By Rohana R. Wasala

The Joint Opposition rally dubbed the ‘Maha Jana Handa’ (Vox Populi/ Voice of the People) held at the Ananda Samarakoon Open Air Theatre, Nugegoda on November 21, 2025 has suddenly acquired an increasing potential to be remembered as a significant turning point in post-civil conflict Sri Lankan politics, in the wake of the meteorological catastrophe caused by the calamitous Ditwa cyclonic storm that devastated the whole island from north to south and east to west on an unprecedented scale. But the strength of this  prospect depends on the collective coordinated success of the future public awareness raising rallies against the incumbent Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led Jathika Janabalavegaya or the National People’s Power (NPP) government promised by the participating opposition parties. They are set to expose what they perceive as the government’s utterly inexperienced and unexpectedly authoritarian stand on certain vitally important issues including the country’s national security and independence, political and economic stability, and the Lankan state’s unitary status. The government is also alleged to be moving towards establishing a form of old-fashioned single party Marxist dictatorship in place of the firmly established system of governance based on parliamentary democracy that the adventitious ‘Aragalaya’ protest of 2022 almost toppled, but that the timely intervention of some patriotic elements, though themselves still having to disclose some skeletons in the closet,  saved.   

The minefield of policy making that the government must negotiate is strewn with issues including, among others: the seven or so recent  agreements or MOUs (?) secretly signed with India; the unresolved controversy over the allegedly illegal clearance of some 323 containers (with unknown goods) from the harbour; the Prime Minister’s arbitrary,apparently  ill-considered and hasty education reforms without proper parliamentary discussion; the proposed culturally sensitive lgbtqia+…..legislation non-issue (it is a non-issue for Sri Lanka, given its dominant culture); the digital cards problem; the so-called IMF debt trap; dealing with the unfair, virtually unilateral UNHRC resolutions against Sri Lanka; the inexplicably submissive surrender of the control of the profit-making Colombo Dockyard PLC, Sri Lanka’s pioneer ship building and ship repairing centre which is one of Sri its key national assets to India; some government MPs’ eyebrow raising personal assets declarations, and the government’s attention-seeking theatrical handling of anti-narcotic and anti-corruption operations. The opposition politicians relentlessly criticise the ruling JVP/NPP’s failure to come out clean on these matters. But they themselves are not likely to be at an easy wicket if challenged to reveal their own positions regarding the above-mentioned issues.    

 In addition to those problems, the much more formidable challenge of unsolicited foreign-power interference in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs, in the guise of friendly intervention, remains an unavoidable circumstance that we are required to survive in the geostrategically sensitive region where our homeland is located. Having  been active right from the departure of the British colonialists in 1948, the foreign interference menace intensified after the successful ending of armed separatist terrorism in 2009. Such external interferences are locally assisted by latent domestic communal disharmony as well as real political factionalism, both of which are  normal in any democratic country. 

The war-winning president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, leader of the the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)-led United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), was made to suffer a largely unexpected electoral defeat in 2015 through a foreign-engineered regime change operation, that tacitly favoured his key rival, Ranil Wickremasinghe, who was then leading Sri Lanka’s Grand Old Party the generally pro-West and rightist United National Party (UNP) founded in September 1946. Mahinda Rajapaksa was betrayed by his most trusted lieutenant Maithripala Sirisena, said to have been co-opted as a muppet into that grand scheme, who later proved that he was not malleable enough for the role.

The SLFP, a more middle of the way socialist-leaning rival political party,  was formed in September 1951 (that is, five years after the birth of the UNP)  and was elected to power in 1956, ending a near decade under the rather West-friendly latter party. It was deemed to be a ‘revolution’ that started an era of ‘transition’ (from elitist to common citizen rule). From nominal independence in 1948, governing power has to date alternated between these two parties or alliances led by them, except for the last electoral year, 2024. Though incumbent executive president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, may be said to have made history in this sense, the fact remains that he was barely able to scrape just 43% of the popular vote as the head of a newly formed, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led, alliance called the Jathika Janabalavegaya or the National People’s Power (NPP). Anura Kumara Dissanayake was installed in office as executive president in September 2024. But his less than convincing electoral approval triggered a massive victory for the NPP at the parliamentary election that followed in November, giving him a parliament with 159 members, which is unprecedented in Sri Lanka’s electoral history. 

In my opinion, there are two main reasons for this outcome. One is that the average Sri Lankan voters trust democracy. Since the president elect is accepted as having won the favour of the majority of the pan-Sri Lankan electorate, the general public choose to forget about their personal party affiliations and tend to vote for the parliamentary candidates from the party of the elected president. This is particularly true of the majority Sinhalese Buddhist community represented by the two mainstream, non-communal national parties, the UNP and the SLFP.  The brittle foundation of that victory is not likely to sustain a strong enough administration that is capable of introducing the nebulous ‘system change’ that they have promised in their manifesto, while it is becoming clear that the general performance of the government seems to be falling far short of the real public expectations, which are not identical with the unconscionable demands made by the few separatist elements among the peaceful Tamil diaspora in the West to whom the JVP/NPP alliance seems to owe its significantly qualified electoral success in 2024. 

  The Maha Jana Handa reminded me of the long Janabalaya Protest March from Kandy to Colombo where it ended in a mass rally on September 5, 2018. That hugely successful event was organized by the youth wing of the SLPP led by Namal Rajapaksa, who was an Opposition MP during the Yahapalanaya. He has played the same role just as efficiently on the most recent occasion, too. At the end of his address during the Maha Jana Handa, he declared his determination to bring down the malfunctioning JVP/NPP government at the earliest instance possible. Probably, he missed Ranil’s protege Harin Fernando’s speech that came earlier. This was because Namal Rajapaksa joined the rally midway. Harin Fernando had brought a message from his mentor Ranil Wickremasinghe to be read out to the rally audience. But he said he didn’t want to do so after all, saying that it was not suitable for that moment. Anyway, during his speech, Harin Fernando said emphatically that the era of heir-apparents or crown princes was gone for good. People knew that he was alluding to Sajith Premadasa and Namal Rajapaksa (sons of former presidents hopeful of succeeding Anura Kumara Dissanayake). Harin was seen biting his tongue or sticking it out a little as he was preparing to leave the stage at the end of his address. Was he regretting what he had just said or was he cocking a snook at what, he was sure, was Namal’s ambition that would be revealed in his speech, the rally having been organised by the Pohottuwa or the SLPP that he leads? 

To be continued