KAMALIKA PIERIS
The JVP did not fade away after April 1971 as
it would have done, had it been a purely local affair. Instead, JVP met
secretly and reorganized. JVP first
retreated into their hideouts in the jungles of the North Central Province.
They moved the camps from place to place.
They did not stay in one place for long. The leader at Namal oya camp was in a
separate chena known only to couple of trustworthy members.
There were jail breaks. In November 1971 JVPers escaped from
Vidyalankara, Vidyodaya and Weerawila camps. At Vidyalankara, they escaped through a tunnel which they had
dug. Prison authorities had earlier
reported that there was no tunnel
leading to the conclusion that JVP has accomplices in the prison. At
Anuradhapura prison as they escaped, JVPers had freed the other prisoners as
well.
The plan was to get back the original cadres
rather than recruit new ones. JVP
prisoners received visits by persons
pretending to be relatives. They carried JVP messages in and out of these camps
and prisons. JVP cadres met them as they were released. One of the
places used for this was the Peradeniya University. It was done discreetly without arousing
suspicions of undergrads, said Indradasa.
Cells were established throughout the country
except North and East. Cells were set up in Colombo, Galle, Tangalle,
Embilipitiya, Ratnapura, Polonnaruwa, Chilaw Kegalle and Moneragala. There were cells of 25 in each police
area Cells were all linked with each
other, Cells were used for recruitment,
indoctrination, and weapons training. Cells were organized
in schools as well. JVP also
later had cells at Walkers and Central Finance Co in
Kandy
The
five lectures had originated in
1968 and were developed in 1969. In 1977 the five lectures were revised. They
now focused on the need to capture power by force. They were given by specially trained members.
After 1971, JVP made changes in its structure.
All key points in the organization were held by those loyal to Rohana
Wijeweera. A secret Central Committee
was established, which gave the main directions. The identities of this secret committee were
known only to the district organizers. The
leading JVPers had code names.
The JVP was wary of those who wanted to join
them and they were first screened. There was tight control of information.
Those who came for lectures were given places to meet at, from where they would
be taken to a secret venue. The organization structure of JVP was secretive. It
was almost beyond destruction said Rohan Gunaratna.
By
1977, Wijeweera had set-up an organization with thirteen Politbureau members
and twenty-nine Central Committee members. The Politbureau Members were Rohana
Wijeweera, Upatissa Gamanayake, Piyadasa Ranasinghe, Saman Piyasiri Fernando,
P.B. Wimalaratne, Gunaratna Wanasinghe, Sumith Athukorale, Somawansa
Amerasinghe, H.B. Herath, D.M. Ananda, Shantha Bandara, Nandatillake Galapatthi
and Lalith Wijeratne. Names of the Central Committee members are given in the
footnote below. [1]
The JVP Politburo never met in full session.
They got together only in ones, twos or threes. It was D M Ananda the
functionary number 1 in the JVP’ who conveyed decisions from one group to
another.
The organization
was divided into three Departments. The departments were directly placed under
the Politbureau. Department No1” consisted of Zonal Committees. The
island was divided into five zones, (i) Western/Sabaragamuwa; (ii) Central;
(iii) Rajarata; (iv) Uva/Eastern, and (v) Southern. Analysts noted that the North and North West
were excluded. The names of the Zonal leader are given in the footnote below.[2]
The Zonal
Committees were in turn divided into District Committees which were placed
under the leadership of members of the Central Committee. The District
Committees were headed By Central Committee members. Names of District
committee members are given in footnote below. [3]
Each district was
divided into a number of Divisions. A district could have two or more
Divisions, depending on the size and requirements. Each Division had a
Divisional Secretary, and a Secretary each for education, finance, military
organization, propaganda, youth, students, workers, bhikkhu and women. Rank
wise, the Secretaries of the Divisions were just below the Central Committee.
But often, a single person held various
ranks simultaneously. The military wing
had
an operation leader, trainer, intelligence specialist, planner and strategist.
Divisions
were classified and numbered . Kandy
district was divided into four divisions D1 to D4. D1 contained K 33, K 66 and
K 99. K 33 was Mahanuwara, Senkadagala ,K 66 was Udunuwara, Yatinuwara and K 99 was Galaha, Marassana and
Talatuoya. D2 was Gampola and Nawalapitiya, D3 was Galagedera and Harispattuwa,
D4 was Teldeniya, Ududumbara, Kundasala and Wattegama. With the exception of Wattegama, l these
are the polling divisions of the Kandy
electorate.
Department No. 2” consisted of National
Committees. There were national committees for Education, Finance, Propaganda,
and Military Organization. Gunaratne Wanasinghe headed the committee for
education; Finance was Somawansa Amerasinghe, Propaganda, Upatissa Gamanayake
and Military, Saman Piyasiri Fernando
Department No. 3” consisted of eight Front
Organizations. They were Youth, Students, Bhikkhus, Women, Trade unions,
Rural, Cultural and Propaganda. Through
these JVP expanded its support among
school children, university students, unemployed youth, Buddhist monks, the
nationalist intelligentsia and intermediate layers of rural Sinhala
society” said analysts. The Womens wing was started in 1983 and schools girls joined.
Regarding these fronts, there was the Patriotic Students Movement for secondary
schools. This was entirely controlled by the JVP though they avoided getting
identified directly with it. Branches of
this organization were set up in several schools in Colombo and
outstations. The intention was to build
up a membership, especially in the ‘A’ level classes, from which these students
would enter university. This would ensure a readymade membership from among
freshers. JVP had put up posters near
smaller schools so that an awareness of JVP would be in their minds when they
reached A levels. This was one of their most valued sources of recruitment.
In
the universities JVP started with action committees. From these developed a
powerful apex organization, the Inter-University Student Federation (IUSF). The
IUSF co-ordinated student activities in a national level. The IUSF
became the most powerful organization formed by JVP in the universities.
By 1985, the JVP came to dominate student
politics in school and University.
Analysts
noted that the Arts
students, who had traditionally given the lead, were now the followers. At
the Peradeniya University, it was the Engineering students who took the lead,
at the Colombo University it was the
Science undergrads and at
Ruhuna , it was the medical students.
Two
powerful bhikkhu fronts, Deshapremi
Taruna Bhikshu Samidanaya and Manava Hitavadi Bhikkhu Sanvidanaya were set up
by the JVP in the 1980s Young
bhikkhus, some from University joined
these fronts and were very active. The possibility of some bhikkhus
giving up their robes and joining the JVP/DJV cannot be ruled out, said
Attanayake. It is also possible that members of the JVP, posing as
priests, went to various temples to propagate their ideology. The robe
could be used to great advantage, observed Indradasa. The robe offered
cover, and had impact on a Buddhist population.
However,
this was not the first JVP bhikkhu
organization .
Young bhikkhus had participated in the 1971 insurgency. The decision to start the 1971 attack was taken in
the Bhikkhu hostel of a
university. In Kotmale insurgent
activity had centered around the
Buddhist temple, where they coordinated the plan to attack the police
station. Fifty six bhikkhus had been arrested by 1976.
The correct figure could he much higher, said analysts.
These bhikkhus had gone to great lengths to
provide all kinds of incidental help, said Attanayake. These bhikkhus had assisted in raising funds for the
organization. They had provided shelter
in abandoned temples to JVP members on the run. These temples were also used
for storing weapons.
For the trade union front, JVP created their
own trade unions and also infiltrated the trade unions of other political
parties. JVP-led trade union, the
Samastha Lanka Sevaka Sangamaya which only had about 500 to start with, benefited by the July 1980 strike where
the government dismissed over 40,000 workers. They also benefited from the Nurses strike of
1986. JVP tried to take over the GMOA
but failed.
There were 17 JVP dominated or controlled
trade unions in 1986. A trade union combine, called Janata Satan Peramuna,
comprising all JVP trade unions was formed thereafter. When JVP trade unions
were proscribed, JVP infiltrated the service itself.
JVP also set
up the Jatika Sisya Madyastanaya and the
Jatika Kamkaru Satan Madyastanaya. Jatika Sisiya Madhastanaya handled all JVP
action in schools and technical colleges . It formed committees of teachers,
parents, and staff. In 1986 JVP had support in over 2000 schools
in island except in north and east.
there were also
‘sympathetic organisations’ such as ‘Citizens Committee of Colombo’, ‘HR organization of University teachers’ and ‘international University bhikkhu Federation.
JVP
conducted its propaganda at village, district and town
level. JVP had monthly, bi weekly and weekly publications. Publications had militant sounding
titles, such as Vedihanda”,” Ripalaya”
(rifle)” Aragalaya”. Some publications
were targeted towards specific groups,
such as fishermen, school teachers, or
security forces. By 1987 these publications were popular at village
level. There was also the JVP
radio transmissions. Postersgave
time and frequency.
To attract
mass support at village level JVP
organized several attractive campaigns in late 1970s and 1980s where Wijeweera said that JVP was the leading left
movement in the country. The JVP are
the only saviors of the workers
,unemployed, students and the masses. Speakers at public meetings of JVP were
articulate, they were carefully handpicked, progress monitored. Many listened
to speeches even if they did not agree
with all of it, to hear the criticisms
against those in power in the country. Hundreds joined JVP from 1983-1987 and were indoctrinated.
JVP was a major underground force from1983-1987. JVP had
grass roots contacts and knew
exactly where to go and whom to meet it
was not possible to catch the JVP in a particular area, because there was
absolute secrecy. they used five to ten aliases. .
leaders and cadres never operated in an area
native to them. Nobody knew them. .
there was a rapid transfer of activists from one unit to another or from one
zone to another. if the leader was caught, he would be rapidly
replaced Even if all are taken from
one district those in the other district will oversee, said Rohan Gunaratna.
By 1984, the
JVP had decided on a second armed struggle. in 1984 JVP
started camps for military
training in jungles between Ampara and Siyambalanduwa, there were camps at
Hiniduma, Hambegamuva. Hambegamuwa
camp was a major JVP training center.
Batches of 30
to 40 were trained for five to seven days. . these temporary training camps
familiarized member with various types of weapons such as T56, AK 47, said
Indradasa. This was done mainly by hand drawn sketches, and pictures of rifles.
A rudimentary military training was given.
There were also classes in physical training. At the camp trainees were forbidden to
divulge real name, and place of
residence, only the leader knew the
names.
in 1987
intelligence services had received reports of university students undergoing
weaponry training in camps of the Deshapremi Janatha Vyapaaraya DJV. The biggest such training camp was held
in the Erathna area, near Sri Pada in January 1987. Maheepala Kodippili,
following his arrest, admitted to the CID on June 19, 1987, that he had
attended the training camp along with a group of university students under the
direction of Sarath of the Colombo University.
JVP leader Padmasiri was asked to form an armed student battalion. there
were at least 100 combat trained JVPers in University of Ruhuna. Undergraduates had played a key role in the raid on
Pallekelle army camp.
A separate
military wing was set up in 1986 and JVP started to collect weapons. Weapons
were discovered in Ruhuna, Colombo and
Peradeniya Universities.
1987–89 JVP INSURRECTION
JVP
staged a second uprising which lasted from 1987 to 1989. This was not an open revolt, but a low intensity conflict with the JVP resorting to assassinations, raids and attacks on military and civilian targets. With these
practices of fear and intimidation, the JVP was able to bring the country to a
standstill. This campaign virtually brought the country to a
standstill confirmed Indradasa. It was
known as period of terror.
JVP had
some support initially among the public, especially in the southern and central
districts, after JVP challenged the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. JVP seemed to enjoy public support In Matara, Hambantota, Moneragala, Badulla,
Kurunegala and in the Uva Province as well and
successfully carried out various strikes, work-stoppages, protests and
boycotts, in 1987.
JVP resorted to sheer terrorism to bring about work stoppages,
disruption to transport services, and
trade JVP burned down post offices, robbed the
collections from bus conductors, and destroyed their ticket machines, damaged
industrial and domestic electricity and water meters. JVP forcibly collecting
vehicle revenue licenses. JVP destroyed records held in kachcheries including
files on local taxes and land registers.
Almost two thirds of the country
did not have an electricity supply for more than six weeks, because the power
pylons in Matale were destroyed by the JVP.
JVP repeatedly went for electric transformers. There were other acts of sabotage with the destruction of
Government property. There was also a campaign to boycott Indian
goods.
JVP crippled the country with violently enforced general strikes
for two years. Many individuals or organizations were warned or intimidated
with messages dropped in the night in front of homes and with posters or
graffiti on walls. Those that did not cooperate were brutally killed, with the
repercussions extended to their family members.
JVP
issued death threats to professionals, to lawyers and doctors so they could not
work. JVP called for hartals and work
stoppages. JVPs repeated warning to State-owned media personnel to stay away
from work and increasing threats led to
resignations. As a result, trains were not functioning properly, schools and
college did not hold exams for almost two years. For four years no one had graduated from any
of the state universities. Medical College was not functioning for almost five
years. Factories and work place were
forced to close down for long periods resulting in the workers undergoing
severe hardship and production suffered. Strikes paralyzed key government
departments. Tourists were walking past
immigration and customs counters freely
as the officers were not there.
JVP called upon the public to engage in a
civil disobedience campaign by refraining from paying taxes and other dues such
a bus fares. Posting letters’ without stamps. JVP
said people must observe curfew and not leave homes, work places should shut
down, transport must cease to operate, blackout must be observed from 6 pm.
People should refrain from listening to radio or watching TV. The public
were ordered not to go out of their homes. “Lights off” and
“switch-off Radio and Television” orders were given.
Schools were targeted. Ellawala Medhananda
recalled that when he was principal of Anura Maha Vidyalaya, Getahatta, his
pupils informed him that they were ordered not to attend school and to
congregate outside. Or they will be killed. They had to go on strike in school.
Pupils were told they would be killed if they did not strike for at least three
days. The pupils obeyed, after informing Medhananda.
Medhananda also received a letter, from Kirti
Vijayabahu”, threatening to kill him.
His temple received a letter telling
both monks to leave the temple .The two monks did so. Medhananda went back
to the school and hid there. In the
night the JVP came to the school and searched it, watched by Medhananda
who had hidden in a loft in the school.
In June
1989, a group of students at the Peradeniya University seized a jeep,
killed the three inside, and burnt their bodies within university premises. A
similar incident took place at Sri Jayewardenepura University. In July 1989 all
universities were closed down indefinitely.
Initially the public did not take JVP orders
seriously. But JVP started killing and the public realized that they dare not
disobey these orders. Teachers who
resisted interference of JVP activities were assassinated. JVP selectively
conducted attacks on shopkeepers, drivers of public and private vehicles, trade unionists, management staff of
government and private institutions and burning buses of both private and
public companies. These acts of terror
served to create fear among the public.JVP
made it a point to track down those who resisted opposed or betrayed them and punished them. Principal of Mahakumbura college who opposed
JVP was shot and killed together with
his two daughters.
From 1987 to
1989, the JVP was able to dominate in the affairs of the
country. The UNP government tried to
appease it. 1988 JVP Imposed ban on Sinahla New Year shops in south ordered to
close before that. University
exams not held due to threats . there were spectacular jail breaks at Welikada,
Bogambara, Badulla.
At the height
of the JVP’s attempted destabilization, police officers in and around Colombo
given the task of fighting the JVP had to live at the end of their wits. They
found that they could not hold conferences in police stations as the JVP had
informants inside. They found themselves having conferences at odd hours in
places like Galle Face Green and the Parliament Esplanade.
JVP reacted violently to exposure of their
activities by newspapers, TV and radio. Newspaper agents were killed, vehicles
transporting newspapers were burned, and employees of TV stations, Rupavahini,
ITN and SLBC were threatened and ordered to give up employment. When these were
ignored JVP killed important media personnel, including DG of Rupavahini and SLBC, a director of SLBC, a radio and TV announcer. Gladys Jayawardene,
Chairman of the State Pharmaceutical Corporation was also assassinated for not
stopping the import of Indian pharmaceuticals.
Deshapremi
Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV) the military
wing of the JVP was the division
responsible for the violence of the 1987 period. DJV trained it members, in the jungles in the southern and western quarters,
In central highland and a few in India. The training
tactics were a closely guarded secret. JVP
first said that DJV, was a separate
organization which was being supported but not directed by the JVP
Later, they abandoned this position. DJV openly
received instructions from JVP.
The
head of the DJV was Keerthi Wijebahu”. Keerthi Wijebahu was the pseudonym of Saman
Piyasiri Fernando leader of the military wing.. There was also another military wing,
Deshapremi Sannadha Balakaya also under Keerthi Wijayabahu.
DJV consisted of full time members, they had a
cell structure. Communicating between one cell and another was tightly controlled, so that even if one was
caught he could not give info on more than ten members. Many gave useless information and stayed silent under extreme pressure when
caught.
DJV used the army. Soldiers who went on leave
were used to attack security force installations. Some were asked to desert and bring a weapon
with them. DJV also roped in those who
were suspended from the army. The three who started the JVP military campaign in south were three deserters from the army in the
north.
DJV also used common criminals and contract killers.
The DJV carried out a large number of murders.
It killed more than 70 Members of Parliament between July 1989 and November
1989. The DJV murdered probably thousands of people, said analysts. Killings
took place in both urban and rural areas . DJV
targeted opponents. On December 15,
1986, the DJV abducted and murdered Daya Pathirana, the leader of the
Independent Students’ Union (ISU) of the Colombo University, which was a rival
students’ union.. analysts see this as
the significant starting point of
political assassinations.
Executions
were mostly carried out at night with armed groups entering homes of victims
and carrying them away to be tortured and executed. Occasional bombings also
took place. Funerals of these victims were not allowed to be held. Traditional final rights were not allowed and
the caskets had to be carried below the knee level as a mark of disrespect.
There was also a JVP Bhikkhu death squad called Kudahapola
Balakaya, operating in the JVP insurrection in 1980s. These were Buddhist monks
who were also terrorists. At night they
would done civilian clothes and go out and commit murders and as monks would do
the last rights later on, said Chandraprema.
JVP Killings
JVP killed 1342 government supporters, 353
government servants, 250 policemen, 284
policemen, 163 servicemen, and 80 home guards.
3 university dons, 2 education officers, 44 principals of schools, and
57 teachers. They destroyed 430 post
offices, 78 DDC offices, 59 GA/AGA offices, and 59 agrarian centers, 17
Superintendants of estates were killed.
JVP assassinated some senior monks as well.
They included Pohaddaramulle Pemaloka,
Thambugala Sumanasiri, Vellatota Pannadassi and Kotikawatte Sadhatissa.
Many civilians including a cultivation officer
in Anamaduwa, cooperative chairmen of Weuda and a CTB driver were killed these killings were all in Sinhala areas JVP
also killed surrendering JVP cadres. They killed two families of surrendered
cadres in Anuradhapura. Heads of
some people who were slain were arranged
around the Peradeniya University pond.
Wasantha Bandara General
Secretary of the Patriotic National Movement (PNM) JVP assassin Lionel
Ranasinghe widely believed to be responsible for at least 41 targeted
high-profile killings. Ranasinghe’s victims included Sri Lanka Mahajana
Pakshaya (SLMP) leader Vijaya Kumaratunga, Professor Stanley Wijesundera,
Director, CID, Terrence Perera, UNP General Secretary Nandalal Fernando and UNP
Colombo Municipal Council member Jayantha Mallimarachchi. Sub Inspector of
Police T.C.D. Rajapaksa attached to the Counter Subversive Unit (CSU),
Narahenpita police. Lionel Ranasinghe shot him at Ambagahapura, Maharagama on
Sept 22, 1988. .
Here is a list of some persons killed.
- Amara Wellappuli – Attorney-At-Law
- Anura Daniel – United National Party MP for Kandy
- Chandratne Patuwathavithane – Academic & Former vice chancellor of University of Moratuwa
- D. C. Atukorala – A Chief Engineer attached to the Ports
Authority, Sri Lanka
- Daya Pathirana – Former leader of the Independent Students Union (ISU) of University of Colombo
- Daya Sepali Senadhira – United National Party MP for Karandeniya
- DIG Bennet Perera – Former Director Criminal Investigation Department of Sri Lanka.
- DIG Terrance Perera – Former director of the counter subversive
division, Sri
Lanka Police
- Esmie Amarasiri – Wife of M. S.
Amarasiri, former
Chief Minister, Southern Provincial Council, Sri Lanka
- G. V. S. de Silva – Former district minister and United
National Party MP for Habaraduwa
- Gamini Medagedera – attorney at law, english teacher and
secretary of Sri Lanka Communist Party, Polonnaruwa
- Gladys
Jayawardene
– Former Chairman of State Pharmaceutical Corporation of Sri Lanka.
- Harsha Abeywardena – Former chairman of the United National Party
- Jinadasa Weerasinghe – United National Party MP for Tangalle
- K. Amaratunge – Chief News Editor, Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation
- L. W. Panditha – Member of Sri Lankan communist Party and
Trade unionist
- Lesley Ranagala – United National Party MP for Borella
- Leslie Yatanwala – Attorney-At-Law
- Lionel Jayatilake – Former minister and United National Party
MP
- Merrill Kariyawasam – United National Party MP for Agalawatte
- Nandalal Fernando Former General Secretary of United National
Party
- Premakeerthi de Alwis– Famous Sri Lankan radio and television
broadcaster and lyricist.
- Rev.
Fr. Michael Paul Rodrigo, OMI – Catholic priest
- Sagarika
Gomes – Artist
and TV newscaster.
- Stanley Wijesundera – Sri Lankan academic and a Professor of
Chemistry, the first Vice Chancellor of the University of Colombo and former the Chairman of the Association of Commonwealth
Universities
- Thevis
Guruge –
Distinguished broadcaster with Radio
Ceylon and
subsequently the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation. First Sinhala Announcer of the Radio Ceylon
- Ven.
Kotikawatte
Saddhatissa Thera
– Famous Buddhist monk
- Ven.
Pohaddaramulle
Premaloka – Buddhist monk
- Vijaya Kumaranatunga – Popular Sri Lankan film actor and
politician, founder of Sri Lanka Mahajana Party (SLMP)
- W. M. G. T. Banda – Former Minister of Buddhist Affairs and
United National Party MP for Galagedara
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE.
From 1987 to 1989, the JVP was able to
dominate the country. On December 12, 1988, 170 JVP detainees escaped after
breaching the prison walls in two simultaneous operations launched outside and
within the prison. It stunned the UNP Government.
But the attitude changed in 1989. The
government decided not to give in. When Thevis Guruge, head of SLBC was
assassinated in 1989 for ignoring the threats of the JVP, security forces took
charge of the Radio and Television Stations. The news was read by armed service
personnel.
The government under President Premadasa
responded militarily in 1989. The army and police started shooting suspected
JVPers and their families and burning their houses. In Kandy road barriers were put up at night
time, in places like Lewella.
At
mid-year, 1989 the Government began a massive crackdown on the JVP. It detained
several thousand JVP suspects. By the end of the year, security forces had
captured or killed much of the JVP’s top leadership.” Anti JVP operations of government after July 1989 were effective and
sophisticated. Impact felt only after August 1989.
Initially
there were five intelligence agencies working on JVP .They were National
Intelligence Bureau, Counter Subversive Unit, Colombo Detective Bureau,
Military Intelligence and Operations Combine . They could
not function effectively because there were political barriers, bureaucratic intervention, and
operation difficulties, said Gunaratna.
He does not give further information on the subject.
Earlier the Secretary
Defence, Joint Operations Command and the army
could give orders for Ops Combine. Army now asked for and obtained
full control of Ops Combine . Ops combines restructured. Under single
authority, troops better deployed , a
new intelligence unit set up and Rapid deployment force was given specialist
tasks. Cops combine was to capture
special targets covertly. Ops
combine in Colombo was given a lot of security forces.
War against the JVP was a hit-job war. It was not superior weapons
or training or numerical strength, it was accurate information and element of
surprise. It was not difficult to kill off the JVP , observed Chandraprema.. A
lot of work was also done by police.
The
operations were carried out by platoon
commanders and corporal s . Specially
trained to work in small numbers army detachments were sent into jungles and
villages throughout Sri Lanka . Troops moved
light, often out of tents in mini groups. Most of the time they were out on
operations moved by
foot, keeping enemy under pressure, They divided into three, guard group to
guard camp, reinforcement group, and
deep penetrating group. JVP now deterred from using small number attacking
patrols, forces also operated in
small numbers
Troops
checked vehicles day and night. There were
cordon and search operations as well. Sudden road blocks were set up
every time at different places . Troops were positioned there and also undercover . Troops in
civil were also at bus stand, tea
boutiques and eating houses, trailing suspicious persons, keeping watch on
houses. They also engaged in ambushes,
these were done mostly at night after 10 pm and would last till early hours of
dawn. Persons were picked up late in
night or early morning.
Operations teams isolated themselves from the rest and kept mum
about their work. Army used code words and were vigilant about
infiltration. Army watched soldiers
when they went on leave.
The teams were also asked
to obtain public support. To encourage information from public, ask them
identify infiltrators and to indicate
land mines. The teams were told that they
should go out and patrol impressively with canopy removed from the truck. They
should give the public confidence.
From August 1989 reprisal killings against JVP became common.
Bodies began to appear on road daily. 16 decapitated heads were placed around
the pond in University of Peradeniya . JVP had killed three army families in
Anuradhapura . In retaliation, decapitated heads appeared on stakes, all over
Anuradhapura district.
Private armed groups emerged to counter JVP
terrorism. JVP were killed by private
vigilante groups, such as Black Panthers, Yellow Scorpions and the People’s
Revolutionary Red Army, PRRA.
When JVP issued
death threats, these vigilante groups issued counter
threats. Posters appeared which said ape ekata thope dolahak.” The ‘Deshapremi
Sinhala tharuna Peramuna’ circulated a letter to JVP.
This letter
said Dear father/ mother/ sister, your
son, / brother/ husband has taken the lives of mothers like you, also sisters
and innocent children. They have killed
the family members of heroic Sinhala soldiers who fought the Tamil tigers to
protect the motherland. Is it not
justified to put you also to death?
Be ready to die. May you attain Nirvana.
Sgd Patriotic Youth Front. ( abridged
)
Estates employed private defence groups known as
Green Tigers. JVP had killed 17 estate
superintendants. Lawyers who took up
the causes of JVPers were also killed by these vigilantes. It was not possible
for the security forces to protect all
threatened persons, so they encouraged the creation of these vigilance groups
and provided them with shot guns. Political
parties were given repeater shot guns for their protection.
By October, 1989 it became clear that although the JVP was
still in a position to organize strikes and hit out at key state installations,
its capacity to seize state power had
weakened considerably. It was running out of weapons and manpower. The fact that the JVP had been unable to
kill more than 20 people from the ceasefire on 27th to the end of September,
was an indication of their limited
strength. ·
Government of Sri
Lanka eventually defeated the JVP. Intelligence cells set up in police stations, had
good penetration and advance information
was received on JVP activities. The
government set up the Operation Combine ,
the Joint Operations of the armed forces(“Ops Combine”) .
in July 1989 Ops Combine underwent
certain changes. The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was given specific tasks and
a new intelligence service unit was formed. One of the concepts of the
“Ops Combine” was the capture of special targets secretly.
In 1988 a
large section of the elite was willing to bend over backwards to accommodate
the JVP, but in 1989 JVP’s excesses had upset them. The Government was
therefore able to obtain help from a wide spectrum of society including the
opposition parties and particularly the Left in crushing the JVP. The
Government was thus able to deploy methods from the crudest to the
highly sophisticated. They used
persons who knew to handle different groups of people accordingly, said Rajan
Hoole.
When the security forces and the vigilante
groups launched an offensive against the JVP, younger monks were very
vulnerable as they had been identified for having spearheaded public
agitations. Many monks gave up robes, some died or disappeared. By early 1990, there were 45 Buddhist monks,
mostly university students, in detention camps. Some had surrendered. They
criticized the JVP for misleading them and started supporting the government.
Their statements were given wide publicity in the media.
Analysts
had had much to say about the state operation against the JVP. Certain analysts were more upset about the
state killings than the JVP killings. This period, according to observers was
as bad as the JVP offensive. Death squads were dominant and the government
allowed them to function. . There seemed to be no difference between State
armed forces and secret death squads. Both had only two objectives: eliminating
subversives and injecting as much fear in the public mind as possible. As a result of this double violence the
highest number of killings in Sri Lanka took place in August 1989. , the target list of the JVP had also
expanded at this time.
Death squads and Joint Operations did not
hesitate to take away any youths from their homes and no complaint was accepted
by the police or army posts regarding those youths. The authorities kept quiet
about the abductions and investigations were closed after the abductions took
place. Strict censorship of the
mass-media prevented any coverage of events. On the whole, the result was
terror and near-anarchy in the country.
From
August 1989 onwards, reprisal killings against the JVP became a regular
feature. Bodies began to appear on road sides. Bullet riddled and burnt bodies
were a common sight in rivers, wells, pits and by the road sides. That was the
only evidence about how many youths were abducted per night.
A
section of the JVP cadres made use of the ceasefire declared by the government
over a period of three weeks and surrendered to the armed forces. The
government announced that over 7,200 were under detention for involvement with
the JVP.
In
October 1989, Raja Mahattaya, the Colombo district division number two leader,
was arrested. From information the army received from Raja Mahattaya and from
others, they were able to trace D M Ananda to the Ratnapura area. His arrest
was a major breakthrough for the government.
D.M.Ananda
was the functionary number 1 in the JVP . He was also the political cum
military leader of the Colombo/Sabaragamuwa area, the leader of the bhikkhu,
women’s and workers’ fronts and the leader of the Jathika Kmart Satan
Madyathanaya. These made him the single
most powerful person in the organization.”
Ananda
was held in the Mattegoda army camp, where he divulged that Araliya Estate in
Galaha was the group’s headquarters in the region. A special operations team of
the army arrested Piyadasa Ranasinghe and H B Herat in Galaha. they were JVP
leaders who met Rohana Wijeweera frequently.
Under
interrogation, they told army investigators the whereabouts of Wijeweera and a
few hours later Wijeweera was arrested at Ulapane, Kandy, at the estate
bungalow where he lived, masquerading as a planter under the name of
Attanayake. The next day, Upatissa Gamananayake, who was the General Secretary
of the JVP, was also captured. He was captured in Panadura, where he was
running a small shop under the pseudonym of Dias.
By November
1989 Rohana Wijeweera and 12 of
the 13 JVP Politbureau members
were arrested. The only
Politbureau member to survive was Somawansa Amarasinghe who had fled the
country as soon as the first arrest took place. ( continued)
[1] Central Committee
Members were Gamini Wijegunasekera,
Kandewatte, Amarasiri, Lionel Fernando, Ragama Some, Upali Jayaweera, Norman
Manawadu, Ananda Idagama, Ruwan, Jayatilaka. Palitha, Jude Anthnny, Mirigama
Chandare, P. Thangarajah, Gamini Jayalath, Beligalla Siriwardene, Aruna
Wijesuriya, Gunapala Satharasinghe, Ariyasena, Piyasena Ramanayake,
Dharmawardhana Munasinghe, Indraratne, Samaranayake, Algiriye Munasinghe, Y.M.
Aheyratne, K.G. Jinadasa, Sirimal, Ranjitham Gunaratnam and Kitulagoda.
[2] The Zonal Leaders
were 1.Western/Saharagamuwa Zone Political Secretary: D.M. Ananda Military
Secretary: Saman Piyasiri Fernando 2. Central Zone Political Secretary:
Piyadas:1 Ranasinghe Military Secretary: H.B. Herath 3. Rajarata Zone Political
Secretary: Lalith Wijeratne Military Secretary: Lalith Wijeratne
4. Southern Zone Political Secretary: Upatissa Gamanayake Military Secretary:
Upatissa Gamanayake 5. Uva/Eastern Zone Political Secretary: Shantha Bandara
Military Secretary: H.B. Herath( godahewa probably)
[3] Distdct
Secretaries D.M. Ananda (Colombo), Dharmawardana Munasinghe (Gampaha), P.K.B.A.
Indraratne (Kegalle), Mahinda (Puttalam), Upali Jayaweera (Kandy), Dhammika
ldamegama (Matale), Ranjitham Gunaratnam (Kurunegale), Wimalaratne (Kalutara),
S.K. Jayatilaka (Galle), Gamini Wijegunesekera (Matara), Ariyasena
(Hambantota), Sumeda (Polonnaruwa), Tissa (AnUradhapura), Premakumar
(Trincomalee), Shantha Bandara (Nuwara-Eiiya), Amarasiri (Badulla) and
Kandewatte (Monaragale
.
