court-upholds-tamil-genocide-education-week/

[2] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/case-dismissed-canadas-supreme-court-rejects-challenge-tamil-genocide-education-week-act

[3] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/ontario-court-upholds-tamil-genocide-education-week-sinhalese-challenge-fails

[4] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/canadas-parliament-recognises-tamil-genocide-landmark-motion

[5] https://digital.ontarioreports.ca/ontarioreports/20241206/MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=2027067#articleId2027067

[6] https://colombogazette.com/2022/06/29/ontario-court-upholds-tamil-genocide-education-week/

[7] Justice Akbarali said the recognition of a Tamil genocide is in service of(i) educating the public about the Tamil genocide, and about other genocides, including the need to prevent such atrocities from occurring in the future;(ii) allowing non-Tamil Ontarians the opportunity to better understand their Tamil neighbors, and Tamil youth to better understand their families, community and history; and(iii) through education, helping to create the conditions for Tamil Ontarians to share their stories and begin to heal from the trauma and inter-generational trauma https://colombogazette.com/2022/06/29/ontario-court-upholds-tamil-genocide-education-week/

[8]   https://ceylontoday.lk/2025/09/16/canada-rejects-tamil-genocide-a-landmark-ruling-for-sri-lanka/

[9] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/case-dismissed-canadas-supreme-court-rejects-challenge-tamil-genocide-education-week-act

[10] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/case-dismissed-canadas-supreme-court-rejects-challenge-tamil-genocide-education-week-act

[11] https://colombogazette.com/2022/06/29/ontario-court-upholds-tamil-genocide-education-week/

[12] https://digital.ontarioreports.ca/ontarioreports/20241206/MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=2027067#articleId2027067

[13] https://policy-research.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/5-Letter-to-Joly-from-OCPR.pdf

[14] . https://ceylontoday.lk/2025/09/16/canada-rejects-tamil-genocide-a-landmark-ruling-for-sri-lanka/

[15] island 7.2.22 p 1  

[16] https://mfa.gov.lk/en/tamil-genocide-sl/

[17]  https://island.lk/international-law-implications-of-canadian-parliaments-motion-on-tamil-genocide/ 25.11.22

[18] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/canadas-parliament-recognises-tamil-genocide-landmark-motion

[19] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/ontario-court-upholds-tamil-genocide-education-week-sinhalese-challenge-fails

[20] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/canadas-parliament-recognises-tamil-genocide-landmark-motion

[21]   https://ceylontoday.lk/2025/09/16/canada-rejects-tamil-genocide-a-landmark-ruling-for-sri-lanka/

[22] https://mfa.gov.lk/en/slrejects

[23] island 7.2.22 p 1    .

[24]  https://ceylontoday.lk/2025/09/16/canada-rejects-tamil-genocide-a-landmark-ruling-for-sri-lanka/

[25] darshan Weerasekera https://island.lk/international-law-implications-of-canadian-parliaments-motion-on-tamil-genocide/ 25.11.22

[26] For 2023 statement see https://www.om.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2023/05/18/statement-prime-minister-first-tamil-genocide-remembrance-day.[26]

For 2024 see https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2024/05/18/statement-prime-minister-trudeau-on-tamil-genocide-remembrance-day

 For 2025 see https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/05/18/statement-prime-minister-carney-mark-tamil-genocide-remembrance-day

[27] https://www.sundaytimes.lk/230521/news/sl-slams-trudeau-for-outrageous-claim-520724.html

[28] https://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2025/03/31/the-supreme-court-does-not-further-inquire-about-tamil-genocide-in-sri-lanka-and-the-bill-104-tamil-genocide-education-week-act-tgewa-is-not-within-provincial-jurisdiction-education-under-canada/

[29] https://www.sundaytimes.lk/251123/columns/northern-governor-slams-officials-ngos-for-failure-to-uplift-people-622128.html

[30] https://island.lk/canada-to-build-second-tamil-genocide-monument/

[31] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/tamil-genocide-monument-inaugurated-brampton

[32] https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/tamil-genocide-memorial-unveiled-in-brampton-after-years-long-wait/ar-AA1EzwXP

[33] https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/tamil-genocide-memorial-unveiled-in-brampton-after-years-long-wait/ar-AA1EzwXP

[34] https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/tamil-genocide-monument-inaugurated-brampton

[35]   https://ceylontoday.lk/2025/09/16/canada-rejects-tamil-genocide-a-landmark-ruling-for-sri-lanka/

[36]  https://island.lk/foreign-minister-summons-canadian-hc-over-genocide-monument/

https://www.dailynews.lk/2024/08/16/local/610161/foreign-minister-summons-canadian-hc-to-register-sls-objections-on-construction-of-a-tamil-genocide-monument-in-canada/#google_vignette

[37]   https://ceylontoday.lk/2025/09/16/canada-rejects-tamil-genocide-a-landmark-ruling-for-sri-lanka/

[38] https://ceylontoday.lk/2025/09/16/canada-rejects-tamil-genocide-a-landmark-ruling-for-sri-lanka/

The Supreme Court does not further inquire about Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka, and the Bill 104 Tamil Genocide Education Week Act (TGEWA) is not within provincial Jurisdiction Education under Canada’s Constitution Act s. 93

[39] https://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2025/03/31/the-supreme-court-does-not-further-inquire-about-tamil-genocide-in-sri-lanka-and-the-bill-104-tamil-genocide-education-week-act-tgewa-is-not-within-provincial-jurisdiction-education-under-canada/

[40]   https://asianmirror.lk/news/12431/request-made-to-canada-to-remove-tamil-genocide-monument-in-brampton/

National Development Bank PLC

Highlights

• Profit after taxes reach an all-time high of LKR 11.0 billion (2024: LKR 9.0 billion). Excluding the one-off impact of the ISB debt-restructure in 2024, which represents close to a two-fold growth on a comparable basis

• Net loans and deposits expand by 26.7% and 10.4% respectively on a normalised basis, outperforming industry averages on an all currency basis across both local currency and foreign currency

• Credit granted to Small and Medium Scale Enterprises expands by over 25.0% showcasing the Bank’s continued commitment to support the country’s economic revival

• Full year ROE and ROA (pre-tax) improves to 13.5% and 2.5%, respectively, supported by strong momentum in the second half of 2025, where ROE and ROA was at 16.4% and 2.8% respectively for the period

• Growth driven primarily by core banking operations

• FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

National Development Bank PLC (hereinafter ‘the Bank’) announced its results for the financial year ended December 31, 2025 to the Colombo Stock Exchange recently. Full year results tabled by the Bank showcase a strong growth across all business lines with Net Banking Revenue increasing by a 45.2% on a comparable basis. Like most other peers, the Bank’s 2024 financial performance was positively impacted following the successful conclusion of the ISB debt restructure with a one-off impact on interest income, fee income and net impairments amounting to LKR 1.4 billion, LKR 0.7 billion and LKR 9.4 billion, respectively for the said year.

• Fund based income

Net interest income (NII), which accounts for close to 75.0% of Bank’s total operating income, grew by 6.5% on a normalised basis. Despite pressure on interest-earning assets arising from the lower interest rate environment, the Bank’s disciplined margin management helped stabilise Net Interest Margin (NIM) at 4.0% for the year. On a comparable basis, excluding one-off exceptional items, NIM stood at 4.2%, compared to 4.3% for both scenarios in 2024. By the end of the year, the Bank had close to LKR 29.3 billion in Loans and Deposits under a special arrangement with its customer(s) with a netting-off feature (end 2024: LKR 19.6 billion).

• Non-fund based income

Net fee and commission income reached LKR 8.1 billion for the year – representing a growth of 14.3% from LKR 7.1 billion in 2024 excluding ISB restructuring related fees. Key growth drivers for the current year were trade finance, credit and lending, digital banking and credit and debit cards.

• Credit and operating costs

Credit costs for the year amounted to LKR 5.7 billion, reflecting a substantial reduction of 57.1% compared to LKR 13.2 billion in 2024, a testament to the Bank’s strong credit underwriting practices and focused efforts on collections and recoveries. The Bank’s success on account of the latter is best reflected in notably improved stage 2 and 3 loan stock which stood at 7.9% and 10.8% respectively at end 2025 as compared with 16.6% and 14.0% at end 2024. Stage 3 provision coverage also saw further improvement to 59.1% from 54.5% during 2024 showcasing the Bank’s prudent management of credit risk.

Operating expenses closed at LKR 19.0 billion for the year, marking a 13.1% YoY increase. This increase was primarily driven by routine staff-related increments and necessary market realignments, along with higher investments in IT infrastructure and business development undertaken during the year.

• Investor key performance indicators

Return on average equity (ROE) was 13.5% – improved notably when compared with 12.2% in 2024 on an all-inclusive basis and 7.7% excluding the one-off income reported from the ISB debt restructure. Looking at the second half of 2025 alone, ROE was close to 16.4% indicating strong improvement from the first half of the year. Similarly, the Bank’s pre-tax return on average assets was 2.5% for the full year and 2.8% for the second half of 2025 (2024: with and without ISB one-off gains 3.1% and 1.5%, respectively).

Earnings per share was LKR 25.90 for the full year 2025 as compared with LKR 21.25 in 2024 on as is basis and LKR 13.30 excluding the impact of the ISB debt restructure. Group level ROEs and EPS, respectively, were 13.6% (2024: 12.5%) and LKR 27.83 (2024: LKR 23.05). Net asset value per share was LKR 201.51 (2024: LKR 186.91) and compared with a closing share price of LKR 141.25, which posted a 24.7% appreciation since end 2024. Group Net asset value per share was LKR 215.45 (2024: LKR 199.13).

• FINANCIAL POSITION

By year-end, the Bank’s total deposits increased to LKR 707.2 billion, reflecting an 11.9% growth from LKR 631.7 billion at end-2024. Meanwhile, net loans expanded more strongly to LKR 593.6 billion, marking a 28.8% increase from LKR 460.7 billion in the previous year.

However, excluding transactions of a one-off and special nature, this represented a normalised absolute net growth of 26.7% and 10.4% over end 2024, respectively. The Bank’s CASA ratio on a normalised basis stood at 23.9% by year end 2025 having improved from 22.5% at end 2024 in line with the Bank’s ongoing efforts to improve its low cost funding from current levels.

• LIQUIDITY AND SOLVENCY

Liquidity levels also remained strong with the Bank’s Liquidity coverage ratios, across both Rupee and All currency, closing at 257.3% and 208.5%, respectively at end 2025 (end 2024: 358.1% and 308.3%) while the Net stable funding ratio was 129.7% (end 2024: 152.4%) – all of which were well above the minimum regulatory requirements of 100.0% and comparing well with industry averages. The Bank’s solvency levels as measured by CET1/ Tier I and Total CAR were 12.4% and 15.9%, respectively representing more than adequate buffers over its regulatory minimums (2024: 13.7% and 19.1%).

Commenting on the financial results of the Bank for the financial year 2025, the Bank’s Director/Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Kelum Edirisinghe, stated:

We are very pleased with the Bank’s performance during the year. This achievement is not the end result of one-off gains but purely the outcome of focused execution in our fundamental banking businesses, disciplined credit growth, prudent risk management, a strong deposit franchise, sustained net interest margins, and the continuing efforts to improve our overall operating efficiencies on a consistent basis. Our core banking operations have performed exceptionally well, despite the pressure stemming from lower interest rates, reinforcing the sustainability and quality of our earnings.

Importantly, this performance also equally reflects the trust our customers place in us and the dedication of our employees who strive to deliver excellence every day. Their commitment has strengthened our franchise and deepened relationships across retail, SME, and corporate banking segments. Amongst others, one of our standout achievements during the year was the strong growth reported in the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) loan book, which grew by over 25.0% year-on-year, clear evidence of our deep and ongoing commitment to advancing the SME sector, a critical engine of national economic growth. This performance is both a milestone and a reflection of the strength of our foundation and our trajectory, plans and ambitions going forward.

While we celebrate these results, we remain focused on our future. Our 2030 strategy aims to further strengthen our core banking operations, enhance digital capabilities, optimise cost efficiency, and grow responsibly. We are confident that the momentum generated this year positions us for sustained long-term value creation.

I take the opportunity to thank the Chairman and the Board of Directors for their unwavering guidance and strategic foresight, to my senior leadership team for their relentless drive and commitment and to our staff at all levels for their hard work and dedication – if not for which none of this is possible.I wish to also extend my gratitude to all our stakeholders including our Regulators, Customers, and Shareholders for their continued trust and confidence placed in us. Your collaboration and confidence will enable NDB to innovate, grow, and create long lasting value for the benefit of its stakeholders and the nation. We look forward to the future with a great degree of hope and optimism!

Gamini Goonetilleke

The first mortar screamed just after dawn on 10 June 1990. It tore through the coral-stone ramparts of Jaffna fort, the blast rattling every window in the city. Inside the pentagonal walls, 130 men- soldiers of the Sinha Regiment and young police recruits- looked at one another and knew: this was no skirmish. This was a siege.

For 107 days, the old Portuguese-Dutch-British fortress became the eye of a storm that swallowed the peninsula, Outside, LTTE snipers hid in the public library, mortars thundered from behind the post office, and a home-built monster called the Pasilan 2000 prowled the streets. Inside, the defenders rationed rice, drank brackish well water, and buried their dead between crumbling colonial walls.

LTTE Invention – Pasilan 2000

I wasn’t behind those ramparts, but I treated the men who were there. At Palaly Base Hospital, we waited for helicopters that came in low over the lagoon, carrying boys with limbs shredded by shrapnel and policeman who hadn’t seen their families in hundred days.

Walk today along those same ramparts. Beneath the grass lie the bunkers where men prayed, the corners where fourteen soldiers were buried, and the echoes of a siege that still whispers through Jaffna’s wind.

Jaffna Fort: The Fortress That Became a Battlefield

Jaffna Fort stands as one of Sri Lanka’s most imposing reminders of the island’s turbulent past. Situated on fifty-five acres in the heart of Jaffna city and overlooking the shallow lagoon, its massive coral and stone ramparts dominate the landscape. The pentagonal, star-shaped design reflects seventeenth-century European coastal fortification principles, while the complex once housed administrative buildings, barracks, chapels, warehouses, and defensive bastions.

Built in 1618 by the Portuguese under Phillipe de Oliveira to consolidate control over the peninsula, the fort later fell to the Dutch East India Company in 1658. The Dutch expanded and strengthened it, transforming the site into a major centre of administration, trade, and defence. In 1795, the United Kingdom assumed control, and the fort subsequently served as a military base, logistics hub, and medical facility. After independence in 1948, it remained an important garrison of the Sri Lankan armed forces.

For decades the structure existed largely as a historical monument. However, the outbreak of civil war in the early 1980s turned it into a heavily militarised stronghold. Between 1983 and 1995 the fort witnessed repeated battles, sieges, and changes of control. The 107-day siege from June to September 1990, fought between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, became particularly significant. It highlighted the strategic and symbolic value of the fort, the resilience of the besieged garrison, and the broader military and political realities of the conflict in northern Sri Lanka.

This essay explores the context, course, and implications of that siege within the wider trajectory of the war

Symbolic Value to Both Sides

During the civil war, the fort assumed enormous symbolic importance. For the Sri Lankan state, retaining control over Jaffna Fort demonstrated governmental authority in the Tamil-majority North. The national flag flying above its ramparts signified sovereignty in an area increasingly contested by separatist forces.

For the LTTE, capturing the fort meant much more than holding territory. It represented psychological victory, control of the heart of Jaffna city, and a step toward legitimizing their claim of liberation.” Thus, when battle finally engulfed the fort, both sides fought with extraordinary determination.

Several Key Dates, Framed the Events Leading to the 1990 Siege:

Sri Lanka’s civil war escalated dramatically after the events of 23 July 1983, when a landmine attack in Jaffna triggered nationwide anti-Tamil riots known as Black July, pushing the country into full-scale conflict. The Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 brought the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka on 30 July, leading soon after to Operation Pawan on 10 October 1987, a major and bloody confrontation with the LTTE in Jaffna. After a controversial mission marked by heavy casualties and political tension, the IPKF completely withdrew by the end of March 1990, creating a power vacuum in the North. A tenuous ceasefire from March to June 1990 collapsed as trust eroded and both sides quietly prepared for renewed hostilities, culminating in police personnel retreating to the fortified Jaffna Fort on 8–9 June amid escalating threats. Full-scale fighting exploded on 10 June 1990, marking the start of Eelam War II and setting the immediate conditions for the impending siege of Jaffna Fort.

Preparation for Battle after the Departure of the IPKF

During the Indian intervention (1987–1990), both the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE underwent dramatic expansion. The Sri Lankan military modernized rapidly, increasing manpower, acquiring new weapon systems, and receiving training in counter-insurgency tactics. Simultaneously, the LTTE gained extensive experience confronting a large conventional army and emerged from the conflict more confident, organized, and battle-hardened.

By the time the IPKF withdrew, both sides had renewed their focus on strategic targets. The Jaffna Fort became an obvious flashpoint, being centrally located and easily identifiable from any direction in the city.

LTTE Deployment and Preparations

During the ceasefire period, the LTTE carefully positioned itself for a large-scale assault. Fighters occupied or fortified major buildings surrounding the fort, including the Telecommunication Department building, the Jaffna Public Library, the Post Office, Duraiappa Stadium, Regal Theatre, and several adjoining streets and houses.

The group consisting of both male and female LTTE fighters constructed robust underground bunkers, dug trenches, and concealed heavy weapons. Anti-aircraft guns were moved into place to threaten helicopter-borne resupply. Simultaneously, Palaly Military Base—the lifeline of the peninsula—was surrounded to impede troop movement and logistical support. The LTTE understood that if they captured Jaffna Fort, they could isolate large segments of government control and dramatically weaken state presence in the peninsula.

Composition of the Fort Garrison

When fighting broke out in June 1990, approximately 200 personnel were stationed inside the fort. Of these, 84 belonged to the Sixth Battalion of the Sinha Regiment, and the rest comprised young policemen, many newly trained and on their first major posting. A sizable number hailed from the Eastern Province. Their lack of combat experience would later magnify the difficulties of resisting a seasoned and well-armed insurgency.

Among them were two policemen described here under pseudonyms—Omar and Abdullah—whose injuries and survival would not only become emblematic of the siege’s human cost but were also able to provide me with an eye witness account of the siege after their miraculous recovery from serious injury.

LTTE Fires the First Shots

On 10 June 1990, LTTE units opened fire on the fort. The following day, a large explosive charge detonated close to the lagoon-side entrance, shattering wooden gates but failing to breach defensive positions. Intense small-arms fire raked the walls, and sporadic mortar bombardment continued for days. As snipers moved into adjacent buildings, the garrison found itself under constant threat. Attempts by the military to break the siege began almost immediately.

Operation Eagle 1 – 3 July 1990

In early July, the Sri Lanka Air Force initiated a daring aerial resupply mission. A Bell 212 helicopter gunship, flying under heavy fire, landed on the narrow road outside the fort near the lagoon—the only possible landing zone. Supplies, ammunition, and additional weapons were rapidly unloaded, while injured personnel were evacuated.

Close air support from other Bell 212 gunships armed with .50-caliber machine guns and rockets, as well as bombing runs by SIAI-Marchetti jets, helped suppress LTTE fire long enough for the helicopter to escape safely. This operation temporarily bolstered morale, but the respite was brief.

Deteriorating Conditions within the Fort

As weeks passed, conditions inside the fort worsened dramatically. Ammunition stocks dwindled. Food supplies were nearly exhausted. Water and electricity supply were cut. Only a single well within the fort provided brackish, salty water. Medical supplies were nonexistent. The daily diet consisted of rice and lentils, cooked over makeshift fires. When those ran out, soldiers resorted to eating fish caught from the moat.

Injured personnel were kept in bunkers to avoid further harm, but without antibiotics, dressings, saline, or transfusion facilities, wounds became infected. Fourteen soldiers eventually died from injuries that would otherwise have been survivable. They were buried within the compound.

Air-dropped supplies often missed their target, landing in LTTE territory or the lagoon. Rice bags that did reach the interior burst open on impact, became contaminated with debris, and scattered across the fort floor. One policeman recalled, It was stinking to glory,” describing decaying bodies, shrapnel-embedded walls, and filth.

Improvised Weapons: Pasilan 2000 and Baba Mortar

The LTTE employed grim ingenuity in weaponry. Two notable systems included the Pasilan 2000 – a large mortar launched from a modified tractor, devastating at close range and Baba mortars – improvised heavy-caliber launchers designed to lob explosive payloads irregularly but effectively. Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were also fired repeatedly. Although inaccurate, their psychological impact was severe.

Air Force Bombardment of LTTE Positions

Recognizing the severity of the situation, the Sri Lanka Air Force launched systematic bombardment of suspected LTTE positions. Helicopter gunships, light fighters, and transport aircraft modified to drop improvised 200kg barrel bombs” targeted buildings surrounding the fort. Artillery fire from land and naval assets further intensified.

Much of central Jaffna was reduced to rubble. Civilian casualties likely occurred in significant numbers, though precise figures remain unknown. Paradoxically, LTTE fighters benefited from deep underground bunkers, while the open interior of the fort made its defenders vulnerable to falling debris and shockwaves—even from friendly fire. Several soldiers suffered injuries from their own side’s ordnance.

Meanwhile, wounded LTTE cadres were treated openly at Jaffna General Hospital, funded by the state—a surreal and troubling paradox of war.

A Suicidal Offensive by Female Cadres

On 5 August 1990, the LTTE launched a bold infantry assault on the fort’s entrance. This attack was led by an all-female unit commanded by the cadre known as Lt. Sangitha.” During this intense battle, four female fighters, including the commander, were killed. Their action showcased the LTTE’s willingness to deploy women in frontline combat and suicide missions—an unusual feature among insurgencies worldwide. Although repelled, the attack further strained the fort’s defenders, who had to expend precious ammunition.

Medical Duty at Palaly Base Hospital

During this period, simultaneous fighting erupted around Palaly Army Camp. On 23 August 1990, a civilian surgical team—including an anaesthetist and assistant doctor—was flown to Palaly aboard a Y-8 transport aircraft. The mission was to strengthen the surgical team already there to treat casualties arriving from across the peninsula, including from Jaffna Fort. The medical officers worked around the clock with limited facilities, witnessing firsthand the grim toll of the siege.

Injuries to Policemen Inside the Fort

On 25 August, a mortar blast struck the entrance to the fort, killing one policeman instantly and severely wounding Omar. A large section of his left buttock was torn away. Bleeding heavily and terrified, he believed he was facing certain death. As a devout Muslim, he recited the Holy Quran while comrades wrapped him in cloth and carried him to a bunker.

Helicopter evacuation that evening proved impossible due to enemy fire. He remained untreated for nearly 48 hours. Another policeman, Abdullah, had already waited two weeks with a chest wound from shrapnel, blood accumulating dangerously in his pleural cavity—an injury ordinarily fatal without drainage. Both men desperately needed evacuation.

Operation Eagle 2 – 26 August 1990

On 26 August, the Air Force launched another daring rescue attempt. Flying low over the lagoon to avoid radar and gunfire, a helicopter gunship briefly hovered near the fort’s entrance. There was no possibility of landing. Under sustained covering fire, troops hoisted and pushed the wounded inside the aircraft.

As the helicopter climbed, the door gunner held on to the casualties with one hand while firing with the other. Hot spent shells rained onto their bodies, adding burns to their existing injuries. The helicopter landed on Mandativu Island, where preliminary first aid was administered before transferring both casualties to Palaly Hospital by ambulance. Against all odds, they had survived.

Emergency Treatment at Palaly Hospital

At the hospital, Abdullah received the following treatment. A rubber tube was inserted to the chest to drain the blood in the chest cavity. Intravenous fluid, antibiotics were administered followed by blood transfusion.

                         A Victim Being Treated at the Palaly Hospital for a Chest injury

Omar required urgent debridement of gangrenous tissue on his buttocks, blood transfusion, and strong antibiotics to control infection. After five days, both men were stable enough to be flown to Colombo aboard a Y-12 transport plane. The patients and the attending surgeon lay on the floor of the aircraft during the flight—a testament to wartime improvisation.

Further treatment at the Military Hospital and Colombo General Hospital resulted in full recovery.

Continuation of the Battle

Meanwhile, conditions inside the fort deteriorated further. Ammunition was nearly exhausted, food was scarce, and morale sank. Outside, LTTE forces tightened their ring around the compound. As collapse appeared imminent, the Sri Lankan military planned a massive combined assault to break the siege.

Massive Counter-Operation from Mandativu Island

On 13 September 1990, approximately 4,000 soldiers launched an amphibious operation from Mandativu Island, supported by naval gunboats and Air Force aircraft. Artillery thundered from both land and sea. Civilian areas around Jaffna city shook under relentless bombardment.

As troops attempted to land across the lagoon, LTTE fighters entrenched along the coastline poured fire into approaching craft, destroying several vessels and killing numerous soldiers. A SIAI-Marchetti bomber was shot down over the water, its wreckage visible for days.

Mounting casualties forced suspension of the offensive. The trapped garrison was once again isolated.

Withdrawal from Jaffna Fort

By late September 1990, the government concluded that further attempts to hold the fort would result in unnecessary loss of life. On 26 September, the order was given to withdraw. This coincided with the LTTE commemoration of Thileepan’s death anniversary.

Before evacuating, troops destroyed weapons, ammunition stockpiles, and vehicles to prevent capture. The surviving soldiers slipped out under cover of darkness.

For the LTTE, raising the Tamil Eelam” flag over the fort was a moment of immense symbolic triumph. They held the fort for nearly five years.

Recapture During Operation Riviresa (1995)

In late 1995, Sri Lankan forces mounted their largest offensive of the war: Operation Riviresa (Sunshine”). After fifty days of intense fighting, government troops re-entered Jaffna city. On 5 December 1995, the national flag was once again hoisted atop the battered ramparts of Jaffna Fort.

The pendulum had swung back.

Legacy and Aftermath

The siege left deep scars. Buildings inside the fort were extensively damaged. Vast areas of Jaffna town were reduced to rubble. Civilian displacement continued for years. Psychological trauma affected soldiers and civilians alike.

Today, the fort has been partially restored as a historical monument. Visitors walk across the same ramparts once struck by artillery, unaware that beneath their feet lie remnants of bunkers, graves, and battle debris.

Conclusion

The siege of Jaffna Fort in 1990 represents one of the most dramatic episodes of Sri Lanka’s civil war. It encapsulates many of the conflict’s defining features. intense competition for symbolic space, improvisation from both sides, enormous human suffering, blurred lines between soldiers and civilians.

The stubborn defense mounted by a small, under-resourced garrison demonstrated remarkable endurance. Equally, the LTTE’s determination to capture the fort reflected their broader strategy of staged territorial legitimacy.

Ultimately, the fort’s repeated change of hands—Portuguese to Dutch, Dutch to British, British to Sri Lankan state, Sri Lankan state to LTTE, and back again—reflects the shifting tides of history in the Jaffna peninsula. Today, its walls stand silent, bearing witness to centuries of conflict.

However, beyond strategic analyses and tactical evaluations, the siege reminds us of something more enduring: the human dimension of war. The surgeon, the anaesthetist, the young policemen on their first posting, the female cadre leading a suicidal charge—all were bound together in the crucible of Jaffna’s entropy.

In hindsight, the fort’s battered ramparts offer not only a military lesson but also a solemn plea for peace. When seen not as a fortress but as a monument to resilience, loss, and recovery, Jaffna Fort becomes more than a relic—it becomes part of Sri Lanka’s collective memory.

Dr. Gamini Goonetilleke, FRCS is a senior consultant surgeon from Sri Lanka with over four decades of distinguished service. His career spans a wide range of hospitals across the country, including extended service in conflict-affected zones during Sri Lanka’s civil war, where he gained extensive experience in managing complex battle-related injuries. He is a Past President of The College of Surgeons of Sri Lanka and the author of three books: In the Line of Duty: the life and times of a surgeon in war and peace”, The Extra Mile: a surgeon’s experiences”, The Healing Cut: extraordinary surgical triumphs”.

Courtesy The Daily Mirror

Colombo, Feb. 25 (Daily Mirror) – Former Minister Ali Sabry has expressed concern over the arrest of former State Intelligence Chief Suresh Sallay, describing it as a troubling development for the Sri Lanka Army and its Intelligence Corps.

In a statement posted on social media, Sabry said the arrest of Major General Sallay—an officer he noted was associated with operations that dismantled the LTTE’s intelligence network and targeted senior leadership figures including Tamilchelvan, as well as efforts linked to the apprehension of Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP)—raises serious concerns about the direction of the national discourse.

“These were officers who once placed their lives on the line to protect the nation during its most dangerous years. Today, many feel that those same individuals are being drawn into a political battlefield shaped less by evidence and more by competing narratives. Accountability under the law is essential in any democracy, but it must be pursued with fairness, restraint, and respect for institutional integrity.

The Easter Sunday tragedy deserved a professional, evidence based inquiry focused on justice for victims and national security. Instead, what we increasingly witness is the transformation of a complex investigation into a public spectacle. International cooperation, including the extensive involvement of the FBI and U.S. authorities, has already taken place with investigations, prosecutions, and assistance provided. When even external partners indicate that further probes may not yield meaningful new outcomes, continuing to weaponise the issue for partisan gain risks damaging Sri Lanka’s credibility and long-term security interests.

National security institutions cannot become collateral damage in political contests. Undermining officers who once safeguarded the country may offer temporary political advantage, but it weakens morale within the armed forces and sends a troubling signal to those tasked with protecting the nation.

Sri Lanka must pursue truth and justice, but through law, evidence, and responsible leadership, not through theatrics designed to mislead or divide. History will judge not only those who served in difficult times, but also those who chose to politicise matters that demanded unity and maturity,” Sabry said.

Courtesy Daily Mirror

Colombo, Feb. 25 (Daily Mirror) – The Colombo High Court today ordered that Daisy Forrest, the grandmother of Yoshitha Rajapaksa, be released from the case filed against her under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

Deputy Solicitor General Janaka Bandara today presented to court a special psychiatric report obtained through the Colombo Judicial Medical Officer to determine whether the accused, Daisy Forrest, was mentally fit to stand trial. He informed the court that medical recommendations had concluded that the accused was not in a suitable mental condition to face trial.

Courtesy HiruNews

රාජ්‍ය බුද්ධි සේවයේ හිටපු ප්‍රධානී, විශ්‍රාමික මේජර් ජෙනරල් සුරේෂ් සලේ අත්අඩංගුවට ගැනීමේ සිද්ධිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් නිවේදනයක් නිකුත් කරමින් ජාත්‍යන්තර ත්‍රස්තවාදය සහ ආරක්ෂාව පිළිබඳ විශේෂඥයෙකු වන මහාචාර්ය රොහාන් ගුණරත්න සඳහන් කර ඇත්තේ මෙම අත්අඩංගුවට ගැනීම දේශපාලනික ක්‍රියාවලියක් ලෙස පෙනෙන බවයි.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ වඩාත්ම ගෞරවනීය ජාතික ආරක්ෂක වෘත්තිකයෙකු වන ජෙනරාල් සුරේෂ් සලේ මුළු ජීවිතයම ශ්‍රී ලංකාව ආරක්ෂා කිරීම සඳහා කැප කළ අයෙක් බවයි ඔහු සඳහන් කරන්නේ

ජෙනරාල් සලේ කිසිදු වරදක් කළ අයෙකු නොවන අතර 2019 වසරේ සිදු වූ පාස්කු ඉරිදා ප්‍රහාරයට ද ඔහුගේ කිසිදු සම්බන්ධයක් නොමැති බව මහාචාර්යවරයා පවසනවා.

ප්‍රහාරය සිදුවන අවස්ථාවේ මැලේසියාවේ ශ්‍රී ලංකා මහ කොමසාරිස් කාර්යාලයේ සේවය කරමින් සිටි සුරේෂ් සලේ අත්අඩංගුවට ගැනීම දේශපාලනික වශයෙන් සිදුකළ කටයුත්තක් ලෙස පෙනී යන බවයි මහාචාර්ය රොහාන් ගුණරත්න වැඩි දුරටත් පවසන්නේ.

මේ අනුව පාස්කු ඉරිදා ප්‍රහාරයට හේතු වූ නොසැලකිලිමත්කම සම්බන්ධයෙන් සුරේෂ් සලේ අත්අඩංගුවට ගැනීම පිටුපස සිටින අය ගැනද විමර්ශනය කළ යුතු බවද ඔහු පවසනවා.

ජෙනරාල් සලෙයි අත්අඩංගුවට ගැනීම කණ්ඩායම් දෙකක් විසින් සමරන බව පෙන්වා දෙන ඔහු පවසන්නේ ඉන් පළමු කණ්ඩායම පාස්කු ඉරිදා සංහාරය සිදු කළ ත්‍රස්තවාදීන් සහ අන්තවාදීන් බවත්, දෙවැනි කණ්ඩායම පාස්කු සංහාරය පිළිබඳ ව්‍යාජ ආඛ්‍යාන සහ කුමන්ත්‍රණ න්‍යායන් ගොතමින් ශ්‍රී ලංකා ආරක්ෂක හමුදාවන්ට දොස් පවරන දේශපාලන රැඩිකල්වාදීන් බවයි.

මහාචාර්යවරයා වැඩිදුරටත් පවසන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ පාස්කු ඉරිදා සංහාරය – ජාත්‍යන්තර ප්‍රජාවට පාඩම්” යන ග්‍රන්ථයේ කතුවරයා ලෙස තමා එම ප්‍රහාරය පිළිබඳව ගැඹුරින් විමර්ශනය කර අපරාධකරුවන් හඳුනාගෙන ඇති බවයි.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ නායකයින් ජාතික ආරක්ෂාව සමඟ සෙල්ලම් නොකළ යුතු බවත් ජාතියක් සුරක්ෂිත කිරීම සඳහා ද්විපාර්ශ්වික ප්‍රවේශයක් තිබිය යුතු බවත් පෙන්වා දෙන මහාචාර්ය රොහාන් ගුණරත්න පවසන්නේ පරිණත පාලනයක ස්වභාවය එය බවයි.

SL Leaders

Udaya Gammanpila

German Dharmaduta Society

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many German intellectuals and seekers viewed British

occupied Ceylon  (modern-day Sri Lanka) as the “Mecca of Buddhism”. This fascination was driven by several key factors: 

• Purity of Doctrine: German scholars, influenced by the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer and Hermann Oldenberg, believed Ceylon preserved the “purest” form of Theravada Buddhism and the original Pali Canon.
• Ven. Nyanatiloka
• The Island Hermitage at Polgasduwa: Founded in 1911 by the German monk (born Anton Gueth), the Island Hermitage became the primary center for German-Buddhist migration and study.
• Intellectual Infrastructure: Germany was home to pioneering Buddhist scholarship, with professorial chairs for Pali and Sinhalese established at Universities like Berlin and Heidelberg by the mid-19th century.
• Ven. Nyanaponika , a German-born monk who became a leading authority on Theravada, solidified the spiritual bridge between the two nations.
• Leading Personalities: Figures like Dr. Paul Dahlke , who founded Das Buddhistische Haus in Berlin, and
• the German Dharmaduta Society, founded by Asoka Weeraratna in 1952, continued this legacy by sending Buddhist missions from Sri Lanka to Germany to satisfy a “spiritual hunger” in the post-war era.
• Das Buddhistische Haus celebrated its 100th anniversary (1924 – 2024) on a grand scale in both Sri Lanka and Germany. 
• In Sri Lanka, the celebrations were conducted at Temple Trees (Official Residence of the Prime Minister ) on August 03, 2024 with full State Patronage. Hon. Dinesh Gunawardena, Prime Minister was the Chief Guest and Dr. Felix Neumann, Ambassador of Germany was the Guest of Honour, both of whom spoke at the function which had a large gathering comprising over 620 persons including over 70 Buddhist monks, foreign envoys representing China(Ambassador  Qi Zhenhong), European Union ( Ambassador Ms. Carmen Moreno), New Zealand ( High Commissioner  David Pine), India ( Deputy High Commissioner Dr. 
•  Satyanjal Pandey), Vietnam (Deputy Ambassador Le Van Huong), and several other distinguished Guests including the Speaker of the Parliament Mr. Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena. A large number of school children from across the country were also present. Ven. Olande Ananda Thero spoke of his visits to Das Buddhistische Haus in the 1980s and thereafter, and its influence and the support it gives to the maintenance of Buddhism in Germany.  Venerable Panadure Chandaratana Thero, the Deputy Abbot of the Mitirigala Nissarana Vanaya Monastery administered Pansil and delivered a short Anusasnava. General Sardha Abeyratne( President of the German Dharmaduta Society) delivered the vote of thanks. 
• In Germany the Celebrations were conducted at Das Buddhistisches Haus (Open Day for Visitors) spread over two days, August 3-4, 2024. An Exhibition about the history, founders and mission of DBH was held.  The festivities ended with an International Buddhist Conference held at Zehlendorf Community Hall, Berlin on August 04, 2024. The keynote speaker was Professor (Dr.) Martin Baumann, (Professor for the study of religions at the University of Lucerne, Switzerland).  He obtained his Ph.D. with a thesis on the history of Buddhism in Germany (1993). He concluded his keynote address by specifically naming Dr. Paul Dahlke as the Pioneer and Asoka Weeraratna as the Saviour of Das Buddhistische Haus. 
• A noteworthy feature of the celebrations was the issue of a Commemorative Postage Stamp in Sri Lanka and the release of a Book titled ‘ 100 years Das Buddhistische Haus’.  The architect of this rare volume was a German national, Dr. Winfrid Liebrich who served as the Chief Editor together with Senaka Weeraratna and Tissa Weeraratna as Co – Editors. This volume was released in both Colombo and Berlin during the celebrations. The publication was financed by a Vietnamese born Philanthropic Buddhist Nun. 
• Bhikkhuni Elizabeth Sujata is also known by her Vietnamese name,

Bhiksuni Dr. Bich Lien. A former beauty queen ordained in 2006, she is recognized for supporting the Berlin Vihara and several other meritorious projects in Sri Lanka.

• Dr. Winfrid Liebrich was also instrumental in releasing a Book in German to commemorate the 100th year anniversary of DBH. Its title ‘100 Jahre gelebter und gelehrter Buddhismus im Buddhistischen Haus Berlin-Frohnau’. Edited by Dr. Winfrid Liebrich, Senaka Weeraratna, Tissa Weeraratna

Tectum, 1. Edition 2024, 380 Pages. Book Review –    ‘Insights into the beginnings of Buddhism in Germany’ 

• https://www.sundaytimes.lk/251102/plus/insights-into-the-beginnings-of-buddhism-in-germany-618192.html

• Ven. Pelane Dhamma Kusala Thera based at Das Buddhistische Haus together with Mr. Tissa Weeraratna (Manager, DBH) played a pivotal role in organizing and co – ordinating the preparatory activities spread over a year. They were supported by the staff of the Embassy of Sri Lanka led by the Ambassador Ms. Varuni Mutukumarana, Members of the Sri Lanka Association of Berlin e.V. (Mr. Lankananda Perera), Mr. Tobias Siesmayer ( Präsident, Buddhistisches Haus Förderverein e.V.), and several other volunteers and patrons of Das Buddhistisches Haus.
• Over 40 leading Buddhist Monks drawn from Buddhist Temples across Europe and beyond attended the Conference, alongside prominent academics and dignitaries comprising the Ambassador Varuni Mutukumarana (Sri Lanka), Thai Ambassador Nadhavathna Krishnamra and his wife, and envoys from India, Pakistan, Cambodia, and several other Buddhist countries. Several monks delivered talks on the significance of the event and the leading role that Das Buddhistische Haus has played as the seat of Theravada Buddhism in Germany and other western countries, with growing emphasis in its aims on Mindfulness and Meditation. Mr. Lankananda Perera compered the whole proceedings. 

German Dharmaduta Society