KAMALIKA PIERIS

Karannagoda   in his book The turning  point ‘ provides us with a detailed account of the arms procurement method of the LTTE . Navy intelligence knew about these movements, but lacked the strength to stop them.

 Initially, most of the explosives and weapons LTTE used were obtained from Tamilnadu and also from the government of India. The items obtained from the international market were  unloaded on their boats off the Tamilnadu coast and came in, mingling with the fishing boats. From there, the cargo came to Sri Lanka across Palk Strait wit dinghies fitted with multiple outboard motors  for greater speed.[1]

in the 1990s LTTE  used the  direct sea route  to smuggle arms to the  northeast and northwest coasts. The area between Point Pedro and north of Trincomalee had the largest number of LTTE sea tiger bases along the coast. Merchant vessels carrying LTTE cargo approached the Sri Lanka  waters up to about 20 km from north east coastline and unloaded cargo unhindered. at the time,  Navy did not have   enough craft to stop them and LTTE was able to bring its goods in without any difficulty.[2]  

With the increase in navy  patrols, LTTE change its tactics. In   2000 LTTE  transferred its   goods stuff in small quantities onto different types of boats in mid sea from their large ships acting as floating warehouses ,and brought them ashore to LTTE controlled areas on the northeast coast.

The floating warehouse remained on high seas and approached Sri Lanka  up to 150-200 km from the coast. The transfer took place there.. LTTE radars installed at strategic locations in northeast and northwest coastlines monitored the present or absence of navy craft and communicated the info to the incoming arms carriers which then decided on which route to take.[3]

One method they adopted was to use  large high speed fiberglass boats fitted with multiple outboard motors of 150-200 HP to carry the cargo ashore. Once the transfer was done they made a   dash for the coast. [4].

Second method was for the ship acting as a floating warehouse to tow a large boat approx. 20 m in length, loaded with items  up to 100 km from land, and release it to proceed on its own.  Navy Intelligence showed that such large  boats took off  from remote areas in Indonesia where the LTTE arms procurement network was active .  These boats came out of the Indonesian coastline up to 150 km to meet the warehouse ship. that took them in tow.[5]

Third method was to transfer  the goods onto multi day fishing trawlers from the floating warehouses and   bring them ashore. These trawlers had Sinhalese names painted on the bow of the boat. With that they could mingle with the  regular fishing clusters. About 95 % of the multi day trawlers were owned by the Sinhala, who, I am sure could have detected the rogue boats. [6]

 After the transfer the LTTE floating warehouse ship would move away from Sri Lanka waters to  the high seas, and stay there in an area close to Indonesia, until the next transfer was to take place. The operating base for LTTE was Indonesia close to Jakarta. [7]

 LTTE had obtained its weapons  and ammunition   from different countries  illegally through their international arms procurement network. LTTE had a cell in Indonesia that provided war material including HP outboard motors and large fiberglass boats.[8]  The items were stored on the high seas in merchant vessels belonging  to them that acted as floating warehouses.  This was a very judicious move of the LTTE  as the high seas were  common to all.[9]

I, Kamalika Pieris would observe at this point that it is highly questionable whether an uneducated, non-English speaking local  group, based  exclusively in Jaffna could have accomplished all this. Clearly the LTTE was merely the local front for a war directed by and  supported from abroad. The boats they used, such as Indumathi, were built   abroad.

The book gives the inside story of how the SLMM  ( Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) helped the LTTE  floating warehouses. One of the condition in the Ceasefire Agreement was that whenever the navy conducted an operation against the LTTE , a member of the SLMM must be present  in its vessel. Later navy was instructed to carry a SLMM member on board when they went on special operations as well. The SLMM representatives   carried  satellite phones  when they  travelled in a navy vessel. [10]

 We adopted tactics to prevent SLMM  joining us, said Karannagoda . We  gave them very short notice,  ensuring they missed the craft,  we cancelled the sailing after they got on board citing engine problems, we  took them out to sea when the sea was rough and kepi  them at sea for many days, grealty exhausting  them. This had  the desired  effect. SLMM started to avoid sailing with us.[11]

In June 2003 Director, Military Intelligence  Kapila Hendavitarana   contacted Karannagoda about another LTTE ship movement . it gave details of the ship expected to come into position 180 nautical miles northeast of Trincomalee harbor. Ship was towing a smaller craft.[12]

Then came a message from Navy HQ that if a suspicious ship was identified as an LTTE ship then SLMM was ot be informed immediately. Someone at Naval HQ,  it had to be a very senior person, had informed Defence Ministry  This was. same person as before,  purpose again to prevent Karannagoda from getting credit if the operation succeeded.[13]  

Nandimithra had spoken to the ship .  They have given bogus details, it  is not registered in any country,  it has no flag and does not belong to any company. When ordered to stop, it continued to move away from the navy reported Nandimitra.[14] .

Navy Commander was out of the country and he had  given instructions  to area commanders to use their discretion. Karannagoda decided to  destroy the ship. The navy was very enthusiastic about the operation.

When the order to  fire was given,    I could see faces light up with satisfaction recalled Karannagoda ,[15] but  a power failure occurred at Nandimithra. it could not fire and the ship moved away. The ship was  sunk but the  smaller craft   detached and escaped. A Board of Inquiry was held against the commanding officer of Nandimithra. .[16]

 Defence secretary Austin Fernando rang. .    LTTE at Kilinochchi had complained.Have  you captured a LTTE ship. This will hurt the peace talks. Who permitted you to do this.[17]  This is a serious matter. You will face the consequences [18]   Then Defence Minister rang.  He was      also not in a good mood.  Was there an SLMM on board, he asked. Only one of the four were available and by the time he came, it  was late, the  craft had sailed. We sent  him in another boat  but that boat could not catch up with the other craft.[19]    

The next day, June 15. 2003, Karannagoda  was told that Defence Secretary had issued   instruction to allow the SLMM to inspect all the craft that took part in the operation and question the commanding officers and officers in charge.[20]

SLMM turned up the next day and wanted to inspect the location where the ship sank.    They were sent  on Shakthi, given an uncomfortable journey on a very rough sea. The skipper was instructed to steer a course that would exhaust SLMM, and they returned quickly. [21]  After this incident, Defence ministry imposed further restrictions on the navy. It was made mandatory to take SLMM even on special operations.[22]  

Fishing trawler Tharindu had informed Fisheries Corporation  signal office in Galle on 16  Oct 2003  that there was a suspicious ship off the east of Trincomalee harbor.[23]    Karannagoda took action, The FACs  at that position were  alerted and in addition navy  vessels  Edithara and Ranadhera and   the  FGB Prathapa  were   directed there. Sri Lanka Air force also sent a plane to report on the ship. [24]   

SLMM representative had come  in Prathapa.  SLMM had  informed  its head office  who then checked with LTTE   at Kilinochchi whether any of their ships were in the area. When they sited the ship, SLMM had called head office in Colombo and informed of the detection of this ship.  The ship  left the area.  The time it left tallied with SLMM phone call. [25]   

Karannagoda reported the incident and Defence Minister, Defence Secretary, and Navy Commander came to inquire into Karannagoda’s actions.  They questioned Prathapa commanding officer,   other officers and Karannagoda . They appeared suspicious of Karannagoda’s report. The matter ended when in Nov 2003 President  Chandrika  took over the Defence Ministry and deported the Country head of SLMM, Major Telifsen .[26]   

In 2006, the Joint operations Command   was sending reports to the three service  HQ with details of the number and type of artillery and mortar rounds the LTTE  had fired the previous day.  Karannagoda looked at this data and saw that the  LTTE was always well supplied with weapons and ammunition regardless of how many LTTE  boats were destroyed. This  meant that they had a regular supply of  weapons from outside. This had to be stopped if the war was to be won.

The book  describes in great detail the role of the navy in destroying LTTE floating warehouses  Operation Sagara Balaya  is   described at length in the book. The event was well publicized at the time, but the media did not provide the full story. This book does. 

Karannagoda  was sure that   if he had good intelligence and good weapons, four vessels that could sail far, with another vessel to provide logistics support, the task could be accomplished.  Karannagoda    spoke to the  Defence advisor  in the US embassy in Colombo.

He told him that  the LTTE warehouses also posed a threat to US as they may be selling arms to organization like Al Qaeda. If US could provide satellite pictures,  Sri Lanka navy could  neutralize the ships. The US embassy spoke to US Pacific Command and the  US Pacific Command provided  locations to the LTTE  ships.[27]

The public  wondered why the USA  suddenly provided information against the LTTE .This book explains .Karannagoda    had earlier  established a relationship with  Admiral R Willard, Commander US Pacific Command.[28]  This fact is not well known. It would have been crucial to obtaining the location information.

The navy had only five vessels that could sail long distances. They were  missile boats Nandimithra,  Suranimila, landing ship, Shakthi, ex-coast guard cutter Samudra and   the  offshore patrol vessel, Sayura. . Two other old vessels were modified to act as logistics ships.[29] Sayura was the  youngest at 19 years, the others were more than 30  years old

Operation Sagara Balaya was carried out using  these aged ships. The ships set off  on their historic mission, from  Trincomalee, Kankesanturai, Galle and Colombo harbors at different times on different days, at auspicious times provided by an astrologer.[30] The astrologers  calculations  were sound. The last four LTTE  warehouse ships were   destroyed in September and October  2007 very neatly and  efficiently by these ships .LTTE no longer had a  supply of  heavy weapons.[31]   ( CONCLUDED.)

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[1] Karannagoda The turning point p 127

[2] Karannagoda The turning point p 284

[3] Karannagoda The turning point p 284

[4] Karannagoda The turning point p 284

[5] Karannagoda The turning point p 285

[6] Karannagoda The turning point p 285

[7] Karannagoda The turning point p 286

[8] Karannagoda The turning point p 249

[9] Karannagoda The turning point p 286

[10] Karannagoda The turning point p 63

[11] Karannagoda The turning point p 63

[12] Karannagoda The turning point p 62

[13] Karannagoda The turning point p 65

[14] Karannagoda The turning point p 68

[15] Karannagoda The turning point p 69

[16] Karannagoda The turning point p 69

[17] Karannagoda The turning point p 69

[18] Karannagoda The turning point p 70

[19] Karannagoda The turning point p 71

[20] Karannagoda The turning point p 72

[21] Karannagoda The turning point p 73

[22] Karannagoda The turning point p 74

[23] Karannagoda The turning point p 94

[24] Karannagoda The turning point p 94

[25] Karannagoda The turning point p 95,96

[26] Karannagoda The turning point p 97

[27] Karannagoda turning point p 304.

[28] Rohan Gunaratne .foreward to The Turning point pxix

[29] Karannagoda The turning pointP 288-289

[30] Karannagoda The turning point p 299

[31] Karannagoda The turning point p 172,173