KAMALIKA PIERIS
In both JVP insurgencies, 1971 and 1987, JVP tried to infiltrate
all four security services, police, army, navy and air force. The 1971 insurgency this was not very
successful in this. Only about ten persons became JVP supporters in each of the four services
in 1971 said Chandraprema., Some joined the JVP when the insurgency ended. However, Godahewa observed that several
members of the armed forces were recruited into the JVP and used very
discreetly.
Wijeweera had
tried to recruit army personnel who were
thought to be loyal to SLFP, but they were not interested. Wijeweera was more successful with the navy.
Wijeweera targeted the Sri Lanka navy from the very beginning. A list of navy
personnel were submitted to him by a contact.
Wijeweera met this group at Trincomalee navy base and spoke to
them, probably in 1965. And a group of
JVP navy men” was created. Many naval
personnel attended the JVP classes in 1966 and 1967. Naval ratings who were
close to Wijeweera were among the instructors at the JVP training camps.
Able Seaman H.M. Tillekeratne was the
‘Coordinating Officer’ between the Navy and the JVP, and the JVP was planning
to appoint him as North-East commander if they seized power.
He was in the habit of regularly travelling between the Elara Camp
and the Trincomalee Naval Base. He was conducting political classes for
some Navy personnel.
The notion
that in 1971 the JVP was only interested in taking over police stations is
incorrect. This was only a cover. Even then, the target was the armed forces
and the military installations. During the 1971 insurgency, JVP took over the
Anuradhapura air strip and was eyeing the one at Vavuniya. JVP planned to establish military
units in each police area in the country.
JVP was also
planning to take over Trincomalee by sending JVPers parading as football
players to start the insurgency there. Towards the
end of March, 1971, the Trincomalee Naval Base received a letter from the
Peradeniya University requesting to arrange a football match between university
students and Navy personnel on the naval base grounds n Trincomalee on April 5.
The letter also requested the Navy to arrange for the university team to spend
the night at the base, since it was difficult for them to return to Peradeniya
the same day after the match.
The naval authorities were wary. The Navy decided it was not safe to allow a
football match between the Navy and University team at Trincomalee. The
university authorities were informed that the naval base grounds could not be
given for the match.
JVP planned to
take over the navy bases in Jaffna or at least their weapons.
Sailors who supported the JVP has
been posted to the armories there. Within
48 hours of the JVP uprising Superintendent of Police Jaffna, received a
message from Colombo of a suspected move to put sleeping tablets into the
water filters at the Elara Camp’s officers mess. The
police took immediate action. They arrested Tillekeratne and after a
squirmish, shot him dead.
After Tillekeratne’s death, police searched
his personal belongings and found secret documents, and several bottles of
sleeping tablets which were to be put into the water filters of the Elara
Camp’s officers’ mess. Tillekeratne’s plan was to seize all weapons and
ammunition from the camp’s magazine, before joining his JVP comrades, after
making naval officers unconscious.”
Since the army and navy had refused to go over to the JVP
wholesale, it was necessary to somehow put them out of action during the 1971
insurgency. JVP had planned to put laxatives and sleeping pills into the food
in the army and navy camps. They were
going to introduce an ayurvedic laxative, japala seeds, which tasted
like coffee. If taken in excess it could even cause death by dehydration. This
was known as the ‘japala plot’. The army was aware that something of the sort
had been planned. Around March 1971 army officers who were in camp had heard
that there was a threat to poison them, said one commentary.
One of the tasks assigned to the JVP in 1987-89 was to weaken the Sri Lanka army and divert
military attention away from the Eelam war. The first targets of the JVP in
1987 were, therefore, armed forces and police.
JVP planned this well. An Increasing number of youth were
reported, when arrested, in 1987, to
have in their possession detailed maps of army camps, important government
institutions, and residences of government politicians. One youth had several
maps of the Panagoda army camp. It was obvious that JVP was planning large scale strike against the
state, noted Chandraprema.
Saman Piyasiri, head of the DJV, had plans of vital military
installations, photographs and documents, in his house when he was taken into custody. The photos included installation of the
military police headquarters Sri Lanka.
JVP launched their attacks on military establishments at the
height of the Eelam wars. On 15 April 1987, JVP attacked the Pallekele Army
Camp in Kandy. Lead by a former soldier, under the directions of Shantha
Bandara. JVP successfully raided Pallekelle and took
off with firearms and ammunition. JVP
seized 12 Type 56 assault rifles, seven sub-machine guns and ammunition. The daring and ingenuity
of the Pallekelle raid in early hours of New Year day showed the imprint of a
well organized movement, said Godahewa.
When the 1987
Vadamarachchi campaign was turning out well, three days after the Indian
‘parippu’ drop, JVP launched two armed attacks on the Katunayake air force base
and Kotelawala Defence Academy, removing
a valuable haul of weapons from each. They
had support inside the Air force base and were able to take away eleven T56 and 15
submachine guns.
In Oct 1987 JVP attacked Kallar army camp in Trincomalee
and after a 20 minute gun battle, over ran the camp and
took away a huge amount of weapons, six
T56, three LMG spare barrels, This was
the JVP ‘s Largest haul of weapons to date. The
Kallar army camp was near Mahindapura in Serunuwara in the Kantalai police
division
In Jan 1988 JVP attacked the army training camp at Kumbukke in Horana. In April 1988 there was
a second attack on Katunayake Air Base and JVP took away weapons and
ammunition. In November 1988 JVP attacked the Pannala National Air Force
training camp .The arms haul from Pannala was bigger than those from Kallar. At Pannala JVP was helped by an air force
deserter. There was also an
unsuccessful attack on Panagoda army camp.
In the period 1987-1989, soldiers were killed not only by the LTTE
but also by the JVP. JVP targeted and
killed members of the armed forces. In 1988, a soldier of Gemunu watch
was beheaded when he was on leave at Weeraketiya. In 1989 two soldiers were
knifed at Tyre Corporation, two NIB
officers were gunned down in Timbirigasyaya
and a soldier who came to celebrate New Year at Navagamuwa was killed on
his way to see an Avurudu play and his severed head displayed. Many STF
officers were killed when they came home on visit or on sick leave.
In 1988 JVP ambushed an army commando unit sent out on to track
down JVP killers at Kirula in Hungama area. Three commandos died. In April 1989,
there was a spate of landmine blasts in Embilipitiya, four soldiers were killed.
There were landmines in Hungama,
Tissamaharama, Angunokolapelssa, Kamburupitiya, Urubokka, and Middeniya as
well. Land mine in Medirigiriya killed four police officers.
JVP specially targeted the Counter Subversive Unit (CSU) set up
to hunt them down. CSD operatives were handpicked as targets, their homes were
burned and loved ones killed. In 1987 PC
Sapukotana of Matara police was stabbed and killed. This was the beginning of a
series of attacks on CSU operatives, said Gunaratna. Peliyagoda CSU sub inspector Wickremasinghe
was killed as he was driving. In
December 1987 JVP shot dead the Director of the CSU, Terrence Perera. CSU did not develop after his death.
JVP humiliated the armed services.
In October 1988 an army detachment was attacked with stones by demonstrating
school children in Ambalantota. Family members of security forces were made to
walk at the head of JVP demonstrations, so that they would be the first to be
killed if the force opened fire.
From 1984
onwards JVP had infiltrated the armed forces. JVP
infiltration of armed service in 1987-89 was more successful than in 1971
observed Chandraprema. DJV had a registry with names of over 700 service
personnel from police, army, navy and air force who held membership in JVP or
supported it. The registry also showed how to contact them.
JVP successfully
infiltrated the lower rungs of the police and armed services. Three policemen attached to Kandana and
Middeniya police stations were JVP activists.
At Athurugiriya a soldier killed tenother
soldiers in the night. A pro JVP police
officer had infiltrated the military police of the army. JVP also had a
military officer in the Ops Combine
audio visual unit. He had given JVP the names and addresses of officers
engaged in anti JVP operations.
There was another benefit from the infiltration. JVP
infiltration helped to retard army attacks on the JVP. There was at least a degree of hesitation, said Rohan
Gunaratna. The government found that the army was not that eager to go after
the JVP in March- April 1987 said Chandraprema.
Infiltrating the army was not difficult as
persons were recruited to army and police without full screening in 1984, said
Godahewa. But the army soon realized that its lower rungs had been infiltrated.
There were acts of indiscipline and appropriation of arms. The army suspended
its training of one batch of recruits suspecting that they were JVPers. And the
batch recruited in 1986 to the army was not sent for training until they were
fully screened.
The JVP was
able to get some service men to desert, mainly from the lower and middle
grades. There were over 150 desertions, between 1984-1987 and there were 250 desertions from 1987 onwards, said
Chandraprema. They were asked to bring a
weapon with them but most of the desertions took place
without weapons.
These
deserters were useful to the JVP .The military campaign in the south was
started by three deserters from the army. Another deserter, a ‘trained ex
army man,’ led the operation at
Pallekelle. Army deserters had trained JVP in three locations in Kandy
district.
However, JVP
was unable to infiltrate the armed forces in the number needed to generate
large scale desertions. JVP even approached those who were suspended from
the army. In 1988 JVP asked the security forces to
desert and join JVP. In late June 1989
the JVP repeated its call to the armed forces to defect from the State by July
29, 1989, but large-scale desertions did not happen.
JVP had also
hoped for a large scale mutiny of army. JVP
were waiting for forces to mutiny and come to their side but this did not
happen, though JVP waited a long time, said Chandraprema.
JVP then decided on strong
arm tactics. JVP issued threats to members of the armed services and police
that they should resign or be killed. JVP threatened the families of service
personnel who did not desert. Police officers
investigating JVP activity also got death threats. Letters were sent to OIC of
police directing them to release suspects already taken into custody. Due to
JVP threat many in the army retired or left the service.
JVP radio
repeatedly warned that August 1989 was the deadline for security forces
personnel of all ranks to desert or face the consequences which was death. In the Ranabima
bulletin of 21st April 1989, JVP specially threatened the families of those
active in counter-insurgency operations, the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and the Special
Task Force (STF). Chandraprema observed that a similar threat had been made in 1988 as well.
In 1989 JVP carried out
their threats. JVP already had the addresses of captains, lieutenants, and
second lieutenants. Over hundred homes of military men were set on fire in south and
northwest. JVP killed 122 members of
families of security forces and police in the most brutal fashion. Some were
hacked to death, some were burned alive in their homes which were set on fire.
JVP made no allowance for old people or children.
One such case was the murder of mother, brother, sister in law and
two nephews of a DIG ( Udugampola) who was serving in the south. They were shot
and whilst still alive, their residence was set on fire with them inside. The
IGP had said he wanted to finish off the JVP.
JVP’s
decision to kill family members of the security forces and to destroy their
property was the main factor in changing the security forces’ approach towards
the JVP. The security forces became
very angry. Among the public also, there
was a wave of indignation against JVP. JVP had made an irrevocable and fatal
mistake.
No one in the JVP took responsibility for the decision to kill
servicemen. They all denied it when they
were arrested. JVP’s deputy leader Gamanayake had said that this threat was not
intended to be carried out, but only to neutralize active sections of the
security forces.
No
sooner had they issued death threats to the families of the servicemen, posters
appeared all over the country under the name of vigilante group, Deshapremi
Sinhala Tharuna Peramuna, announcing, Ape ekata thope dolahak!”
Deshapremi
Sinhala Tharuna Peramuna also circulated a note to the families of the JVPers,
which read as follows:
“Dear
father/Mother/Sister,
“We
know that your son/brother/husband is engaged in a brutal murder under the
pretence of patriotism. Your son/brother/husband, the so-called patriot, has
cruelly taken the lives of mothers like you, of sisters, of innocent little
children. In addition he has started killing the family members of the heroic
Sinhalese soldiers who fought with the Tamil Tigers and sacrificed their lives,
in order to protect the motherland.
“It is not
amongst us, ourselves, the Sinhalese people, that your son/brother/husband has
launched the conflict in the name of patriotism? Is it then right that you, the
wife/mother/sister of this person who engages in human murder of children
should be free to live? Is it not justified to put you to death? From this
moment, you and all your family members must be ready to die. May you attain
nirvana! Deshapremi Sinhala Tharuna Peramuna.”
Then came the
counter attack. There were ruthless series of counter terrorist groups, PRRA,
Black cats, Yellow cats, Rajaliya, Ukussa. They killed JVPers and dismembered the bodies and hung
placard round their necks warning similar fate to others..
‘In October 1989 after Capt T.E. Nagahawatte, the Assistant Registrar
of the Peradeniya University, who was also a volunteer soldier was killed by
two gunmen inside the University premises, eighteen heads were found the next
day placed neatly around the University pond. The headless corpses had been placed
in various postures in the vicinity. Bodies kept appearing by the dozen in the
rest of the country, as well.’
The army also attacked the JVP. A Sri Lankan Army official said ‘we
have learned too many lessons from Vietnam and Malaysia. We must destroy the
insurgents completely. We have no choice. ‘ At Embilipitiya the Army intercepted JVP letters at the post
office itself, so no extortion letters reached the public. The public appreciated
the army effort. By December 1989 all
members of the new JVP committee were taken in,
the last was taken in January
1990. (Continued)