KAMALIKA PIERIS

Wasantha Karannagoda, former Commander of the Sri Lanka navy, has written a book titled, ‘The Turning Point,  the navy’s role in Sri Lanka’s war” published by Penguin India in 2025.

The book  records the experiences of the  Sri Lanka Navy ,  at two specific periods of  the Eelam war,  first when  Karannagoda  was Commander Eastern Naval Area in 2003-2005 and second when Karannagoda   became   Commander of the Sri Lanka navy in 2005.

Karannagoda was appointed    Commander Easter Naval Area in January  2003 .At the time his rank was Rear Admiral and was he was  third in order of seniority next to Navy Commander and Chief of staff . [1]   This appointment  therefore looked like  a demotion. But Karannagoda hid his disappointment and took up duties  at Trincomalee as Eastern Naval Commander.

He did so at a time when the Ceasefire Agreement was in  effect  and  LTTE power was at its peak.  Karannagoda took the view that the Ceasefire Agreement did not include the sea and proceeded to act accordingly. LTTE had forgotten to get the sea into the Ceasefire Agreement, therefore  the  territorial and economic  sea came under the government of Sri Lanka. But   there were restrictions on the actions the navy could take.( See p 39 of the book.) 

Thereafter Karannagoda took over as Commander of the Navy. He succeeded Daya Sandagiri.(2001-2005).He  held the position of Commander  in the decisive period of 2005- 2009, when the war against the LTTE intensified and ended in victory for the government of Sri Lanka. I always believed that we could win the war against the LTTE, said Karannagoda in his book .[2]

Karannagoda took the navy away from its escort function and made it a  fighting force.  The navy at the time was  engaged in escort duties for other ships. He improved its fighting  ability, with better weapons, equipment, boats. Karannagoda  revolutionized naval warfare with the introduction of small boat concept said Rohan Gunaratne in his foreword to the book. [3]

Karannagoda  was instrumental in providing better  conditions  and standards for the sailors and officers. He   saw to the welfare of the sailors under him, which increased their morale  and made them  eager to fight the war.

The navy  was a key player in the defeat of the LTTE.  The navy crushed the  Sea Tiger wing  by early 2008.  Sea Tigers were fighting on land after that, observed Karannagoda in his  book.[4] The navy’s role in destroying the floating warehouses was crucial to  the defeat of the LTTE .

 The events  described in the book are well known, such as  Sea Tigers, the  LTTE suicide boats,  the floating ware houses and  the Small Boat  concept with its  Arrow and Wave Rider boats. These operations were  given publicity by the media and the public know the main facts.

 This book   however, gives the inside story, with   dates, places, even the  exact time  of events. It gives   decisions, conversations, the sequence of events. There is an insistence on date and time. The several attacks on the navy by suicide boats in 2005 onwards, each carry the date and time.[5]The role played by other navy officers is generously noted, the officers are mentioned by name. For  each encounter described, Karannagoda  lists the number of dead  even if it is only one death, also the number injured.

The book contains many maps,  including   a  map of the critical  LTTE build up at  Sampur, shown to the authorities, indicating its huge  artillery reach . Maps  showing  LTTE Sea Tiger camps in north- east, Sampur and further down are also  shown (Map  no 4, 6, 7).

There is a  good description of the navy headquarters at Trincomalee  , specially the Naval Dockyard, which we are told, also  contains   the Naval and Maritime Academy, and  Navdock which was responsible for   repairs and maintenance of  navy ships.[6]   The Dockyard area  had many  beaches with roads that led to  them through the jungle.  From  the 1980s sentry points were  placed every 500 meters along the beach.[7]

The book gives a positive image of the navy.  There is information on  the routine surveillance operations  during the Eelam war,  as well as the  arrangements made  for the protection of Trincomalee and Colombo harbors during this period   and  the navy’s  strategy to defeat the  Sea Tigers In Eelam war IV. The navy is proud of the fact that it  kept the sea route to Jaffna open throughout.[8]

Karannagoda paid  attention to the security of  the   Colombo and Trincomalee harbours.. LTTE  tried to attack Colombo harbor twice, in January and June 2007.  Navy destroyed the suicide boats before they got close to the harbor in the first  attack  and  prevented underwater saboteurs  from approaching the harbor in the  second.[9]

The infrastructure at Trincomalee  harbour  was  inadequate and the harbor was not safe for ships. The number of alongside berths for ships and craft  was grossly inadequate. Large ships were kept at anchor, which made things difficult for logistics and crew, as well as  security  from LTTE attacks.[10]

Karannagoda   took measures to protect the  merchant and naval vessels entering Trincomalee . He stationed FACS at the southern end facing Sampur .[11]    A high frequency surface wave  radar  was installed at Nilaweli to monitor movement of large vessels sailing 300 km from land.  This provided surveillance between Point Pedro and Trincomalee .[12]

In 1999,  army troops stationed  north of Trincomalee were sent to Vavuniya and  the navy  was given the area  in Trincomalee ,vacated by the army. This was very beneficial to the  navy. This area was important in the defense of Trincomalee harbor.   Navy set up two independent  naval  units there, SLNS Vijayaba and SLNS Walagamba,  along the coast, with 500 men  each. They were   15 km and 35 km north of Trincomalee  . [13]

A naval cordon   from Mullaitivu to Kokkilai [14] known as Operation Varuna Kirana has been set up in  In May 2001 to prevent Tiger guerrillas from smuggling in military supplies. It had  a set pattern . LTTE simply shifted their operation to the northwest .[15]

Karannagoda terminated Varuna Kirana .He did not allow a pattern to be established. He deployed craft on the basis of intelligence,  and changed the areas of deployment accordingly. This gave results.  Eleven large fishing trawlers of the LTTE, carrying weapons  were destroyed  in 2006.[16]

 Karannagoda  faced opposition. In April 2003 Navy HQ  received information  in about a LTTE arms ship. navy was getting read to ambush it.  Next day newspapers  reported that a LTTE vessel had arrived and that navy was getting ready to attack . LTTE did not send the ship. A very senior officer at the Navy HQ had leaked the information He had done so not to help LTTE but to prevent Karannagoda from getting the credit [17]

  The same officer  tried to scuttle another navy attack. In June 2003   navy was getting ready to accost a LTTE  ship detected in the high seas, without informing SLMM because the navy knew that the SLMM would  alert the LTTE .While navy was getting ready, an order came from Defence Ministry that if the ship was a LTTE one then SLMM must be  informed  immediately.[18]  

There was quiet  sabotage in the Eelam war. When he became Commander,  Karannagoda found that  Sri Lanka  had placed an order with  a company in Israel to provide 20 FACs with 20 and 30 mm  new  Oerlikon guns. [19]   The navy  officers  who went to Israel  found that  they were getting refurbished old guns.[20]  These guns had been   removed from UK ships and were 20 years old. The firm had stopped production in 1980 and  no one was manufacturing  ammunition for it. Karannagoda  cancelled the tender.[21]   There was an inquiry  which  recommended disciplinary action against the three senior naval officers  involved.[22] 

The ferry, Pearl Cruise, which transported the army into and out of Jaffna, was  quite unsuitable for the task, but no attempt was made to replace it  with a  better ferry.[23]   Instead, the Pearl Cruise contract was extended every 3-6 months, continuously for more than   two years,  without going for a fresh tender.[24]    

When it became necessary to install new sonar in Colombo Harbor, the  Chairman,  Port Authority got together with a friend and brought a fish finder which he wanted the navy to accept as sonar. He was reported and removed from the position of Chairman, recalled Karannagoda  in his book.[25]      ( continued)

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[1] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 4.

[2] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 122.

[3] Rohan Gunaratne .foreword to The Turning point p xix

[4] Rohan Gunaratne .foreword to The Turning point p xx

[5] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 181-.

[6] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 10.

[7] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 9.

[8] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 22.

[9] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 177.

[10] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 172.

[11] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 253.

[12] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 177.

[13] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 11.

[14] https://www.sundaytimes.lk/010603/sitrep.html

[15] Karannagoda The turning point p 286

[16] Karannagoda The turning point p 286

[17] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 59,60.

[18] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 64,65.

[19] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 219.

[20] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 218.

[21] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 220.

[22] Wasantha Karannagoda , The turning point. P 230.

[23] Karannagoda The turning point p 171

[24] Karannagoda The turning point p 194

[25] Karannagoda The turning point p 271