KAMALIKA PIERIS
ARMING SINHALA SETTLEMENTS, 1984
The Tamil response to the Maduru Oya settlement was an eye-opener for the small coterie of Colombo elite who had taken an interest in the matter. They found that settling Sinhalese in Eelam needed much more strategy than they thought. Tamils who arrived here through settler colonialism were determined to prevent the return of the Sinhalese to the East. They intended to completely stamp out these Sinhala settlements by killing off the Sinhala settlers and the bhikkhus who supported them.
The first cold-blooded killing of Sinhala settlers was in 1984. LTTE attacked the Sinhala settlements at Kent and Dollar farms on 30 November 1984, and Kokkilai and Nayaru fishing villages on 1 December 1984. It was an orgy of killing. [1]
After the attacks, Sinhala farmers living north of Padaviya and the Sinhala fishermen settled along the Trincomalee-Mullaitivu coast and started fleeing to their original villages. They left with their families and with whatever they could carry with them. [2]
Lawyer S.L.Gunasekara informed his friends in Colombo that Kent and Dollar farms have been attacked by the LTTE and settlers killed. Now Padaviya will fold up, he said. Padaviya is about 30 minutes drive from Kent and Dollar farms, one hour from Kokkilai.
A group led by S.L.Gunasekara including Malinga Gunaratne and B.H. Hemapriya went to Padaviya on 7th December. They saw Sinhala villagers from Kokkilai and Nayaru piled into lorries and leaving for refugee camps at Negombo, Duwa and Pitipana. Padaviya villagers were also getting ready to leave for refugee camps. This meant the Padaviya settlement would collapse
Ven. Halmillawe Ratanasara whose temple was at Parakramapura, told them that Padaviya residents were poor and had no resources. We have no organization to support us, no finances. The villagers are living in the fear of death. they are no longer tending their crops. The mood is of dejection and despair.
The Colombo visitors decided that Padaviya must not be allowed to fall. To do so, they must stop Padaviya residents from leaving. They announced that they will help only if the Padaviya residents continued to stay in Padaviya.
Despite the panic that had gripped Padaviya some farmers still remained with their families, said Malinga in his book. They had been given guns by Major Bohran of the army unit there. Gunasiri, who was from the Maduru Oya project, emerged as the leader. He said better to die fighting than run for the rest of our life.
S.L. Gunasekera returned to Colombo, much concerned. He met Devinda Senanayake in Colombo on a private matter. Devinda Senanayake was the son of Robert Senanayake, brother of DS Senanayake. Gunasekera told Devinda about the situation at Padaviya. Devinda went to Padaviya to see for himself.
Devinda and S.L. then drafted a report to Chief of Civil Defense, Brigadier Dennis Hapugalle. The report recommended two items. The first was to arm and train the Sinhala villagers in the use of firearms. The second was to station an army brigade in Weli Oya and to establish a string of army posts to guard the Sinhala villages.
This report went to Security Council and from there it came to the attention of Ravi Jayawardene who had returned to the country from Australia, where he was living. He contacted Devinda, whom he knew socially. They discussed how to stop the Sinhala retreat.
In the meantime, a handful of the Colombo elite were also concerned about the matter. There was Malkanthi (pseud) a Colombo socialite and her husband Harendra (pseud). There was Sonia and Mithra who hosted meetings at their houses. Others in the group included Malinga, Hemapriya and some members of the army. They had realized the need for discretion. we must fade away after the projects are completed, they said.
After the Maduru Oya fiasco, and the Yan Oya non-event, this group decided that now was not the time for new settlements. We must first consolidate what we have. The settlements needed armed protection. Their solution was to provide weapons and training to the settlers so that they could withstand an LTTE attack.
Malinga said in his book, with deep feeling that they had tried to inform Colombo politicians, about the threat to Padaviya. They knew about this because Karunatilleke and Hemapriya had reported in 1983 to Mahaweli authorities that the LTTE were getting ready to attack Padaviya. they were training for this at Kent and Dollar farms. Padaviya settlers were going to be killed by the LTTE.
Malinga and Co tried to ‘inject a sense of urgency’ to Colombo but failed miserably. Despite our pleadings, Padaviya remained unprepared, said Malinga. Padaviya’s situation did not interest Colombo. It was as though Padaviya was not a part of the country.
Ravi Jayewardene’s interest in the matter was theretofore a tremendous boost to Malinga and his group. They met with Ravi. In Ravi we found the support we needed, Malinga said. Ravi told them how to set about the matter. This must be a low key operation done in the strictest of secrecy, said Ravi.
he would select the trainers and supervise the training. They must be put through an assault course, given firing practice and brought up to combat level. This will take some time. Ravi would also obtain the guns and ammunition needed by the settlers.
Ravi found the future trainers. They came from the army. he trained them for the task. He had to personally supervise the operation to the minutest of detail. He received very little cooperation from the authorities. His team was ready by December 1984.
In the meantime the Colombo group met daily to work out the logistics. Malinga was asked to identify the key Sinhala settlements. Malinga told them that there were three critical areas, Padaviya, Trincomalee and Malwatu Oya, in that order. LTTE will strike at them all. If we can hold these three settlements, LTTE will face a setback. 5000 guns around Trincomalee, 7000 round Padaviya and 5000 around Malwatu Oya plus training and they will look after themselves.
Further, If we hold these three settlements, we can afford t lose small pockets in Mannar Mullaitivu and Jaffna, Malinga added. The Sinhala concentrations in Jaffna and Mannar have already retreated.
The group discussed the possibility of getting monks in Yan Oya, Padaviya and Trincomalee to resettle people around the temples in those areas but did not carry out the idea. They focused on arming the settlements.
The group decided to arm and train Padaviya settlers first. Padaviya was of strategic significance. The settlement was only two miles from the sea. They went to Padaviya in first week of January 1985 taking Ravi Jayewardene, the team of trainers and the guns. Weapons went by road, people went by helicopter.
Dimbulagala Hamuduruwo was also brought there. Malinga had suggested this. Dimbulagala has the ability to muster support. He is the only person who can take 50,000 people to any part of the country, said Malinga. Malinga addressed the crowd. Then Dimbulagala spoke. He chanted pirit for a few moments, tucked up his robes, gave a stirring speech and asked the settlers to hold on to Padaviya.
Halmillawa Ratanasara of Parakramapura together with the chief priest at Sinhapura had organized the volunteers for the training. Trainers had been given clear instruction on what to do. I won’t give the details, said Malinga in his book. Later historians can find out how the defense system was mounted. But a fine defense system was developed at Padaviya. That is why Padaviya still stands today.
However, the Padaviya farmers had complained that they could not till the soil and earn their livelihood while at the same time watching out for the LTTE. After a full day’s farming it was not possible to function as security as well.
The Colombo group next decided to fortify Trincomalee and its hinterland. Morawewa was selected as the location for training, as there were Sinhala settlers there who were ready to defend Morawewa. Morawewa, Gomarankadawela and Tiriyaya leaders were contacted. They were told to get people form Yan Oya delta as well and come along.
The group went to Morawewa on third Saturday of January 1985 .They used the air force agriculture base camp at Morawewa for the training. Ravi supervised the training. The trainers came from the STF. They were unable, however, said Malinga, to fortify south of Trincomalee, such as s Ali Oluwa and Muttur.
Then they went to Malwatu, where the settlements at Tantirimale and Villachchiya were under threat. They selected Tantrimale for training. Two aircrafts took the people and the guns.
Looking back, Malinga notes that the whole operation was done silently, Padaviya, Trincomalee and Malwatu. No publicity, no fanfare. Ravi was invisible. Malinga Gunaratne drew attention to the contribution of Ravi Jayawardene.
The fortification of Padaviya, Trincomalee, and Tantirimale, using trained and equipped civilians was done by Ravi Jayewardene. The world must know this. There were no attacks on civilians there after this, concluded Malinga Gunaratne,
Journalist T Sabaratnam, writing to Tamilnet provides another account of this period. He said that the Devinda- S.L. report had reached Security Council. In one of the Security Council meetings, Brigadier Dennis Hapugalle submitted a report prepared by S. L. Gunasekera- and Devinda Senanayake. [3] KEEP
The report advocated two measures. The first was to arm and train the Sinhala villagers in the use of firearms. The second was to station an army brigade in Weli Oya and to establish a string of army posts to guard the Sinhala villages.
Those recommendations were accepted and Weli Oya Brigade Headquarters was established four kilometers from Kent Farm. The former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Janaka Perera, was appointed the Commanding Officer. Janakapura, a new town built in Weli Oya, was named after him, said Sabaratnam.
Arming of the Sinhala villagers began in mid- January 1985. It was announced in January 1985 that 50 to 100 Home Guards would be trained and deployed to guard Weli Oya. Ravi Jayewardene and the voluntary organization he founded, Sath Sevana, undertook that job. Funds were provided by the government. Sath Sevana started the arming operation from Padaviya and concluded with Gomarankadawela in the in the Trincomalee district. By the end of April, all Sinhala villages in Weli Oya had been armed.
That policy resulted in the militarization of the Weli Oya settlements.All Sinhala border villages had been militarized by the middle of 1985. The army became the enforcer of civil rule among the Sinhala villages in the region. But, arming of Sinhala border villages only heightened Tamil militant activity. It created a situation where an entire brigade of the army had to be deployed to protect the Sinhala settlers, concluded Sabaratnam.
In 2000, there was another bout of support for the Sinhala settlers at Weli Oya, (former Manal aru) .This time it was for bunkers, not arms.
Weli Oya was attacked by the LTTE November 1999 using guns they had captured from the Army. These attacks on the Weli Oya villages resulted in a mass exodus to Padaviya. A group of Sinhala expatriates were at the Chaitiyagiriya temple on November 12, 1999. We were able to witness the confusion that resulted due to these attacks.
An alert Army Commando suddenly shouted for us to take cover when he heard the sound of an artillery shell pick up. We immediately ran for cover to an abandoned pond below ground level. that was the safest place in the absence of an underground bunker. Three artillery shells fell in the adjacent paddy field in quick succession, but no one was hurt.
It was on this day that we of the Thawalama Development Foundation decided to fund the construction of underground bunkers in Weli Oya, if and when the people decided to return to their homes from the refugee camps to which they were now rushing.
With the readjustment of the forward defence line closer to the Weli Oya settlement, more than 60% to 70% of those who were displaced as a result of the November LTTE artillery attack, returned home, However, a similar exodus cannot be ruled out if another LTTE attack is staged unless underground bunkers are built .
We set up a project to construct underground bunkers for the protection of the Weli Oya Sinhala villagers and called for patriotic Sinhala organizations and citizens here and abroad to consider contributing t.
A project proposal was prepared by the 223 Brigade Commander. The total cost of the project was approximately Rs. 6.5 million for the construction of 622 underground bunkers in the settlement. The cost of a family underground bunker was estimated at Rs. 10,000 and nine larger underground bunkers were to be built for the five schools. Each of these bunkers was estimated to cost Rs. 30,000.
The Thawalama Development Foundation based in Colombo could not implement such a large project single-handed. We therefore requested that an organization named the Weli Oya Development Foundation be established in the project area to assist us in this Endeavour with Ven. Kuda Halmillewa Ratnasara Nayake thero of the Chaitiyagiriya temple as its president. This organization is presently successfully implementing the project at grassroots level in Weli Oya with the finances we provide.
Visiting Weli Oya on August 23, 2000 to see the progress achieved, we saw that at Janakapura, construction work on 15 family bunkers had been completed with the funds so far provided. Funds for a further 30 family bunkers at Janakapura have been promised by expatriates living in the Middle East.
At Athawatunuwewa construction work on 18 family bunkers had been completed with the funds sent in by the Sri Lanka Association North West UK. Two larger bunkers were under construction at the Athawatunuwewa village school.
We have already received the necessary funds to construct the nine bunkers necessary for the five schools from the Buddhist Village Trust Sri Lanka based in the UK. This same trust also funded the construction of 17 family bunkers at Kalyanapura 1. The construction work on family bunkers at this village too had been completed.
It was at Kalyanapura that we were made to realize the tremendous value of our timely action. Villagers pointed out to us several craters near their houses where artillery shells had fallen on August 18, at around 4.30 in the evening. They told us that on hearing the sound of the artillery shell pick up, all the villagers had rushed into the newly constructed family bunkers carrying their children with them.
They had hardly reached safety when the first shell exploded in the compound of Herath Banda. 25 shells followed before the bombarding ceased. No villagers were hurt thanks to the bunkers. The destructive power of the artillery shells was clearly evident to us from the banana trees that had been ripped to shreds and the deep gashes the shrapnel had cut on the barks of hardwood trees. Had it not been for the bunkers, that shell attack would have taken the lives of many of us, villagers said.
While we live in the unaffected areas of the country sleep soundly in comfortable bedrooms the families of Weli Oya spend their nights cramped up bunkers for the sake of survival concluded Thawalama Development Foundation, in 2000. [4](Continued)
[1] Malinga Gunaratne. For a sovereign state p 219?
[2] https://sangam.org/pirapaharan-vol-2-chap-43-the-massacres/ sabaratnam
[3] https://sangam.org/pirapaharan-2-chapter-23-manal-aru-becomes-weli-oya/
[4] https://www.sundaytimes.lk/000924/plus5.html
