KAMALIKA PIERIS

LTTE  established small  Sea Tiger bases the north- eastern  and north- western coasts  in lagoons opening to the sea. They were approx. 10-15 km apart along the coast.    In 1994  LTTE went into the Vanni, it was pushed out of Jaffna. In Vanni, they freely used all the lagoons that opened to the sea.[1]   Over  8 Sea Tiger camps were set up  in the Vanni. LTTE  attack boats and suicide boats were hidden in the jungle adjoining.  LTTE had found a   way to launch and pull back the boats, using  the bull dozers and tractors kept in  each base .[2]    

LTTE   engaged in asymmetric warfare with suicide boats and wolf pack type attacks on the navy. .this is well known. LTTE did not invent asymmetric warfare. It was  there before. Asymmetric tactics at sea consisted of  small, fast moving, elusive,  hard hitting teams , engaging in surprise attacks,[3] using  a   superior knowledge of the  territory.[4]

LTTE  also introduced  suicide divers,   suicide boats,   and semi-submerged submarines.[5] .Suicide boats were used successfully against the slow speed naval craft such as landing craft and merchant vessels. [6]

 Suicide divers attacked two surveillance vessels,  Abhita and Edithera  at KKS harbor in 1990.[7]   LTTE used suicide divers effectively until the last stages of the war.[8]   Navy lost a FAC with its entire crew off Mullaitivu on January 2009. That was the last suicide attack.[9]  LTTE also had  moored mines and limpet mines. Mines were used successfully on two occasions, destroying two logistic vessels in KKS and Trincomalee [10]  .

Four months after the Ceasefire Agreement  was signed in 2002, LTTE found that the sea was not included in  the hurriedly prepared Ceasefire Agreement.  LTTE  decided to rectify this omission and  get their Sea Tiger camps legitimized.[11]

LTTE  asked the government to transfer LTTE cadres training at Vakarai, from Vakarai to Mullaitivu  and  back  by sea.  LTTE cadres were to be taken past the  Trincomalee harbour on both journeys.  Karannagoda found this a strange request.LTTE had been transferring their cadres by land between LTTE and government controlled land, why seek a sea route. When the Navy objected defense ministry overruled it. LTTE obtained approval for the sea transfer from the government. [12]

The first movement took place in August 2002. Then after a few more trips, LTTE wanted the sea convoy to stop at Verugal aru, 15 miles from Trincomalee harbor and pick up   LTTE from there.  This was also approved , despite objections of the navy . Then LTTE got permission to pick up two LTTE from a location very close to Trincomalee harbor, Illankanthei. Navy objected but government agreed.  Illankathei was  next to Sampur village. LTTE was trying to  establish their presence on the southern side of the Trincomalee harbor.[13]

 Before 2002, the LTTE camp closest to Trincomalee was the camp at Nayaru. It was not possible to  attack Trincomalee from Nayaru as naval patrols and shore based radar  were in operation between Nayaru and Trincomalee  . LTTE  therefore  needed camps closer to Trincomalee harbour. [14]  

Karannagoda  found  in 2003 that   the LTTE had  established new  camps surrounding  the Trincomalee harbour,  using the Ceasefire Agreement . LTTE already had a camp close to Morawewa.  They were  now converting this  into a  permanent camp, taking building materials   secretly through the jungle.[15]  Morawewa was 25 mins drive  from Trincomalee.

LTTE  had  started a program to settle Mahaveer families”   in     colonies planted  in Trincomalee near the harbour. Mahaveer families”  were families of LTTE cadres killed in action. The houses were built by  the NGO known as Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). There were 50-100 houses in   each  colony. [16]These colonies  encircled Trincomalee harbour and Trincomalee town  and LTTE could use them to mount an attack on the  military bases   near the harbour.[17]

 Karannagoda found that LTTE  had also got into the restricted area of the Naval  headworks Sanctuary, which faced Tambalagam Bay. Three fourths of Naval Headworks Sanctuary    is covered in thick jungle and preserved as a sanctuary while only one fourth is used for naval purposes.

 In  January 2003 Karannagoda as Area Commander  visited the jungle area.  Access  was thorugh  a gravel road,   off the Trincomalee Colombo road,  1 km before Tambalagamuwa town, where the majority  are Tamil.

500 km onwards, he found that  thousands of cattle were grazing freely and 27 huts had come up with men in each hut. I had never before seen cattle and huts within  the Naval Sanctuary, said Karannagoda . He was told these  cattle belonged to the  villagers of Tambalagamuwa.  They has  arriving  in  increasing numbers after the Ceasefire Agreement was signed. Karannagoda  found that  the  LTTE was occupying 2 of the 27  huts and from these, they  were monitoring all the naval movements  in the    Naval Headworks.[18] If the LTTE had free access to the  sanctuary they could  disrupt the water supply  to all the military camps in the Trincomalee area.  They could poison the water supply too.[19]

 Karannagoda ordered the cattle  be removed, also the huts.[20] This was a restricted area. He ordered the withdrawal of over 1000 cattle from the  Naval reservation and from 18,000 hectares of jungle in Tambalagamuwa.[21] He  sent additional troops to Headworks camp,  together with  platoons of the elite Special  Boat squadron (SBS)  with instruction to cover the entire jungle. He also instructed not to allow LTTE to enter naval sanctuary and to use force if necessary[22] .

The UNP and the Tamil Separatist Movement were angry with Karannagoda for  this. TNA MP Sampanthan rang Karannagoda and said that his order went against the Ceasefire Agreement . The sanctuary area was a traditional grazing area for cattle,  you have no right to give such order. The practice  must continue and the huts  must remain.  Karannagoda refused and Sampanthan said he would complain to the Prez.  Sampanthan reported Karannagoda to President  Chandirka Kumaratunga.[23]  President  supported Karannagoda. [24]

Then SLMM rang. You have stopped the movement of the LTTE on Naval Sanctuary in Tambalagamuwa area.  LTTE might retaliate. They might plant landmines, attack naval vehicles on the road, said SLMM. Then we will retaliate replied Karannagoda. That ended the matter.[25]

 In  2000 LTTE had attacked  two fast passenger carrier inside the  Trincomalee arbour evne without h aving camps on the  south side. By 2006 it was different, LTTE had establish several sea tiger camps and ships and craft in Trincomalee harbor  were vulnerable. [26] .

LTTE had  established  camps   at Koddiyar bay. LTTE has establish several small sea tiger coams in the estuary of Mahaweli river  as it entered Koddiyar Bay, approx. 500 to 1000 upstream. The camps were completely concealed by the thick vegetation, they could not be detected  even from the air.[27] 

 LTTE had also  set up 13 new camps  including  five  Sea Tiger camps in Sampur  directly facing the Naval headquarters across Koddiyar Bay. This  was a meticulously planned campaign. [28]These Sampur camps were a serous threat to the navy and Karannagoda was  very concerned about them. As he expected, in August 2006 LTTE attacked the Naval dockyard, Air force camp in China Bay  and the airfield using  artillery from  Sampur.[29]

 The fishing villages  facing Koddiyar  bay,  in the Sampur area were all Tamil except for Mutur, which was Muslim.  Karannagoda wanted a navy camp at Mutur  but under the Ceasefire Agreement They needed  permission from the Peace secretariat .Therefore  Karannagoda tried to persuade the Muslim villagers to ask for a navy camp there.

 However, LTTE attacked Mutur and set fire to shops in March 2003, Minster Hakeen went on a hunger strike and  demanded a naval detachment at Mutur .On the instructions of Defense Minister , Karannagoda promptly  established a naval detachment near Mutur pier. Marapana also suggested, later on,  in conversation, send more troops and when the order to  withdraw troops comes, withdraw the excess lot, keep the rest”.[30]

  Karannagoda   was deeply concerned about the LTTE camps at Sampur. He   informed Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe , Minster for Defense, Tilak Marapana and Permanent Secretary, Defense, Austin Fernando about this Samur build upon three separate occasions , but they did not take it seriously.”[31]

  In April 2003 Prime Minister   had visited Trincomalee . Karannagoda told him of the new sea tiger camps in Sampur. They were a serious  threat.  Intelligence  said that  under cover of Ceasefire Agreement LTTE was training large number of new cadres.  Already they had trained over 10,000 cadres. Prime Minister said Cant be, how to train so many in such a short time.”   Karannagoda said that  LTTE  only  trained recruits in the handling of weapons, not seamanship. Prime Minister then changed the subject.[32] 

The Defense Minister ,the three service commanders and the  IGP came to Trincomalee to discuss security  in July 2033.. The  army and navy made two power point presentations which tallied on the subject of Sampur. Both showed a total of 18 camps of which 13 were new camps.[33]   Karannagoda  had a map which showed the LTTE camps, both  new ones and old.  This map is given in the book.[34] 

In  September 2003  Mahinda Rajapaksa, then Leader of Opposition came to Trincomalee to obtain first hand information on the  security situation. Karannagoda  made a presentation to him as well.[35] 

In August 2003 Karannagoda was asked to make a presentation to the President of Sri Lanka . regarding Sampur     Lakshman Kadirgamar  came instead of President. He accepted  what Karannagoda said. [36] 

Karannagoda then found that the UNP government was very angry with him for making a presentation to the  President.  Austin Fernando rang, did you meet the President, he asked.. They also wanted to see Karannagoda’s presentation. So he  showed it. They queried ,  how did they get this information,  they asked, when no    one was allowed near the LTTE camps . From people living nearby, came the reply. How did you know the exact position of the LTTE new camps. By listening to their  radio communications.[37] 

In September 2003  Karannagoda was informed that  the   Commander of the 22 Division of the army based in Trincomalee had said, in an ITN broadcast, that there were no new LTTE camps in Trincomalee, the  Karannagoda report was false.

 Karannagoda  then produced  the presentation made in July 2003   by   the earlier divisional commander of the 22nd Division,  Brigadier John Senaweera of the army,  which showed  13 new LTTE camps.[38]  Karannagoda later learnt that the new Divisional Commander 22^nd Division had given a false statement because  a very senior official in the Defense Ministry had asked him to do so. [39] .

Karannagoda  stated that he had informed the authorities on five occasions about the threat  from Sampur. The information he supplied was accurate. He had  set up three separate boards to report on the matter. He also had  information from his  operations staff and intelligence Department.[40] .

I brought the threat posed by Sampur to  the notice of Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Defense secretary on five occasions in January, April and July 2003,   said Karannagoda in the book. They took no notice.  When the President  took up the matter, these three suddenly got worked up and started slinging mud at me on ITN,  a government owned TV channel.  [41]

Three  ITN broadcasts  were made on  three successive Fridays ,5,12 and 19 September attacking Karannagoda regarding Sampur. Karannagoda  sued ITN for 150 million, and after  two years won the case. This event is described in detail in the book. [42]  

The Army Commander was also an obstacle where Sampur was concerned. Whenever he was asked to clear Sampur of the LTTE , Army Commander made excuses. The troops were insufficient and Army  was not ready  for a war with LTTE  .Army Commander was angry with Karannagoda. Karannagoda had  opposed  the  Army Commander’s  attempts to control the navy.[43]  

Karannagoda had made repeated requests to the Security Council to clear LTTE from the Sampur area, as a  priority[44]    After the attack on Jetliner in August 2006 it  became  urgently necessary to clear Sampur[45]  .  I silently cursed the Army Commander for not clearing the Sampur area giving silly excuses, despite my repeated requests , said Karannagoda in his book.[46]   

When Mahinda Rajapaksa became President, in 2005, Karannagoda  spoke to him and he ordered Army  Commander to clear the Sampur area on priority basis, ignoring his excuses. Army Commander said that his army  did not have the troops to hold the ground after clearing. Navy said they would do that. So Army Commander had not further excuses. He had to clear Sampur.[47]   

He had earlier said that  he needed to deploy around 2000 troops for the purpose, but  used a much smaller  number of troops for the job.    When the  navy moved in, they found that LTTE had only  had 300-400 cadres there.[48]  Once Sampur was cleared ,navy established four camps  with over 1000 trained sailors. This removed the biggest threat to Trincomalee harbor   and  was a  huge relief to the  navy.[49]   ( continued)

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[1] Karannagoda The turning point p 21

[2] Karannagoda The turning point p 138

[3] https://www.spsnavalforces.com/story/?id=163.

[4] https://www.spsnavalforces.com/story/?id=163.

[5] Karannagoda The turning point p 127

[6] Karannagoda The turning point p 136

[7] Karannagoda The turning point p 135

[8] Karannagoda The turning point p 135

[9] Karannagoda The turning point p 135

[10] Karannagoda The turning point p 136

[11] Karannagoda The turning point p 42

[12] Karannagoda The turning point p 41

[13] Karannagoda The turning point p 41,42

[14] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 23.

[15] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 15.

[16] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 19.

[17] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 43.

[18] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 18.

[19] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 26.

[20] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 26.

[21] Rohan Gunaratne .foreword to The Turning point p xvii-xvii

[22] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 27,28.

[23] Rohan Gunaratne .foreword to The Turning point p xvii

[24] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 25,26.

[25] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 27.

[26] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 252.

[27] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 23, 52

[28] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 19, 22.

[29] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 56

[30] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 51-55

[31] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 76

[32] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 57

[33] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 76

[34] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 79

[35] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 87

[36] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 77,79

[37] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 82,83

[38] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 89

[39] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 91

[40] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 84

[41] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 84

[42] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 85

[43] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 252

[44] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 252

[45] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 253

[46] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 261

[47] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 265

[48] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 265

[49] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 266