KAMALIKA PIERIS

Intelligence reports indicated that the LTTE’s strategy was to demoralize the navy.[1] The more they target the navy the more the navy resolved to fight back, said Karannagoda .[2]   Navy  listed all the  vulnerable   naval targets and took precautions. [3]   Despite the many precautions we took LTTE always managed to find  ways to attack the navy,  said Karannagoda.[4]

LTTE launched hit and run attacks from their Sea Tiger camps located on the coast line. Sea Tigers launched their attacks  within 10-20 nautical miles from land, then they could return to base before Navy arrived.[5] FACs  were stronger  than Sea Tigers in the deep sea, where the sea was rough. Whenever a sea battle started Navy tried to lure LTTE boats towards the deep sea while the  LTTE tried  to do the opposite.[6] 

Karannagoda was sure that LTTE would violate Ceasefire Agreement as soon as they completed training new cadres and obtained arms and ammunition.[7] LTTE attacked   the Navy on  23. December 2005.[8] 

The first significant attack  on the navy by LTTE was on January 7, 2006,  a LTTE suicide boat disguised as a fishing craft, attacked a  FAC fast patrol craft on patrol covering the outer harbour at Trincomalee . [9]  The suicide boat had come from one of the LTTE  Sea tiger camps in Sampur area.   Three officers and 15 sailors died.[10]

 The incident is described in  detail in the book. The  officer in charge  was a newly commissioned inexperienced sub lieutenant. He had not been alert and had acted irresponsibly when LTTE boat charged. He was a  less than mediocre officer who should never have been put in charge of an FAC, observed Karannagoda . [11]

On 11 May 2006  LTTE attacked  the ferry ‘Pearl Cruise’ which was used to transport army personnel  to the north. This was the first sea battle, the others had been attacks on lone vessels.[12]

 Navy knew that an attack was planned because of the increased traffic in messages. The navy studied the LTTE  traffic in coded messages though they lacked the technology to decode the message. Heavy traffic meant LTTE was planning an attack . [13]

Ravindra Wijegunaratne recalled, our sea convoy was sailing off Chalai, a few miles south of Point Pedro, at the first light of May 12, 2006. The FAC on scout duty in front of the convoy spotted and reported fifteen sea tiger boats off of Chalai. [14]

LTTE attack craft mounted with an assortment of weapons in each of them, 23 mm and 20 mm guns, 50 calibre guns  and light machine guns,  were moving at high speed, some 30 to 35 knots, towards  Pearl Cruise  and its escort vessels. Four smaller vessels laden with explosives and guided by suicide cadres were also at the scene.[15] Pearl Cruise was ordered to alter course and move seaward.[16]FACs took up battle positions.  

The Sea tiger boats launched the attack with their heavy guns . A a tense,  90-minute fierce gun battle erupted at sea.[17] Karannagoda was on the radio giving detailed directions.[18]The  navy boats, led by Lt Commander ELP Edirisinghe, began sinking the LTTE Sea tiger boats one by one.

One suicide boat, of a different shape, was speeding towards the MV Pearl Cruise, This  boat  had been specially designed to attack  vessels like Pearl Cruise.[19]it was larger in size than the usual  suicide boats, had four 200 HP outboard motor engines and moved much faster.[20] It wasguided by a command boat fitted with  radar. The  boat was fired on by nearby FACs but withstood gunfire  as it was amour plated and continued heading towards Pearl Cruise.[21]

 Lieutenant Commander  Edirisinghe, of  FAC No P416,  one of the FACs assigned to protect Pearl Cruise,  rammed the  suicide boat. Both boats exploded killing all.[22] Edirisinghe’s  two children were waiting for their father to return home, after sea duty, to light the Vesak lanterns they had made.[23]  Pearl Cruise   having crossed the  International Maritime Boundary Line between India and Sri Lanka during the battle [24] entered the Kankesanturai  harbour just after 10 p.m. [25]

Lieutenant Commander Edirisinghe’s action was the bravest act  in the entire history of the navy, said Karannagoda in his book. It prevented the deaths of 700 soldiers.   Lieutenant Commander Edirisinghe was promoted to the rank of Commander posthumously and awarded the highest gallantry award Parama Veera Wickrama Vibhishana. The crew were also promoted posthumously  to the next  rank and were awarded gallantry medals. .[26]

LTTE attacked Galle harbor on October 18.2006. at 2.30 pm. the episode is described in detail in the book.  Navy was informed before hand by  a Sinhala business men  who owned several fishing boats . these   fishermen had reported  that five boats  with occupants dressed in black, were moving a high speed towards Galle. They did not look like  fishermen.  They had taken off from Batticaloa .[27]

The navy  at Galle was ready, but the Commander deserted post and the LTTE won the battle.  We could have easily turned this confrontation  into a massive defeat for the LTTE if the officer had acted responsibly, said Karannagoda in his book.  We knew the attack was coming we had sufficient notice.   LTTE entered the harbor and succeed in  firing rocket propelled grenade  at various naval targets.  Two naval vessels were destroyed  by LTTE  two suicide boats. All ten LTTE cadres died. The cowardly commander was court martialed and made to retire. [28]

 In June 2007, navy  fought for the first time  with its Small Boats”. There was a  major confrontation between  navy and LTTE. LTTE launched  25 boats from Challai and Mullaitivu. Arrow boats were ready for them.  There were  50 Arrow boats against 30 LTTE boats.[29]    Arrow boats won the battle.  LTTE withdrew having lost several boats.  [30]  This battle is  described in the book, with much detail. This was  a huge defeat for LTTE and a big victory for us, said Karannagoda. Navy in high spirits over the success of the battle.[31]

LTTE attacked the sailors on land as well as at sea. The  land routes for a navy convoy  were Trincomalee to Colombo via Habarana  and Talaimannar to Colombo via Vavuniya. There was a considerable Tamil population  on these routes. LTTE could mingle with them and launch attacks on military vehicles. [32].

 LTTE attacked a Colombo bound  navy convoy near Tampalagama on 11 April 2006 at 10 am. Ten junior sailors proceeding on leave after completing a  course at the Naval Academy were killed in a claymore mine attack .The mine had been placed high on a tree. it had been so strong that       shrapnel  had penetrated the amour plates of the bus. 

Thereafter, when travelling in a convoy  passengers sat on the floor, wearing helmet and body armor. The convoy bus  had two armor plates with sand in-between.   This was too much for ordinary buses and Sri Lanka Navy started  making armored personal carriers at  Welisara.   They produced four armored personnel carriers a month..[33]

There was a second attack at Digampatana on  16 October 2006.Two navy convoys scheduled to meet there, were  attacked at Digampatana. This was the biggest LTTE attack on the navy, the navy worst disaster.  103 sailors  died. This was a large number for the navy. [34]   

The  convoy from Trincomalee and the convoy from Colombo regularly  met and  handed over weapons,  armour and helmets  at a selected place near  Habarana. Various precautions were carried out for this activity.  The   location changed every two days. The location was given to the two convoy commanders only when they were starting.  There were  other  preventive measures such as snap checks and  road blocks.

On this day, the two convoys were handing over weapons,  when an explosive filled lorry had come at high speed and rammed into them. The lorry had  come at  the exact time that the exchange was taking place.  This meant that they has been informed.

 There were several boutiques on the other side of the road at the location and the tip off had come from there.  The population there was 90% Sinhala. it was found that the informant  was  a Sinhalese who was a close confidant of   a strong Sinhala political leader in the area.He had done it for the  money. He avoided arrest due to patronage of the politician. As expected  LTTE  killed him. [35]  

Inquiry showed  that the  commander of  one convoy had  gone off to Dambulla  when he ws expected to stay with the convoy. He should have been there throughout. He had also not  seen to road blocks. Those watching had observed these lapses and gave the tip off.  LTTE had been observing and waiting for just such an opportunity, said the book. The   officer  who went to Dambulla was court martialed and dismissed from the service.

   My  view, (Kamalika Pieris) is that   the LTTE knew the location for that particular day.  LTTE would not  keep an explosive filled lorry waiting every  day, in the  vague  hope of ramming the navy convoy. Also, clearly there was support  from inside. The commander  was not at the scene    and the usual  precautions, such as check points, had not been carried out.   In the  Galle harbor attack too, the commander had deserted post.( continued)

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[1] Karannagoda The turning point p 189

[2] Karannagoda The turning point p 213

[3] Karannagoda The turning point p 189

[4] Karannagoda The turning point p 190,191

[5] Karannagoda The turning point p 250

[6] Karannagoda The turning point p 251

[7] Karannagoda The turning point p 151

[8] Karannagoda The turning point p 181

[9] Karannagoda The turning point p 183

[10] Karannagoda The turning point p 186

[11] Karannagoda The turning point p 153

[12] Karannagoda The turning point p 191

[13] Karannagoda The turning point p 191

[14]Ravindra C Wijegunaratne, https://www.dailymirror.lk/news-features/COUNTRY-BEFORE-SELF-Extracts-from-book-

[15] https://www.sundaytimes.lk/060514/columns/sitrep.html

[16]Ravindra C Wijegunaratne, https://www.dailymirror.lk/news-features/COUNTRY-BEFORE-SELF-Extracts-from-book-

[17]Ravindra C Wijegunaratne, https://www.dailymirror.lk/news-features/COUNTRY-BEFORE-SELF-Extracts-from-book-

[18] https://www.sundaytimes.lk/060514/columns/sitrep.html

[19]Ravindra C Wijegunaratne, https://www.dailymirror.lk/news-features/COUNTRY-BEFORE-SELF-Extracts-from-book-

[20]Ravindra C Wijegunaratne, https://www.dailymirror.lk/news-features/COUNTRY-BEFORE-SELF-Extracts-from-book-

[21] Karannagoda The turning point p 198 or close to this.

[22] Karannagoda The turning point p 197

[23]Ravindra C Wijegunaratne, https://www.dailymirror.lk/news-features/COUNTRY-BEFORE-SELF-Extracts-from-book-

[24] https://www.sundaytimes.lk/060514/columns/sitrep.html

[25] https://www.sundaytimes.lk/060514/columns/sitrep.html

[26] Karannagoda The turning point p 198

[27] Karannagoda The turning point p 206

[28] Karannagoda The turning point p 211, 213

[29] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  239

[30] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 240

[31] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 241-242

[32] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 204

[33] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 188,189

[34] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 203,205

[35] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 203,205