Courtesy Adaderana

UNP MP Dr. Harsha de Silva has resigned from his portfolio of Non-Cabinet Minister of Economic Reforms and Public Distribution.
 
In a letter to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa congratulating him on the victory at the Presidential Election, the parliamentarian said he wished the new President wisdom and strength to unite our beloved nation that has become deeply divided into ethnic lines.”
 
This is to inform you of my resignation from my portfolio of Non-Cabinet Minister of Economic Reforms and Public Distribution with immediate effect so that you can appoint a suitable person of your choice to carry out the duties of the same.”
 
I gave my best to this and all previous portfolios I held and am satisfied that I was able to contribute towards the development of our country,” he said. 

De Silva also requested the President to place the free ambulance service launched by the incumbent government, funded by the government of India, under his direct purview and to strengthen the service further.

He says: Upon leaving, I have one important request to make from you. That is to place 1990 Suwa Seriya Foundation under your purview and strengthen the service as I fear it may be subject to unnecessary interference elsewhere.” 

In fact, in preparation for sustainability after my tenure, I initiated and was able to enact in Parliament unanimously, the service as a Foundation by Act No 18 of 2018 giving the President of Sri Lanka the authority over this lifesaving service.” 

While the Foundation was always gazetted as a subject under me as its founder, the time is now right to place it under you, as envisaged in the Act.” 

Let me also inform you with a sense of humility that the service we established as a pilot in July 2016 in the face of such baseless allegations, is today saving lives 24x7x365 across the country with a 300 unit strong network with a dedicated staff of close to 1,500 Sri Lankan young men and women.” 

On an average day, 1990 Suwa Seriya admits over 900 patients to critical and emergency care with an astonishing average response time of under 13 minutes. It has also been identified as perhaps the best such service in the developing world.”

Once again, I wish you the best and will always be ready to extend my unstinted support to the improvement of the 1990 Suwa Seriya service to continue to save lives.”

Courtesy NewsIn.Asia

Colombo, November 19 (newsin.asia): The Indian Foreign Minister, Dr.Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who arrived in Colombo on Tuesday met the newly elected Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had won the November 16 Presidential election beating Sajith Premadasa of the United National Party-led alliance by a margin of 1.3 million votes.

At the end of the meeting Jaishankar tweeted:

With Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s visit, India is clearly forging ahead of its rivals China and Pakistan in cultivating the new Sri Lankan government.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the first foreign leader to congratulate Gotabaya Rajapaksa through a tweet and was the only leader to have spoken to him over the phone on the day Gotabaya won.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa responded to Modi’s warm greetings and said that he is keen on having close relations with India covering security and economic development – areas in which India is equally keen.

India has a number of developmental projects in Sri Lanka which are still to see the light of day. Modi would be keen to see these projects kickstarted.

India is also concerned about China’s strategic plans in Sri Lanka given its hold on the Hambantota harbour and its strong presence in the Colombo harbour the main business of which is with India. India would like to have a container terminal there, which the previous government promised but did not deliver.

India would also like the Gotabaya government to keep an eye on the Jehadist menace especially after the April 21, 2019 serial blasts carried out by local Jehadists.

Prime Minister Modi had invited President Gotabaya to visit India and the invitation was accepted.

Courtesy NewsIn.Asia

Colombo, November 19 (newsin.asia): The appointment of the tough as nails” Major General (retired) Kamal Gunaratne as Secretary to the Ministry of Defense, is a clear indication that the newly elected Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is dead serious about  ensuring Sri Lanka’s security.

The majority Sinhalese, who backed Gotabaya to the hilt  in the November 16 election, have been living under the apprehension that the island nation is under threat from Jehadi terrorism, albeit  nascent. Sections of the majority community are also apprehensive about the possibility of a revival of Tamil extremism, given the voting pattern in the just concluded election.

The Tamils had voted massively for Sajith Premadasa because they felt that Gotabaya Rajapaksa is an Sinhala extremist. They feared that they would not get even the minimal constitutional concessions that Sajith had promised in his manifesto. Gotabaya had not mentioned devolution of power, let alone increasing devolution or promising power-sharing at the Center as Sajith did.

At the inaugural ceremony in Anuradhapura on Monday, Gotabaya regretted that the Tamils and Muslims had not responded to his invitation to join his all-inclusive national movement for peace and prosperity. His repeated statement that he is the President of all Sri Lankans and not just a section of them, had fallen on deaf ears in the Tamil and Muslims areas.

It is feared that there could be a sharpening of the Sinhala-Tamil conflict, aided and abetted by interested Western powers. This could foment Tamil extremism which was thought to have been crushed in Mulliwaikkal in May 2009.

The appointment of a security expert and war veteran like Gen.Kamal Gunaratne is a departure from the past when the Defense Secretaries were civilians.  The outgoing  Secretary Gen.Shantha Kottegoda, was an exception. But he was appointed only because his civilian predecessor and the police chief, had miserably failed to act on advance actionable intelligence provided by India about the possibility of a Jehadi attack in April 2019. Only after the April 21 multiple suicide attacks that the Lankan Establishment realized the value of acting on intelligence cooperation and taking follow up action quickly.

Field commander Gen.Gunaratne, who led the 53 Division during the critical last stage of the war, not only knows the value of intelligence but also the need to coordinate different inputs and take appropriate action. He is known as a soldier who would follow orders to the letter. As such, he would be a very reliable Defense Secretary from the point of view of his boss, Defense Minister cum President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

As a close associate of Gotbaya Rajapaksa and as a  fellow member of Viyathmaga” an organization of intellectuals and professionals set up by Gotabaya, Gen.Gunaratne shares the latter’s views on ethnic and other national issues.

In an interview given to Shanika Sriyananda of Daily FT in September 2016 following the release of his book: Road to Nandikadal, Gunaratne said: If a situation is created, the LTTE will make a comeback because the LTTE ideology is still alive. I don’t think that the Tamil political leaders will be satisfied with judicial, land and police powers, as the agenda of the Tamil National Alliance is Eelam and nothing else.”

If the situations are not handled properly, the LTTE can make a comeback, as over 12,400 ex-combatants are living in society. Though they have undergone a comprehensive rehabilitation program, that doesn’t mean that they are 100 percent transformed into civilians,” he added.

In his first hand account, Gen.Gunaratne had said that the Sri Lankan forces had done their job with ruthlessness, which United National Party stalwart and the then Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera described as a dossier of the military personnel’s crimes from the early 1980 onwards.

According to an AFP story, the book talks of the army setting fire to homes of Tamil civilians, killing innocent civilians and plundering valuables of homes under the guise of cordon-and-search operations. Samaraweera described the book as a betrayal” of the Sri Lankan military.

But then that was war and as Mao Tse Tung said: War is not a tea party”. There is no war in which such incidents do not happen. Moreover, both sides committed atrocities and it would be unethical to single out one side for bashing. Further, the enemy that the Sri Lankan forces were facing for 30 years was described by the US officially, as the world’s deadliest terrorist outfit which had also pioneered the belt bomb and had initiated suicide bombings which are causing havoc all over the world.

According to Gen.Gunaratne, the LTTE had, at its height, not less than 200 volunteer suicide cadres, many of them girls.

Gen.Gunaratne also said that Prabhakaran had raised a very efficient and committed force which was led in the field by excellent commanders like Balraj, Soosai, Theepan and Karuna. The top order had also fought to the last. Prabhakaran never wavered in his aim or the execution of his plans and would patiently wait for the right moment to strike, the Lankan General added.

By P.K.Balachandran Courtesy NewsIn.Asia

Colombo, November 18 (Daily Express): The new Sri Lankan President, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, is likely to cozy up to India but be wary about the US.

Sources close to him say that President Gotabaya will view India as Sri Lanka’s main security provider” and China a key source of funding for infrastructure projects given its deep pocket and willingness to lend.

Given neighboring India’s strategic concerns, and the history of Sri Lanka-India relations, Gotabaya will not take China as a strategic ally but only as an important source of funds for the large infrastructure projects he has in mind.

What Messages Say

The foundation for India-Sri Lanka ties under the Gotabaya administration can be seen in the messages exchanged by them when Gotabaya won the November 16 Presidential election by a huge margin of 1.3 million votes.

In his congratulatory message, the first by a foreign head of government, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed confidence that under the able leadership of Rajapaksa the people of Sri Lanka will progress further on the path of peace and prosperity, and that the fraternal, cultural, historical and civilizational ties between India and Sri Lanka will be further strengthened.”

The Indian Prime Minister, who also spoke to Gotabaya on the phone, unlike other heads of government, reiterated India’s commitment to continuing to work with the Government of Sri Lanka towards these ends.

In his reply, Gotabaya thanked Modi for his good wishes and expressed his readiness to work with India very closely to ensure development and security.”

The emphasis on development and security in Gotabaya’s message is significant as these two areas are of special interest to both countries.

As Sri Lanka’s Defense Secretary between 2005 and January 8, 2015, Gotabaya was part of the Indo-Lankan Troika” to consult and decide on matters relating to defense during the war against the Tamil Tigers.

The Troika comprised the then Indian National Security Advisor M.K.Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and Defense Secretary Vijay Singh. On the Sri Lankan side it was Secretary to the President Lalith Weeratunga, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s brother and Economic Affairs Minister and political organizer Basil Rajapaksa.

The Troika” was one of the key factors which had helped Sri Lanka defeat the LTTE, and that was publicly acknowledged by the Sri Lankan side several times. Even recently, Mahinda Rajapaksa had sought the revival of the Troika system to determine and smoothen defense and strategic ties with India.

Significantly, Prime Minister Modi extended an invitation to Gotabaya to visit India at his early convenience and the Lankan President accepted the invitation. Therefore, Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s first overseas visit will be to India.

Revival Of Pending Projects

In the proposed talks in New Delhi, Modi is expected to make use of Gotabaya’s interest in development, especially infrastructure projects, and remind him about the many pending Indo-Lanka joint venture projects.

Sri Lanka and India had drawn up an extremely tight schedule for the economic projects mentioned in the MoU signed in New Delhi on 25 April 2017, in the presence of Prime Ministers Ranil Wickremesinghe and Narendra Modi. The list included a re-gasified Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) fired 500 megawatt capacity power plant in Kerewelapitiya near Colombo, plus a LNG Terminal/Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU) in the same place. It was to be a Joint Venture with entities from Sri Lanka, India and Japan.

There was a project for piped gas distribution system and retail outlets for the supply of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) to the transportation sector. The LNG project also envisaged a piped gas distribution system; and conversion of liquid fuel-based power plants to R-LNG fired plants.

There was to be a 50 MW (extendable to 100 MW) solar power plant in Sampur in the Eastern Province. On the Trincomalee oil tanks the two countries had decided that the 84 giant oil tanks in the Upper Tank Farm in Trincomalee would be jointly developed” by the Lanka Indian Oil Corporation (LIOC) and the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC). A Joint Venture (JV) was to be set up for this.

India and Sri Lanka had agreed to build a port, a petroleum refinery and other industries in Trincomalee, for which the governments of Sri Lanka and India was set up a Joint Working Group. The two countries were to jointly set up Industrial Zones or Special Economic Zones in identified locations in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka was to submit to India a list of road projects to be considered for joint development. The two countries had already agreed to develop a Mannar-Jaffna and Mannar-Trincomalee highway; and to build a Dambulla-Trincomalee Expressway with Indian investment.

India and Sri Lanka were to build a Container Terminal (the East Terminal) in Colombo Port as a Joint Venture. India had also made a bid for the China- built Mattala Airport near Hambantota to make the world’s emptiest airport hum with activity. There were also projects in livestock development, water management and agro-based industries.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, being a development enthusiast, is expected to find ways and means of implementing these projects.

No Mention of Rights And Reconciliation

It is noteworthy that in his message to Gotabaya, the Indian Prime Minister did not mention the politically sensitive subject of ethnic reconciliation, good governance, and democracy which India now considers as being part of the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.

And human rights and ethnic reconciliation are not priority areas for Gotabaya because his focus is on economic development. He believes that if economic development is evenly distributed and if economic justice is rendered equitably, ethnic issues will not arise.

Reconciliation Issue Will Strain Ties With US

However, Gotabaya will be under domestic Tamil and international compulsion to attend to human rights and ethnic reconciliation issues because of the voting pattern in the November 16 Presidential election.

The entire Tamil-Muslim dominated North-East voted for his rival, Sajith Premadasa, and the entire Sinhalese South, Central and West and North Central voted for Gotabaya dividing the country on ethnic lines. The reason for such a division was that Sajith had included some conciliatory elements in his manifesto, and Gotabaya had not. Muslims saw Sajith as being conciliatory towards them, while Gotabaya was seen as being anti-Muslim.

Handle To West and US

The issues created by this voting pattern will give a handle to the US-led West and international human rights lobbies to put pressure on Sri Lanka. The Tamil parties in Sri Lanka are already sounding an alarm about impending persecution” by the Gotabaya government because Gotabaya had come to power almost solely on the basis of his appeal to the majority Sinhalas. There will be attempts to activate rights lobbies and rights oriented governments in the West, especially the US.

American Statement’s Emphasis

The American statement on Gotabaya’s victory issued on Monday had said: We are ready to continue our work with the new President and with all the people of Sri Lanka in supporting the country’s sovereignty through heightened good governance, expanded economic growth, the advancement of human rights and reconciliation, and in fostering an Indo-Pacific region where all countries can prosper.”

Thus, the US could use the ethnic issue to interfere with and control the Gotabaya regime. It will try its best to thwart his plan to opt out of the resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council, which had suggested accountability mechanisms to bring to trial and punish Lankan military personnel who had allegedly committed war crimes in the closing stages of the war against the Tamil Tigers.

But Gotabaya and his Sinhalese constituency are totally opposed to these resolutions, and that could lead to trouble with the US and the West.

Status Of Force Agreement

The other irritant in US-Lanka relations could be the US anxiety to get Colombo to move forward on the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s projects which have already been approved by the Lankan cabinet. While Gotabaya might take the US$ 480 million MCC project forward by getting it parliamentary approval, he would be most reluctant to sign the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which, in its new avatar, would turn Lanka into a US military base.

But given the American fear that the Chinese might use Hambantota harbor as a naval base sooner or later, exploiting the 99 year lease they enjoy, the Americans are unlikely to give up on SOFA.

This will put Gotabaya in a tight spot because SOFA is anathema for the majority community in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese. The majority Sinhalese not only fear an American takeover of Sri Lanka but the conversion of Sri Lanka into a battle ground for big powers wanting to dominate this part of the Indian Ocean. A people who had gone through 30 years of war and terrorist bombings just want to be left alone.

By P.K.Balachandran Courtesy NewsIn.Asia

Colombo, November 19 (The Citizen): There are indications that under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka will see India as its main security provider” given India’s proximity and its status as the regional power. On the other hand, China will be seen as a key source of funds for big infrastructure projects, given its deep pocket and willingness to lend.

Sources close to Gotabaya say that given neighboring India’s strategic concerns, and the stormy history of Sri Lanka-India relations, Gotabaya will not take China as a strategic ally but only as an important source of funds for the many large infrastructure projects he has in mind.

Investments from India and other countries will also be welcomed as Gotabaya has come to power promising rapid development to make up for five years of inactivity under the slothful Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government. .

What Messages Say

The foundation for India-Sri Lanka ties under the Gotabaya administration can be seen in the messages exchanged by them when Gotabaya won the November 16 Presidential election by a huge margin of 1.3 million votes.

In his congratulatory message, the first by a foreign head of government, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed confidence that under the able leadership of Rajapaksa the people of Sri Lanka will progress further on the path of peace and prosperity, and that the fraternal, cultural, historical and civilizational ties between India and Sri Lanka will be further strengthened.”

The Indian Prime Minister, who also spoke to Gotabaya on the phone, unlike other heads of government, reiterated India’s commitment to continuing to work with the Government of Sri Lanka towards these ends.

In his reply, Gotabaya thanked Modi for his good wishes and expressed his readiness to work with India very closely to ensure development and security.”

The emphasis on development and security in Gotabaya’s message is significant as these two areas are of special interest to both countries.

As Sri Lanka’s Defense Secretary between 2005 and January 8, 2015, Gotabaya was part of the Indo-Lankan Troika” to consult and decide on matters relating to defense during the war against the Tamil Tigers.

The Troika comprised the then Indian National Security Advisor M.K.Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and Defense Secretary Vijay Singh. On the Sri Lankan side it was Secretary to the President Lalith Weeratunga, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s brother and Economic Affairs Minister and political organizer Basil Rajapaksa.

The Troika” was one of the key factors which had helped Sri Lanka defeat the LTTE, and that was publicly acknowledged by the Sri Lankan side several times. Even recently, Mahinda Rajapaksa had sought the revival of the Troika system to determine and smoothen defense and strategic ties with India.

Significantly, Prime Minister Modi extended an invitation to Gotabaya to visit India at his early convenience and the Lankan President accepted the invitation. Therefore, Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s first overseas visit will be to India.

Revival Of Pending Projects

In the proposed talks in New Delhi, Modi is expected to make use of Gotabaya’s interest in development, especially infrastructure projects, and remind him about the many pending Indo-Lanka joint venture projects.

Sri Lanka and India had drawn up an extremely tight schedule for the economic projects mentioned in the MoU signed in New Delhi on 25 April 2017, in the presence of Prime Ministers Ranil Wickremesinghe and Narendra Modi. The list included a re-gasified Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) fired 500 megawatt capacity power plant in Kerewelapitiya near Colombo, plus a LNG Terminal/Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU) in the same place. It was to be a Joint Venture with entities from Sri Lanka, India and Japan.

There was a project for piped gas distribution system and retail outlets for the supply of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) to the transportation sector. The LNG project also envisaged a piped gas distribution system; and conversion of liquid fuel-based power plants to R-LNG fired plants.

There was to be a 50 MW (extendable to 100 MW) solar power plant in Sampur in the Eastern Province. On the Trincomalee oil tanks the two countries had decided that the 84 giant oil tanks in the Upper Tank Farm in Trincomalee would be jointly developed” by the Lanka Indian Oil Corporation (LIOC) and the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC). A Joint Venture (JV) was to be set up for this.

India and Sri Lanka had agreed to build a port, a petroleum refinery and other industries in Trincomalee, for which the governments of Sri Lanka and India was set up a Joint Working Group. The two countries were to jointly set up Industrial Zones or Special Economic Zones in identified locations in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka was to submit to India a list of road projects to be considered for joint development. The two countries had already agreed to develop a Mannar-Jaffna and Mannar-Trincomalee highway; and to build a Dambulla-Trincomalee Expressway with Indian investment.

India and Sri Lanka were to build a Container Terminal (the East Terminal) in Colombo Port as a Joint Venture. India had also made a bid for the China- built Mattala Airport near Hambantota to make the world’s emptiest airport hum with activity. There were also projects in livestock development, water management and agro-based industries.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, being a development enthusiast, is expected to find ways and means of implementing these projects.

No Mention of Rights And Reconciliation

It is noteworthy that in his message to Gotabaya, the Indian Prime Minister did not mention the politically sensitive subject of ethnic reconciliation, good governance, and democracy which India now considers as being part of the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.

And human rights and ethnic reconciliation are not priority areas for Gotabaya because his focus is on economic development. He believes that if economic development is evenly distributed and if economic justice is rendered equitably, ethnic issues will not arise.

Reconciliation Issue Will Strain Ties With US

However, Gotabaya will be under domestic Tamil and international compulsion to attend to human rights and ethnic reconciliation issues because of the voting pattern in the November 16 Presidential election.

The entire Tamil-Muslim dominated North-East voted for his rival, Sajith Premadasa, and the entire Sinhalese South, Central and West and North Central voted for Gotabaya dividing the country on ethnic lines. The reason for such a division was that Sajith had included some conciliatory elements in his manifesto, and Gotabaya had not. Muslims saw Sajith as being conciliatory towards them, while Gotabaya was seen as being anti-Muslim.

Handle To West and US

The issues created by this voting pattern will give a handle to the US-led West and international human rights lobbies to put pressure on Sri Lanka. The Tamil parties in Sri Lanka are already sounding an alarm about impending persecution” by the Gotabaya government because Gotabaya had come to power almost solely on the basis of his appeal to the majority Sinhalas. There will be attempts to activate rights lobbies and rights oriented governments in the West, especially the US.

American Statement’s Emphasis

The American statement on Gotabaya’s victory issued on Monday had said: We are ready to continue our work with the new President and with all the people of Sri Lanka in supporting the country’s sovereignty through heightened good governance, expanded economic growth, the advancement of human rights and reconciliation, and in fostering an Indo-Pacific region where all countries can prosper.”

Thus, the US could use the ethnic issue to interfere with and control the Gotabaya regime. It will try its best to thwart his plan to opt out of the resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council, which had suggested accountability mechanisms to bring to trial and punish Lankan military personnel who had allegedly committed war crimes in the closing stages of the war against the Tamil Tigers.

But Gotabaya and his Sinhalese constituency are totally opposed to these resolutions, and that could lead to trouble with the US and the West.

Status Of Force Agreement

The other irritant in US-Lanka relations could be the US anxiety to get Colombo to move forward on the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s projects which have already been approved by the Lankan cabinet. While Gotabaya might take the US$ 480 million MCC project forward by getting it parliamentary approval, he would be most reluctant to sign the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which, in its new avatar, would turn Lanka into a US military base.

But given the American fear that the Chinese might use Hambantota harbor as a naval base sooner or later, exploiting the 99 year lease they enjoy, the Americans are unlikely to give up on SOFA.

This will put Gotabaya in a tight spot because SOFA is anathema for the majority community in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese. The majority Sinhalese not only fear an American takeover of Sri Lanka but the conversion of Sri Lanka into a battle ground for big powers wanting to dominate this part of the Indian Ocean. A people who had gone through 30 years of war and terrorist bombings just want to be left alone.

උපුටා ගැන්ම හිරු නිව්ස්

මංගල සමරවීර, රාජිත සේනාරත්න, රංජන් රාමනායක, පාඨලී චම්පික රණවක ඇතුළු ආණ්ඩුවේ චෝදනාවලට ලක් වූ අමාත්‍යවරුන්ට එරෙහිව නීතිය ක්‍රියාත්මක කළ යුතු බව මහා සංඝරත්නය පවසනවා.

උන්වහන්සේලා මේ බව සදහන් කළේ අද පැවති ප්‍රවෘත්ති සාකච්ඡා කිහිපයකට එක්වෙමින්.

Courtesy Hiru News

Deputy Minister Nalin Bandara says that Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has no moral right to continue a government further.

Addressing a media conference held in Colombo, Nalin Bandara said that he would step down from the Bingiriya electoral organizer post as well if the office bearers are not elected anew for the party.

Meanwhile, Economic Reforms and Public Distribution Minister Harsha de Silva has also forwarded his resignation to the President today.

Courtesy Hiru News

Political sources say that Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe is scheduled to hand over his resignation tomorrow.

According to the sources, President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa has decided to appoint a caretaker government with a limited cabinet of 15 ministers until the next general election.

Gorringe, H Courtesy Journal of South Asian Development Vol. 2 (1): pp51-73

Abstract: Although Dalit orators and slogans threaten (or promise) to
‘turn Tamilnadu on its head’, the 2006 state elections offer Dalit
analysts pause for thought. In compromising its principles and allying with established parties, the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (Movement) – the largest Dalit movement in the state – has come full circle since 1999. In alternately backing the two dominant parties in the state (the DMK and the AIADMK) the DPI appears to be increasingly institutionalized. Excavating the future of Dalit action from past trends and contemporary politics I suggest that Dalit parties are following an established political repertoire in which a phase of militant activism gives way to ‘politics as normal’. In the face of this analysis
the paper asks whether such an approach is sustainable or can carry the
majority of Dalits with it. If Dalit politics is a continuation of
hegemonic politics, it argues, the liberatory promises of Dalit activism
will have been betrayed.

Keywords: Dalits, Caste, Tamilnadu, Elections, Democracy

Introduction: Tamil Politics and the Dalit Challenge

In the seemingly surreal world of Tamil politics, the Southernmost Indian state, anything is possible: sworn enemies make up before clashing again; film-stars become politicians, turning fan-clubs into party organisations; a convicted politician became Chief Minister before securing an appeal verdict; the leader of the opposition assured party activists that she would not attend the Assembly unless absolutely necessary (Hindu 2006a); and a key manifesto pledge of a winning alliance offered a colour TV to households meeting certain criteria. Parties routinely split, merge and reform in an endless kaleidoscope; arch-secularists ally with Hindu chauvinists; and people (claim to) vote 17 times for their candidates despite the ‘indelible ink’ used to identify voters (cf. Subramani 2006). An insult (perceived or intended) to one leader can reshape political coalitions overnight and contingency and compromise prevail. As the political stability accorded by the predominance of two main parties has been challenged, the shifting panoply of electoral alliances and the colourful jostling for position have added further complexity.

Until recently, however, one feature has remained constant (albeit unacknowledged) in the post-independence Tamil political system: it has been dominated by Backward Caste (BC) parties and interests.[1] Commentators, such as Subramanian (1999), recognise this but argue that Dravidian parties have created an open, democratic and plural society. This paper argues that the egalitarianism of Dravidian rhetoric has not translated into social practice and the incorporation of marginal groups into a system of state patronage does not equate to an extension of democratic participation (cf. Harriss 2002). T. Subramanian (2001a) notes the irony ‘that such a large number of caste parties should sprout in Tamil Nadu, the cradle of the Dravidian movement’, but it is because the interests of marginal social groups were not served by established politics, that they have mobilised for a share of political power. The innumerable Dalit (formerly untouchable) and caste-parties emerging over the past decade are an attempt to extend or, in the case of parties emerging to counter Dalit assertion, limit the scope of Tamil politics.

Subramani, a Dalit activist, summed up this process: ‘without protest we cannot achieve anything. One cannot claim anything from the government without protest. Only if we protest is there an opportunity for our community to do anything’ (Interview, 27 April 1999). When the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (DPI – Movement), the largest Dalit movement in Tamilnadu, abandoned its electoral boycott in 1999, therefore, it promised to redraw the ‘political map of Tamilnadu’ (Gorringe 2005: 301). Seven years and two State elections later, the DPI’s radical rhetoric looks as tattered as old election posters – clinging torn and dishevelled to walls and billboards.

This paper charts the changing face of Tamil politics, focusing on the subaltern challenge. Drawing on fieldwork with Dalit movements and analysis of subsequent state elections, this paper assesses the entry of autonomous Dalit parties into the body-politic.[2] Having charted the rationale behind political participation, and the opportunities that this engagement offers, I argue that the radical possibilities suggested by the initial foray into electoral competition have evaporated. Rather than reforming the institutions they entered, Dalit movements have been institutionalised. In closing, therefore, I will consider where Dalit politics goes from here. First, however, a brief introduction to the intricacies of Tamil politics is required to contextualise the ensuing discussion.

Dravidianism, Dalit Marginalisation and Emergence

Tamil politics is bewildering to those familiar with its ideologies, parties and characters; for the uninitiated, it is a welter of nigh-identical acronyms and political fluidity. Any comprehension of current trends, therefore, requires the historical background without which all Tamil politics is ‘sound and fury’.[3] The starting point must be the non-Brahmin movement which dominated state politics in the 1920s and, in interaction with the colonial power, set the template for subsequent engagements in the political sphere (Irschick 1986). In the protracted exchanges between Brahmins who monopolised administrative power under the British, and a rising Backward Caste elite, caste was established as the mobilising strategy par excellénce and elections as the vehicle for its expression. Into this heady mix, the Self-Respect and Dravidian parties introduced the emotive issues of Tamil nationalism and autonomy from the expansionist ambitions of Hindi-speaking northern politicians, which continue to inform contemporary politics (cf. Subramanian 1999).

Though the Congress party dominated post-independence Tamil politics, each election saw their vote-share eroded by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progressive Federation – DMK) – a regional nationalist party which played on language nationalism and espoused populist/socialist policies that were successfully mediated to the electorate through cinema and an efficient party-machine. In 1967 Tamilnadu became the first Indian state to elect a regionalist party, heralding the decline of Congress pre-eminence and the rise of the region (Pandian 1992, Kohli 1990). Indeed, the DMK victory was hailed as the end of ‘Brahmin’ rule and the birth of a new nation of ‘Tamils’.

Under its founder, Annadurai, and his successor, Karunanidhi, the DMK ruled until 1976. The party became increasingly conservative and centred around the leader, however, and the DMK split in 1972 with M.G. Ramachandran (MGR), a Tamil screen legend, founding the Anna DMK (ADMK – ‘Anna’ by reference to Annadurai) which claimed to be closer to the party’s original ideals. The ADMK gained power in 1977 due to MGR’s popularity and populism (as typified by his provision of free school meals for children), and dominated Tamil politics until MGR’s death in 1987. Since then both parties have alternated in office. Corruption and a personalisation of politics in the personages of MGR (or his successor Jayalalitha) and Karunanidhi, has pervaded Tamil government in this period and populist politics (to maintain power) have prevailed over ideological or fiscal concerns (Kohli 1990, Pandian 1992).

Dravidian social radicalism, thus, was strictly curtailed. Rather than envisaging inequality in class or caste terms, both Dravidian parties used the Brahmin/Non-Brahmin divide to suggest a commitment to social change whilst drawing their leadership and core constituents from dominant, landowning BCs (Subramanian 1999). Stressing language rather than inequality the DMK (and later the ADMK) attempted to foster Tamilness and avoid acting upon politically sensitive election pledges on land-reform, dowry and caste. Over time both parties abandoned their anti-Centre and anti-Hindi positions, softened their anti-Brahminism (to the point where a Brahmin could succeed MGR) and failed to implement meaningful redistributive policies. The DMK’s progressive reforms resembled ‘charity from above’, and the ADMK disproportionately taxed the poor to finance populist programmes (Pandian 1992, Harriss 2002).

Subramanian’s admiration for Dravidian pluralism, therefore, seems misplaced. Indeed, he shows (1999: 58) that state politics are dominated by BCs who have become jealous of their power as new entrants to Tamil politics have eroded their authority. This is evident in the ‘increasingly overt conflict between lower-caste Hindus and Dalits’ (Harriss 2002: 97).[4] Faced by frequent violence, Dalit movements voice grievances and highlight atrocities rather than campaigning proactively for social change. Their protests, petitions and demonstrations demand the enforcement of the constitution, and seek to de-legitimise a polity that does not adequately represent or serve them.

The subsidiary position of Dalits is evident in that 84 per cent of Dalit land-holdings are marginal (under 1 hectare) and only 4 per cent are over 4 hectares, as opposed to over 10 per cent for others.[5] Dalit land is seldom irrigated (Gorringe 2005). Thus, while 80 per cent of Tamil Dalit workers are in the agrarian sector, 64% are agricultural labourers.[6] The failure to implement effective land reform has curtailed Dalit autonomy by rendering them dependent upon others for work. This deprivation is compounded, and alternate opportunities are limited, by poor education. Literacy, as Mendelsohn and Vicziany observe, ‘lends confidence and expands mental horizons. It leads to a more assertive, less compliant, community’ (1998: 35). In 1991 the 58 per cent literacy rate for Scheduled Caste (SC)[7] men compared to 74 per cent for Tamil males. 35% of SC women were literate opposed to 51% overall (Rath and Konlade 2000).[8] These inequalities render Dalits vulnerable to social boycott (denied work, access to shops and common resources), intimidation, assault and murder if they resist caste norms.  

Faced by socio-political marginalisation, Dalit movements in the 1990s mobilised extra-institutionally before entering mainstream politics. Puthiya Tamizhagam (PT, New Tamilnadu) – the second largest Dalit Party in TN – arose as a Pallar movement and, despite its casteless title, remains strongest in Pallar strongholds in the South and West.[9] Its leader, Dr Krishnasamy, battled discrimination to qualify as a doctor and came to Dalit activism via Marxist-Leninism (Warrier 1998). Despite this, he is portrayed as Westernised – appearing in jeans and trainers – and removed from ‘ordinary’ Dalits (Gorringe 2005: 254). Krishnasamy was the first autonomous Dalit leader to win a Legislative Assembly seat in 1996. This seat was subsequently lost, but PT consolidated its vote-base in the 1998 national elections polling more votes than the victory margins in several seats (Wyatt 2002). Although PT remains a significant force, and preceded the DPI into electoral competition, this paper focuses on the Panthers for two reasons. Firstly, the DPI is the largest Dalit party in TN and, secondly, it entered electoral politics during my fieldwork enabling an analysis of the dynamics of institutionalisation.

The DPI was formed in 1982, inspired by the Maharashtrian movement of the same name. Although billed as a Dalit movement, it is preponderantly Paraiyar and is flourishes in the northern districts. Thirumavalavan, its leader, came from a poor family to gain a Law degree and a government job and entered Dalit politics through social networks (Gorringe 2005). He is famed for his oratory and for popularising the assertive slogan: ‘a hit for a hit’. Thirumavalavan lived in humble surroundings and frequently visited Dalit villages. Whilst Dr Krishnasamy faced questions about his choice of a luxury hotel in one interview (Warrier 1998), thus, Thirumavalavan cited his ‘life situation’ as evidence that the DPI had no resources (Illangovan 1998). Lacking resources, the DPI relied on grass-roots mobilisation to succeed. A decade of poll boycotts emphasised the movement’s radicalism and denied legitimacy to the Legislative Assembly, but in 1999 the DPI completed a tactical volté face and contested the polls on the slogan: ‘We are voting for ourselves’. Why, however, did they choose the electoral route and what did they hope to achieve thereby?

Entering Politics: Rationales, Opportunities and Pitfalls

Dalit movement’s reliance on exclusive identity categories constituted a defensive response to caste repression, but effectively legitimised caste actors. Contesting elections, by contrast, raised the question of citizenship and the prospect of reform. ‘India’s institutions are not only the bedrock of its democracy, providing an ordered process for the politicisation of previously marginalised groups’, as Jenkins argues, ‘but also … the means by which democracy’s change-resistant tendencies are overcome’ (1999: 224). Whilst Dravidian dominance narrowed the political agenda, recent elections confirmed the fragmentation of Tamil politics (Yadav 2001) and this erosion of political fealty offered opportunities for Dalit movements.

In 1998, Thirumavalavan averred that elections achieve little, and refused to ‘take part in something which upholds the status quo’ (Illangovan 1998). The following year, therefore, Nandan (1999)pressed him on the abandoned boycott: ‘Will you not be tainted’ they asked, and ‘is your decision … a victory for government repression’? Contradictory responses insisted that this was a change in tactic not policy; that the boycott harmed the movement; and that ‘if Dalits are to gain official power we have to vote’. He maintained that the DPI would not ‘put forward a representative’, but that ‘if we gain seats in the Centre [Delhi] we will be able to act against abuses’. ‘We are not going to support opportunist or self-serving political parties’, he maintained (ibid.).

The above quotes reveal the contingency of the move to politics. Key issues and longer-term prospects were not thought through. The attractions of politics are seen in vague references to ‘using Dalit votes’ and gaining ‘Dalit power’. The obvious forerunner here is the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP – Majority People’s Party: the most successful Dalit-based party) in Uttar Pradesh (UP). The BSP was referred to in movement speeches as epitomising the possibilities of Dalit politics, because it united the Dalit vote in UP and forged pragmatic coalitions which enabled it to take power (Pai 2002). In brief periods of office, furthermore, the BSP expedited the employment of Dalits to positions of responsibility and instituted ‘programmes of Dalit uplift’ (Pai 2002: 178).

Chandra (2004) and Pai (2002) argue that the BSP successfully altered its ‘representational profile’ – by allocating seats to higher castes for example – to widen its appeal beyond its caste-base. Pai (2002) shows that the Dalit vote remained fairly constant but politically astute seat allocations and pragmatic alliances carried the party to power. Puthiya Tamizhagam echoed these tactics in Tamilnadu, fielding non-Dalit candidates in 1999 and 2001 (Illangovan 2001), and both the DPI and PT have attempted to broaden their social base by appealing to ‘Tamils’ and dropping caste terminology from their titles (the DPI renamed itself the ‘Liberation’ Panthers in 1999).

The BSP’s experience, however, is of limited relevance in Tamilnadu. Elections in UP are often contested between 4 strong parties (Pai 2002) but, though Ananth (2006) notes that Congress, Communists and Caste parties retain strong support they have failed to establish autonomous alternatives and Tamil elections are dominated by two Dravidian coalitions. Non-aligned alliances have occasionally secured a respectable vote-share, but this has failed to translate into seats. Chandra’s (2004) account of ethnic headcounts also seems simplistic in this context where 50 years of Dravidian discourse has fostered a Tamilian identity that shatters the automatic assumption that Dalits (for instance) will vote for a Dalit party. Furthermore, Dalits in Tamilnadu are divided amongst themselves. Following the fragmentation of the Dravidian vote, therefore, Dalit parties in the 1990s attempted to create an ‘ethnic’ constituency.

Given the absence of strong ‘pull factors’, Nandan is right to question whether political participation is a ‘victory for government repression’. In considering DPI actions, the compulsions of politics are more obvious than its attractions. The boycott enabled the government to cast the Panthers as undemocratic extremists, thereby justifying repressive measures which alienated the movement from the people (Gorringe 2005). Thirumavalavan concedes that political engagement is important to ‘show our strength in and commitment to democratic means’ (Nandan 1999). Secondly, despite the DPI boycott most Dalits continued to vote. Elections are exciting times, politicians seek you out and party activists distribute largesse and promises of more if they come to power (De Wit 1996). The boycott withheld the votes of activists and offered sympathisers no electoral alternative, so they voted for established parties, including those antithetical to Dalit empowerment.

Lacking a positive vision to justify political participation the DPI was in tumult preceding the 1999 Indian elections; internally they faced discontented activists, externally they confronted a casteist social environment and a political scenario in which they were isolated. Many dedicated activists were distraught: ‘Government is a sewer’, Subramani – an activist from Cuddalore observed, ‘we do not want to fall in’ (Interview, 27 April 1999). Not everyone, he insisted, would follow Thirumavalavan into politics. The DPI emerged as a radical grass-roots movement that fought back against caste oppression. Parliamentary parties were frequently castigated for failing to advance social justice and conniving in continuing caste discrimination.

Such concerns were unavoidable in 1999 because Dalits in one village had been forced to flee their homes by a casteist mob in March and, on the eve of the elections, the police violently dispersed a Dalit demonstration in Tirunelveli killing 17 people (Gorringe 2005: 297, 350). In the teeth of these incidents the DPI could not ignore the records of political parties or downplay the realities of caste. The decision to contest the elections was unpopular, and these events rendered an alliance with Dravidian parties untenable. A dalliance with the (opposition) AIADMK raised such a storm that rebuttals were issued with alacrity. The identities of social activists, Jasper (1997) astutely notes, frame how they view both the world and themselves. Having invested significance in the concept of radical action, forging links with an enemy was unbearable.

Indian elections, however, operate on a first-past-the-post system which means that parties need not secure an overall majority to win a seat. The ‘practice of electing representatives according to geographical constituencies,

[implies]

… that interests are relatively homogenous within localities’ (Philips 1991: 63). The polarisation of caste-based parties illustrates the naivety of such assumptions and reveals the ‘universal citizen’ to be a myth. There are no geographical concentrations of Dalits sufficient to guarantee victory in any constituency and although certain seats are reserved for Dalits (as part of affirmative action to offset inequality) such candidates are dependent on the votes of others. Whilst voting is tied to localities, therefore, Dalits cannot neglect other castes.

DPI leaders, thus, were torn: to appease activists they needed to suggest radicalism, but to stand any chance of winning they needed cross-caste alliances. This latter point was particularly contentious given the problematic of representation. As Kamaraj, a DPI adherent put it:

Yes there are hundreds of Dalit MPs in India, but they do not win alone. They win as party people, as politicians. There is no opportunity for Dalit MPs to speak out about Dalit society and problems so we do not need them. We need our own MP who will speak for us (Interview, 10 September 1999).

This context explains why the DPI decision seemed so momentous. Dalit politicians are commonly portrayed as political pawns or self-interested careerists (Roy & Sisson 1990). ‘Suitcase politics’ was the contemptuous phrase used by respondents to denote ‘unprincipled’ and ‘self-aggrandising’ leaders who ‘sell out’ in return for resources. Against this backdrop, DPI leaders had to persuade followers of their continuing autonomy and to justify electoral participation and alliance formation.

The exoneration of police for the violence in Tirunelveli at this point encapsulated Dalit distrust of institutions but also facilitated a realignment of political affiliations. The protests surrounding the incident brought the fissiparous Dalit movements onto a common platform. They were joined by the Tamil Maanila Congress (Tamil State Congress – TMC) which had been frozen out of the main coalitions. Contingency, thus, dictated the DPI’s decision to join the (non-Dravidian) Third Front in 1999. As Viswanathan (1999) argued, the ‘consolidation of the oppressed sectors, particularly Dalits, in Tamil Nadu’ constituted a significant fall-out of the massacre. This solution to the DPI’s political dilemma was welcomed in the media but distrusted in the movement. The TMC, when allied to the DMK government, had overlooked anti-Dalit violence and so DPI cadre were sceptical of the alliance. Faced by such disaffection Thirumavalavan belatedly insisted that the DPI’s political engagement was conditional on four key demands: A share of power; political recognition; the consolidation of Dalit forces and; the attempt to force the Dravidian parties out of office (Speeches and Interview 1999).

These conditions refuted prevalent projections of Dalits as a vote-bank who could be bought with promises or hand-outs. This development, as Viswanathan (1999) opined, was ‘seen as having the potential to bring about substantial changes, not only of electoral politics in the state but in the nature of political activism in general and the approach of mainstream political parties to organisations that represent Dalits’ aspirations’. Dalit engagement in elections promised an expansion of the political sphere to include marginalised sectors of society, but also reflected the growing strength of caste-based groups and the declining appeal of Dravidian parties. Wyatt (2002) subsequently argued that a coalition government requiring Dravidian parties to share power is no longer a chimera. The DPI had abandoned revolutionary struggle, but looked set to revolutionise Tamil politics. We turn now to the impact of this move and the DPI’s gradual integration into the political system.

The Parliamentary Route to Change? 1999-2006 Elections.

‘If, after Thirumavalavan has spoken and left, you listen to what the DMK lot or the AIADMK lot or any other political party people are saying and are scattered, then the Dalit Panthers cannot protect you. It is necessary for us all to unite. It is necessary for us to cast our votes for our own sake. We need to show our opponents that we are a united political force’ (Thirumavalavan, Speech, 16 June 1999).

After all the posturing and positioning accompanying the move to politics, how have the Panthers fared at the ballot box? To what extent have they maintained the united front that Thirumavalavan extols above? As analyses of earlier elections have been provided elsewhere (Wyatt 2002, Gorringe 2005), I confine myself to a brief summary before turning to more recent developments. The TMC-led Third Front (above) fared poorly in the 1999 elections. Despite polling heavily in several constituencies it failed to win a seat, thus emphasising the electoral pre-eminence of the Dravidian parties. Significantly, the Front was not humiliated and Thirumavalavan came second in Chidambaram constituency, forcing the AIADMK candidate into third place. The ability of a non-Dravidian, Dalit-based coalition to mobilise significant votes was established and the easy assumption of Dalit loyalty to the status quo was shattered.

Despite intimidation and violence, thousands of Dalits voted for Thirumavalavan. Press coverage increased noticeably as did the political recognition accorded to the party. In playing on the issue of representation, the DPI persuaded many Dalits that it was their ‘duty’ to support them. Sakthidasan an agricultural labourer from a remote village in Chidambaram constituency was typical: He insisted that the political process was the only means for leaders to gain more ‘respect, attention, and power’. Dalits here primarily depend on other castes for work as agricultural labourers, and Sakthidasan was forthright in his analysis:

We do not have that much faith in democracy, but for the first time a Dalit has stood as a Dalit and we have done our duty by voting for him. Whether he does anything for us or not is the next question, but our votes are for ourselves (Interview, 26 September 1999).

Sakthidasan’s assertion reveals both the cynicism that characterises Dalit views of politics, and the fact that the proactive election campaign succeeded in raising consciousness even if it failed in the polls. The quote also adds complexity to Chandra’s (2004) notion of ethnic head-counts in emphasising that material concerns need not determine electoral choices. The symbolic and emotive reasons of pride and duty can outweigh expectations of reward.

The publicity and votes gained by the DPI (especially in northern districts) persuaded leaders that the electoral process was worth pursuing. The fluid nature of Tamil alliances, however, meant that the Third Front was precarious. There was no guarantee that the TMC would remain independent and without the resources and credibility of an established party the Front would be undermined. Furthermore, the question of what the DPI hoped to achieve came to the fore. Persisting with a non-Dravidian Front would radicalise voters and offer a critical alternative: pursuing the same ends using institutional rather than radical (often criminal) means. Contesting elections, however, proffered new opportunities (cf. Coy & Hedeen 2005): Strategic alliance building, for example, could lead to financial resources, extensive networks, a wider pool of voters, and Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) status. To be most effective, though, this path required a Dravidian alliance which seemed impossible since neither was trusted in 1999:

Yesterday the AIADMK fostered the BJP, now it is the turn of the DMK. Yesterday Jayalalitha, today Karunanidhi. We need to question which is the scoundrel and which is the rogue (Thirumavalavan, Speech, 16 June 1999).

The implication was of a Hobson’s choice, since both had betrayed their ideals and fostered the Hindu nationalist BJP which is antithetical to Dalit interests. Furthermore, Dr Krishnasamy re-iterated the concern for autonomy: ‘Dalit leaders should retain the leadership of Dalit campaigns … and that mainstream political parties should not derive undue political mileage from the struggles of Dalits against caste oppression’ (Nambath 1999). Despite the compelling logic of Dalit assertion, Krishnasamy’s principled but unrewarding offer of autonomous action was rejected by the TMC and DPI who allied to the AIADMK for several bye-elections in 2000.

The DPI’s dramatic volte–face invited accusations of ‘suitcase politics’ and outraged activists felt betrayed, but it is worth considering the decision more dispassionately. The votes garnered by the Third Front highlighted that shifting from movement to party entailed more than a ‘tactical’ shift: It altered the constituency to whom the DPI appealed. The 225,000 people who voted for Thirumavalavan far exceeded those prepared to engage in social protest. This wider constituency was, by definition, less radical and more interested in the bread-and-butter issues of political participation. Activists spoke of Thirumavalavan turning parliament on its head, but most voters wanted him in office as a symbol of Dalit assertion and as a source of patronage.

Election campaigns require resources and organisational infrastructure that Dalit movements lack and established allies can provide. Finally, Pandian (1992) notes how Dravidian parties (the AIADMK in particular) have successfully mediated subaltern consciousness and secured active consent despite neglecting their interests. Whilst autonomous Dalit movements increasingly counter Dravidianism, interviews and observations confirmed his analysis. Allying with the AIADMK, therefore, was a pragmatic recognition of Dravidian hegemony. Thirumavalavan continued to critique Dravidian policy and his exhausting schedule of engagements and relatively obscure and humble accommodation suggested that he had not profited personally from the new strategy. The alliance with the AIADMK was the lesser of two evils since the DMK was portrayed as most opposed to Dalit liberation and the AIADMK is traditionally more popular with Dalits and women. The main drawback was that the coalition isolated PT (which was at loggerheads with the AIADMK) and splintered the Dalit vote.

The results of the 2000 bye-elections threw the wisdom of pragmatism into doubt, however, when the ‘DMK gained from Dalits’ apathy to the AIADMK’ (Nambath 2000), suggesting that real-politick could alienate principled actors and blur the distinction between a Dalit party and an established one. The DPI emerged as a radical response to parties that saw Dalits as pawns to be bought off before each election. In 1999, the campaign slogan (‘our votes are for ourselves’) resonated with many Dalits and encouraged them to vote for the first time or to back an autonomous Dalit candidate. In 2000 Dalit voters refused to be the pawns of their own leaders either, and rejected the AIADMK-DPI combine because they saw Dravidian parties as ideologically opposed to them.

Despite failing to persuade their supporters, the DPI remained in alliance with the AIADMK preceding the 2001 Legislative Assembly elections. PT mooted a principled alternative before succumbing to the politics of pragmatism themselves when their attempt to initiate a Congress-led Front failed. Unwilling to contest without a mainstream partner, PT sought an electoral pact with the DMK. The fragility of alliances and electoral understandings, however, came to the fore in this election when disputes over seat sharing (how many seats each alliance partner should be allowed to contest) disrupted both coalitions. The DMK was not accommodating (retaining most seats for itself) and alienated its main electoral allies who swapped sides. The major party to defect was the Vanniyar (a Backward Caste) dominated Paatali Makkal Katchi (PMK – Toiling People’s Party) which is seen to hold sway in northern Tamilnadu. The DPI was formed partly as a defensive reaction against Vanniyar assertion, so when the PMK joined the AIADMK, the DPI jumped ship.

Bereft of other allies, the DPI allied to the DMK, thus abandoning a key rationale for electoral contestation. In 1999, Thirumavalavan pilloried the PMK leader for swallowing his pride and rejoining the DMK despite being insulted. He also insisted that: ‘Karunanidhi’s complete government has been against the downtrodden and remains so. He is only concerned in nurturing the dominant castes’ (Speech, 01 November 1999). At the time (Gorringe 2006a) I saw the acceptance of Dalit parties into the DMK Front as significant for 2 principal reasons. Firstly, Karunanidhi had been the subject of personal attacks by movement orators: ‘Karunanidhi is a scoundrel and we need to oppose him first’, as Thirumavalavan had said. Granting 18 seats to the DPI and PT, therefore, constituted a loss of face for the party. Defections and splits are endemic in Indian politics, and the colourful language used at the point of departure has rarely precluded reconciliation, but swallowing the insults of an untested group is uncommon. Secondly, the two Dalit organisations were given more seats than established parties (Hindu 2001). In retrospect this significance was overstated. The bargaining for seats suggested the DPI would only enter alliances on the basis of a share of political power, and wresting so many constituencies from the DMK signalled that Dalit parties are now considered capable of delivering votes. Beyond this, however, the import is limited.

The accommodation of the Dalit parties must be viewed in context: as a desperate attempt by the DMK to attract more votes after the departure of other allies. Dalit parties are now treated as vote-banks that can be won over at election time, and the asymmetry of power was emphasised by seat allocations. Though the PT had proved itself in previous elections the DPI reached a swift agreement over seats because it opted to campaign on the DMK symbol of the rising sun. The PT, which demanded its own flag, was engaged in protracted negotiations (Nambath 2001). The DPI, thus, acted as a pawn and did not gain autonomous political recognition. Its allocation of 8 seats testifies to the caste-based logic of electoral competition rather than its strength. Caste informs the electoral outcomes of many constituencies and five decades of rhetoric on ‘Tamilness’ has not constrained its salience. If anything, caste figures more prominently in contemporary elections due to the caste-based parties that have arisen in the past two decades. The Dalit Panthers were welcomed by the DMK as a possible counterweight to the PMK.

The rise of minor parties has meant that neither Dravidian party can win unaided in several constituencies. The PMK, for instance, is seen to dominate in the north-east and has broken the Dravidian duopoly in a way that Communist and Congress parties failed to do. The DPI’s heartlands are here, reflecting the fact that they campaigned against Vanniyar caste domination. Sure enough, the DPI’s lone success was in Mangalore where Thirumavalavan emerged victorious although the DMK-Front was routed in the polls. PT did not win a seat, but their strongholds in the south are where the DMK has struggled to make inroads. Paradoxically, far from furthering their ultimate objective of eradicating caste, the DPI victory emphasised the importance of caste considerations.

This was most evident in the fact that Dalits voted en masse for DMK candidates (Subramanian 2001b, Yadav 2001) whilst other caste voters shunned the ‘Dalit-friendly’ parties. Even DMK cadres neither campaigned nor voted effectively for their Dalit allies (Subramanian 2001b, Venkatesh 2001). Kamaraj, a DPI activist from Madurai insisted that BCs have an ‘allergy’ to Dalit mobilisation, and his crude analysis gained credence in 2001. ‘The social aversion” on the part of DMK candidates, mostly belonging to Mukkulathors and other OBCs, to be identified with Dalit leaders and cadres’, Illangovan (2001) reported, ‘has made the DMK an untouchable” among its own rank and file’.[10] As Dalit organisations have entered politics, the social ostracism associated with untouchability has informed the electoral process. Indeed, caste sentiment has been exacerbated as Dalit movements have confronted BC dominance (Pandian 2000) ‘The DMK’s gamble with the Dalit card … failed’, Illangovan concluded, ‘thanks to the sharp polarisation of Dalits and non-Dalits, where the party affiliations became irrelevant’. Untouchability at the ballot box is arguably part of a backlash ‘resisting Dalit efforts at claiming their human rights and dues’ (Rajadurai and Geetha 2002: 119).

The heightening of caste sentiment helps explain why, despite entering politics later, the Dalit Panthers have surpassed Puthiya Tamizhagam. The social antipathy to Dalit interests dictates that Dalit parties are a default option to mitigate the loss of key allies. The Panthers have an advantage since they offset the PMK vote-bank, whilst PT has no equivalent opponent. Poll results, thus, have established a pecking order based on electoral arithmetic. The DPI are a natural second choice if an alliance with the PMK fails. Their secondary status became apparent, however, when their Dravidian ally canvassed their support for the 2004 Lok Sabha elections but denied them any representatives. The Legislative Assembly has 234 members whereas Tamilnadu only has 39 representatives in the Lok Sabha, but the failure to grant even one seat to the Panthers was telling. Thirumavalavan resigned from Mangalur (which he had contested on a DMK ticket) ‘on principle’ and joined an alliance of Dalit and non-Dravidian parties:

A majority of the mainstream parties in the State, such as the TMC, the Congress(I), the PMK and the two Left parties had already allied with the AIADMK. The DMK then had only the BJP with it. Karunanidhi was left with no option but to accommodate the DPI and the P.T. along with some small caste-based parties. But now, because Kaunanidhi has had the support of some much bigger parties, he has ditched Dalit parties,” Thirumavalavan said (Viswanathan 2004).

The message is clear: Dravidian parties use the DPI as a vote-bank when necessary and abandon them when more tested alliances appear. Karunanidhi’s call for the DPI to support the DMK alliance from the outside was rightly perceived as an insult, but the hastily assembled Dalit alliance was a washout, coming third in most seats except for Chidambaram where Thirumavalavan again came second.

Given the repeated ability to secure thirty percent of the vote without the main parties it cannot be long before the DPI contests national polls in a Dravidian Front. The reticence of the main parties to offer the Chidambaram constituency to the DPI supports the argument (above) that this would alienate Dravidian cadre. Until they contest national constituencies, however, the Panthers will remain the Cinderella of Tamil politics and lack adequate political recognition. This was emphasised in 2006 when the DMK compounded its earlier insult by requesting unconditional DPI backing for Assembly elections. The DPI’s actions at this point are noteworthy. Rather than reviving the Dalit alliance that unsuccessfully contested the 2004 polls, Thirumavalavan led the DPI back into the AIADMK fold.

The outset of the 2006 elections, therefore, saw a complete reversal of 2001. This time the AIADMK was isolated and its allocation of 9 seats to the DPI (1 more than it contested in 2001) must be read against this backdrop. ‘The AIADMK considered us a political force and invited us to join their front’, Thirumavalavan insisted, but had roles been reversed there would have been no place for them. The incremental road to political recognition took another step, however, when the DPI stood as the Viduthalai Ciruthaikal Katchi (Liberation Panther Party), not under the AIADMK banner. The Electoral Commission allotted them a ‘bell’ as a campaigning symbol, because the DPI have no established emblem. The political significance of visual imagery cannot be overstated in a society where most voters identify the symbol they intend to vote for rather than the party. The emotive force of such markers was apparent when the fledgling Desiya Morpokku Dravida Kazhagam (National Progressive Dravidian Federation – DMDK) was assigned a drum in 2006, leading several Dalit women to align themselves behind Vijayakant: ‘It is our symbol’ they are quoted as saying – since beating drums made of polluting leather is traditionally a Dalit task (Hindu 2006c). The DPI’s allocated marker rang no such ‘bells’. That a film-star with no history of Dalit activism should elicit such a response is an indictment of Dalit parties and raises questions about the current strategy.

The 2006 results favoured the DMK-led ‘Democratic Progressive Alliance’, forcing Jayalalitha to resign as Chief Minister. The DMK, with 96 out of the 234 seats, became the largest single party, but remained 22 short of an overall majority raising the real prospect of coalition government in the state. The most likely coalition partner (the Indian National Congress which secured 38 seats), however, overrode the desires of the state wing of the party and brokered a deal whereby they shored up the minority government in return for a similar favour in Pondicherry. The AIADMK alliance gained 69 seats of which the DPI gained 2 (double its previous return). The remaining 7 DPI candidates all finished second but the Dravidian alliance would account for this. The Panthers unerringly backed the loser again, but how much choice did they have? As a second choice ally, they are limited to the weaker coalition. Perhaps the strategy needs to be rethought.

Caging the Dalit Panthers?

Seven years after entering the elections the arguments, tactics and results remain static. Whilst the exigencies of political competition require political parties to compromise and agree to a minimum common platform, if this exhausts the DPI’s ambition then political participation will accomplish little. Indeed, their participation merely legitimises the political system and buttresses the politics of contingency. The repeated assurance that elections are a ‘tactic’, not a ‘principle’ (Warrier 2006), is increasingly tenuous. The DPI now routinely gains press coverage of speeches, meetings and its manifesto, and the number of seats it has contested has risen. It has, however, become a stock player. Although Dalits are prevented from standing in at least four panchayats, this was not central to the party’s manifesto. ‘We may have come to the elections’, Thirumavalavan insisted in 1999, when trying to persuade followers, ‘but our warrior spirit has not changed … we will not give up our struggle for liberty’ (Speech 07 August 1999). Political opportunism, it seems, has tamed the Dalit Panthers.

The DPI, I contend, is becoming institutionalised and losing the mantle of radicalism. Institutionalisation essentially refers to the process whereby movements ‘develop internal organisation, become more moderate, adopt a more institutional repertoire of action and integrate into the system of interest representation’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 148). As Coy and Hedeen (2005: 407) argue, institutionalisation may lead a movement to become ‘bureaucratized and technique centred, losing its adaptive vitality’. They observe that assimilation into institutional practices can involve a dilution of movement critiques and tactics.

The institutionalisation of the DPI is evident in the formalisation of the party (a rule book outlining roles and responsibilities was prepared) but also in the actions and expectations of leaders and participants: Firstly, its willingness to support alternate Dravidian parties indicates an attenuation of ideological principles and an adaptation to the prevailing political environment. Secondly, the disappointment when Thirumavalavan decided not to stand in 2006 (Hindu 2006b) suggests that activists are increasingly focused on elections rather than sustained anti-caste activism. Thirdly, the choice of candidates for the nine constituencies in 2006 highlighted a growing distance between the leadership and the grassroots. Dedicated local activists were passed over in the nominations (ibid.) though the party promised to bring the Assembly closer to the people. The four ‘key demands’ on which political involvement was predicated (see above) have disappeared: Institutionalisation, Piven and Cloward (1971) observe, can entail co-optation and demobilisation.

Alert to this danger, Thirumavalavan argued that ‘if the gap between the

[people and movement]

widens too far, the people will be alienated from the movement’ (Interview, 03 November 1999). Opportunist politics, however, will widen this rift. Already the sympathisers inspired by the DPI’s radicalism in 1999 have begun to look elsewhere for a Dalit revival. ‘Thirumavalavan is finished’, a Jesuit priest and one-time supporter opined (Father J, Personal Communication, 27 April 2006).[11] The decision to join a Third Front in 1999 breathed air into the stultified atmosphere of Tamil politics. The failure to consolidate the Dalit vote, and the support for Dravidian parties, has re-instated the status quo. The dilution of radicalism is illustrated in the neglect of local activists who cultivated constituencies and established movement strongholds. They were by-passed in the selection of candidates, suggesting that the calculations of a party-machine are eroding the DPI’s grassroots basis.

In recounting the costs and motivations for action Subramaniam, a Tamil Dalit Liberation Movement activist, encapsulated a problematic now confronting the DPI: ‘None of us have saved a penny in our activism. This movement is our asset. The liberty of the people is our future. In that context it is unjust for someone to say: This is my movement”’ (Interview 11 October 1999). The top-down allocation of seats and alliances, and the move from a movement responding to ideological imperatives and social injustices to a party with a set agenda renders the DPI increasingly leader-centred. Father J noted the frustrations occasioned by this trend and spoke of DPI youth, imprisoned due to previous radicalism, plotting revenge against Thirumavalavan because they felt abandoned and betrayed (Personal communication, April 2006). If the groundswell of support that was evident in 1999 evaporates then the tactics will have back-fired. Supporting the main parties has yet to ensure elections in reserved panchayats, let alone objectives such as land-reform. Were Thirumavalavan to become an MLA or MP then members would at least feel that they have a voice, but in 2006 the two DPI MLAs were not only on the losing side they were parachuted into the constituencies they contested. Is political engagement a failure then?

The Social Impact of Politics?

Judging the decision to contest elections solely on the basis of vote-share and seats gained, would be mistaken. Democracy, Lefort (1988) shows, is as much about social practice as political institutions, and it is arguably in social terms that the greatest impact of DPI politics can be seen. Dialogue with political opponents since their entry into the electoral sphere, for instance, potentially offers a more inclusive politics: that of Tamil nationalism. Rajadurai and Geetha (2002: 121) claim that ‘Dalits have a quarrel with the very notion of Tamilness’, and Nambath (2005) regards the DPI’s adoption of Tamil nationalism as a deliberate ‘attempt to grow beyond identity politics’ enabled by the low social status of the dominant castes in Tamilnadu who ‘owe no allegiance to Hindutva’. What they neglect is the long-standing attachment to Tamilness occasioned by Dravidian ideology and anti-Hindi agitation. The DPI, thus, aspires to a ‘nation of Tamils undivided by caste’ (Thirumavalavan: 18 July 1999).

The cross-cutting nature of social descriptors, led Pandian (2000: 515) to question the analytical utility of catch-all caste categories, arguing that the complexities of political coalitions and social mobility cannot be captured by reference to ‘Dalits’ and ‘Backward Castes’. We have seen that Dalit castes have their own leaders, and cannot assume that Vanniyars share interests with other Backward Castes (Radhakrishnan 2002). The dominant discourse is restricted to caste categories, obscuring the contingency of identity claims:

A Vanniyar, however he may assert his specific caste identity, also claims a Tamil ancestry and in this, rhetorically at least, is willing to be part of a common nation that is transcendent of caste (Rajadurai and Geetha 2002: 123).

The contingent nature of identity formations and the possibilities of non-caste activism were emphasised between 2004 and 2006. Having been locked in implacable conflict with the PMK for a decade, the DPI began 2006 in alliance with them. The roots of this rapprochement lie in the party leaders’ attempt to mitigate spiralling caste violence, and their ability to forge a common identity around the supra-caste issue of Tamilness. Since 1999, the DPI have courted – and been courted by – various political interests. In this process, a commitment to Tamil self-determination took Thirumavalavan to Sri Lanka to support the fight for a Tamil nation. The PMK shares this objective and both parties agreed to campaign jointly as the Tamil Protection Movement (TPI).

Tapping into an emotional political current, both parties have called for Tamil medium education and the eradication of English titles for shops and films (MyTamil.com 2004, Tamil Info Daily 2005). Political immediacy colours the cognitive template of DPI politics and the naïve expectation that communities can be re-imagined so speedily reflects this. Thirumavalavan argued that the TPI had fostered more harmonious social relationships: ‘You will see that there is no brutal violence against Dalits there now. There are no law and order issues also there. The northern districts are quite peaceful’ (Warrier 2006). Whilst the TPI has enabled DPI/PMK (commonly seen as proxies for Paraiyars and Vanniyars) dialogue, the rosy picture painted by Thirumavalavan is misleading. The lack of physical (brutal) violence against Dalits does not mean that the structural inequalities which render Dalits dependent upon the dominant castes have been addressed. Rather it bolsters arguments that much collective violence is politically organised.

The truce between the rival parties is welcome, but unless and until the structures of mind, body and resources are reconstructed Tamil Dalits will live under the shadow of caste discrimination. Caste clashes are not spontaneous eruptions of communal sentiment, rather they feed on everyday processes of identity formation, misunderstanding and the cultural concepts of honour and shame (Gorringe 2006b). Establishing the humanity of the Dalits in the eyes of caste superiors requires more than a political alliance as the 2001 results testify. Even granting the reduction in caste enmity, though, there are grounds to question whether the TPI advances Dalit objectives.

In articulating a ‘Tamilian’ identity, in fact, the TPI could compound the marginalisation of the most vulnerable Dalits. The politicisation of a linguistic ethnicity, marginalises Telegu-speaking Chakkiliyars further, and obscures the fact that Tamil nationalism has done little to mitigate untouchability. Furthermore the TPI’s nationalism has been accompanied by a moral conservatism and ethnic chauvinism that clashes with a theoretical commitment to women’s rights. The stress on chastity and the virtues of ‘Tamil women’ that greeted a film actress’ comments about pre-marital sex are in direct contrast to earlier critiques of patriarchy and the cultural constraints placed on women. ‘All women wish to enter politics, wish to stand on the front line of such protests, do all husbands permit that?’ – Thirumavalavan asked at a movement wedding. Addressing the Women’s Struggle Committee’s protest against poll violence he went further still:

‘Woman’ is taken to mean being the handmaid of her husband, women have yet to enter politics. Whether it be the Communist party or the Dravidian parties they see women as objects to be kept within boxes (Speech, 1 November 1999).

In pursuing the TPI agenda, however, Thirumvalavan has joined the ‘morality police’ trying to impose an idea of virtue and rectitude onto Tamil women (cf. Anandhi 2005). This confirms the sense that the demand for women’s rights was tokenistic. It is pertinent, here, that none of the DPI candidates in 2006 were women. Thirumavalavan said he would ‘sacrifice anything for the cause of Tamil’ (My-Tamil.com 2004), but if the Tamilian ‘solution’ to exclusive identity relegates Dalit interests it constitutes a ‘dramatic dilution of its [DPI’s] radicalism’ (Anandhi 2005: 4876). There is also a question mark over the extent to which an appeal to a trans-caste identity can be mobilised given the extent to which the political sphere has been colonised by caste concerns. Indeed, in April 2005, the joint PMK/DPI protests against the erosion of Tamil culture faltered in the face of two bye-elections (Venkatesh 2005). Is the DPI’s radicalism now confined to socio-political conservatism?

Concluding Remarks: Dalits and the Politics of Opportunism

‘Our people only think: If I don’t like Karunanidhi, I’ll vote for Jayalalitha. If I don’t like the Two Leaves [AIADMK symbol], I’ll vote for the Rising Sun [DMK symbol]. But what we need to ask is: what have either government done for the downtrodden?’ (Thirumavalavan, Speech, 7 August 1999).

Omvedt suggests that Dalit protest laid the basis of an ‘alternative Indian identity’ (1994: 340). In TN this alternate identity has withered as the DPI is increasingly assimilated into Dravidian hegemony. The centrality of caste to Tamil politics, however, makes the revival of such a project both essential and overdue. Restricting such an endeavour to the ‘Tamil nation’ reveals a blinkered opportunism that ignores the pan-Indian possibilities offered by the Dalit tag and the perils attending particularist nationalism. Whilst broader in scope than a reactionary Tamil identity, however, the Dalit struggle remains limited whilst ‘Dalit’ continues to be a proxy for ‘untouchable’. Anti-caste activism is undermined by caste-based mobilisation mirroring the hegemonic social relations it aims to transplant.

‘The struggle for tolerance’, as Subramanian concludes, ‘will attain fuller success only if organisations less constrained by the interests of dominant or upwardly mobile groups play an important role in it’ (1999: 329). Dalit movements followed the established repertoire of protest to establish themselves on the map of Tamil politics, but ‘the existing repertoire [also] constrains collective action’ (Tilly 1986: 390). Continuing repression and isolation raises the question of what ‘politics as normal’ can achieve. The success of the BSP makes it an obvious referent here, but Pai’s analysis of the BSP raises similar dilemmas. Noting the compromises entered into by the party she argues that it has failed to implement social change. In a question with resonance for the Panthers, she insists that the BSP is ‘faced with a difficult decision: is it a movement with an agenda for radical social change, or a political party driven solely by the compulsion of achieving power?’ (2002: 1).

‘Athu meeru’ (fight back, resist), was theDPI slogan that galvanised Dalit resistance. The radicalism inherent in the assertion touched a nerve in rural TN and raised the prospect of a significant social transformation. Chellamma – a landless labourer in a village blighted by caste violence – insisted that; ‘It is only if we return a blow for a blow that the grindstone (ammi kallu) will shift’ (Interview, 20 March 1999). The assertion rests on the dubious assumption that counter-violence will make upper castes respect their social ‘inferiors’ as equals. The empirical evidence from Tamilnadu indicates that such optimism is misplaced at best and probably counter-productive. The occasional use of violent means may have discouraged groups minded to attack Dalits, but it has not prevented anti-Dalit atrocities or shifted the structural inequalities which render Dalits dependent upon higher castes for land, work, water and other amenities.

The DPI’s transition to politics is an implicit acceptance of the failure of violent protest. Politics, as Mouffe argues, is about ‘domesticating hostility’ (2000: 149), and whilst elections have occasioned Paraiyar/Vanniyar conflict, they have also facilitated (an imperfect) dialogue and the interaction seen above. The DPI certainly cannot hope for electoral success without reaching out to other groups. Unfortunately, scepticism about political involvement has been compounded as the DPI has compromised its ideals. ‘Parliamentary politics is the deciding factor’, Thirumavalavan assured me in 1999, ‘that is the centre of power’ (Interview, 3 November 1999). The flaws in such analysis were papered over in justifying the DPI’s engagement in electoral politics, but they have since come home to roost.

Pai concludes that the BSP reflects the ambitions of a class of Dalit power-seekers and differentiates it from grassroots attempts to erode the bases of caste domination. Her analysis begins to ring true for the DPI, as does her prescription for the BSP to democratise itself and articulate a new ideological perspective rooted in the material conditions of the disadvantaged (2002: 244). The DPI insists that electoral participation is a tactical rather than ideological move, but Coy and Hedeen (2005: 418) note how rarely movements ‘return to other forms of contention’. Short of the transformation outlined by Pai, however, the DPI has institutional alternatives. In 2002, Wyatt (2002: 753) noted that ‘the possibility of a viable third front emerging cannot be ignored’. In 2006, Vijayakant’s DMDK – which gained just under 10 per cent of the vote and polled more the difference between victory and second place in many instances – highlighted the viability of a serious, non-Dravidian alternative.

This example suggests that the DPI could harness the politics of principle. The Dravidian parties have fomented casteism in Tamilnadu, as Thirumavalavan avers. The eradication of caste discrimination, therefore, is not furthered by shoring them up. The real prospect of a coalition government in 2006 has punctured the Dravidian parties’ aura of invincibility. The DMK and AIADMK can no longer assume that governing the state is their birthright. Taking steps to establish an alternative can only further the democratisation of Tamilnadu and increase the credibility of the DPI. The enthusiasm accorded to autonomous Dalit candidates evaporates when ‘our votes are for another’.

Making ‘room for dissent and foster[ing] the institutions in which it can be manifested is vital for democracy’, Mouffe (2000: 150) argues. Entering unstable and opportunistic alliances with political rivals is not a sustainable means of effecting social change: ‘If a calf joins with piglets’, DPI activist Subramani insisted, ‘then the two will become one and you cannot distinguish between them – both run in the gutter’ (Interview 27 April 1999). In striking contrast to the promise of its political debut the DPI now constitutes an option not an empowering alternative. Unless it can revitalise its vision and mode of operation, the DPI’s political participation will ‘do nothing for Dalit rights’ (Father J, Personal communication, April 2006). Alternately supporting the rival Dravidian parties and placing a priority on Tamil rather than Dalit issues will not shift the grindstone of caste.

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[1] Backward Caste (BC) refers to the constitutional category of low-caste groups deemed to require positive discrimination due to their social status. Many BCs, however, are politically powerful.

[2] Empirical data was collected in Tamilnadu between 1998-9. The multi-sited ethnography focussed on Dalit movement activists, motivations, modes of operation, and ideological aspirations. The data consists of 30 group discussions, 32 formal and 30 informal interviews with activists, leaders, academics and non-participating Dalits. Interviews were complemented by participant observation.

[3] For detailed accounts of Tamil politics see: Kohli (1990), Subramanian (1999), and Wyatt (2002).

[4] See Harriss (2002: 107-8) and Gorringe (2005) for examples of mounting anti-Dalit hostility.

[5] Government of Tamilnadu, Statistical Handbook 2005. ‘Other groups’ are not disaggregated.

[6] These figures are for 1991. Source: Rath and Konlade (2000).

[7] The Indian Constitution rendered the practice of untouchability a punishable offence and reclassified Untouchables as ‘Scheduled Castes’ (SCs) by reference to a schedule of castes entitled to positive discrimination.

[8] Literacy rates vary, with urban Dalits more literate than the average and rural Dalits, especially in the West of the state trailing behind (Government of Tamilnadu 2005).

[9] Paraiyars, Pallars, and Chakkiliyars are the largest Tamil SC groups. SCs constitute 18% of the population. Paraiyars are the most populous. They live throughout Tamilnadu but are concentrated in northern districts. Pallars are fewer in number but more affluent and better organised partly due to their higher social status. They are mainly based in the South and West. Chakkiliyars, the lowest of the main SCs, are traditionally landless. Many speak Telegu and are seen as outsiders. They are distributed across Tamilnadu but mainly in central and western districts. The BC groups immediately competing against SCs are Vanniyars and Thevars. Vanniyars gained Most Backward Caste status after successful agitation in the 1980s. They are the largest single Tamil community, accounting for 12 per cent of the population, concentrated in the northern districts. Thevars have an exaggerated sense of caste pride though their educational and economic achievements are negligible. They are BCs but are a major landowning caste in south Tamilnadu. See Gorringe (2005: 58-60).

[10] Mukkulathors are one of the most prominent Backward Caste groups in Tamilnadu. OBC (Other Backward Castes) refers to those castes perceived to require affirmative action to offset caste-based inequalities. Both groups are socially ‘backward’ but politically strong in Tamilnadu.

[11] As someone who works for Dalit welfare, Father J is well placed to comment. As he works closely with the DPI and other movements, however, he preferred not to be named.

H. L. D. Mahindapala

Ranil Wickremesinghe reached the peak of his power on January 8, 2015. 

Then he was neither the prime minister nor the president. But he  had the power to make things happen. It can be argued that he had the world at his feet because he represented the promising moral force of the day. With that power he held his future and the future of the nation in his hands. Led by Ven. Maduluwawe Sobitha, the respected moral spearhead of the time, surrounded by NGOs and civil society, backed the West and India, boosted by the grass root forces disillusioned with the Rajapaksa regime, hailed by the minorities, welcomed by the business community, he had all the power he needed to make the difference” he promised, particularly with a newly elected President who was puttee in his palms. It was the greatest hour of his long career as the leader of the UNP.  Gifted with a pliable President who could be easily pressured to follow his instructions he had the power to achieve whatever he wanted

Perhaps, the only exceptions were Dudley Senanayake who swept the polls on the sympathy vote of his father’s death and J. R. Jayewardene in 1978 who sailed into power (5/6^th majority in Parliament) on the crest of the anti-Sirima-Marxist wave. Ranil had equal, if not greater power, to revitalise the nation  and raise the political culture to higher levels. More than the political victory he had the goodwill of the all the well-meaning reformists who expected him to give leadership to a radical change in the corrupt political culture and fulfil his moral duty.

In politics the moral power is far superior to the power of guns. In fact, guns used to enforce moral power are superior to guns fired to suppress risen forces of morality. All great revolutions that  changed the course of history were moral forces that won against the mighty guns of corrupt and decadent states. History invariably validates guns used to protect and enforce political morality. Ayotollah Khomeni overthrew the powerful police state of Shah in Iran with tapes issued from his exile in Paris. When Mao said that power comes out of the barrel of a gun he failed to mention that his bullets were packed with the additional power of a superior moral force that was targeting the degenerate and  crumbling feudal forces of Chiang Kai-Shek. The guns of pro-West, corrupt and anti-national guns of Chiang Kai-Shek failed because Mao’s guns  were cleaned to target, with moral accuracy, the evil forces destined  to die sooner than later.  

Marxism was only a secondary ideology which was understood and used as a political tool to direct the operations at the ground level by the top echelons of the party. At another  level it was the intellectual weapon used to combat the ruling evils of the decadent state. Conquering  the mind was as important as conquering territory. Ideology was the trigger to fire the guns of morality. The vast masses who followed Mao were inspired and guided by the moral essence that percolated down to  them from theoretical Marxism.   Mao became the brightest  star of the East because he represented a new political morality.  His Long March was to  achieve moral goals and his soldiers worked with the toiling masses to ease their suffering. The Chinese masses bonded with the new work ethic of the soldiers more than with Mao’s abstract theories. In short, the power that packed the punch into his guns was the moral force contained in Marxism.

Morality comes in various guises. Marxist morality dominated the 20^th century. Gandhism was another. Whatever the ideology it is moral content that  shines  through, like the Star of Bethlehem, to lead men. Gandhi is the better example because his fire power consisted purely of non-violent morality. The power of morality reached its full height in the person of Gandhi. All advances in history has been to reach the higher levels of morality.

On January 8, 2015 Ranil won because he was backed by the superior moral force led by Ven. Sobitha. Ranil acquired power by hanging on to the moral force represented by the Sangha. There was no one in the civil society, NGOs or in the political arena who could win the confidence of the people searching desperately for moral leadership other than Ven. Sobitha. Overnight the vilified Sangha became the saviours. Even the anti-Sinhala-Buddhist NGOs were following the yellow robes. It was the moral force of the Sangha that legitimised the other Sinhala-Buddhist symbol of the time, Maithripala Sirisena. Ranil, who was not acceptable to the people, rode into power by hanging on to the Sinhala-Buddhist bandwagon. Clearly, Sinhala-Buddhism represents the power of a moral force that has revitalised and bonded the nation particularly in times of peril. The victory of Gota should be read as the triumph of the Sinhala-Buddhist ethic rising once again to rescue the nation from the perils and evils of alien forces.

Cleansing the nation with the Sinhala-Buddhist principles has been a repetitive theme that runs, like clockwork, throughout its  history. It happened in 2015 too when Ranil came into power. Empowered by the Sinhala-Buddhist political ethics the people expected Ranil to be a moral leader who could create history by creating a new and clean political culture. His duty was to be a courageous  and reliable reformer without alienating the moral base of the nation. The people were willing to go along with him believing that he would perform his duties as Mr. Clean”. And he had the  power at the time to revive  the nation. His power was so great that he could even become Prime Minister without a majority in Parliament. He insisted in ousting the legitimate Prime Minister, Dimuthu Jayawardena, who was occupying the prime ministerial chair. Under Ranil’s  pressure the much beholden and obliging new President, Maithripala Sirisena, caved in.  Ranil could even force the hands of the President and import Arjuna Mahendra, a Singaporean con-man to head the Central Bank when there were more competent and experienced locals who could have served the nation with integrity, competency and dignity.

Ranil was at a point where he could verily say that he was the lord of what he surveyed even though he was neither the prime Minister nor the president.  He was then the uncrowned king of the new moral force that was expected to take the nation into higher levels of peace, prosperity and unity free from corruption. But he threw it away with ideological myopia, congenital inability to understand the fundamental forces that were throwing the nation unmanageably from one crisis to another and sheer cussedness with which he manipulated his henchman and victims to achieve his personal agenda, filled with greed to hang on to power  even if it means betraying  the nation. With his short-sighted self-deception, which assumed that he was the superior intellectual in a cesspool of ignorant mediocrities, he rode all the way cockily into his own nemesis. Ignorance to him was bliss. He dug his own grave. He  paved the path to November 16^th and he has to lie in it now.

What he did during his tenure as leader to his own Party and the nation is unforgiveable. He grabbed all the power available and dragged both the Party and the nation into the lowest imaginable depths of corruption, destruction, and despair. He revelled in posing as the solution to the nation’s problems. Drunk with his self-righteous and self-defeating superiority complex, he refused to believe that he was the cause of the problems. He was, in fact, the bane of the nation. It has taken a thundering slap from the people for him to realise that he no longer has the credibility, even among his loyal supporters, to lead the Party. Having failed 30 times at the polls what can he offer the Party or the nation? At last the nation can get rid of him for good. The nation can now hopefully look forward to find its way to a new era without the  negative forces generated consistently by the most unwanted man in politics.

Ranil’s biggest failure is his intellectual and moral inability to grasp the dynamics of politics that rule the nation at grass root levels. He lives in an airy-fairy world of his own. Take, for instance, his recent role in the Party at its most critical time of selecting the presidential candidate.  He must have been aware that  he  has been categorised as the most rejected figure in politics.. He has been a stark contrast to Mahinda Rajapaksa who is still the most popular figure in contemporary politics. But he fancied that he could lead an election campaign to defeat Gota Rajapaksa, a war winning hero who was perceived as the best guarantor of security for the nation – a nation traumatised by the Easter Sunday bombers. Everyone except the blind followers of Ranil knew that pigs have a  better chance of flying to moon than Ranil winning the presidency. Elections  results have proved it. The UNP hierarchy who knew this fatal flaw had to fight tooth and nail to reject him as a born loser. Ranil’s insistence on grabbing the nomination as a presidential candidate was insane. It damaged the image of the party as a viable force to lead the nation.. Once again it is the personal ambition of Ranil that ruined the chances of even scoring some runs at the electoral crease. It sent the wrong message to the electorate. A divided party, fighting bitterly to slaughter each other, cannot expect the nation to believe that they are capable of providing security or leading the nation. In fact, Ranil killed Sajith before the nation savaged him on November 16. In the end Sajith had to pay for Rail’s sins. Sajith did his utmost  to whitewash Ranil’s sins with his rhetoric But no one  believed him. Even his appointment of Field Marshall Sarath Fonseka as his  Defence Minister was a flop. The people opted for Gota as the guarantor of their security.

In hindsight it is obvious that Ranil had divided the Party beyond repair. It was a divided Party that sat to launch Sajith’s manifesto in Kandy. Ranil, the leader, was not even given the opportunity to say one word on the manifesto. Instead the Mangala-Sajith combo, the new leadership, invited Victor Ivan, the JVP bomb-maker who began his career in journalism determined to destroy Sajith’s father, President Premadasa.

The signs of UNP’s decline  and impending fall was clear at the Kandy launch of Sajith’s manifesto. The UNP had fallen from the moral heights of Ven. Sobitha to a bomb-maker who produced weapons of mass destruction that killed hundreds of innocent civilians. Ranil was made to sit on a chair on the floor while Victor Ivan was invited to the stage to deliver the key-note speech. And what did Victor Ivan do? He refused to speak on the manifesto – the most important subject required to raise the image of the UNP in the eyes of the nation. Instead he rambled on, spinning yarns about the need for constitution-making which was the most sensitive issue that angered the nation. The rejection of this issue was confirmed on November 16^th. Constitution-making was wrapped in the 13 demands put forward by the TNA to the  presidential candidates. Gota had wisely rejected it in toto. However, the hand-picked pundit of the UNP gets up on the party’s most  critical day and indirectly lauds the 13 demands  which were focused on constitution-making. Oddly enough, Ranil, the most committed proponent of constitution-making to appease the minorities, was demoted to a chair on the floor of the Kandy launch.  It was obvious that the UNP had gone to pieces. There was no pragmatic or viable centre to hold it together. A leaderless, pointless, worthless Party was heading blindly to November 16 – the day of reckoning. The in-fighting within the Party was worsened by the lack of an alterna      tive and credible leadership that could win the hearts and the minds of the critical voters who had waited patiently to get even with the Ranil-led regime.

The massive swing indicates clearly that the nation was biding its time to cut the neck of Ranil’s regime with the sharp edge of their lengthy ballot papers. And they did it in right royal style, peacefully and decisively, leaving no doubt in anyone’s mind that they can’t fooled by bogus  theoreticians in the civil society, NGOs,  or even the vacillating and partisan Mahanayakes of Malwatte who had lost their moral compass. The people’s reply was loud and clear. And the besieged nation is settling down again hoping  that a change of regime is going to bring at least a clean administration. The new Sinhala-Buddhist ethic was defined by Gota when he took his oaths – not at the traditional Malwatte – but at Ruwanweli Seya in Anuradhapura. He went  back to his roots that ran all the way to the  epic period of history written by Dutugemunu. The symbolism and its meaning rang deep in the hearts of the threatened Sinhala-Buddhists.

The psephological numbers stunned the political pundits and the UNP leaders who believed that the majority could not win without the minority. Gota’s victory rewrote the political equation that was accepted as the truth written in stone. The anti-Sinhala-Buddhist intellectuals and academics must revisit their fake theories and reconsider their spurious assumptions of the  grass root forces that determines national politics. For instance, they must reconsider who won and  who lost. If they can drop their inane prejudices they will realise that it was not Sajith who was defeated. It was Ranil. Sajith was faced with an uphill task, battling to wipe out the evil memories of Ranil and present a new face to the public. But the public knew that Sajith was merely the mask hiding Ranil’s anti-national, anti-majority, pro-West, corrupt regime.  He made a desperate bid to distance himself from Ranil. But not all the gewgaws, lollipops and tampons of the world could save him from going down the toilet.  Predictably, in his desperate bid to win, Sajith too swallowed Ranil’s calculation that the minorities could save him.

The alliances made by Ranil with the minorities boomeranged on Sajith. The more Ranil got closer to the minorities the more it threatened the security of the majority.  The demonised majority reacted en masse to defend their cherished heritage and their way of life from the arrogant minorities who assumed that they could make the majority dance to their naga salam.  Ranil fell for that line and danced all the way to November 16 believing that the Northern drumbeat would do the trick for him. The people refused to trust the man  behind Sajith’s mask. With a silent stroke  of the pen the voters cut the neck of the selected protector of the nation, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka. There was no one to protect the protector when he  lost his Kelaniya seat. Chandrika Bandaranaiake who came flying in on a rescue mission could not win her seat to save Ranil. Even the Presidential candidate could not win his seat in Hambantota. To change the metaphor, this lot put all their eggs in the minority basket. And the majority rejected them.

Asath Sally boasted of the power of the 30 per cent minority that could teach a lesson to the majority. Make no mistake: It was the Sinhala forces threatened by the minorities in the North and the East that triumphed on November 16. It was a clear cut power struggle between the minority and the majority. This  election turned out to be the most defining event since  Nandikadal. Nandikadal was won with bullets. Novmber 16^th was won with ballots. Both were led by Gota. The nationalist forces that swept Gotabaya into power is not confined to Sri Lanka. It is the force that is sweeping the globe. Though it is an odious comparison, it is the Sri Lankan version of Make America Great again”. Similar corresponding forces dominates global politics in the post-Cold War era. Easter Sunday highlighted the peril in which the nation is haunted by minorities resorting to violence. Running against the trend, Ranil ganged up with the minorities. This alliance with the minorities became his first and  last defence line. But it boomeranged. The Sinhala voters rallied as one united force to reject Ranil’s formula for peaceful co-existence. The Sinhala forces that saved the minorities from the fascist tyranny of the Tamil Pol Pot at Nandikadal define peacefully and democratically once again the  parameters within which the minorities can co-exist in a shared society with equal rights to all. The minorities ganged up to dictate politics to the majority. It was this threat to the majority that kept  the numbers ticking for Gota as results tumbled down on live  telecasts. Except  for  a brief moment or two, the consistent 50+vote never left Gota as the results captured the emerging  polling trend on the screen. There were no prizes for the runner-up. The winner took it all.

On the sideline, Victor Ivan, the new guru of the UNP, was theorising that Sajith has behind him the thousands of beneficiaries who  were recipients of his visionary father’s (1) poverty alleviation through  samurdhi, (2) house-building on a national scale (3) decentralising bureaucratic power and  taking it to the grassroots through gam-udawas, (4) creating  jobs by incentivising  businessmen to take garment factories to the villages , etc. President Premadasa also peoplised” the UNP by taking it away from Kurunduwatte to Kehelwatte. But Ranil reversed it. He took it to his new haven in Kollu”-pitiya, which is  next door to Kurunduwatte.

In his  delusional way Ranil also ran after Geoege Soros, the Hungarian billionaire, hoping he would  rush to save him with investments. He  joined the IDU – the exclusive club  of white, Christian, Western leaders – hoping  that the Western entrepreneurs would flock in their hundreds and thousands with investments to save him. In the end, the collective actions of his allies in the West and in the North helped him only to go gurgling down the drain. It must  be  conceded that Sajith in  his own flamboyant style tried to reclaim his father’s heritage. But there is more  to the shaping of historic events than a slick tongue, theatrics on the  stage and packing the Galle Face space with bussed Bandas bought with buth packets. The expected crowds predicted by Victor Ivan did not turn up at the polling  booths. As usual his cock-eyed theories went down his anatomical pipes like the beer he sips.

Gota’s second victory against the anti-national forces is as great as his first victory in defeating the invincible” Tamil Tiger terrorists. The battle lines were drawsn clearly between the nation and the anti-national forces. If Sajith won it would have taken the nation in the same direction as Ranil. Despite all his chest-beating bravado Sajith was  a mere ventriloquist for Ranil.

Gota was won this war because the Sinhala people rallied behind him to fight the battles against the anti-nationla forces. When his brother and mentor returns as Prime Minister they will collectively capture the ower that was denied in the 19^th Amendment. Ranil has been hoisted by his own petard. He designed the 19^th to strengthen  his prime minieterial hand because he feared that  he could never bythe president. The irony is that al Ranil’s labours have ended in consolidating  the power of the Rajapaksas. Jointly they both have another  chance to act unitedly to overcome all the obstacles placed in the 19^th Amendment. The coming events will mock the constitutional-makers who were straining every muscle to curtail the powers  of the presidency by increasing the powers of the prime minister. But when the President’s brother is also  his mentor what obstacle can stand in his way to do override the 19^th Amendment? Soon Gota will have all the powers except making man a woman, and vice versa. Together they will have unlimited power to achieve what they failed to fulfil in their first run.

Gota cannot do what Ranil do to the nation: betray the interests of the people with immoral politics and anti-national betrayals.

Gota owes everything to the Sinhala people. And the Sinhala-Buddhists, he must remember, never failed to protect the minorities and give them security and prosperity at all times, even when they were persecuted by their own leaders or  the foreigners. For instance, the Muslims will remember that when Sankili ethnically cleansed Jaffna, partly by throwing pig’s heads into  their wells, and when Prabhakaran persecuted and chased the Muslims out  of Jaffna within 24 hours it was the Sinhala south that gave refuge to them. He will also  remember the Sinhala people can protect the minorities as long as long as they live under the protective umbrella of the democratic, sovereign, undivided state and not if they fall under the separate rule of fascist Tamil or Sinhala Pol Pots.

There is no doubt that the two war-winning brothers will be back again after the next Parliamentary elections.

That, of course, will be another story for another  day.

UK was a former colonial invader occupying Sri Lanka from 1815 to 1948 & until 1972 when Sri Lanka became a republic. Let us not dwell into the atrocities committed under colonial British rule which mind you has yet to be acknowledge, apologized or compensated. As teacher and preacher of parliamentary democracy, Sri Lanka held a democratic election on 16^th November to elect the country’s 7^th President who became Gotabaya Rajapakse with a historical vote result. It did not take long for a barrage of anti-Gotabaya articles to emerge and seriously questions what is this ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom of speech’ the West is promoting when an elected President is character assassinated as he is without even giving him a chance to assume office.

The Telegraph article titled former defense chief who led brutal suppression of Tamil Tigers wins Sri Lanka’s presidential election’ published on 17 November 2019.

So are we to presume that Sri Lanka has faulted in ‘suppressing’ LTTE who are the Tamil Tigers that the author Qadijah Irshad is referring to? The West can go bombing countries dropping drones and killing innocent people claiming to be going after terrorists, but Sri Lanka is at fault for eliminating a terrorist movement? Can Telegraph UK please answer – yes or no.

What is the ‘fear’ raising among Sri Lanka’s religious & ethnic minorities? Who is claiming this and based on what evidence? Fears were raised when inspite of 97 foreign intel warnings the government in power failed to protect over 350 lives from becoming victim of jihadi suicide terrorism. No such colossal life was lost during the reign of the previous government as a result of state negligence and inaction inspite of prior warnings. Was it therefore wrong of voters to fear for their lives and place national security as one of their key concerns in voting?

We seem to again return to a fallacious choice of the word ‘civil war’ – Sri Lanka did not suffer a civil war, Sri Lanka suffered terrorism and LTTE were Tamils but LTTE also killed Tamils which is why we continue to say not all Tamils are LTTE but all LTTE were Tamils. Please correct this notion. Some of Sri Lanka’s best Tamil leaders were wiped off by the LTTE including the most admired Foreign Minister Mr. Lakshman Kadiragamar.

Another correction that needs to be made is that there are no ‘charges’ against President Rajapakse but ‘allegations’ which have no facts or basis but are all part of an international campaign by those angry that their pet LTTE terror movement was eliminated. How about coming up with names and facts instead of using a broad brush and simply parroting what everyone who wants to character assassinate is presently doing.

We would like to ask the author whether it is a crime to regard anyone eliminating a terrorist movement as war heroes? Obviously those living overseas and writing from overseas have no idea what we people went through when LTTE was reigning terror. We didn’t know whether the next bomb would go off, our parents dreaded us leaving homes and we in turn dreaded our parents leaving home not knowing when and if they would return. Ambulances were heard almost every hour. The newspapers had only obituaries and photos of the dead. Don’t make it out to be that the death of the terrorists is to be mourned and not the dead of innocent people who had done no wrong to these maniacs carrying arms & weapons. How dare they see fit to plant bombs and carry out suicide missions to end people’s lives.

How dare this author refer to the Buddhist clergy as ‘extremists’ let us remind the world that before the Westerners arrived there was not a single example of any community in conflict under the Sinhala Buddhist kings. If anyone says otherwise, we would like to challenge them to produce evidence where the Sinhala Buddhist kings have mistreated the minorities before 1505. All of the troubles we suffer today are outcomes of divide and rule policies implemented by colonial invaders so they could keep the people at each others throat while they pilfered and plundered the nation. When the Portuguese and Dutch were attacking the Muslims & Tamils it was our Sinhala Buddhist kings who sent troops to defend and protect them. Just don’t kill the majority community with your pen for media publicity.

So the author seems to be knowing how Parliament of Sri Lanka runs? Well its 19^th November and still ‘Mahinda’ is not declared PM. Is this how Parliament works in the UK? How about telling the West’s pet the sitting PM to honor the spirit of the mandate and resign without making life difficult for everyone by refusing to do so. Is this gentlemanly politics and parliamentary decorum, taught by West, one wonders!

The author is incorrect because the people of North voted for Sarath Fonseka in 2010 and he was the immediate former army commander while a world campaign promoted notion that the Sri Lankan Army were war criminals. India’s Subramaniam Swamy once said he was confused how the Sri Lankan Tamils can call the Sri Lankan Army war criminals and at the same time go all out and vote for its army commander. Very puzzling in deed. The Tamils also voted for Maithripala Sirisena when he was fielded as common candidate in 2015 – so this is certainly not the first time that the Tamils have voted for a Sinhalese. Take the election result maps of 2010-2015 and 2019 to see for yourself. What is also puzzling is that Tamils voted for a Sinhalese while not giving even 2% of votes to a pro-LTTE Tamil candidate and relation of Prabakaran! What was the objective behind the vote?

It is good to jerk everyone’s memory here. LTTE was ruling a virtual defacto area of the North. The LTTE split Tamils into two – those on their side and those against them. Whoever was against LTTE faced the brunt of LTTE terror – the others obviously had it good. But LTTE did not share any of its $300m annual profits amongst the Tamil people. Areas that were eventually liberated were without electricity, had no proper roads, schools were abandoned and used as LTTE bunkers, children were kidnapped and turned into child soldiers – so was this fear not greater than the nameless and data-less scare tactics foreign journalists are carrying out? The development that North saw after elimination of LTTE was nothing anyone can deny credit to the Rajapakse administration. They had to take loans to do this development LTTE was making illegal profits annually but did not spend a dollar on the people it claimed to represent. Don’t’ forget 300,000 people were saved from LTTE during the final stages of the conflict – probably it is some of these that became the 5% that voted for Gotabaya Rajapakse at the Presidential Elections.

President Rajapakse confirmed and reconfirmed again during the oath taking that he is the President of all – those who voted for him and those who didn’t vote for him. Therefore, before bringing down the gavel before he has even started out on his journey as President, give him a chance to prove himself. He proved himself as Defense Secretary and steered a development drive in Colombo and outskirts to be even acknowledged internationally – therefore there is no reason to fear that he doesn’t have a plan as President. Obviously those who know he has a good plan to develop Sri Lanka are concerned because he will completely raise the bar to type of leadership that many are loathsome and jealous about which is probably one of the key reasons for their envy and jealousy. They just cannot measure up to him and therefore they want to character assassinate him as that is the only way they can.

Please don’t quote the same bankrupt and creditability-less so-called political activists who have no clue about the pulse of the people, no care about the general public and simply enjoy blabbering words in accents in 5 star hotels to the international arena only. These people are so out-of-place in any segment of society in Sri Lanka.

These so called activists have taken millions to promote ‘peace’ and it is a good time those that fund them began asking them to show what they have done for the money they have been given.

Give the people of Sri Lanka room to breathe and solve their own problems.

By interfering how many countries has the Western political power houses solved internal problems instead of making them worse.

Just give the new President some room. We are all watching too. Our concerns are more than your concerns. We also want to have a peaceful nation. We got dominion status in 1948, became a republic in 1972 the same year we faced an insurgency, then we had terrorism for 30 years together with another insurgency. We have not had a period of lull to enjoy any peace dividends. So please allow us room to sort out our matters on our own.

Hope the UK Telegraph publishes this so their readership can see another view of Sri Lanka

Shenali D Waduge

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/11/17/former-defence-chief-led-brutal-suppression-tamil-tigers-wins/?WT.mc_id=tmg_share_fb&fbclid=IwAR3pOpzcRqdRB1zFAEFOLElcHuo-p5wBzq-4w_Dy0uRC1ouW5nAmnBpabYM

When SLPP began its campaign – Gotabaya Rajapakse’s message was clear – One Nation – One Law. It was an inclusive motto. There was no segregation. There was no discrimination. It was something simple for all to relate to.

The Opposite Camp on the other hand were with a bunch of separatists-fundamentalists, politicians and political parties we thought everyone was fed up with.

We thought people would not listen to them for Tamils & Muslims themselves publicly denounced their leaders.

So our guess was that they would give GR a CHANCE because he was only speaking of a Vision & Policy.

When his opponents on top of their stages were slinging mud, threatening to hang the Rajapakse’s from windows, speaking in abusive and derogatory terms, GR and his team only spoke about the future plans and policy.

The GR Team had minority representatives who also appealed to give GR a chance. They campaigned among their people to appeal to them to change their thinking. They were also sure that their people would give GR a chance. When people spoke about development, cleanliness and good management – GR was the only person who came to mind who had proven via actions what people claimed to want. But, were these sincere thoughts or were they just hiding what they felt?

Everyone was optimistic that they would be thinking of the Future & not the Past.

The results have not really surprised us because if our established conclusion of minority thinking was correct that was how they would have voted whatever laurels of peace we offered but our hearts wanted to prove us wrong but eventually the minority vote result proved otherwise. It was virtually identical to how they voted in January and August 2015. What is it that the majority have done wrong to them? What is it that they want? What is it that they don’t have that the poor rural Sinhala voters enjoy?

Now, as damage control, the guilt is being hidden by quickly attempting to transfer blame on the majority. It has always been to point at the majority and blame them for all ills. The fact that an opportunity for them to be inclusive was rejected by them with no valid reasons is being quickly swept under the carpet and there are some trying to showcase that they need to be more ‘reconciliation’. It takes two to tango. Sinhalese have done their part. What have the minorities done in return?

In the poorest of villages – where people suffer to have a meal a day, the Sinhalese went and voted realizing that national security & protecting Sri Lanka required their voice and vote. They knew this election was far more than just bringing Gotabaya Rajapakse to power. If these people could go & vote without complaining about what they don’t have – we see no basis for complaints by others.

However a handful of Tamils & Muslims did vote for GR – they campaigned much for him too…

However, we do realize that separatist and fundamentalist thinking elders & their politicians are doing great injustice to their children, the future of Sri Lanka by dragging them to continue the hatred and vengeance that they live with day in and day out.

This is not good for the Youth or the Future. Therefore, we certainly need to integrate all Youth and make them stakeholders for the future. These programs will certainly be rolled out and we hope these separatist and fundamentalist elders will leave the Youth alone to decide for themselves instead of dragging them to live with hate and vengeance.

Of course, we appeal to the elders to rethink how they have voted and be the FIRST to reach out to integrate as that is where the Change should start. Will they is left for them to think about.

Demands without Duty is unacceptable

Reconciliation without Reciprocity is unacceptable too.

Nothing works only on paper – these terms imported from West are just words used to diplomatically & politically exert pressures on nations. The countries preaching the terms do not practice a word they promote and force upon nations to enforce. Now they are tying aid and grants to such terms.

All citizens must learn to love the Nation & be proud of the Nation & acknowledge its proud history & heritage and not try to infuse false history & change it for political advantage.

Minorities in particular have always found it easier to complain of what they have not got or what the majority has not done for them but what have the minorities done in return to make such demands?

Remember – LTTE was brutalizing both Tamils & Muslims. Areas of North & East were not developed for 30 years not because the government did not want to but because the LTTE was in control over these areas. However, immediately after eliminating the LTTE, the GOSL embarked upon development programs that included providing electricity to areas that were living in darkness. The then govt did much to uplift the lives of these people.

Why should they still shower hatred even after giving them what LTTE did not? Can someone please answer this? Didn’t the then govt remove the fear of living they experienced under LTTE? Could they not freely travel to any part of Sri Lanka because LTTE was no more? Have they forgotten how life was before LTTE was eliminated and how life change after LTTE was no more?

From all of the minority parties and minority political leaders we like to ask – what have your party done for the betterment of the country & the citizens not only for your people? Enjoying tax payers money (70% of which is contributed by the majority) – what have minorities returned to the Nation?

Its time everyone started doing a SERVICE TO THE NATION without ONLY COMPLAINING ABOUT what the NATION hasn’t given them….

ASK YOURSELF THIS QUESTION FIRST –

WHAT HAVE YOU GIVEN THE NATION to DEMAND from the NATION

Shenali D Waduge

KAMALIKA PIERIS

The Eelam wars came to an end on May 2009 with a humiliating defeat for the LTTE and a triumphant win for the government. The entire world was amazed and surprised. None of the other countries had been able to end such a war, said observers.

Nalin de Silva observed that Eelam War IV was undoubtedly a great victory. The government of a small country had defeated a terrorist outfit supported and sponsored by the western powers. Col. C.R.Hariharan said LTTE has been outwitted, out-gunned and out-strategized by the Sri Lanka army. This must be accepted”, he said.,

 Dayan Jayatilleke said that by defeating the Tigers so completely and utterly, Sri Lanka and its armed forces made a contribution to regional and global security. ‘We have got precious little thanks for making the region a little safer’ he added. Gotabhaya Rajapakse said that other countries facing terrorism should follow Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka had shown that terrorism could be defeated. 

Analysts also noted that throughout the thirty years of war, the government unfailingly delivered all essential services to the LTTE controlled areas in north and east. The government paid salaries and pensions, ran the state schools, paid salaries of teachers and kept the state hospitals going. They did so through the Government Agents in the north, including GAs of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu.

Sinharaja Tammita Delgoda says one of the most striking things about Eelam War IV was the chorus of derision and condemnation in which the operation was conducted. No other fighting force had faced this kind of ridicule during a campaign. Bogollagama noted that the war was fought in an unhelpful and hostile background.  The army was winning, but it was publicly ridiculed by a section of the political elite.

However, there was considerable gratitude among the  Sinhala public for this victory. Those who were affected by the LTTE attacks were especially grateful. When I was in Trincomalee some time ago, the owner of a tourist stall told me Madam, people who live in Colombo do not understand   how we suffered during LTTE rule. We slept in the jungle at night. When a husband or child went out during the day, we could not be sure that they would return. We are grateful to Mahinda Rajapaksa for ending the war.”

But after winning the war, Rajapaksa government failed to consolidate the win. Rajapaksa did not declare at any time that this was a secessionist war, which was legitimately won by the Sri Lanka army. The government stupidly took the position that the war was a “terrorist war”, not a secessionist war. Despite the fact that the said terrorists called themselves, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”, indicating clearly that it was a separatist war.

Mahinda Rajapaksa stated repeatedly that this war was not against the Tamil people, it was against the terrorists. Critics did not agree with Mahinda Rajapaksa. It was not terrorism. It was   civil war, they said.Sri Lanka fought a just war by just means, they said.    

The Eelam Wars were outright civil wars.  They were secessionist wars, with the purpose of dividing the island and setting up a new littoral (coastal) sovereign state.  The land area of future state of Eelam started at Kalpitiya went northwards up to Jaffna, then down past Trincomalee, Batticaloa and ended at Ampara.  A ‘friendly country’ was ready and waiting in New York, to get the new state recognized at the UN.

Critics pointed out that Separatism is prohibited by law in Sri Lanka. The Sixth Amendment to Constitution of Sri Lanka, which is also Act no 6 of 1983,   said that it was the duty of the state to safeguard the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. 

Article 157A of the Constitution said that no person shall, directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka.  No political party or other association or organization shall have as one of its aims or objects the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka. Any political party supporting such an aim shall be proscribed and any MP unseated from Parliament and deprived of civic rights.

The first thing  Mahinda Rajapaksa did after winning the war, was to  let the UN in. the Eelam wars were outside the scope of the UN, They were an internal matter. But President Mahinda Rajapaksa permitted UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to visit as soon as Eelam War IV ended.

Moon arrived on 23.May 2009.  He visited the internally displaced persons (IDP) sites at Vavuniya and flew over the area near Mullaitivu, that was the scene of the conflict. He spoke with the President and senior officials. He also ‘consulted other relevant stakeholders, members of international humanitarian agencies and civil society”. 

Rajapaksa thereafter issued a joint statement with Moon. This statement   did not make any reference to the praiseworthy victory of the government of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka  did nto congratulate itself. Instead, the statement spoke of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. 

The statement said, inter alia, htat  the government would work towards a lasting political solution.  The aspirations and grievances of all communities would be addressed.  And a national solution acceptable to all sections of people will be evolved.   To do so, the government would begin a broader dialogue with all parties, including the Tamil parties. It was a sort of pro-Eelam statement which implied that the government was in the wrong. The statement implied that the government was at fault for creating a situation where the Tamils had to take to arms. That Tamil Separatism was justified and should be   taken into consideration.

Thereafter, in May 2010 Rajapaksa appointed a Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation (LRRC). The members of the LLRC were C. R. De Silva, PC (chairman)  Attorney General (2007–09), Solicitor General (1999–2007).  A. Rohan Perera, PC  former legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and  Chairman of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and member of the International Law Commission.

Karunaratne Hangawatte, Professor of Criminal Justice at the Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada, Las Vegas and former consultant to the United Nations[ Chandl Chanmugam, Secretary to the Treasury (1987–88).,Manohari Ramanathan ,former Deputy Legal Draftsman and former member of the Monetary Board of Sri Lanka Maxwell Paranagama, former High Court Judge M. T. M. Bafiq, Senior Attorney at law and member of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka. and H. M. G. S. Palihakkara, former Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Permanent Representative to the United Nations 2008-2009. Palihakkara had trained in international human rights and humanitarian law at the Raul Wallenberg Institute, Lund University, Sweden.

The committee was asked to study the circumstances that led to the failure of the Ceasefire Agreement and report on the lessons learnt from the war thatwouldprevent recurrence.  They were asked to recommend the best way to make restitution, and ways to promote national unity and reconciliation among all communities. The time period for the survey would be 21. February 2002 to 19 May 2009. The report was completed in November 2011, tabled in the Parliament and published in December 2011.

The LRRC report was a gift to the Tamil Separatist Movement. The conclusions of the LLRC report are now used exclusively by the Tamil Separatist Movement.

The LLRC accepted that the North and East had issues that required addressing and that reconciling was needed to heal wounded Sri Lanka. It advocated demilitarization, vacating of all private and public land occupied by the security forces, solving of land ownership disputes through special land commissions. It wanted the establishment of a politically independent civil administration. The long standing Tamil grievances needed to be provided with a political solution which included devolving power.

LLRC report also called for a comprehensive investigation into the crimes of the LTTE, hitherto not undertaken, also to look at the accountability of the UN and international organizations.  They should be subject to scrutiny. These two recommendations of the LLRC have been ignored by the government and the Tamil Separatist Movement.

Instead of following up on the victory and crushing the Tamil Separatist Movement, Rajapakse government took a defensive approach after the war ended.  This was an invitation to the  Tamil Separatist Movement to take steps to erase the Eelam victory. This series examines the attempts made by the Tamil separatist movement to do so. (continued)

By Bodhi Dhanapala, Quebec, Canada.

Jehan Perera, writing in the Island on 19th November says that the expectation was that neither of the two leading candidates, i.e., Gotabhaya and Sajith, would get a clear mandate, and hence a second preference re-count will be needed. Several urban political Pandits like Kumar David had suggested that while the first preference should be given to the JVP candidate, the second preference should be given to Sajith. This time the  JVP has not claimed that the election results are a mere computer Jilmart”.

Most of us do NOT get our nourishment, drinks and pocket money from the Colombo cocktail circuit and from foreign-funded  NGO accounts. We knew that the JVP candidate will loose even his deposit and that Gotabhaya Rajapaksa will go over the 50% mark with ease.

Jehan Perera’s analysis, as usual, is based on the simplistic race-based projection of election outcomes, while holding in common with the Marxist writers that the Rajapaksas are synonymous with a brutal end to the war and fascist suppression of opposition. The Marxist political pundits are quite amnesic about the brutality of the end justifies even the bloodiest Bolshevik means” philosophy of their peers who have given the world a majority of Pol-Pot style dictators. Furthermore, these individuals have always been ready to write off the collaborationist pro-LTTE politics of the TNA, while pushing for  peace-talks” at any cost with terrorist Tigers and bashing the terrible Sinhala-Buddhists.

However, having been in power for nearly five years, all those who executed the regime change have none of their allegations proved in court. The JVP and Hela Urumaya” leaders were the most vociferous with their allegations against the Rajapaksas.  The Marxists pundits have found themselves in the same camp as the Western Capitalist powers and the strongly racist Tamil diaspora in their hatred of the Rajapaksas for different reasons. The West hated the Rajapaksas for not being subservient to them, while the Diaspora opposed them as they knew that as long as the Rajapaksas were in power, their plans for a separatist regime in the merged North-East will never come to fruition.

Gotabhaya Rajapaksa’s electoral vote was no surprise to anyone who saw the Elpitiya vote. Take the Elpitiya percentages of votes going to the SLPP, UNP, and JVP, and add most of the North and East votes to the credit of the UNP after readjusting to a 100% total, and you get approximately what Gotabhaya has actually got.

So, how was this election result in a surprise to the political pundits?

Remember that these Pundits, the  Western Military strategists as well as the UNP leaders held that the war against Prabhakaran is unwinnable”, and that claims of victories in Alimankada (Elephant pass in the North) must be about some skirmishes in Paamankada (a Colombo suburb)?  After the war was over, the Center for Policy Alternatives,  as well as Yasmin Sooka’s outfit, claimed that the IDP camps were concentration camps and that the IDPs will never be resettled. The MacKenzie Institute, a Canadian Think Tank, was the first to reject these claims and being without substance.

Gotabhaya, during his tenure as the Defence secretary, proved, contrary to the claims of experts, that the war was winnable,. During his tenure as the head of the Urban Development Authority, he proved that an ugly and smelly city full of slums and undisciplined drivers could be tamed and made into the prettiest and cleanest city in South-East Asia. The Yahapalanaya” returned it back to its grim state. Now,  in securing his presidential bid, Gotabhaya has disproved the myth that no candidate can become president of Sri Lanka if the minorities are not with the candidate.

The whole point is, only a minority of the Tamil minority lives in the North and the East. A major part of the Tamil-speaking Sri Lankans lives among the Sinhalese. The old ethnic live-apart” political program launched by the Vellalar upper-crust Colombo-Tamil-Nationalist lawyers led by Chelvanayagam,  re-affirmed at Vaddukkoddai (aka Batakotte”), they fought for over thirty years, and resuscitated by the TNA, finds little resonance with the ordinary voter, be he Sinhalese or Tamil. They were appalled to see individuals like Mervyn de Silva, Sajin Vas Goonawardena and others, previously cast in black by the UNP itself, appearing on Sajith’s electoral platforms.  

The people wanted a good manager who will provide the stability, the administrative reconstruction, and facilities needed for the people to do what ordinary people do – the least of which is haggling over OruMitta” and Ekeeya constitutions”  for over 4 years while they do not even have their everyday material needs.

By M D P DISSANAYAKE

Dr P B Jayasundera brings three vital skills.  Financial management, Economic Policy implementation and Public Administration with extensive knowledge of Financial Regulations (FR).

In the past, he has successfully managed Spending against Budget.  But now as Presidential Secretary, he extends his arms right across.    He will not allow distributing, for example, SIL REDI during an election campaign even if the President wishes to do so. The President will have a Peace of Mind with PBJ in charge of the machine so that his attention could be diverted to drive his Policies.

In this role,  the person must be a Neutral Advisor, who cannot be bullied around. In this role, he or she must be a Protector of the Office of the Presidency.  In this role, he needs to ensure the Funds of the State are not released Light Heartedly.

Courtesy NewsIn.Asia

Colombo, November 18 (AIR): As Gotabaya Rajapaksa was sworn in as Sri Lankan President on Monday, discussions on dissolving Parliament and holding fresh elections have begun.

The Leader of the opposition and Gotabaya’s elder brother Mahinda Rajapaksa has said that with Gotabaya’s victory in the Presidential election, it is best to hold a parliamentary election as soon as possible.

The former President said that work cannot commence as the President is from one party while the cabinet, including the Prime Minister, is from another.

He said that the mandate of the people should be respected.

Sources in the Gotabaya’s Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) said they are having discussions with United National Party (UNP) to reach a consensus on dissolving the House.

As per the constitution, parliament cannot be dissolved till February next year unless the House passes a resolution to this effect with two-thirds majority.

Meanwhile, a meeting of UNP parliamentary group under Prime Minister Ranil Wickremsinghe failed to arrive at a decision on this issue in its meeting held today.

There were reports of heated exchanges between MPs loyal to him and to Sajith Premadasa, who lost the Presidential Election held on November 16.

Earlier, President Gotabaya Rajapakasa said that he will follow a neutral foreign policy and stay out of any conflict with world powers.

Gotabaya was sworn in as seventh President of Sri Lanka at a ceremony in Anuradhapura this morning. Speaking after the ceremony, the new President said he knew that the response to his request to the Tamil and Muslim community to join in his victory was less than expected.

However, as the new President, he had invited all to work together with him for the future prosperity of the country as true Sri Lankans. He also promised a technocratic and meritocratic system with no place for corruption.

(The featured image at the top shows Gotabaya Rajapaksa being sworn in in Anuradhapura)

By Shiran Illanperuma Xinhua Courtesy NewsIn.Asia

COLOMBO, Nov. 18 (Xinhua): Sri Lanka’s business community has expressed hope that the country’s new president would move forward with open market reforms, provide a conducive environment for local industries and attract foreign direct investments.

Sri Lanka’s Elections Chief Mahinda Deshapriya on Sunday afternoon confirmed that opposition candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa won the presidential election on Saturday.

International Business Council President Kosala Wickramanayake told Xinhua on Monday that the business community hoped Rajapaksa would accelerate the development of infrastructure projects, attract more foreign direct investment and provide a stable policy environment.

The business community welcomes the change,” Wickramanayake said.

Meanwhile, Chairman and Managing Director of Imperial Teas Group and Chairman of Colombo Tea Traders Association Jayantha Karunaratne told Xinhua that exporters would be looking to the new leadership to lower operating costs, improve access to credit, remove unfair taxes and provide policy assistance to make local exports competitive in the international market.

The business community accepts the choice of the people and we are ready to work with the new leadership to develop the economy of the country,” Karunaratne said.

According to Siri Hettige, professor emeritus of Sociology at the University of Colombo, the new president will have to bridge the widening gap between communities and deliver economic reforms to industrialize the country.”

Rajapaksa gained over 6.9 million, or 52 percent of the votes, defeating his opponent Sajith Premadasa from the ruling party, who gained over 5.5 million, or 42 percent of the votes.

After the final election results were announced declaring him the winner, Rajapaksa vowed to represent all communities regardless of their race and religious identity.(The featured image at the top shows tea being packed in the Stassen factory. Photo: Tang Lu)

Courtesy NewsIn.Asia

Colombo, November 18 (newsin.asia): The United States on Monday congratulated the people of Sri Lanka on their democratic presidential election and said that it looks forward to working with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

In a statement released by the US embassy here, Washington said: Sri Lanka has continued to show the strength and resilience of its republic with a free, fair, and transparent presidential election befitting Asia’s oldest democracy. We commend the Elections Commission, civil society and government authorities for promoting a peaceful election.”

We are ready to continue our work with the new President and with all the people of Sri Lanka in supporting the country’s sovereignty through heightened good governance, expanded economic growth, the advancement of human rights and reconciliation, and in fostering an Indo-Pacific region where all countries can prosper.”

උපුටා ගැන්ම හිරු නිව්ස්

රාජ්‍ය ආයතනවල ජනපතිගේ රුව ප්‍රදර්ශනය කරනවා වෙනුවට රාජ්‍ය ලාංඡනය ප්‍රදර්ශනය කරන ලෙස ජනාධිපති ගෝඨාභය රාජපක්ෂ උපදෙස් දීතිබෙනවා.

එහිදී ජනපතිවරයා වැඩිදුරටත් උපදෙස් දී ඇත්තේ මාර්ග නාමපුවරුවලින් ද දේශපාල​නඥයින්​ගේ රුව ඉවත්කිරීමට පියවර ගන්නා ලෙසයි.

උපුටා ගැන්ම හිරු නිව්ස්

ගෝඨාභය රාජපක්ෂ මහතා මෙරට 7 වන විධායක ජනාධිපතිවරයා ලෙස දිවුරුම්දීමෙන් අනතුරුව දිවයින පුරා විවිධ සැමරුම් පැවැත්වුණා.

ගෝඨාභය රාජපක්ෂ මහතා අනුරාධපුර ඓතිහාසික රුවන්වැලිසෑය ඉදිරිපිට ජනාධිපති ධූරයේ දිවුරුම් දීමත් සමගම රට පුරා ස්ථාන රැසක ගිනිකෙළි දල්වමින් ජනතාව සිය සතුට පළ කළා.

බස්නාහිර පළාතේ ස්ථාන රැසකම ජනතාව ප්‍රධාන මාර්ග අසලට පැමිණ කිරිබත් දන්සැල් පවත්වමින් සිය සතුට පලකළ ආකාරයයි මේ.

ගෝඨාභය රාජපක්ෂ මහතා ජනාධිපති ධූරයට පත්වීම සිහිවීම පිණිස ශ්‍රී ලංකා රාජ්‍ය ඉංජිනේරු සංස්ථා සේවකයින් මෙලෙස පැල සිටුවීමේ වැඩසටහනක් ක්‍රියාත්මක කළා.

මේ අතර දිවයිනේ අනෙකුත් පළාත්වල ජනතාවද විවිධාකාරයෙන් සිය සතුට සැමරුවා.

උපුටා ගැන්ම හිරු නිව්ස්

පාරිශුද්ධත්වයේ සංකේතය වන සුදු නෙළුම් මල තේමාව කර ගනිමින් මෙරට 7 වන විධායක ජනපති ගෝඨාභය රාජපක්ෂ මහතාගේ නිල ධජය නිර්මාණය කර තිබෙනවා.

කොඩියේ ප්‍රධාන වර්ණය ලෙස යොදාගෙන ඇත්තේ කුරහන් ධාන්‍යයේ වර්ණය වන තද දුඹුරු පැහැයයි.

ජනාධිපති ධජයේ නෙළුම් මලෙන් පාලකයා සතු නිර්මලභාවයත්, පිවිතුරු පාලනයත් පිළිඹිබු කෙරෙනවා.

නෙළුමේ කලංකයේ සිට සිව් දිශාවන්ට විහිදෙන සුත්‍රිකා මගින් නිරූපණය වන්නේ කීර්තිය සැම අත පැතිරී යෑමයි.

ඒ වටා ඇති කහ පැහැති රවුමෙන් ප්‍රඥාව ද සුදු පැහැති රවුමෙන් සත්‍යවාදී බවද නිරූපණය කෙරෙනවා.

සිව් කොන පිහිටි බෝපත් හතරෙන් බුද්ධාගම සහ ඉන් ජාතියට ලැබුණු ආභාෂයත් උට්ඨාන සම්පදා, ආරක්ඛ සම්පදා, කල්‍යාණ මිත්තතා සහ සමජීවිතා යන ව්‍යග්ගපජ්ජ සූත්‍රයේ සඳහන් මෙලොව යහපතට හේතු වන කරුණු 4 නිරූපණය වනවා.

සිව්කොන පිහිටි නාමල් සතරෙන් ජාත්‍යන්තර සබදතා නිරූපණය වන අතර, එහි තැඹිලි පැහැයෙන් දෙමළ ජනතාව ද කොළ පැහැයෙන් මුස්ලිම් ජනතාව ද නිරූපිතයි.

එකිනෙකා අභිමුඛව පිහිටුවා ඇති වී කරල් සහ ඒ අතර ඇති කුරහන් මල් සහිත රාමුවෙන් නිරුපණය වන්නේ සශ්‍රිකත්වයයි.

කොඩියේ ප්‍රධෘන වර්ණය ලෙස කුරහන් ධාන්‍ය යේ වර්ණය වන තද දුඹුරු පැහැය යොදාගෙන ඇත්තේ ගෝඨාභය රාජපක්ෂ මහතා පැවත එන කෘෂිකාර්මික පදනම මුල්කරගත් ජන මූල පාරම්පරික නායකත්වය සංකේතවත් කිරීමේ අරමුණින්.

එක සමාන පළලකින් යුත් සුදු පටිය මගින් සියලු අතින් සලසන ආරක්ෂාව නිරූපණය කෙරෙනවා.

ඊට පිටතින් ඇති කහ පටිය මගින් නිරූපණය කෙරෙන්නේ ජාතීන් අතර එකමුතුව, සාමය සහ අන්‍යෝන්‍ය අවබෝධයත් ඒ තුළ පවත්නා ජීව ගුණයයි.

නව ජනාධිපති ධජය නිර්මාණය කර තිබෙන්නේ ප්‍රවීන නිර්මාණකරුවෙක් වන ජගත් ජයසිංහ මහතායි

Courtesy Hiru News

Lawyers of Rayynor Silva, Chairman of HIRU TV, sends letters of demand to MP Mangala Samaraweera and two others for recent defamatory comments made against him and his family demanding 1 Billion rupees each.

Hindustan Times

China on Monday congratulated the newly-elected Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, saying Beijing is ready to work with the new leadership for high-quality” cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the ambitious intercontinental connectivity project launched by President Xi Jinping.

The Rajapaksa family, including the new president and his elder brother, former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, are considered close to Beijing. It was under the elder Rajapaksa’s presidential reign between 2005 and 2015 that Beijing emerged as a key economic ally and major investor of the war-torn country.

Sri Lanka has successfully held the presidential election, which is a major agenda political agenda at home. We are pleased to see that and offer our sincere congratulations to Gotabaya Rajapaksa on his success,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, Geng Shuang, said on Monday.

China and Sri Lanka are strategic cooperative partners with sincere mutual assistance everlasting friendship,” he said.

We stand ready to on the basis of respect, equality and mutual benefit work with the new leadership and the government for high-quality BRI cooperation and greater progress in bilateral ties to bring more tangible benefits to two countries and their people,” Geng said at the regular ministry conference.

Rajapaksa was the defence secretary – during his elder brother’s presidency – at the end of the civil war with Tamil rebels.

China at the time was one of the main suppliers of arms and ammunition for the Sri Lankan army.

Since the end of the civil war in May 2009, Beijing has emerged as Colombo’s key investor in infrastructure across the country, a development New Delhi has monitored closely.

China has repeatedly denied that its massive loans to Colombo have pushed the country into a debt trap. Chinese officials have said Beijing, on the contrary, is helping Colombo out of that trap.

Quoting a report by the Lankan Central Bank, state news agency Xinhua reported last month that by the end of 2018 Sri Lanka’s total foreign debt volume was about $52 billion, $6 billion of which was from China, making up only 11.5% of the total debt. 

Courtesy Ceylon Today

P. B. Jayasundera has been appointed as the Presidential Secretary to the newly-elected President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

He served as an Economist, Economic Adviser and the Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury from 2009 until 2015 during the tenure of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Courtesy Ceylon Today

A news saying that Major General Kamal Gunaratne has been appointed as the Defence Sectary is circulating on social media.

However, when Ceylon Today Web contacted the media unit of the Defence Ministry, they denied and said they cannot confirm the news.

The Defence Ministry said that they weren’t notified about such a news.

Courtesy Hiru News

The UNP has decided to hand over the government to the new President.

The decision has been taken following a special meeting of UNP Parliamentarians chaired by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe this afternoon

However, party presidential candidate Sajith Premadasa was conspicuously absent in this discussion.

In addition to the UNP ministers who resigned yesterday following the defeat of their candidate, Ministers Patali Champika Ranawaka and Ashok Abeysinghe have also tendered their resignations today.

Meanwhile, Omalpe Sobhitha Thera reiterates that the Prime Minister should follow suit his Cabinet ministers and leave room to appoint a new Cabinet.

The Thera was addressing a media briefing held in Embilipitiya today.

Sudath Gunasekara Kandy

Your victory as well as that of the country is a foregone conclusion. I am repeating, you will be definitely starting with at least 65 lakhs the minimum that is what the SLPP UPF and SLFP got at the 2018 Local Government Elections as I see. Looking at the present trend no one should be surprised even if it exceeds 70 lahks.

(This is a copy of an email sent to Gothabhaya on 14.Oct 2019)

Extremely Important

Whoever opens this note please bring it to Mr. Gotabhays immediate attention.

Dear Mr President Elect; Gothabahaya Rajapaksa

Dr SudatH Gunasekara Former Permanent Secretary to Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranayaka the late Prime Minister  and President Sri Lanka Administrative Services Association (1991-1994)

14.11.2019.

Dear Mr. President Elect.

With congratulations in advance and my heartfelt well wishes as I have already indicated in my previous mails to you, your victory as well as that of the country is a foregone conclusion. I am repeating, you will be definitely starting with at least 65 lakhs the minimum that is what the SLPP UPF and SLFP got at the 2018 Local Government Elections as I see. Looking at the present trend no one should be surprised even if it exceeds 70. Lahks.

This will get enhanced unexpectedly by gains from UNP. JVP and New votes and even with Tamil and Muslim votes we never got last time. I don’t think you should have any doubt about that.

 I am writing this note to you to make a suggestion to draw your immediate attention to work out the majority in Parliament with a target of at least 125 majority for you to enable to appoint MR as the PM immediately after you swear in as the President to complete this unprecedented mammoth victory in the political history of this country.

Already you have solid 93 +Wijedasa and Ratana Thera. That is 95 as I see from outside. Even Vasanta Senanayaka might vote with you. That makes it 96. But going by past experience he is very unpredictable. So the bear Minimum you need is only 18 more members.  You need to get this number from the disgusted UNP MPP as the TNA 16 will always stand with UNP and even the 6 JVP might go with the UNP as they have done in the past 5 years. But again as you can’t afford to take a risk we have to have a solid majority. So that even last minute crossings we still have 115. Whatever it is worth, I suggest you have a target of 125 in the House So that you will definitely have more than 115.

                Please remember how you collect another 15 Members is immaterial. Because the end justifies the means, as in this case you are doing it in the broader interest of the whole nation. The intention is absolutely good. It is bona fide. Therefore practicing a bit of Machiavellian tactics could be fully justified, although, I don’t agree with his concept of statecraft fully, as an Asian. I have no doubt that you must have already made some arrangement to entice them to join you to get the required majority.

                 What is more in this instance is by appointing MR as the PM you are ending a four and half years of absolute anarchy in this country and restoring political stability and also ending uncertainty in all fields. This will also enable you to have a people friendly new and trimmed Cabinet in place of the present set of thieves and tormentors. If we fail to do that, obviously, then we will have to tolerate Ranil and his pack of pole cats and  skunks and their ominous odor for another four months until we wipe out all these undesirables in one shot, in and island wide political landslide at the next General Electio. 

                With best wishes,

                 Yours,
Sudath Gunasekara

                 14 11, 2019. Hanthana Mahanuwara

Sarath Bulathsinghala

Congratulations and well done. It is with enormous pride that we accept you as the 7^th President of Sri Lanka. Your conducted an exemplary campaign which culminated in your getting elected as the President of our beleaguered Motherland, Sri Lanka.

I am sure your election will see the end of dirty politics as we know it today. Those who threw mud at you bit the dust the day before yesterday – on 16 Nov.  The unpatriotic UNP is well-nigh done and finished! The decisive loss Sajith Premadasa at the Presidential Election  shows the bankruptcy of his approach to alleviating poverty  and in general of the mudslinging, corrupt UNP politics in Sri Lanka. His personal loss at Hambantota magnifies his political incompetency manifolds!

A decisive chunk of the votes that Sajith Premadasa received were from Tamil Racists TNA and Muslim Extremists of all hues in the North and East. Their racist demands before the elections you rightly threw in the wastepaper basket and from the voting pattern it is clear that they are yet to learn how to coexist. Reconciliation is a two-way street and it is apparent from the voting pattern they know little of it!

These mono-ethnic concentrations in the North and East constitute a clear and present danger to the existence of Sri Lanka. If Tamils and Muslims can live, work and prosper in the Sinhala majority South, equally it must be true for the Sinhalese in the North and East. The ethnic imbalances must be corrected in a way that is good for all Sri Lankans. Continued development of the road and rail network, the airports and the Internet will put an end to this isolation and mono-ethnic sickness. We have to forge a unified nation based on mutual respect and not on ‘dog-eat-dog’ mentality. The wholesale buying and alienation of land for worthless Rupees and political patronage should be stopped to prevent mono-ethnic enclaves all over the Island. 

Now that you – nation’s beloved GOTA is in the driving seat the long 5 year political drought is over and all well-meaning Sri Lankans can ‘go to work’! The nation lost valuable 5 years of progress and in the process ended up poorer. The selfishness of Sirisena and his lackeys, the traitorous agenda of Ranil and his cohorts to make Sri Lanka a Failed State brought untold miseries to the average man and woman. Internationally the nation was compromised on many fronts – political, economic and security.  Investors left the island in droves for they did not have any confidence on a state that robs itself! The final nail in the coffin was the much tooted mostly one sided agreements to be inked with the USA. The long-awaited end of Jadapalanaya that came into being on that unfortunate date in Jan 2015 is now over and hopefully for good!

Let the Law and Due Process take place in handling corruption and frauds. All those who are responsible for the Bond Scams and other similar scams must be allowed to be brought in before the law and dues extracted of the stolen wealth. The nation waited with utmost patience for the last  5 years to see justice. Apparently, Sirisena locked the Presidential Inquiry report of the Bond Scam and other Presidential Commission reports well away from the reach of the Law. These reports made with people’s money must be available for public scrutiny.

Making Sri Lanka a failed state was Ranil’s main agenda given to him by his masters in the Christian West. The Central Bank Bond Scams, planned well ahead of the Jan 2015 Presidential Elections, the resulting high Bank Interest Rates, higher taxation, pauperizing of the farmers and other agricultural industries put paid to the economy that was running over 7% per annum and now brought down to 1.6% per annum. The food security was compromised by the numerous pressures brought in against the farmers. The export markets were destroyed by the dilution of Sri Lanka brand products with imported look alike trash.

All these and others were aimed at making Sri Lanka a failed state as well as a country highly vulnerable to foreign sanctions. No country in the world prospers by destroying the well-being of the indigenous farmer. Most developed countries protect their farmers with many subsidies, soft loans and outright protection when deemed necessary. In these countries, the farmers are usually rich! It was countries that were self-sufficient in their food supplies that made way of the industrialization of their economies. The Industrialization of Japan only took place after they became self-sufficient in their rice supplies in the 13% cultivable land in their possession. To this day the Japanese farmer is a highly protected entity! The extent of Ranil’s treachery know no bounds!

The responsibility of forging a new nation is on your shoulder. The patriotic business community, the farmers, the small-scale entrepreneur and the youth of our nation are on your side. It is up to you to harvest this potential for the good of the nation. You rightly promised to bring in just the right combination of economic factors including lowering of taxes and in some cases their outright elimination. The poverty alleviation measures and others measures you have brought in your manifesto will sensitize and spur the nation into production mode. Once the land is made secure and safe, investors will flow in to take advantage of what Sri Lanka can offer to the world. It is the tourist industry that can bring the quickest results to our failing economy for an excellent tourist infrastructure is already in place – waiting for the customers!

It is time for the SLFP and UNP to wither away. They are slowly but surely outliving their usefulness and use by date. The division of the majority Sinhalese between these two selfish and impotent political parties led to making racial and religious minorities the kingmakers of Sri Lanka. These Shylocks continue to ask for the proverbial ‘pound of flesh’ in return for their ‘favors’. Their tactics and antics bled the nation ever since the beginning of the 20^th Century and then after Independence for the last 70 year and during the 30 year Tamil Racist Terrorist War. The role of the TNA as the main Opposition Party in the Parliament should be an eye-opener for what their intentions are.  The end results are Easter Sunday Bombings and the 13 demands from the TNA and the voting pattern we witnessed on 16 Nov.

It is with a sigh of relief that we notice that you were able to come to power without giving into the extremist demands be they racial or religious. The well thought out leaving of the extremist elements from your campaign team augurs well for the future of Sri Lanka. This is a good start and it is time to build on these strengths for there are many in the UNP and the SLFP who wish well for Mother Lanka and who are aware and understand the danger of balkanizing Sri Lanka. Balkanizing simply means unending war and enmity across a divided land across disputed borders and water rights. Closing ranks of the patriots is the only way ahead for Sri Lanka!  At the present moment a meeting of Sri Lanka lovers can now only happen under the Pohottuwa umbrella!

National Service for all youngsters. This is a measure that will allow building the character of our youth as well as their racial and religious integration. This is the foundation of patriotism and a strong and faithful military. Taking our immediate past history a strong military is a sin quoi non for Sri Lanka

It is extremely important how we handle India. They have justifiable security concerns regarding their Southern Flank. Only way Sri Lanka can meet their concerns and be interference free is to have a strong military and Intelligence services. Sri Lanka should be a major force for the protection of the Southern Sea Lanes as well of the South Indian Ocean. Hambantota Harbour lease with the Chinese must be re-negotiated if at all it is possible at this late hour. It was with the intention of making Sri Lanka a playground for competing powers that Ranil literally sold this valuable asset to the Chinese. One can easily see how the Indians and the US are maneuvering in Sri Lanka to get a piece of the action. Sri Lanka will have to be very smart if we are to remain a free and peaceful nation. This responsibility is now on your shoulder. We also must develop strong bonds with other Buddhist Nations in Asia – Myanmaar, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, China and Singapore – for we have much in common on all fronts including security and the well-being of our age old cultures.

Sri Lanka must be made governable. The traitorous lowering of the minimum voting percentage to 5% ( from 12.5%)  in order to curry favor with the Muslims by myopic Premadasa Sr has made the political institutions in Sri Lanka ungovernable. This must be corrected.  Rabble rousers who lost even their deposits including the JVP have no place in main stream politics. Perhaps they have a role in trade union activity but no other. The behavior of the JVP in main stream politics have not been of any benefit to the political process for their political representation is minimal and do not represent the needs of the nation by any stretch of imagination.

We do not live forever. Making way for succession is an important part of your work. It is of utmost importance that the future that you intend to build for our beloved Motherland is left in secure hands – most importantly and not necessarily in the hands of the Rajapakse nephews. They must come to prominence on their own steam and not on the shoulders of fathers and uncles!

Nepotism though not right is not necessarily wrong either. Otherwise we would not have you as our beloved President now. Sri Lanka needs leadership material and we are seriously short of good leaders. When found they must be cherished and not vilified. This is the reason tens of thousands still throng wherever the Rajapakses go. Ever since you started working as the Defence Secretary and was performing well, I knew you were Presidential material. I have been proven right today and I am happy for that! A lot depends on how you lead the nation in the coming months and years!

We are a grateful nation. By and large majority of us do not forget easily nor are ungrateful. Have no second thoughts – it is a grateful nation that is bringing another Rajapakse to power today!

We wish your presidency well. We wish you continued good health and long life. Have strong faith in the tenets of Buddhism and May you govern the nation with Dasa Raja Dharma!

May the Triple Gem Bless you and May All Gods guide and protect you in all your future endeavors. 

Sarath Bulathsinghala

18 Nov 2019

Idrees Ali CourtesyReuters

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – U.S. President Donald Trump on Friday pardoned two Army officers accused of war crimes in Afghanistan and restored the rank of a Navy SEAL platoon commander who was demoted for actions in Iraq, a move critics have said would undermine military justice and send a message that battlefield atrocities will be tolerated.

The White House said in a statement Trump granted full pardons to First Lieutenant Clint Lorance and Major Mathew Golsteyn, and ordered that the rank Edward Gallagher held before he was convicted in a military trial this year be restored.

For more than two hundred years, presidents have used their authority to offer second chances to deserving individuals, including those in uniform who have served our country. These actions are in keeping with this long history,” the statement said.

A Pentagon spokesperson said the Department of Defense has confidence in the military justice system.

The President is part of the military justice system as the Commander-in-Chief and has the authority to weigh in on matters of this nature,” the spokesperson said.

In recent weeks, Pentagon officials had spoken with Trump about the cases, provided facts and emphasized the due process built into the military justice system.

    In 2013, prosecutors accused Lorance of illegally ordering the fatal shootings of two men on motorcycles while on patrol in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province. He was found guilty of two counts of murder.

    Last year, Golsteyn, an Army Green Beret, was charged with murdering an Afghan man during a 2010 deployment to Afghanistan.

    Gallagher, a decorated SEAL team platoon leader, was accused of committing various war crimes while deployed in Iraq in 2017.

In July, a military jury acquitted him of murdering a captured Islamic State fighter by stabbing the wounded prisoner in the neck, but it convicted him of illegally posing with the detainee’s corpse. That had led to his rank being reduced.

U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks on honesty and transparency in healthcare prices inside the Roosevelt Room at the White House in Washington, U.S., November 15, 2019. REUTERS/Tom Brenner

Golsteyn received word of his pardon from Trump, who spoke with him by telephone for several minutes, Golsteyn’s attorney Phillip Stackhouse said in a statement.

Our family is profoundly grateful for the president’s action. We have lived in constant fear of this runaway prosecution,” Golsteyn was quoted saying in the statement.

The American Civil Liberties Union criticized the president’s action.

With this utterly shameful use of presidential powers, Trump has sent a clear message of disrespect for law, morality, the military justice system, and those in the military who abide by the laws of war,” Hina Shamsi, director of the ACLU’s National Security Project, said in a statement.

    In May, Trump talked about how he was considering pardons for U.S. troops charged with war crimes, a move he acknowledged would be controversial but that he said was justified because they had been treated unfairly.”

    The overwhelming majority of pardons are granted to people who have already been convicted and served time for a federal offense.

    But presidents have occasionally granted pardons preemptively to individuals accused of or suspected of a crime.

    The most famous such case was the blanket pardon President Gerald Ford bestowed on his predecessor, Richard Nixon, after Nixon’s resignation during the Watergate scandal in 1974.

Reporting by Idrees Ali; Editing by Sandra Maler and Daniel Wallis

Our Standards:The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Sri Lanka re-reversed a regime change orchestrated in January 2015 which spiraled Sri Lanka towards a wave of catastrophic changes unbeknown to most, outcomes which will be felt only as the new administration now takes over. The election is one that will enter history books for several reasons and resonates the resilience of a proud nation grappling to preserve their history and heritage protecting the islands every inch of turf. As we enter the closure of 2019 and look ahead to 2020 it has a lot of promise in store but there are some factors that needs to be laid out openly and some messages that need to get drilled into the minds of people.

Gotabaya Rajapakse has become the 7^th President of Sri Lanka and will be taking oaths on 18 November, the birthday of his elder brother Mahinda Rajapakse in Anuradhapura – the first citadel of Sri Lanka & where sacred Sri Maha Bodhi is enshrined. The two brothers will enter history books. Poland had twin brothers who were both President & Prime Minister! Mahinda Rajapakse served as President, Prime Minister, Opposition Leader and likely to be Prime Minister again all in a space of 5 years! Without a doubt they will be envied by many which sadly stands out as reason for most of the ill-feelings towards the Rajapakses.

Why has the Rajapakse’s received the wrath of many? For the West it is obviously the elimination of their pet LTTE on which West was riding to exert influence over Sri Lanka politically and economically. The co-partners UN/NGO nexus with their local stooges played a pivotal role in driving a steady anti-Rajapakse wave that ignored its development and post-2009 programs to divert attention against Rajapakse, though within camp, too, they had numerous shortcomings which should have been immediately addressed. These in fact became golden opportunities used during the regime change campaign.

UNP just blew the chance it was given with a string of corruptions, mismanagement and treacheries some of which are unforgiveable. The manner they have allowed public sector personnel to be a law unto themselves is unacceptable. Today some of these treacherous secretaries who have helped sign treacherous bilateral agreements have fled the nation while others have helped tweak the law to the advantage of the enemies. These treacheries now need to be investigated and culprits duly served justice. Their crimes are no small ones.

We have seen a very significant campaign unfolding. The outgoing President left on a controversial note surrounding a prison pardoning. The UNP without fielding its own candidate once more opted to field a candidate under the infamous swan symbol. It placed its trust in a plethora of parties and individuals that were the team that brought the outgoing President to power. That victory came with the same minority bloc vote while also breaking the Sinhala vote and winning a bonus in anti-Rajapakse votes.

The SLPP candidate was finally named Gotabaya Rajapakse whose candidature was more of a problem to the competition than those proposing to vote for him. Gotabaya was a victim of political/diplomatic/NGO victimization via courts both in Sri Lanka & overseas with a $ funded campaign that did not stop at anything to tarnish his image and raise doubts about his candidacy via an unbelievable fake news campaign that even made a joke out of the US State Dept by changing the spokespersons dress and dubbing her and no action from US raises eyebrows as to whether they were aware of it!

The MCC agreement together with the exposure on the immunities that were to be given to ACSA and SOFA & US Peace Corps raised alarm bells among the nationalists as to what would become of Sri Lanka & the Asian region if it becomes the base for military maneuvers and manipulations which Sri Lanka wished to play no role in antagonizing its traditional friends. The Maha Sangha and nationalist organizations played a pivotal role in carrying the message to the masses that made the majority realize that the election required them to rise to defend the sovereignty & territorial integrity of the nation.

For Sajith campaigning meant solidifying the UNP bloc vote and garnering as many bloc vote via the minority leaders who were all part of the UNP team. The campaign did not require any national policies for it was only meant to appeal to and satisfy the bloc votes. The assurance of TNA’s 13 demands was always a question that many watched to see how far Tamils aligned to TNA separatism and Muslims to Muslim fundamentalism. The voter map sadly established that answer. The result destroyed 2 myths – May 2009 showed that the War” can be won and November 2019 election victory showed elections can be won without North East votes.

What can we make out of the North & East votes?

Ethno-religious political parties has become a bane and divider of people. The people are misled by these leaders who use minorities as their pawns for personal bargaining for themselves. However, the elders cannot destroy the youth by them shouldering divisive politics and separatist notions brainwashed into their minds by their political leaders. Gotabaya Rajapakse’s political campaign will go down as one of the cleanest with no posters and encouraging tree planting as well as drawing youth into a future of hope. He stuck to policy and explaining how policy will be implemented. There was no character assassinations or mudslinging on his stages except to alert people of impending dangers to the Nation & its people. The Youth in particular were promised a better and brighter future.

The Tamil & Muslim youth cannot be disassociated from these programs by their elders nursing separatism & fundamentalism. Therefore, the new government must adopt new methods to embrace the youth and children to integrate and leave the separatist elders to take their hatred and revenge to their grave. The youth deserve far more than hatred to be passed from their elders. These are long term efforts but worth every effort.

India was one of the first to extend congratulatory message to the new President. It is to India’s own advantage that they develop genuine and non-bullying methods of diplomatic relations in realizing the threat to peace with West entering Asia’s shore. The Indian Ocean Rim as a Zone of Peace is something that India needs to work with Sri Lanka on and ensure Sri Lanka does not end up another Middle East or Africa. Asia’s future is development not wars and India must realize that this is a priority that requires a trilateral approach with India-Sri Lanka & China’s inclusive diplomacy. Russia must also play a pivotal role. The world should no longer be a militarized zone but one with shared development dividends for mutual benefit. No country can force Sri Lanka to disassociate with countries that have been Sri Lanka’s friend in times of need both in the past & present.

The West will no doubt re-strategize and return to the UN to again bring in tremendous pressure upon Sri Lanka using their usual chorus of ‘war crimes’ ‘human rights’ ‘law & order’ state of democracy vocabulary. This is where Sri Lanka needs to place patriotic diplomats to handle Sri Lanka’s diplomacy to Sri Lanka’s advantage on international platforms and not have representatives working for the enemy. We do not need any more PrasadK’s in foreign service. A shake up of the foreign ministry is a must.

GR has a vision and we saw that from his work as Defense Secretary but a single man cannot rebuild a nation – it is a clarion call for all citizens to step forward as citizens disassociating from petty party politics. From the results in key pro-UNP belts it is clear that they had put country first and that is a very noteworthy sign that people can change thinking of the country and it should give hope to minorities too that they need not live wearing the mask of a minority with the mindset that they are marginalized but instead think of becoming a stakeholder and partner in development & sustainability. People have been victims of mind conditioning – to make demands alone without asking what they have contributed to society and the nation to make demands – what they have reciprocated to make unfair demands. It is time they should pose these questions to themselves. Reconciliation is no one way street – without reciprocity and without duty it does not hold water.

The academics – professionals, public & private sector will play a major role in the future. Let 2020 begin with a set of goals that look forward to rebuilding the nation with hope – with prosperity where new programs will leverage every level of society a level above what they were. The drastic and dangerous legislative changes made by politicians and public officials need to all be revisited and corrected as an immediate action. Any new changes must come with open discourse to ensure that the interests of the country and people and future generations come first.

We must also mention the nationalists that have always stood as pillars and guardians of Mother Lanka. They have known when dangers loom and come forward to alert and avert the dangers. If not for their silent and vocal contribution the President would not have got close to 7million votes – a first for any President contesting an election and a first for a non-politician to obtain. The volunteers and expats who arrived to vote for the first time on behalf of their birth home deserve much gratitude. No paid campaign could have matched how they contributed to this victory – so many unsung heroes and heroines cannot be made but they did a major contribution to this victory.

Sri Lanka must streamline the national security first – shortcomings, negligence, and disregard for national security enabled innocent people to die while allowing fundamentalisms to take shape. These must be nipped in the bud as we do not wish to walk into another 30 years of death and destruction.

Gotabaya Rajapakse extended the leaf of peace to all and it is those that rejected who must now come forward and attempt to retake that leaf of peace with good intention as Gotabaya Rajapakse is after all the President of all. The minorities must learn to live in an inclusive society and it is good to rethink how they have voted. The result showcased where the extremism lay and that is not healthy for the Youth and it is the Youth that matters.

In Gotabaya Rajapakse, we have a straight forward leader – therefore the citizens must also lean to bat straight. The floating voters and youth vote realized this and made their voice clear. Mudslinging has a short life span and people realized that they needed a future of policies and not character assassinations.

The divine powers have always guarded this nation and this time Sri Lanka has been very fortunate.

To everyone planning to gang up again and torment the new leadership – our kind appeal to you, please leave this nation to breath a bit, allow us the solace to rethink how Sri Lanka should progress, we have not harmed any nation or its security and we never will, all that we ask from the world is to leave us alone to gather our broken pieces and put it all together on our terms and sort out our differences amongst us and by us because like in any home, only we know how to put the puzzle back together again.

Please give us a little room and non-interference into our internal affairs.

Shenali D Waduge