KAMALIKA PIERIS

The book The Turning Point ’has a separate chapter titled  ‘The evolution of the Sri Lanka navy and the LTTE’s Sea Tigers”. This  give us much first hand information on the development of the LTTE Sea Tiger force and the measures taken  by the navy to combat them.

 We are told that the  LTTE first used  their boats to smuggle arms  and ammunition  from India and to  send  their cadres to India for training. Until the mid 1980s  LTTE only   had  25 HP outboard motors for their fiberglass dinghies  which were 17-20 feet in length and  had a speed of around 10-12 knots. [1]

Until the late 1980s the LTTE did not confront the Sri Lanka navy directly. They tried to avoid the  Sri Lanka navy as much as possible.[2]   The Sea Tiger wing called Kadal Pura  was launched in 1985. It was the LTTE ‘ de facto’ navy. The boats   had higher HP out board motors  such as  40 and 75 , which gave the craft the required speed of 20 to 25 knots. The craft also had high caliber 23 mm weapons  which  gave greater range.[3]   LTTE had a cell in Indonesia that provided war material including HP outboard motors and large fiberglass boats.[4]

To  match this, navy obtained   six Fast Attack Craft FAC,  manufactured in Israel, by the Dvora company  in 1985 and 1986.  Colombo Dockyard also built  the ‘Dvora’  later. They were effective but  were   not as powerful as the original  Dvora, observed Karannagoda .[5]   FACs were also bought from other countries, the book gives the  details  and the relative strength of the   different makes.

 When the FACs arrived, LTTE    started to   do  their sea movement at night. Sea tigers started  to  attack  around 4 pm to take advantage of darkness. The navy had difficulty in spotting the much smaller LTTE boats in the dark, though its fighting ability was greater.[6]   Navy  got a powerful search light called Xenon, that  emit a  beam that could illuminate a target at about 1 km, which was  sufficient for attack at night.  It also blinded the LTTE cadres in the  dinghy.[7] 

The    FACs  were divided into three squadrons, each under a commander. There was a separate training officer for the FACS.[8]    Karannagoda looked into the suitability of the officers heading the FACs and found that  more than 50% were not suitable. They were replaced.[9]  

Women sailors and lady officers were appointed for each FAC  area , to visit the families of the FAC staff  and look into their welfare , such as  school, health  and any other matters that needed attention. This was done so that FAC personnel  could concentrate on their work.[10]

The navy deployed FACs to patrol the north-east and north-west seaboard. The   north-eastern seaboard, where LTTE had its  sea tiger camps was patrolled round the clock by six FACS  in pairs, 30 km apart, from three designated positions Challai (C) Mullaitivu ( M)  and Nayaru ( N).They patrolled  a coastal belt of approx. 100 km from Point Pedro to Nayaru.  [11] 

Karannagoda wanted to upgrade the  weapons of the FAC. This is described in great detail in the book . In 1997, the navy got its first multi sensor stabilized integrated system (MSIS) with a thermal  camera. The MSISs connected to a computer that  calculated all aspects including ballistics, wind speed, roll and pitch of the craft, estimated speed of enemy craft an gave the firing solution to the gun, which made it very accurate. [12]  This took the LTTE by surprise. Navy could now see the LTTE boats before the LTTE could see the navy boat and the navy was able to destroy many of the LTTE boats in a night.[13]

 Navy had more than 30 FACS fitted with thermal cameras and stabilizing gun platforms.  Guns of varying strength were fitted on to the boats. Naval firepower became very formidable  and it was difficult for the LTTE to match it at the time. Therefore LTTE could not operate  freely even at night.  The  Navy speed increased to 45 knots , caliber of weapons improved from 20 mm to 23 mm.[14]

Later, four sets of additional engines were bought for the FAC instead of more craft.  FAC could now be repaired within two days .[15] There were other improvements to  the fighting ability of navy craft. These are described in detail in the book. 

Navy had a secure communications network within the navy,   including an internal telephone system between the HQ and area commands, where the conversation was automatically encoded. [16] Satellite phones were provided for each ship and craft during Karannagoda’s time. [17]

But the Navy found it difficult to maintain communications  with its own craft in certain areas in the sea. They could not receive transmission signals after a certain distance from  land, particularly in the areas where LTTE had the highest number of sea tiger camps.  To overcome this, five  masts were  constructed   each over 120 m , at strategic locations, covering the entire  north, north east and north west seaboard. The masts   provided live  pictures of battles ,  and of  additional craft put to sea from LTTE camps. [18] These masts helped  destroy the floating warehouses.[19]

On March 30, 1996, the Dvora bearing number P-458 was tasked with the duty of escorting a convoy. It was under Lieutenant Jude Wijetunge .The LTTE had sent a suicide boat to attack the convoy. It was going at  full speed  towards the  convoy when  Wijetunge’s Dvora rammed the suicide boat and both boats exploded.

 Lieutenant Jude Wijetunge became the first Navy officer to be posthumously awarded the  Parama Weera Vibhushana, the highest gallantry medal awarded to members of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces. He was   also promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Commander.[20]

LTTE use the Ceasefire Agreement (2002-2005) to rearm and improve their fighting capability. Under the Ceasefire Agreement  ,certain officials who held high position in the government  helped LTTE to get down outboard motors with higher HP, fiberglass material for boat building and new communication equipment, all of which had been prohibited earlier.  The items came under the pretext of helping the  fishing community.  Navy complained but the complaints were  ignored. [21]

LTTE had strengthened itself during the Ceasefire Agreement  and were able to deploy  30-40 boats with higher HP engine together with 4-5 suicide boats at any given time from their camps,  to launch wolf pack type attacks on the pairs of FACs.[22]  This reduced the advantage FAC has enjoyed up to 2002.[23]  When LTTE attacked in 2006, only a few FACs had the speed advantage and were capable of facing the new LTTE high speed suicide boat threat. [24]

During the UNP government 2001-2004 military purchases for the  armed forces were either reduced or  halted totally.  Instead the  government  favored the LTTE . Defence Ministry ordered the navy to release a number of  LTTE boats with arms and ammunition, claymore mines and other material captured off the Trincomalee harbor by navy under trying conditions, in rain and scorching sun..[25]  LTTE  violated Ceasefire Agreement over 3000 times, but  government  wanted  the Sri Lanka navy to exercise restraint.[26]

 After the Tsunami of 2004, on the pretext of helping fishermen, LTTE  got down experts from west to help them build lightweight  fiberglass large attack boats and suicide boats.  LTTE also got outboard motors over 200 HP, which were banned  in the country. Customs inspections were relaxed  and LTTE was able to receive the higher HP outboard motors by the container load without difficulty.  They were also able to get fully constructed high speed boats in containers transferred to their areas undetected, said Karannagoda in his book.[27]

 In  1999 and 2000 LTTE started  its well known Wolf Pack  attacks of around 8-12 boats at a time against the FACs who were patrolling the north eastern seaboard, where LTTE had its  sea tiger camps. LTTE had radar stations in their bases and these observed the movement of the FACs and launched the attacks when they were  about 10 kms from land.  It was difficult to catch them as they returned to land very fast .[28] 

 By mid 2006 LTTE was able to launch 20-25 boats with four and five suicide boats at a time in their wolf pack type of attacks against the navy. One intelligence report stated that  LTTE was conducting trials of a new very high speed  suicide boat with speed of more than 45 knots and there was video footage of its trials. LTTE was planning to construct over 100 such suicide  boats.[29]

Navy needed  150 FACs  to combat the Wolf pack .  This was out of the question.  Also, FACs could not  be made smaller as they had to stay a  minimum period of 24 -36 hours sea continuously  to monitor enemy activities. LTTE strategy was to hit and run,  so LTTE  boats   were meant to stay 6-8 hours and return to camp.[30] .

 Karannagoda started to search for a suitable small boat, slightly  bigger  and with better firepower than the LTTE boat. In September 2006, army liberated Sampur,  and  one  suicide boat   caught his eye,  it was an imported boat. He  sent the boat to Welisara navy fiberglass workshop.   They copied this boat and fitted it with  two 250 HP outboard motors,   2.3 mm gun in front,  with two 12.5 mm guns on either side. The boat could carry five.   After several changes we got the perfect boat we wanted  said Karannagoda . He called it Arrow boat.[31]

Arrow boat was mass produced  at Welisara  boat building yard.  It took  6 months to complete the first 30  Arrow boats.  Welisara eventually  turned out more than  8 arrow boats a month [32] totaling over 200 Arrow boats inhouse. [33]  250 HP outboard motors  from Japan,  23 mm guns from Bulgaria, 14.5 mm guns from China were bought in sufficient quantities for these boats. The sailors for Arrow  were trained at a camp establish specially for this at Kalpitiya. [34]  30 Arrow boats  were positioned at selected locations starting with Pulmoddai and extending to Talaimannar , Delft and Kayts.[35]

A harbor was  made for these boats at Point Pedro, in 5 months by the  Northern Area Commander and his team ,[36] with  pier, harbor, fully fledged naval camp and 120 meter mast for installation of radar, thermal camera and antennas for communications. The  LTTE informants in the Tamil villages at Point Pedro  would  have  informed the LTTE about this. [37]  

 In June 2007,there was a  major confrontation between  navy and LTTE. LTTE launched  25 boats from Challai and Mullaitivu. Arrow boats were ready for them.  There were  50 Arrow boats against 30 LTTE boats.[38]    Arrow boats won the battle.  LTTE withdrew having lost several boats.  [39]  This battle is  described in the book, with much detail. This was a  huge defeat for LTTE and a big victory for us, said Karannagoda . Navy in high spirits over the success of the battle.[40]

After this battle,  sailors complained  that a command craft was lacking .[41]    Navy  had captured an abandoned large LTTE boat, Indumathi in 2007.[42]  Indumathi has been constructed abroad  .[43]    At Welisara, the navy copied  Indumathi and  created the  Wave Rider boat. Wave Rider became the command craft. There was  one Wave Rider to five Arrow boats. [44]

This flotilla of small boats belonging to the Sri Lanka navy, was  able to destroy   attack boats and suicide boats of the LTTE  in every battle at sea. This reduced the sea battles from 22 in 2006 to  11 in 2007  and three in 2008. . By the end of 2008 LTTE did not have any boats to fight at sea and the Sea Tigers were fighting on land.[45]   ( continued)

---

[1] Karannagoda The turning point p 126

[2] Karannagoda The turning point p 129

[3] Karannagoda The turning point p 129

[4] Karannagoda The turning point p 249

[5] Karannagoda The turning point p 128

[6] Karannagoda The turning point p 195

[7] Karannagoda The turning point p 129

[8] Karannagoda The turning point  p  215

[9] Karannagoda The turning point  p 216

[10] Karannagoda The turning point  p  217

[11] Karannagoda The turning point  p  138,  231,

[12] Karannagoda The turning point  p 130,

[13] Karannagoda The turning point  p 130,

[14] Karannagoda The turning point p 131

[15] Karannagoda The turning point p 173

[16] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  192

[17] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  170

[18] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  201

[19] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  170

[20] https://archives1.dailynews.lk/2020/09/19/features/229140/cruising-waves-victory?views_lazy_load_disabled=true&page=12#google_vignette

[21] Karannagoda The turning point p 215

[22] Karannagoda The turning point p 232

[23] Karannagoda The turning point p 214

[24] Karannagoda The turning point p 214

[25] Karannagoda The turning point p 44

[26] Karannagoda The turning point p 149,153

[27] Karannagoda The turning point p 132

[28] Karannagoda The turning point p 138,139

[29] Karannagoda The turning point p 133

[30] Karannagoda The turning point p 217,218

[31] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  233, 235

[32] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  235-238

[33] Rohan Gunaratne .foreward to The Turning point p xix

[34] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  235-238

[35] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 242

[36] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  241

[37] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  238

[38] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  239

[39] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 240

[40] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 241-242

[41] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 241-242

[42] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p 240

[43] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  241

[44] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  241

[45] Karannagoda, The Turning Point p  242