Shenali D Waduge
On 21 April 2019, suicide bombers linked to the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) attacked 3 churches and 3 hotels, killing 269 people. After seven years, multiple investigations, commission reports, committee findings, and even a Supreme Court determination, a new investigative theory has now emerged focusing mainly on one individual — Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. Investigators now carry the burden of proving that Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay was the mastermind behind a religious suicide terror network linked to ISIS-style jihadist extremism. This cannot be done referring to him as the mastermind” and simply through assumptions, political narratives, or retrospective theories. Investigators must explain the wider ISIS-linked ideological and extremist network within which Zaharan Hashim and his group operated and where Suresh Sallay fitted into it.
At the same time, shifting attention toward one individual does not erase the responsibility of those who:
- received advance warnings,
- knew the identities of extremists,
- had authority to act,
- and possessed the power to arrest suspects and prevent the attacks before civilians were killed.
Investigating on one theory against Suresh Sallay cannot erase accountability for the other failures already identified.
Both issues must be investigated together — the extremist network that carried out the attacks and the institutional failures that allowed the attacks to happen despite repeated warnings
If Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay is to be linked to the first allegation — being the mastermind behind the attacks — investigators must cross an extremely high evidentiary threshold.
If he is also to be linked to the second allegation — responsibility for the failure to prevent the attacks — then even more serious questions arise because numerous agencies and officials inside Sri Lanka had already received warnings before 21 April 2019.
The arrest of Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay appears to stem primarily from a complaint made to the CID by Fr. Rohan Fernando based on allegations made by Asad Maulana in the 2023 Channel 4 documentary.
However, even before the Channel 4 allegations, Fr. Cyril Gamini publicly claimed in October 2021 that then Brigadier Suresh Sallay knew Zaharan before 2019.
This itself creates a contradiction.
Why?
Because Asad Maulana later claimed that he was the person who introduced Suresh Sallay to Zaharan.
Both claims cannot simultaneously be true when the Cardinal congratulated C4’s Asad Maulana’s revelations.
In addition, the timeline itself is under scrutiny because Maj. Gen. Sallay was not even in Sri Lanka during the period in question.
Therefore, the new narrative begins not with clear and consistent evidence, but with serious controversies, contradictions, and disputed timelines. Contradictions of this magnitude cannot be resolved merely by producing volumes of statements or suddenly emerging witnesses years after the attacks.
After the attacks, many investigations and reports were carried out, including:
- The Presidential Commission of Inquiry
- The Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC)
- The Malalgoda Committee Report
- The Janaki Alwis Report
- The Imam Committee findings
- Supreme Court judgments on the Easter Sunday attacks
- Foreign intelligence agency reports
All these investigations repeatedly pointed to the same main problem:
- intelligence failures,
- failure to act on warnings,
- poor coordination between agencies,
- negligence,
- and breakdown of the security system.
All of these reports agreed on one leader – Zaharan Hashim.
None of the reports identified a controlling figure above Zaharan Hashim or suggested that the operational command structure of the attacks was directed by an external mastermind.
THE BIG PROBLEM WITH THE MASTERMIND” THEORY IN A RELIGIOUS SUICIDE
The Easter Sunday bombings were not ordinary crimes.
These were suicide attacks linked to ISIS-style religious extremism.
The attackers:
- pledged loyalty to ISIS,
- used ISIS flags and videos,
- followed extremist religious teachings,
- and were part of a radical ideological network.
This is important because people do not usually become suicide bombers simply because someone tells them to”.
In almost every known case of religious suicide terrorism globally, the motivation arises from ideological indoctrination, religious absolutism, and group radicalization — not from or for political objectives of another.
Religious suicide terrorism depends on individuals accepting death as part of an ideological or religious mission towards martyrdom. It is not considered a sin.
It is rooted in belief, not merely obedience and strengthened through-
- extremist indoctrination,
- radical preaching,
- ideological training,
- and deep belief systems.
- A close-knit secret group working in isolation
Any attempt to connect Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay to such a network would require investigators to explain how he allegedly exercised influence or authority across the above layers over individuals driven by extremist religious ideology.
Even before 2019, Sri Lanka already had signs of ISIS-linked radicalization – part of a wider transnational extremist movement & not an isolated local phenomenon.
The pattern was seen across several countries in the region where local extremist cells adopted international jihadist ideology.
ISIS had officially declared its focus on Asia since 2014.
Authorities already knew:
- Zaharan Hashim was preaching extremism & was aligned to ISIS.
- NTJ activities evolved from extremist thinking to extremist violence.
- Sri Lankans had travelled to Syria linked to ISIS to commit religious suicide
- and extremist networks were already being monitored.
So, if investigators now say Suresh Sallay was the mastermind”, they must explain:
- how he became connected to this extremist ideological network,
- how he allegedly controlled radicalized suicide bombers
- and why none of the earlier investigations clearly identified him as the central figure behind the attacks while none of its arrested members mentioned that their real leader was not Zaharan but Suresh Sallay.
An allegation of masterminding ISIS-style suicide terrorism requires direct, consistent, evidence — not assumptions, retrospective interpretation, media pressure, or political narratives.
THE WARNINGS CANNOT BE IGNORED
One of the most important facts established by all previous investigations is this:
Authorities received repeated warnings before the attacks happened.
The warnings were so specific that authorities could at minimum have heightened security, restricted access to vulnerable locations, or taken preventive operational measures.
They didn’t – why didn’t they take action?
The reports confirmed that:
- names of suspects were known,
- targets were identified,
- foreign intelligence warnings were received,
- Zaharan was already under radar
- arrest warrants existed,
- and security agencies had advance information.
- Evidence before the Parliamentary Select Committee indicated that extremist material linked to Zaharan had been forwarded to the Attorney General’s Department years before the attacks (2016), yet meaningful legal action did not appear to follow with urgency. The Attorney General’s Department reportedly responded only in March 2019 after earlier material and follow-up correspondence (2018) had already been forwarded years before.
This means the attacks were not completely unexpected.
The key issue raised by almost every investigation was:
Why did those who received the warnings fail to stop the attacks?
That is why previous reports focused heavily on:
- operational failures,
- intelligence not being used properly,
- poor coordination,
- and negligence by agencies and officials inside Sri Lanka.
So even if a new mastermind” theory is introduced today, investigators still have to answer:
Why were the attacks not prevented when so many warnings already existed?
This raises further concern because some of the investigators and institutions presently involved were themselves connected to the operational and investigative failures scrutinized before and after the attacks.
THE MAIN CONTRADICTION
The present investigation seems to create two conflicting stories.
On one side, investigators appear to say:
Suresh Sallay was the mastermind.”
But at the same time, all earlier investigations showed that:
- many agencies already knew about the extremist threat –if so, why did Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay’s name not emerge prominently in intelligence reporting or operational investigations during the relevant period?
- warnings had already been shared,
- and officials inside Sri Lanka had the ability to take action before the attacks.
So the public has a right to ask:
If so many people already knew about the danger, how can the entire blame now be pushed mainly onto one person who was outside the country and outside the operational command chain at that time?
The public is therefore being asked to accept two parallel claims at the same time:
- that multiple agencies inside Sri Lanka failed to act despite receiving detailed warnings,
and
- that the true operational mastermind was someone outside the command structure.
Investigators must explain how both propositions can legally and factually coexist.
The present theory appears to create several unresolved contradictions.
- Gen. Suresh Sallay is mastermind – but had no role in the indoctrination & preaching, arms acquiring, preparation of suicide kits/bombs, renting safehouses – but only showed one target & not the other 5.
Noteworthy is that giving evidence to the PSC – the then Snr DIG CID Ravi Seneviratne said that the attackers were given designated safe location to retreat to and a contact person to approach in case their planned targets failed & that the specific person would meet them. The Snr DIG CID had passed the name of the individual to the Commission on a piece of paper.
If such evidence existed at the time directly linking Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay to operational control of the attackers, it would reasonably be expected to have featured prominently in earlier investigations and public proceedings – at the least during this particular direct questioning.
Also, this testimony contradicts again with Asad Maulana’s C4 as he claims Suresh Sallay phoned him & asked him to pick up Jameel the Taj suicide bomber.
Additionally, when PSC directly asked if there was evidence of attackers links to ISIS – the Snr DIG claimed that 41 banks accounts were identified & they were all local. Were any of the identified financial transactions or accounts linked to Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay in prior investigations?
If not, investigators must explain how a large coordinated suicide operation involving logistics, explosives, safehouses, financing, ideological indoctrination, and operational secrecy functioned without any contemporaneous financial, digital, intelligence, or operational trail connects the alleged mastermind.
- Key security heads were aware of Zaharan and his extremism, they were additionally warned of a terror attack by him which included names of the other attackers (which intel had already lists on) and even venues –
Can the operational failures of multiple agencies and officials who possessed advance warnings now be retrospectively transferred onto one individual outside the operational chain?
QUESTIONS ABOUT CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Another serious issue is this:
Some of the people and institutions now connected to the investigation were themselves questioned in earlier investigations regarding failures before and after the attacks.
The earlier reports examined:
- intelligence failures,
- investigative failures,
- delays,
- and negligence by agencies operating during the attacks.
Yet now the focus appears to be shifting away from those operational failures and toward one individual.
This creates an important question:
Can people connected to the earlier failures now influence an investigation that redirects blame elsewhere?
That raises concerns about fairness and conflict of interest.
Natural justice requires that investigations remain free from both actual bias and the appearance of bias.
QUESTIONS THE PUBLIC DESERVES ANSWERS TO
- If the attacks were ISIS-inspired religious suicide attacks, where is the evidence linking Suresh Sallay to that extremist ideological network?
- How could one person supposedly control an entire network of suicide bombers without clear evidence?
- Why did all earlier investigations focus on systemic failure instead of one mastermind?
- Why was Suresh Sallay not identified as the main operational figure in earlier reports and testimonies?
- Why are the agencies and officials who received warnings no longer the main focus?
- If names, targets, and warnings were already known before the attacks, why were the bombings not stopped?
- Why did the Attorney General’s Department reportedly take years to respond to material relating to Zaharan?
- Is the investigation following evidence — or trying to fit evidence into a pre-decided story?
- Why did none of the earlier commissions, committees, or institutional findings identify Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay as the controlling figure behind the attacks if such evidence existed
- Where is this new narrative emerging – have Fr. Rohan, Fr. Cyril Gamini or even Asad Maulana given evidence for implicating Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay – or are they expecting the investigators to find the evidence that they have failed to present?
THE REAL ISSUE
The Easter Sunday victims deserve truth and justice.
But justice must be based on facts, fairness, and evidence.
Truth must be two-fold
- About the attackers – what they stood for & why they killed
- About those who neglected to prevent the attacks – we know that they knew about the attacks – but we don’t know why they didn’t take action. We want to have the answer to this.
If investigators now want to say one person was the mastermind behind the attacks, they must fully explain:
- how he allegedly controlled a radical ISIS-linked suicide network which is linked globally
- what role he had to play in the 32 Sri Lankans who went to join ISIS – he cannot have a role in one & not the other as he has to be part of the ideology for members to agree to carry out a suicide.
- The present theory appears to separate ideological indoctrination from operational causation by suggesting that Zaharan motivated the attackers religiously while another unseen actor allegedly directed the attacks for political purposes. Investigators must therefore explain whether there exists any established precedent — locally or internationally — where ISIS-style religious suicide attackers operated under dual command structures separating ideological leadership from operational masterminding.
Otherwise, the danger is serious.
Because this would mean that:
- large institutional failures,
- failures by multiple agencies,
- and failures by officials who had advance warnings
can later be pushed onto one selected person.
Another major issue is the apparent absence of contemporaneous evidence.
If Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay was truly the mastermind behind the attacks:
- why did earlier investigations not identify him centrally,
- why did intelligence reports not prominently feature his role,
- why did operational agencies focus primarily on Zaharan and NTJ,
- and why did arrested suspects and witnesses not consistently identify him as the controlling figure behind the attacks?
- Why has there been no links to the 32-38 Sri Lankan Muslims who went to join ISIS in 2016.
- Why did none of the earlier intelligence assessments identify Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay as connected to the wider ISIS-linked radicalization pipeline already under observation before 2019?
The later emergence of a substantially different theory years after the attacks inevitably raises questions regarding consistency, evidentiary development, and retrospective reconstruction.
That is not only a question about one investigation.
It is a question about fairness, equality before the law, and public trust in justice itself.
Moreover, if institutional failures remain unaddressed while attention shifts solely toward retrospective individualized attribution, the underlying risks that enabled the attacks may continue unresolved.
The country cannot afford a situation where the search for a later ‘mastermind’ overshadows the unresolved failures that allowed a known extremist network to operate, organize, radicalize, and ultimately carry out mass murder despite repeated warnings.
Shenali D Waduge
