Senaka Weeraratna

Japan’s Master Plan, if carried out without first attacking Pearl Harbour, would have allowed Japan to dominate everything from East Asia to the Suez Canal plus liberate India and Ceylon from British occupation, says Japanese war history expert, Hiromichi Moteki.

Hiromichi Moteki, Japanese war history expert, says that Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour (December 8, 1941) was a huge blunder and mistake in Japan’s wartime strategy leading to the total defeat of Japan in 1945. Instead had Japan implemented a far-sighted alternate Plan entitled Draft Proposal for Hastening the End of War Against the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Chiang Kai-shek” (Master Plan), developed by economic and other specialists early in 1941 and formerly adopted on November 15, 1941, the course of history may have taken a different turn.

Moteki is the Chairman of the Tokyo-based Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact (SDH), that challenges the conventional narrative of the war manufactured by mainly Western countries, which he argues was “victor’s justice” forced on Japan by the Allied powers. Japan is portrayed as a Criminal Nation. But the truth is vastly different.  The Book entitled ‘Japan’s Master Plan for Victory: What could have been’ (2018), authored by Hiromichi Moteki attempts to put the record straight.

On November 15, 1941, three weeks prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese government and Imperial General Headquarters held a liaison conference. The participants discussed the Draft Proposal for the Promotion of the End of the War Against the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Chiang Kai-shek,” and decided on its implementation. This draft proposal is the Master Plan for victory referred to in Moteki’s Book.

Moteki’s submission is that, Had Japanese military leaders stuck to this Master Plan, the outcome of the war would have been very different, an outcome that Winston Churchill feared in his April 15, 1942 letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (after Japan’s successful air raids on British occupied Ceylon ) where Churchill reverts to the grave situation in the Indian Ocean … arising from the fact that the Japanese have felt able to detach nearly a third of their battle fleet and half their carriers, which force we are unable to match for several months. The consequences of this may easily be (A) The loss of Ceylon, (B) Invasion of Eastern India with incalculable internal consequences to our whole war plan and including the loss of Calcutta and of all contact with the Chinese through Burma. But this is only the beginning. Until we can fight a fleet action there is no reason why the Japanese should not become the dominating factor in the Western Indian Ocean. This would result in the collapse of our whole position in the Middle East, not only because of the interruption to our convoys to the Middle East and India, but also because of the interruptions to the oil supplies from Abadan, without which we cannot maintain our position either at sea or on land in the Indian Ocean Area. Supplies to Russia via the Persian Gulf would also be cut. With so much of the weight of Japan thrown upon us we have more than we can bear”.

This alternate Plan required Japan first to attack the UK and Netherlands East, South Asian and South-East Asian colonies, and then for the Japanese military to proceed West in the direction of the Middle East.

It assumed that ‘with the UK weakened or unable to continue, Japan would persuade the US that conflict with Japan would be futile”, and furthermore any attempts to supply UK forces from the north, over the Soviet Union, could be disrupted easily.

With the UK in a relatively weakened position, the draft proposal further assumed that the US would lose the will to continue hostilities against Japan” (an unprovoked and isolationist US was unlikely to enter a theatre of war in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, Atlantic Ocean or Europe given the heavy opposition in USA to such entry among the American public).

Draft Proposal

Moteki I have also stated that this strategy is virtually identical to one devised by Ishiwara Kanji, a strategist of genius proportions. After World War II had ended, Ishiwara told reporters from Associated Press and United Press that if he had been in charge, Japan would have won. What he meant was that if the Japanese had followed the guidelines in the Draft Proposal, victory would have been theirs”.

Fall of Ceylon – Consequences

He says I am grateful to amateur historian Tanimoto Sunao for telling me about Russell Grenfell, a captain in the British Navy, who wrote the following lines in his book ‘Main Fleet to Singapore’:

Should the Japanese go on to capture Ceylon, an infinity of mischief would be within their reach. They could stop the flow of oil tankers coming down the Persian Gulf to give mobility to British and Allied ships and aircraft. They could sever the newly opened southern supply line to Russia through Persia. Seaborne communication between India and the outside world could be cut off. Nor was this the worst they could do. Along the east coast of Africa ran the main British supply route to the Middle East. By it came all the reinforcements of men, tanks, guns, ammunition, lorries, and all the numberless other things needed by the Desert Army. This, too, would be vulnerable to Japanese sea power; and if it were successfully attacked, our whole Middle East position was imperiled, including our naval influence in the Mediterranean. For with its communications cut, the Desert Army could not avoid defeat, Rommel would reach Cairo, the Mediterranean fleet base at Alexandria would be overrun, the overland route to Iraq, Persia, and India would be at the German disposal, and the Suez Canal would become an enemy waterway. The havoc that the Japanese could do to the British war effort if they used their command of the sea to strike westward was incalculable and would probably be catastrophic.”

The Book: Main Fleet to Singapore (1951)

• Author: Captain Russell Grenfell, a Royal Navy officer.
• Content: An in-depth account of the early naval war in the Pacific, focusing on the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse and the subsequent fall of Singapore.
• Significance: Offers strategic analysis and lessons from the disaster, making it a key text for understanding the end of British naval power in the East.

It was the Imperial Japanese Navy that ‘chased the Royal Navy from the Indian Ocean’. Japan together with the other Axis partners, Germany and Italy, though they lost the war, destroyed more than an ‘arm and leg’ of the British Empire.  It was Japan that brought an end to British naval power in the East.

Moteki then makes the point that Japan’s highly flaunted success at Pearl Harbor was in fact a defeat rather than a victory for Japan. Pearl Harbor wasn’t just an attack — it was a strategic gamble that ultimately failed. Admiral Yamamoto’s original plan included a devastating third wave that never came about, a decision that left American fuel reserves, repair yards, and critical infrastructure untouched.

The Japanese blame Admiral Nagumo for several major failures of Japan to capitalize on their stunning successes early in the war. Nagumo was relatively old for these devilish risky operations. A younger Japanese naval officer, at the helm, as the Commander of the Fleet may have done better, say some Japanese.  

1)     At Pearl Harbour, Nagumo failed to execute the planned Third Wave which would have crippled the American Fuel Depots and infrastructure.

2)     Nagumo failed to invade Ceylon despite two highly successful bombing raids on Colombo (April 5th, 1942) and Trincomalee (April 9^th, 1942). Ceylon was very poorly defended. Japan had 44, 000 Troops in their Ships but the Japanese failed to land on the soil of Ceylon at this critical juncture. It would have been a cake walk for Japan had the Japanese soldiers landed in Ceylon in April 1942

3)     Nagumo hesitated in taking correct decisions in time at Midway exposing the Japanese to their biggest Naval defeat in the war, from which they never recovered fully. Midway was a trap that even Admiral Yamamoto fell for.

Another huge failure in Japanese war strategy (in the eyes of the Japanese) was the failed invasion of India via Imphal and Kohima in the Northeast of India in 1944. This should never have taken place.

Japan’s Plan for liberation of Ceylon from British occupation

Moteki says:

As I have stated throughout this book, the plan was to topple the Chiang Kai-shek administration and establish a coalition government under Wang Jingwei and Chiang. The next step would be achieving independence for the Philippines, Burma, India, and other Asian nations”.

What if the Japanese had put Boots on the Ground in Ceylon in April 1942? Japan was basically a Mahayana Buddhist country. And friendly towards other Buddhist countries in Asia. Japan was the leader of the Buddhist world in the pre – war era. Japan sent the biggest Buddhist delegation to the Parliament of Religions Conference held in Chicago in 1893. Zen Master D.T. Suzuki shone at this Conference alongside Anagarika Dharmapala for Buddhism as much as Swami Vivekananda did for Hinduism.

The Japanese rejected the Manifest Destiny theory of the Christian West. Japan was not prepared to accept the freezing of the World Order based on colonialism and making it the Status Quo that could not be challenged or changed except at the risk of being branded as someone committing crimes against peace. The Manifest Destiny theory was that the United States was destined—by God—to expand its dominion and spread democracy and capitalism across the entire North American continent and there after the Asia – Pacific.

Sinhalese Defiance of Foreign Occupation of Sri Lanka

The Sinhalese never liked foreign occupation. When the Portuguese were carrying a Reign of Terror during their occupation of Sri Lanka (1505 – 1658) the Sinhalese invited the Dutch to help them to get rid of the Portuguese. Likewise, the Kandyan Kingdom sought the help of the English to push the Dutch out of Ceylon (1640 – 1796). It is quite possible that the Sinhalese seeking freedom from foreign rule would not have resisted a Japanese entry. They would have received a warm welcome especially from the Buddhist monks who would have thrown open the Buddhist Temples for Japanese accommodation. It was a Buddhist Temple in Trincomalee which hid two Japanese pilots of Japanese Planes that had crash landed after the raid on Trincomalee on April 09, 1942. The Buddhist monks looked after the Japanese Airmen, fed them, nursed them and after recovery helped them to escape to Burma by boat which was liberated by the Japanese. They survived the war – thanks to these Buddhist monks.  

The enemy of the British occupation of Ceylon were the people of Ceylon. Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and other categories were inhabitants of Ceylon. They wanted freedom from foreign occupation. Japan was seen as the liberator of Asia from Western Colonial Domination. The Great Leaders of Asia and founding fathers of their respective nations such as Netaji Subash Chandra Bose (India), Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta (Indonesia), Aung San and U Nu (Burma), Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), D.S. Senanayake, Dudley Senanayake and J.R. Jayawardene (Ceylon) were all friends and admirers of Japan. They did not fall victim for the racist propaganda line of the Western colonial countries who demonize and blacklist any one in their colonies who wants to end colonial rule. The greatest admirer of Japan in Ceylon (before WW 2) was Anagarika Dharmapala who died in 1933. He extolled the Sinhalese to look up to Japan as the Role Model having visited Japan together with Colonel Henry Olcott in 1886.

The crowning glory of Sri Lanka’s ties with Japan rests with J.R. Jayewardene who on the instructions of his Prime Minster D.S. Senanayake pleaded the cause of Japan at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951 asking for compassion to be shown to Japan (quoting the Buddha “Hatred does not cease by hatred, but only by love; this is the eternal law,” Dhammapada (Verse 5), and not to impose punishment demanding Reparations from Japan. Many Japanese to this day confirm that this unequivocal plea for mercy towards Japan from Ceylon at this Conference saved Japan millions of Dollars when fellow Asian countries withdrew their demands for Reparations after listening to Ceylon’s delegate J.R. Jayewardene.     

Moteki says that the unwise attack on Pearl Harbour brought the USA into the war early and unnecessarily, which should not have happened. It was a tactical victory but a strategic defeat. Japan’s planners had underestimated the power of the USA by thinking that they could defeat the US in the Pacific with their powerful naval forces.

US naval forces instead defeated Japan with impressive victories at Midway, Coral Sea, and Guadalcanal, reducing Japan to a weakened naval power unable to defend effectively their country from ensuing US island-hopping tactical attacks.

Moteki argues that Japan should have placed more reliance on its Army.  With a minimum but determined effort it had already in early 1942 conquered most of the UK and the Netherlands controlled areas in South-East Asia. If it had moved directly from there to the Middle – East, it would have dominated the world’s oil supplies. For Japan, that would be its final victory.

Japan had fought China for eight long years since 1937 yet was unable to defeat China. It was this failure of the Japanese Army on land that led Tokyo to prefer the naval strategy that had guaranteed later its final defeat.

Moteki is unimpressed with the strategy adopted by the highly glorified Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Supreme Commander of the Combined Fleet. He blames Yamamoto for Japan’s ultimate defeat.   It was Yamamoto, who pushed for the futile strategy of having the navy attack southward. Yamamoto was given a free hand after being elevated to a super star status after his spectacular daring raid on Pearl Harbour. Moteki says that the Japanese army, with its early victories in Southeast Asia, should have been given more opportunity.

The Indian Ocean should have been the focus of the Japanese military effort. Not the Pacific nor Australia. Prime Minister Tojo himself realized this truth in 1944 but far too late. Tojo and his entire Cabinet was forced to resign in 1944 when Saipan was captured by the Americans.

The liberation of India through an entry from the Southern coast was well within their capacity in the early stages of the war. That would have had catastrophic consequences internally. British India would have collapsed in 1942. This is the wisdom in hindsight.

 Japan’s role as liberator of Asia

In the early part of the 20th century, it is undisputed that Japan was the only country in the world that stood out openly for the liberation of Asia from western colonialism and had the capacity and resources to take on the challenge. ‘Asia for Asians’ became a battle cry of the Japanese. It was the first non – white country to defeat white majority countries on the battlefield using modern technology, in the last 200 years.  No other Asian country including China and India took up such a Pan–Asian slogan or was placed in such militarily strong position.

On the day following the attack on Pearl Harbour, i.e., December 8, 1941, an Imperial Rescript described Japan’s war aims: to ensure Japan’s integrity and to remove European colonialism from Asia and bring stability to East and Southeast Asia.

The idea of decolonization under Japanese leadership resonated with Asians widely because, in the words of former U.S. President Herbert Hoover in 1942, universally, the white man is hated by the Chinese, Malayan, Indian and Japanese alike,” due to his heartless and spiteful conduct as a colonial master over a few hundred years.”

Japan’s stunning military victories in 1941 – 1942

Thirty-six years after its victory in the Battle of Tsushima, Japan struck the greatest decisive blow ever by any non – white country or non – white people to European power in Asia with the attack on Pearl Harbour. In about 90 days, beginning on December 8, 1941, Japan overran the possessions of Britain, the US and the Netherlands in east and south-east Asia, taking the Philippines, Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies, much of Siam and French Indochina, and Burma with bewildering swiftness to stand poised at the borders of India by early 1942. All over Asia, subject people cheered the Japanese advance into countries forcibly held and occupied by western colonial powers.

General Yamashita – Tiger of Malaya

In the eyes of Japan, General Yamashita suddenly became the man of the hour and was called The Tiger of Malaya. The brilliant military campaign of General Tomoyuki Yamashita in the Malay Peninsula in early 1942 is described in detail and displayed with graphics in the Yushukan Museum which is found next to the Yasukuni Jinja (Shrine) in Tokyo. The Japanese conquest of Malaya and Singapore (considered impregnable by the British colonial rulers) in a mere 70 days under the leadership of General Yamashita and the sinking of the British warships Prince of Wales (Pride of the British Royal Navy) and Repulse by Japanese carrier – borne torpedo aircraft led to the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill calling the humiliating fall of Singapore to Japan as the “worst disaster” and “largest capitulation” in British military history. It was one of the biggest blows to Western prestige in Asia as it was coupled with the surrender of 130, 000 British Empire troops to General Yamashita’s Japanese army of 30,000 troops. This was the death blow to European colonialism, and it was never able to recover their supremacy in Asia thereafter.  

Select Excerpts from Moteki’s book

Rationale for entering the war

Japan certainly did not enter hostilities with the aim of conquering the world or even invading another nation. Faced with an environment that threatened Japan’s security and survival, the Japanese accurately grasped the situation that confronted them and rose to defend themselves using the few strategies available to them”

If only the Indian National Army had advanced from Ceylon to India …
If the Japanese had conducted the Imphal operation on land, in the first half of 1943, when they had the air advantage, and if reinforcements had joined the landing operation from Ceylon, Japanese troops and Indian National Army units might very well have been able to triumph over the enemy.

If Japanese and Indian forces had continued to advance, and the British Indian Army had surrendered, many of the defeated soldiers might have joined forces with the Indian National Army soldiers. Then they might have defeated the British soldiers from India. Once that started happening, things would have proceeded very quickly. The British soldiers from India might very well have been defeated quickly. What would the consequences have been?

The Japanese had already told the Filipinos and Burmese of their intention to acknowledge their independence. Furthermore, Indian nationalists might have been able to establish a government headed by nationalist hero Subhas Chandra Bose — not a provisional government, but a full-fledged one.

Could the US have refused to recognize such a government? How would the Americans have dealt with this problem; after professing they were fighting a just war. They would have been at their wit’s end. They might even have been reluctant to continue hostilities against Japan”.

Potential for Indian independence increases
Operation 11 would have accomplished even more than the obvious. When Ceylon was captured, it was not only Navy personnel, but also two Army divisions that occupied the island. Then soldiers in the Indian National Army could have established a base in Ceylon where they could plan a landing on Indian soil.

For that to happen, Japanese troops in Burma would have to defeat British troops from India in air battles. Then the Indian National Army, with Japanese support, could achieve air supremacy, and advance without difficulty.

On the aerial-warfare front, the Japanese had the 5th Air Division in the Burma area. In September 1942 that division conducted three operations there, overwhelming the enemy. The Fighter Air Group led by Col. Kato Tateo, which later became famous, was part of the 5th Air Division.

But the division was weakened when half of it was diverted to Guadalcanal. For the purposes of our simulation, we must assume that the Battle of Guadalcanal, which contravened the policies laid out in the Draft Proposal, never took place. We must also assume that the 5th Air Division’s war potential remained unchanged. In that case, the Japanese would have had superior air power in the Burma area, compared with that of the British. This assumption is very critical because when the Japanese launched operations in Assam and in Imphal, their aerial war potential was reduced to less than half its former strength (not through combat with UK forces, but because military authorities disregarded the Draft Proposal and diverted troops to the mire of Guadalcanal and New Guinea”.

Did Commander Yamamoto understand the Draft Proposal when he attacked Ceylon?
But between February 20 and 23 (1942) the Combined Fleet Headquarters conducted a map exercise on board the battleship Yamato in which an attack targeting Ceylon was launched in the Indian Ocean. Members of the Naval General Staff were present, as were three observers from Army General Staff Headquarters, who had been invited. The members of the Staff Headquarters apparently objected to the assault, stating that it should not be initiated until Germany had made more progress with its Africa operation, and the subjugation of Burma was complete. The Naval General Staff officers did not voice their opinions. But on February 27 at a joint Army-Navy research conference, they communicated their disapproval of the Ceylon operation.

It appears the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet understood the Draft Proposal, while the Naval General Staff did not. I say this because the Combined Fleet embarked on the Ceylon operation on April 5, even though Headquarters had rejected it. That operation succeeded in sinking two heavy cruisers, as well as the HMS Hermes, a light aircraft carrier. At about the same time the Kondo Fleet, based in Penang and commanded by Adm. Kondo Nobutake, set out accompanied by seven submarines; during a daring, destructive encounter in the Bay of Bengal, it sank 28 merchant ships. These operations should have continued, based on the original strategy, but that was not to be. As stated earlier, on April 10 Commander Yamamoto ordered the Nagumo Fleet to return to Japan so that it could take part in the Midway operation.

After the Pearl Harbor strike Yamamoto had ordered Combined Fleet Chief of Staff Ugaki Matome to investigate subsequent operation plans. They involved attacks on Midway, Johnston Atoll, Palmyra Atoll, and Hawaii. Yamamoto also recommended that the first attack should target Ceylon, an important enemy base, while there was still time to spare (the Ceylon operation).

Since in April Burma was not fully under Japanese control, the Navy could not count on help from the Army. Without that, the Navy would only be displaying their war potential — showing their hands to the enemy.

The Midway operation could never have appeared in the Draft Proposal. The only explanation that occurs to me is that Navy officials did not understand the true objective of the Western Asia operation.”

Victory Disease

There was one more misfortune that arose in connection with the Pearl Harbor success —victory disease. Prof. James Wood cites it as the primary reason for Japan’s defeat. It led to the following notion: Now is the best time to confront the Americans head on! We will crush them. There is no need to worry about defense!” This mindset spread like wildfire and became entrenched. I agree with Prof. Wood; victory disease caused the Japanese to depart completely from their original, basic strategy.”

Soviet – Japan Non – Aggression Pact (April 1941)

Moteki has some nice things to say about this Pact.

The drafters of the master plan were misled by the existence of a Japan-USSR neutrality pact. First, when the pact was signed, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke was fantasizing about concluding a Japan-Germany-USSR alliance on Japan’s initiative. Therefore, in April 1941 such a pact was signed. But within only two months, in June, hostilities commenced between Germany and the USSR.

Failing to understand Germany’s true aims, Matsuoka made a monumentally foolish mistake. The Japanese should have extricated themselves from the Japan-USSR Neutrality Pact. Even if they did not attack the USSR, the possibility that they might would have significantly constrained the Russians and helped Germany.

Then Matsuoka turned table and advocated an offensive against Far Eastern USSR, but Emperor Showa refused to countenance such a move. Japan should certainly have terminated the treaty with the USSR, given that its involvement therewith stemmed from an error in judgment”.

Adverse effects of Japan-USSR neutrality pact
Before anyone knew it, the neutrality pact had become a reality — a grim one. Its benefits were never reaped by Japan. The USSR, however, could now concentrate on waging war with Germany without a care in the world. Thus, a Treaty from which Germany received no benefits whatsoever was now inescapable”.

Japan without the obligations of this Treaty could have easily interdicted the flow of weapons and other valuable material from the USA to the Soviet Union under the Lend Lease Agreement. That would have been of great assistance to Germany.

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Conclusion

I have shared these thoughts as they relate to the most catastrophic event of the last century i.e., Second World War, as seen through the eyes of a learned and dedicated Japanese seer whose love for his country Japan and its finest ideals is impeccable.

Hiromichi Moteki is a decent kindhearted man who I had the privilege of meeting in Tokyo when he invited me to take part in a Seminar held on the premises of the Japanese Parliament (Diet) on November 14, 2018. I also had the privilege of Meeting Mr. Hideaki Kase (former President of the Society for Dissemination of Historical Fact) on this occasion, among several other important Japanese.  Mr. Kase died in November 2022 at the age of 85 years. Meeting and talking to them and listening to their side of the story was insightful. A rare privilege. Day after day we are constantly bombarded with propaganda against the Japanese and the Germans despite the end of the war 80 years ago. The online war continues ad nauseam against Japan.

These are my points in summary:

·  Japan’s Pivotal Role: Japan’s fight against the West was the pivot that led to the freedom of Black and Brown peoples, freeing them from centuries of colonial subjugation. No other non – white nation had such economic and military clout as Japan in the pre – war period.

·  Sri Lanka’s “Easy” Independence: Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948 was relatively peaceful, largely due to the changed global power dynamics post-WWII, making it a beneficiary of the broader Asian freedom struggle.

·  Critique of Colonial Historiography: History of Sri Lanka must be revised to break from Western-centric views.  We must acknowledge in Lanka’s Independence narrative Asian resistance and contributions, especially from India and Japan.

· Decolonizing Asian Minds: Decolonize Asian perspectives and show gratitude for the role Japan played in breaking Western dominance. Though Japan lost the war it left a powerful legacy. The liberation of Asia.

Moteki’s book is a must read for anyone interested in the story underlying the “Greater Far Eastern War” (or Dai Tō-A Sensō). Highly informative and rare in quality. As global power shifts from the West to the East new heroes will emerge from Asia based on their defiance of the West. This is an unapologetic version of a historical narrative.

I would like to end this Book Review by quoting Voltaire who said as follows:

Whoso writes the history of his own time must expect to be attacked for everything he has said, and for everything he has not said: but those little drawbacks should not discourage a man who loves truth and liberty, expects nothing, fears nothing, asks nothing, and limits his ambition to the cultivation of letters”

Senaka Weeraratna

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Author Profile: Moteki Hiromichi

Moteki Hiromichi was born in Tokyo in 1941. He is a graduate of Tokyo University’s Department of Economics. After working for Fuji Electric Company and the International Wool Secretariat, he founded the publishing company Sekai Shuppan in 1990.

In cooperation with the American company Mangajin, Inc., Mr. Moteki published Mangajin, an educational magazine featuring bilingual comics for Japanese-language learners. He is currently the Chairman for the Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact.

Mr. Moteki is the author of such Japanese-language works as The Ministry of Education is Destroying the English Language, Doing Away with English in Elementary School, and The Pitfall of Pressure-Free Education, How China Started the Second Sino-Japanese War: Why Should Japan Apologize To China? and the co-author of Doing Away with English-Language Education in Elementary School, Pressure-Free Education is Destroying the Country, Why Is China Coming to Take the Senkaku Islands? and Who Started the War Between Japan and the US? Analyzing President Hoover’s Freedom Betrayed.” Among works he has translated from English into Japanese are Thomas D. Luckey’s Don’t Fear Radiation! and James B. Wood’s Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?

References:

1)       ‘Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour ignited the liberation of Asia from Western domination – Time to express Asia’s Gratitude to

Japan’ by Senaka Weeraratna (https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Senakas-Speech.pdf)

2)      ‘THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR: HOW JAPAN CHANGED THE WORLD’ Speech by Kase Hideaki (https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Kase-Speech.pdf)