Shenali Waduge

Mali is synonymous with Timbuktu. It was one of the largest empires that existed in Africa. No different to Sri Lanka, from the 15th century, the Kingdom of Mali began to weaken. There is much that the two nations have in common.

Mali is a country in Africa, created out of part of Sudan in 1891, and came under French control in 1892. In early 1959, the Sudanese Republic and Senegal formed the Federation of Mali, which was given independence on 20 June 1960.

The population of Mali is 20.8 million (the same as Sri Lanka). The majority of people there live below the poverty line. 90% survive on less than $ 2 a day.

International organisations claim Mali has a democratically elected government that has developed a national poverty plan, and that the country has a good system of financial accountability while being macroeconomically stable; even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) agree.

Then what is their problem or where lies the problem? The problem lies in aid not being given on the basis of need. Why don’t the WB, IMF, and other donors give aid based on the need? Is this a problem relevant only to Mali or to the majority of Global South nations?

Is the problem the demand of the IMF/WB and other donors to implement controversial unproductive economic conditions like privatising and liberalising their economy?

The IMF and WB insisted that Mali privatise its electricity supply, which ended government support to cotton farmers. Mali was then forced to liberalise the price of cotton.

Less than 1% of rural Mali has access to electricity. Mali’s electricity was privatised between 1998 and 2000 in the midst of IMF/WB reforming the lending process – it was a condition to obtain loans from the IMF/WB. Mali retained 40% control, but 60% went into the private hands of French company SAUR.

What is noteworthy is how former IMF official Mandé Sidibé became Prime Minister of Mali in 2000. From 2000 to 2005, following the privatisation of electricity, Mali experienced electricity supply to affluent areas but not to the areas in need (80,000 in 2000 to 131,000 in 2003, but only in areas around the capital Bamako).

Prices were raised in spite of Mali continuing State subsidies to SAUR and other tax rebates.

In 2005, SAUR nullified the deal, forcing Mali to nationalise the company. It was another cost to an already impoverished nation. Mali accused SAUR of failing its contractual obligations and creating delays in the promised investments.

The World Bank report of 2001 acknowledged that Mali strongly opposed the privatisation of its electricity, but in spite of this, the WB and IMF wanted to include the privatisation of water and of their airport too.

The IMF and WB are both guilty of peddling economic reform conditions while knowing their negative outcome, even after claiming to not continue such practices. To prevent SAUR increasing prices, the Mali Government continued to subsidise, even giving it tax breaks, and subsidising on the fuel used by the company.

In 2003, the Electricity and Water Regulatory Authority was created when Mali’s electricity was privatised, which accused SAUR of falsifying its books. These differences resulted in renationalising electricity at a cost to the Government. This loss to Mali came about primarily because of the IMF/WB insistence on privatisation. The IMF/WB did not take lessons & moved on to putting Mali in further trouble by liberalising the prices of cotton.

Mali is famous for its cotton production. It is the second-biggest cotton producer in sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of people in Mali make their livelihood through cotton and it was naturally Mali’s main export. Mali’s cotton industry was part State-owned and part private. Mali was impacted when world cotton prices began to fall in the late 1990s, primarily as a result of a trading-monopoly by rich countries.

Rich countries subsidise their farming industries, resulting in world prices in the Global South cotton-producing countries getting adversely impacted, highlighting how world economies and production are manipulated. On top of this, the IMF/WB prevented Mali from supporting its farmers. This was a well-orchestrated downfall that forced Mali to seek IMF/WB aid and IMF/WB became the world’s poli-mudalali”, ready to give but with stringent conditions.

The World Bank in 2001 offered $ 70 million in conditional aid if Mali privatised and liberalised its cotton sector. The IMF too made the same demand for its 2002 Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (in reality another name for SAP).

Mali was brought to its knees and had to agree and accept the conditions. By now you should have understood how the IMF/WB orchestrated themselves to give Mali no choice. Look at the scenario that took place in Sri Lanka and understand the bigger picture.

The Cotton Sector Development Policy was drafted by the World Bank though it claims to be a joint effort. We know too well how many of Sri Lanka’s policies must have been similarly passed.

Mali was asked to privatise their cotton industry in 2004. However due to the contentious nature of the demands, the Mali Government delayed it until 2008. This resulted in the WB and IMF using strong-arm tactics of withholding $ 50 million in aid (no different to what is done to Sri Lanka) – forcing the Government to adjust the producer price of cotton with artificially low market prices. The Mali Government adjusted the price of cotton in 2005 resulting in a 20% drop in the cotton prices earned by 3 million Mali cotton farmers. Was this how the IMF and WB claimed to eliminate poverty? Are their economists not aware of the ultimate outcome?

This is what Mali’s then-President Amadou Toumani Touré declared in 2005: True partnership supposes autonomy of beneficiary countries in requesting aid and in determining its objectives. Often programmes are imposed on us, and we are told it is our programme. People who have never seen cotton come to give us lessons on cotton. No one can respect the conditionalities of certain donors. They are so complicated that they themselves have difficulty getting us to understand them. This is not a partnership. This is a master relating to his student.”

The majority of the country’s population live in South Mali, while rebel groups North of Mali made several quests for autonomy in 1963, 1990, and 2006 (periods identical to issues in Sri Lanka). The current crisis began in 2012 with the Tuareg separatist group (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad [NMLA]) rebelling for the 4th time. The NMLA was backed by numerous pro-Al Qaeda groups that ousted the Mali leader and declared independence. 

The French military intervened in 2013 and French troops have been deployed in Mali since 2014, as well as a UN Mission with 13,000 UN peacekeepers. Around 1,200 US military personnel are also present and have built a drone base in Niger to facilitate strikes. Who funds Al Qaeda and other militants? Who trains them? The question of who is fighting those that they have funded and trained, and why, is never answered, because it justifies foreign troop presence whether nations like it or not. A military coup occurred in 2021 and Mali faces economic sanctions. Mali’s situation, in spite of foreign presence, has not improved.

In 2022, the people of Mali protested in the capital against foreign meddling”, primarily because of opposition from the EU and France to a security deal with Russia. The people of Mali were protesting the presence of Western and UN troops.

In October 2022, Mali’s Foreign Minister even accused France of espionage and destabilising acts” and continued acts to undermine the sovereignty and national security of Mali when he addressed UN sessions. To be expected, the UN reports accused Mali soldiers of abusing and killing civilians suspected of colluding with jihadists”.

Mali’s State structure has been weakened by creating private military and security companies in Sahel. There are over 250 licenced companies. It was even encouraged by the UN as a protective measure. However, it has made authorities powerless and helpless.

The international community has failed Mali in its peace missions. In 2022, the French troops present in the country since 2012 agreed to withdraw from Mali. It is noteworthy that Mali’s rebels were used to oust Gaddafi. Every foreign contingent in Mali was present for different reasons than the ones they articulated. Jihadists were used to force Mali into agreeing to solutions” that were advantageous to those proposing. The rebels ended up attacking those that formed them. The entire situation takes us back to how Tamil militancy evolved – how they were used and how they exacted revenge for being used.

Mali is caught between a glorious past and an uncertain future; no different to what prevails in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has at least ended terrorism – but that is only the ground force. Terrorism was tied to separatism, which continues via tie-coat terrorists posing a far more dangerous threat than the uniformed terrorists. Mali was straddled with economic burdens using international monetary agencies and international systems peddled by powerful donor countries wishing to acquire Mali’s resources and gateways. Sri Lanka’s case is no different. The manner in which both countries became prey to loans/aid on conditions to liberate and privatise is a case in point.

Mali sits at a major crossroad in the African continent, just like Sri Lanka’s geopolitical importance in South Asia. Mali shares borders with seven nations that make up West Africa. Mali suffers colonial legacy just as Sri Lanka. Both Sri Lanka and Mali are key players in trade. Mali’s famous emperor Mansa Musa made Timbuktu a cultural centre. Mali is rich in resources. Corruption, cronyism, and poor governance in both Mali and Sri Lanka are features that tend to cloud the real enemies who hide behind the scenes.

(The writer is an independent political analyst who writes on a broad range of topics, and was previously the International Human Rights Commission’s Goodwill Ambassador for Sri Lanka)