KAMALIKA PIERIS
This essay looks at the bungling that took place in the conduct of Eelam war 11 (1990-1995) and Eelam War III (1995-2002). This was no ordinary bungling. It was calculated bungling. War campaigns were planned in such a way that the LTTE would win. The government launched battles that the army would lose. Experienced officers and fine soldiers were made to die in battle. This was a calculated plan to engineer a LTTE ‘victory’.
The war preparations of the Sri Lanka army during Eelam war II and III were highly questionable. Since the Sri Lanka Army did not have a strong military presence in the north. The authorities decided to set up camps in strategic areas. There were camps at Omanthai, Mankulam, Kokavil, Elephant Pass and Jaffna Fort along the A9 road. There were also camps at Palaly, Pooneryn, Mullaitivu, and Thalladi (Mannar). Mankulam and Kokavil were isolated camps inside enemy territory.
Sri Lanka army arrived in the north, by air or sea, watched by the LTTE. The army then proceeded to set up highly visible, vulnerable camps in the Vanni and the Jaffna Peninsula, in full sight of the LTTE army. Army camps were established in Jaffna and Vanni and then left to the mercy of the LTTE, observed Kamal Gunaratne.
The army set up a High-Security Zone at Palaly, which included Palaly airport, Palaly air force base and Kankesanturai harbor. LTTE constructed bunkers and defense fortifications all around it and the army was confined to its HSZ. At Pooneryn too, the army was stuck inside the camp. The rest of the area was controlled by LTTE. Maintaining Pooneryn was a problem. Was it necessary to have an army camp at Pooneryn at all, I asked Kamal Gunaratne?
Mullaitivu was even worse. Mullaitivu camp was surrounded on all sides by the LTTE. LTTE was always dominant in Mullaitivu. Mullaitivu camp was a heavy burden on the navy, observed Kamal Gunaratne.
Mullaitivu had a beach in the east, Nanthikadal lagoon in the west and a large open paddy field in the south. The army had no cover at all. There was no natural cover either since most of the trees had been cut down to make bunkers.
The fortifications at Mullaitivu were highly defective. A large camp should have several successive defense lines with the second line 250 to 300 meters behind the first. In Mullaitivu, the distance was only 50 meters. The trenches were difficult to maintain. Soldiers spent much effort in daily digging out the sand which constantly filled the trenches. There was no fortification plan to stop the LTTE from getting to the trenches.
The minefield at Mullaitivu needed to be protected by a barbed wire fence. Mullaitivu had requested desperately and repeatedly for barbed wire, but HQ did not send any, forcing soldiers to use wires from lamp posts for makeshift fences. The observation posts and listening posts in Mullaitivu camp were in set positions. These were identified by the LTTE and avoided when entering the camp.
It was thought that Mullaitivu camp was protected by an impregnable minefield. Later they found just 2 anti-personnel mines in the 400 meters when there should be at least 800 mines. LTTE must have removed the rest. The sappers who were expected to check the entire minefield and submit a monthly status report had said everything was in order.
No arrangements have been made for the defense of these camps, which were like sitting ducks for the LTTE. None of the camps along A9 had the ability to resist a major onslaught. We had not considered how they would face an impending attack, said Kamal Gunaratne. Army camps did not have the personnel and ammunition they needed.
The camps were only given token troops. Mullaitivu camp started with a nominal army, a small detachment manned by armored corp. Later it had two battalions. That too was insufficient. Mullaitivu should have had an experienced, fearless leader, said Kamal Gunaratne. Mankulam had two platoons and Kokavil had just one.
Pooneryn was guarded, not with highly trained battle-ready personnel but an average infantry company with little training. When Pooneryn was under attack, the troops included 285 new recruits with no experience at all, sent to this volatile area for their basic training.
For the LTTE to win Eelam wars, it was necessary that the Sri Lanka army be soundly defeated. The Sri Lanka army had a well-trained force. It was necessary therefore reduce the strength of this force. The strongest units had to be weakened first. The Sri Lanka army had two crack units, the Commandos, and Special Forces. They were highly skilled, highly motivated, dedicated and lethal.
Commandos were trained for special operations. They should be sent in small groups to secretly enter LTTE front lines and offer deadly attacks. They should go on operations into the jungles, to ensure that LTTE could not infiltrate and identify our locations, said Kamal Gunaratne. Instead, they were used for face to face combat in battles that could have been easily handled by infantry battalions. It took one-and-a-half years to train a Commando or SF soldier, compared to the 6 months it took to train an infantry soldier, he said.
The elite 2CR Commando Regiment was sent to capture a small fortified village called Mannakulam” in 1997 during Jaya Sikurui. This battle could have been easily carried out by the infantry troops. It was a basic infantry operation not one for a special unit like commandos. As expected, LTTE killed them all. The entire 2-Commando Regiment of 90 Commandos, was wiped out. It was the worst commando debacle in the war.
The Combat Rider Squadron, which was a part of Special Forces 1, had been well trained by South African instructors and had scored many victories. They were highly successful in the east due to their speed, surprise, firepower, and skill. In 1995, this Combat Rider Squadron was isolated in the east while the rest of the Special Forces One team were fighting Operation Riviera, LTTE ambushed Combat Rider Squadron and killed 2 officers and 6 soldiers, including its Captain, successfully reducing the effectiveness of this unit.
In 1997, the authorities decided to create a seafaring battalion of the army, using the Special Forces. The army and navy were both unhappy about this new plan. Sri Lanka army possessed well seasoned skilled and capable fighting force ground warfare. Why should they fight on the sea, when they should be fighting on land, the experts asked.
However, a regiment was established within the Special Forces. They trained at Maduru Oya and Trincomalee and went to Pulmoddai to gain experience. Sea Tigers were waiting. They launched an attack at Pulmoddai on 9th September 1997 and killed five and wounded five, thus weakening the Special Forces. This was the end of the plan.
Using Jaya Sikurui, the best infantry divisions were sent to locations where the LTTE could easily attack them. Karappakutti was selected as the tactical headquarters of 53 Division. 53 The division was sent there just when it was clear that the next LTTE attack would be at Karappakutti. LTTE will hit Karappakutti next, predicted the military. LTTE did.
Thandikulam was chosen as a headquarters for 55 Division. Thandikulam was close to Vavuniya where the LTTE was. LTTE always attacked the headquarters first. Therefore this was ‘an open invitation to LTTE to attack us’. LTTE attacked Thandikulam.
Elite infantry divisions were made to face combat together, in Jaya Sikurui, so that they were destroyed simultaneously. The headquarters of 55 and 56 Divisions were located close to each other at Kanagarayakulam, exposing both to simultaneous attacks. This was a violation of the principles of warfare. 53 and 55 Divisions were made to meet and advance together from Puliyankulam. Experts did not like this because both would fall together. At one stage in Jaya Sikurui, 53 Division and the entire reserve force were deployed for ground defense together. Around 2005, all the troops in Jaffna, 51,52, 53, and 55 divisions were on ground defense. None were kept in reserve.
The authorities made sure that the Sri Lanka Army would lose battles, and LTTE would be victorious. One tactic used by them was to delay sending reinforcements to camps that were under attack, or not send them at all.
The army units At Mankulam, informed HQ twice that a large scale attack on Mankulam was planned. HQ took no notice. At Elephant Pass, knowing that an attack was impending, fresh troops were asked for. They were not sent, instead, soldiers who had reported back from leave were sent. They needed fresh troops not a part of their own, observed Kamal Gunaratne.
At Silawatura (1991) reinforcements were delayed. The two battalions going in as reinforcement
were giving various excuses, to delay their departure. When they came it was almost too late.
While Silawatura was under heavy attack, recalled Kamal Gunaratne, the two battalions that had come as reinforcement was sleeping comfortably at Kokkupadayan just a few kilometers away. Instead of sleeping if they had pushed a few more kilometers and fought the LTTE, they could have helped us save ammunition. LTTE sent in wave on wave of attackers with guns blazing, rushing toward us with every possible weapon they could carry. They were trying to overrun the camp.
In 1990, as anticipated LTTE launched a huge attack on Kokavil camp. Kamal Gunaratne‘s team had arrived in Vanni, expecting to be sent to Kokavil which was under siege. But army HQ said that a commando group from the east would be sent instead. Kamal pointed out that it would take several hours for this. It would also take time for them to get a briefing and take off for Kokavil. By which time it would be almost dark. It was not possible to land at night with 30 soldiers in an unknown land and attempt to take a camp under siege. What could 30 commandos’ do in three helicopters, once they landed and how were they going to get to the enemy area. Kamal said His troops could get there faster. He was told, we need to abide by the orders from HQ. The reinforcement delayed starting. When they finally got to the destination, the commando officer refused to launch an attack as it was dark.
Kokavil said the LTTE was getting closer, the number of dead and wounded were increasing, the camp was falling into the hands of the LTTE section by section. Air force gave support but could not halt the advance of the LTTE. Kokavil fell to the LTTE.
Analysts were very critical. Army headquarters failed to reinforce the Kokavil detachment comprising two platoons in spite of Lt Aladeniya calling for reinforcements, they said. Kokavil also ran out of ammunition. About 50 volunteers went down fighting at Kokavil. None of their bodies were recovered. Some of the captured volunteer Sinha Regiment personnel are believed to have been executed. Two soldiers who managed to escape by crawling through the LTTE cordon managed to reach the army base at Mankulam, situated north of Kokavil. According to them, those captured were burnt alive.
Sometime before Mankulam camp was attacked, t Kamal Gunaratne ’s unit was taken out of Mankulam and sent to Vavuniya. It was replaced by the Fifth volunteer force of Sri Lanka Light Infantry (5VSLLI). A well-experienced combat troop was replaced by an inexperienced volunteer force, observed Kamal Gunaratne.
Mankulam camp was attacked in 1998. There were clear signs of an impending attack. The radio transmission was increasing and a lot of LTTE tractors and vehicles were arriving. We would be under attack in a couple of days, Mankulam said. Warnings were ignored at HQ. Mankulam then told HQ that LTTE had built a huge fortification about 500 meters away from camp, covered with sandbags, for launching Pasilan mortars. HQ took no notice. Mankulam fell.
The authorities also held on to the Ammunition. Ammunition was not provided when asked for. At Mankulam the army warned that they did not have sufficient ammunition. A measly 5000 rounds of small arms ammunition was sent. This was insufficient.
At Silawatura, ammunition was airdropped, most fell into enemy territory, 10 of the 15 bags ended up there. During the battle, Silawatura was short of mortars. Pooneryn had only two MBTs ( Main battle tanks). There should be a minimum of 4 MBTs for an operation. A squadron comprising three troops should-haves 10 MBTs, said Kamal Gunaratne.
The authorities weakened infantry fighting ability in all sorts of ways. Raw recruits with hardy any training were given weapons and asked to guard FDLs. It was criminal to use these youths in this way, said Kamal Gunaratne . At Jaya Sikurui one set of bunkers was manned by just two inexperienced officers. Squadrons were split into smaller units. mediocre officers were sent for training.
Some battalions were given absentees or deserters. They lacked training as well as fighting spirit. It is difficult to manage such a battalion. Deserters simply abandoned posts. Also, the negativity of the deserters dampened spirits.
During Jaya Sikurui (1997-1999) the authorities closed down all training centers and assigned the instructors and other staff to active duty. We needed to send new recruits for training, but training schools were closed, observed Kamal Gunaratne. On the other hand, the instructors who had earlier belonged to different units, now lacked the cohesiveness needed in battle.
During Jaya Sikurui, the army took persons from the school cadet corps into the volunteer force. They were mainly teachers without any proper military training. Most were elderly and not fit for war. ‘Suddenly this group of teachers became senior officers of the Volunteer force.’ This caused a split among the officers and much displeasure. It led to repercussions later, observed Kamal Gunaratne.
There was a dearth of officers in Jaya Sikurui’s time. So the army started promoting corporals and sergeants to officer grades. The battalion were given mandatory quotas that they could not meet, so clerks, buddies of senior officers and inexperienced soldiers were recommended. Corporals and sergeants did not make good officers. They were given 1 ½ months officer training but it was totally inadequate. Also this created vacancies at the junior leadership level, a critical component for success in the battlefield. The result was a lack of leadership at all levels. This was an important issue in Jaya Sikurui.
The Sri Lanka army was at a great disadvantage, in the north because they were fighting an enemy who was comfortably ensconced in its own territory and knew the area intimately. LTTE held the advantage. LTTE was a resident in the north. They had lived all their lives in the north and knew the terrain intimately. They were familiar with jungles and the seas around North and east. The main LTTE jungle complex the 14 Base” was situated in the lush jungle north of Weli Oya. They did not need to carry their food, clothes, medicines everywhere they went. Those items were kept at home. The LTTE was used to Jaffna’s hot climate. The Sri Lanka army was not. ( Continued)
STEVE SWEENEY
