KAMALIKA PIERIS
Revised 18.1.19. 7.4.19
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) gets
much attention in Parliament and on television today, because Its leader Anura Kumara
Dissanayake keeps speaking and speaking
, holding audience attention, using
long sentences, in slow
measured tones. He ends up uttering empty statements. JVP is not a popular
party. At the 2015 general election JVP only got 4.87 % and six seats. The
Joint Opposition has openly stated that the JVP is there to support the America-influenced
UNP and the TNA. The Joint Opposition
calls them ‘Rathu Ali’.
Godahewa Indradasa has written about the
activities of the JVP in his book ‘Failed revolts in Sri Lanka. Indradasa served in the top echelons of the
Sri Lanka Intelligence service for nearly three decades, the major part of
which was the investigation of insurgent activities. The subversive activities of the JVP had come
to the attention of the intelligence services and a
special unit has been formed in the CID to watch them.
Rohana Wijeweera, the creator of the JVP, was
given a scholarship by Russia in the 1960s to study medicine at Lumumba
University, Moscow. His visa was thereafter
revoked, when he came on a visit to Sri Lanka and he was not allowed to
re-enter Russia. It is now alleged that Wijeweera was secretly recruited by USA
when he was in Moscow in the 1960s.
Wijeweera on his return to Sri Lanka set about
creating a radical movement in Sri Lanka. Wijeweera secretly sought support for
a closely knit and well organized clandestine movement starting in 1965, said
Indradasa. He began to build a base
among the Sinhala youth. Wijeweera visited various parts of the country to obtain
support for his movement. The movement gained support in the rural areas where there were many alienated youth.
The JVP organization consisted of a central committee
and politbureau at the top, followed by district
leaders, district secretaries, village committees, grass roots units and
full time volunteers. The grass roots
unit was a group of five, in each Police area.
JVP also established contacts in temples. They used them as hide outs after the 1971 insurrection.
The high degree of security consciousness introduced
into each of these committees, is significant, said Indradasa. JVP conducted
their political affairs in secret. The leaders used aliases to prevent identification.
The politbureau met every month in Colombo and the district secretaries would
take the decisions back to their district and from there to the cadres. JVP
started a propaganda section to conduct meetings all over the country, except
North and East. JVP impressed the public through its poster campaigns. The same
poster appeared island wide overnight.
JVP
went into action soon after its formation. Several ‘farms’ were established,
not for farming but for conducting secret classes and storing weapons. The first were in Anuradhapura,
Tissamaharama and Kirinda. The Kirinda
one was a poultry farm. The first educational camp was held in Akmeemana in
1967 followed by one in Tanamalwila. Education camps were thereafter held secretly
in remote parts of the country. Camps were held in Kurunegala,
Anuradhapura Tissamaharama, Elpitiya, Akmeemana,
Tanamalwila, Tambuttegama, Kataragama and Middeniya. Each camp taught about 25 to 100 cadres.
The youth were told that armed struggle was
necessary, and they must be prepared to fight.
Instructions in the use of arms were done through diagrams. In 1970 there was a spate of robberies of
guns and cartridges. They were removed from houses, taking nothing else. There was an unprecedented increase in the
theft of guns in the country, said Indradasa.
The JVP also started making bombs. Bombs were made using condensed milk tins. These
were collected in large quantities and sent to remote areas. Not surprisingly, there was an explosion at
Nelundeniya. At a meeting in Ambalangoda
In September 1970, Rohana Wijeweera ordered the distribution of 1000 bombs and
1000 Molotov cocktails (petrol bombs) to each JVP police division unit.
Wijeweera from the very beginning
targeted the Sri Lanka navy. This is not well known. A list of navy personnel were submitted to him
by a contact whose name is given in Indradasa’s book. Wijeweera met this group at
Trincomalee navy base and spoke to them,
probably in 1965. A group of JVP navy men was created. Many naval personnel attended the JVP
classes in 1966 and 1967. Naval ratings who were close to Wijeweera were among
the instructors. Several members of the
armed forces were also recruited and used very discreetly for this purpose,
said Indradasa.
Uyangoda alias “Oo mahattaya” of the
JVP had visited Karainagar naval base in 1971 and met one these JVP navy men.This
navy man had succeeded in posting pro JVP sailors to work at the armories of
the outstation navy bases, telling his superior that they were trustworthy men. The gullible superior had believed him. (names
withheld)If the JVP plan had succeeded
in 1971 it would have been disastrous for the navy as well as the country, said Indradasa. Wijeweera also tried to recruit SLFP army
personnel arrested on suspicion of trying to over throw the UNP government. But
they were not interested.
There were scattered references to
CIA, the Central
Intelligence Agency of the USA.Dharmasekera,
who was dismissed from the JVP, formed the Mathroo bhumi Arakshaka Sangamaya,
which attacked the UN embassy in Sri Lanka in March 1971. Rohana Wijeweera said
that this attack was engineered by the CIA agents. Dharmasekera faction in turn accused Rohana
Wijeweera of being a CIA agent. When a
splinter group of ex JVPersm, the ‘Vikalpa
kandayama’ emerged, sometime later, Wijeweera said its leader was a CIA agent. When the April insurrection occurred, N.M
Perera stated that it was a CIA operation.
In 1971, the JVP staged the first of its two insurrections. This
has been described as a romantic, innocent revolution, an unplanned spontaneous attack. It was nothing
of the sort. It had been planned beforehand and the purpose was to bring down
the SLFP government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike.
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police stations, all in ‘Sinhala’ areas, were attacked. The electricity supply was cut. Approaches
to police stations were sealed off, in some cases, by felling large trees. The idea
was to take and hold certain Sinhala areas. At the Colombo end, Prime Minister Sirimavo
Bandaranaike would be taken into custody from her Rosmead Place residence. The army
cantonment at Panagoda would be attacked. Navy personnel at Ragama and air force
personnel at Katunayake were to be immobilized by introducing a purgative to
their food.
However,
the insurrection failed. The April 1971 insurrection was amateurish, ill
planned, and carried out hastily, said Indradasa. Also, JVP was not a united organization at the
time. This supports my view that the
JVP had ‘jumped the gun’ and launched the attack prematurely, without waiting
till its foreign handlers gave the order.
The JVP did not fade away after April 1971 as
it would have done, had it been a purely local affair. Instead, JVP met secretly
and reorganized. JVP first retreated
into their hideouts in the jungles of the North Central Province. They moved
the camps from place to place. They did
not stay in one place for long. The
leader at Namal oya camp was in a separate chena known only to couple of
trustworthy members.
There were jail breaks. In November 1971 JVPers escaped from
Vidyalankara, Vidyodaya and Weerawila camps. At Vidyalankara, they escaped through a tunnel which they had dug. Prison authorities had earlier reported that
there was no tunnel leading to the
conclusion that JVP has accomplices in the prison. At Anuradhapura prison as
they escaped, JVPers had freed the other prisoners as well.
According to Indradasa, 8000 JVPers, out of a possible 14,000, were arrested
by government. The plan was to get back
the original cadres rather than recruit new ones. JVP prisoners received visits by persons pretending to be relatives. They
carried JVP messages in and out of these camps and prisons. JVP cadres
met them as they were released. One
of the places used for this was the Peradeniya University. It was done discreetly without arousing
suspicions of undergrads, said Indradasa.
After 1971, JVP made changes in its structure.
All key points in the organization were held by those loyal to Rohana
Wijeweera. A secret Central Committee was
established, which gave the main directions.
The identities of this secret committee were known only to the district
organizers. The leading JVPers had code
names. The JVP was wary of those who
wanted to join them and they were first screened. There was tight control of
information. Those who came for lectures were given places to meet at, from
where they would be taken to a secret venue.
JVP established a branch in London, known as
Ginipupura. Ginipupura provided the JVP
with contacts with Portugal, Spain and France. A military wing Deshapremi
Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV) was established. This wing was responsible for the violence of
the 1987 period.
JVP also established 8 fronts in Sri Lanka. They were Youth Front,
Student Front, Bhikku Front, Peasants Front, Trade union Front, Women’s front, Cultural
front and Propaganda front. JVP created
their own trade unions and also infiltrated the trade unions of other political
parties. The bhikku front, “Manava
hithawadi bhikku Sangamaya”, could
be used to great advantage, observed Indradasa. The robe offered cover, and had
impact on a Buddhist population.
Since 1960s JVP presence in campuses has been
constant, observed Indradasa. The most
powerful organization formed by JVP in the universities was the Inter University Student Federation. There was also the Interuniversity Bhikku Balamandalaya.
Daya Pathirana, head of the rival Independent
Students Union was killed. JVP was considered responsible.
There was also the Patriotic Students Movement
for secondary schools. This was entirely controlled by the JVP though they
avoided getting identified directly with it.
Branches of this organization were set up in several schools in Colombo
and outstations. The intention was to
build up a membership, especially in the ‘A’ level classes, from which these
students would enter university. This would ensure a readymade membership from
among freshers.
Cells were established throughout the country
except North and East. Cells were set up in Colombo, Galle, Tangalle,
Embilipitiya, Ratnapura, Polonnaruwa, Chilaw Kegalle and Moneragala. These were
used for recruitment, indoctrination, and weapons training. The five lectures
were revised. They now focused on the need to capture power by force. JVP was also
compiling information regarding vital institutions which affected the country
security and economy, said Indradasa. The motive clearly was to destabilize the
country.
JVP also successfully infiltrated the lower
rungs of the police and armed services. JVP
planned to establish military units in each police area in the country. Infiltrating the army was not difficult as persons
were recruited to army and police without full screening at this time. The army
soon realized that its lower rungs had been infiltrated. There were acts of
indiscipline and appropriation of arms. The army suspended its training of one
batch of recruits suspecting that they were JVPers. The batch recruited in 1986
to the army was not sent for training until they were fully screened.
In the early 1970s JVP gave the impression
that they were champions of the Sinhala race. This
would have been done to capture Sinhala youth for the movement. After 1977 JVP
changed its stance. JVP discarded its pro Sinhala attitude. JVP recognized the
right of Tamil people for self determination and by 1980 they were supporting the
secession of Tamil areas.
Indradasa observed that JVP while pursuing
concerted action in support of Tamils kept Sinhala masses guessing as regard to
their attitude to ethnic issue. However there was evidence to show that they were
pursuing a policy of support for the separatist Tamils though they attempted to
give the impression that they were champions of the Sinhala race.
In Feb 1978 President J.R.Jayewardene declared
an amnesty for JVP prisoners and all of them, including Rohana Wijeweera were
freed. JVP was allowed to register as a
political party in 1981. At the same
time, JVP was getting ready for violence.
Collection of weapons started in early 1987 .Guns
were got after breaking into houses island wide. There was a set pattern in
doing this. In the 1980s the JVP was
running temporary training camps to familiarize member with various types of
weapons such as T56, AK 47, said Indradasa. This was done mainly by hand drawn
sketches, and pictures of rifles. A rudimentary military training was
given. There were also classes in physical
training.
JVP then staged a second uprising which lasted
from 1987 to 1989. This was not an open revolt, but a low intensity conflict with the JVP resorting
to assassinations,
raids and attacks on military and civilian targets. This campaign virtually brought the country to
a standstill.
The timing of this 1987 insurrection is
important. It came in between the first two Eelam wars, Eelam War 1(1983-1987)
and Eelam war ii (1990-1995). The purpose was to paralyze the government, ruin
the economy, and cripple the armed forces, so that Sri Lanka would not win the
Eelam War. The foreign powers pushing for Eelam, knew that Eelam War 1 would
most certainly be followed by Eelam War 2.
The first targets of the JVP in 1987 were, therefore,
armed forces and police. The
insurrection started in April 1987 with attacks on Pallekelle army camp,
Kotelawela defense academy and Air force base at Katunayake, in sequence. The
daring and ingenuity of the Pallekelle raid in early hours of New Year day
revealed the imprint of a well organized movement, said Indradasa.
JVP issued threats to members of the armed
services and police that they should resign or be killed. Police officers
investigating JVP activity got death threats. Letters were sent to OIC of
police directing them to release suspects already taken into custody.
JVP attacked police patrols and even resorted
to killing unarmed constables on beat duty and traffic duty. JVP assassinated several servicemen and
policemen in their homes or while on
leave or off duty when they could not defend themselves. Director CID and Director, Counter
subversive Drive were gunned down close to their homes while on their way to
work.
JVP killed 122 members of families of security
forces and police in the most brutal fashion. Some were hacked to death, some
were burned alive in their homes which were set on fire, they made no
discrimination regards old people or children. One such case was the murder of
mother, brother, sister in law and two nephews of a DIG who was serving in the
south. They were shot and whilst still alive, their residence was set on fire
with them inside. The IGP had said he wanted to finish off the JVP.
JVP resorted to sheer terrorism to bring about
work stoppages, disruption to transport services, and trade JVP burned down post offices, robbed the
collections from bus conductors, and destroyed their ticket machines, damaged
industrial and domestic electricity and water meters. JVP , forcibly collecting
vehicle revenue licenses . JVP destroyed records held in kachcheries including
files on local taxes and land registers. Almost two thirds of the country did
not have an electricity supply for more than six weeks, because the power
pylons in Matale were destroyed by the JVP.
JVP issued death threats to professionals, to
lawyers and doctors so they could not work. JVP called for hartals and work stoppages. As
a result, trains were not functioning properly, schools and college did not hold
exams for almost two years. For four
years no one had graduated from any of the state universities. Medical College
was not functioning for almost five years. Factories
and work place were forced to close down for long periods resulting in the
workers undergoing severe hardship and production suffered. Strikes paralyzed key government departments. Tourists were walking past immigration and
customs counters freely as the officers
were not there.
JVP called upon the public to engage in a
civil disobedience campaign by refraining from paying taxes and other dues such
a bus fares. Posting letters’ without stamps. JVP
said people must observe curfew and not leave homes, work places should shut
down, transport must cease to operate, blackout must be observed from 6 pm. People
should refrain from listening to radio or watching TV.
Initially the public did not take JVP orders
seriously. But JVP started killing and the public realized that they dare not
disobey these orders. Teachers who
resisted interference of JVP activities were assassinated. JVP selectively
conducted attacks on shopkeepers, drivers of public and private vehicles, trade unionists, management staff of
government and private institutions and burning buses of both private and
public companies. These acts of terror
served to create fear among the public.
JVP reacted violently to exposure of their
activities by newspapers, TV and radio. Newspaper agents were killed, vehicles
transporting newspapers were burned, and employees of TV stations, Rupavahini,
ITN and SLBC were threatened and ordered to give up employment. When these were
ignored JVP killed important media personnel, including DG of Rupavahini and SLBC, a director of SLBC, a radio and TV announcer . Gladys Jaywardene,
Chairman of the State Pharmaceutical Corporation was
also assassinated for not stopping the import of Indian pharmaceutical.
JVP killed 1342 government supporters, 353
government servants, 250 policemen, 284
policemen, 163 servicemen, and 80 home guards.
3 university dons, 2 education officers, 44 principals of schools, and
57 teachers. They destroyed 430 post
offices, 78 DDC offices, 59 GA/AGA offices, and 59 agrarian centers, 17 Superintendants
of estates were killed. Many civilians
including a cultivation officer in Anamaduwa, cooperative chairmen of Weuda and
a CTB driver were killed these killings were all in Sinhala areas. JVP
also killed surrendering JVP cadres. They killed two families of surrendered
cadres in Anuradhapura. Heads of people
who were slain were arranged around the Peradeniya University pond.
The country did not tolerate this for long.
The army and police started shooting suspected JVPers and their families and
burning their houses. In Kandy road
barriers were put up at night time, in
places like Lewella. Private armed
groups emerged to counter JVP terrorism. JVP
were killed by private vigilante groups, such as Black Panthers and Yellow Scorpions.
Estates
employed private defence groups known as Green Tigers. JVP had killed 17 estate superintendants. Lawyers who took up the causes of JVPers
were also killed by these vigilantes. It was not possible for the security forces
to protect all threatened persons, so
they encouraged the creation of these vigilance groups and provided them with
shot guns. Political parties were given
repeater shot guns for their protection.
When JVP issued threats, these vigilante groups issued counter threats.
When JVP issued death threats, other posters appeared which said ape ekata
thope dolahak.” The ‘Deshapremi Sinhala tharuna Peramuna’ circulated a letter
to JVP. This letter said Dear father/
mother/ sister, your son, / brother/ husband has taken the lives of mothers
like you, also sisters and innocent children. They have killed the family members of heroic
Sinhala soldiers who fought the Tamil tigers to protect the motherland. Is it not justified to put you also to death? Be ready to die. May you attain Nirvana. Sgd Patriotic
Youth Front. ( abridged )
Government of Sri Lanka eventually defeated
the JVP. Intelligence cells set up in
police stations, had good penetration and advance information was received on JVP activities. By November 1989 Rohana Wijeweera and 12
of the 13 JVP politbureau members were arrested. Wijeweera was ‘a person easy
to control,’ though his speeches sounded
fiery, said Indradasa. Facing the
camera for a video statement when arrested, the expression on his face was one
of disappointment and dismay. He had spoken in a shattered voice, with emotion.
After the 1989 defeat, the JVP was rescued
by its foreign contacts. The foreign links of the JVP came to light only then.
This fact has not received the publicity it deserved. After 1987,
a large number of cadres set up active cells in France, Switzerland ,
Italy, Thailand , Japan and Australia. In
Thailand alone about 60 cadres have been identified. The cell in Thailand not
only looked after the cadres but also ferried them to Japan. JVPers had also
ended up in Maldives.
JVP
received funds said to be from well wishers in the Middle East. Those in
Thailand and Japan were also remitting funds. JVP supported Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war and was
given funds in return. The sole Politbureau
member to escape, Somawansa
Amarasinghe left in March 1990 to France
via India. He lived in Paris and London
for 12 years and returned to lead
the JVP in 1994. This essay shows that there are certain similarities between the LTTE movement and
the JVP movement.
Senator S. Nadesan (1904-1986) made a
speech in the Ceylon Senate on 14 and 15 of May 1971 regarding the JVP insurrection
of April 1971. This speech was published as a booklet in 1988, by the Nadesan
Centre for Human rights. In the booklet, Senator Nadesan was compared to
Cincinnatus, a Roman leader who lived in 5 BC.
The booklet also noted that Senator Nadesan was a founder member of the
Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka and was very active in the cause of Civil
Rights. The Nadesan Centre is named
after him.
The JVP insurrection of 1971 was met
with stunned disbelief, said Suriya Wickremasinghe in her Introduction. It was
marked with confusion, bewilderment, rumor and speculation. How could such a
situation have come about, who were the leaders of the JVP, was there a foreign
hand behind this extraordinary event,
and so on. There was a curfew and people could not easily meet and
discuss. But Senator Nadesan had a curfew pass and ‘used it to the full’ to go about and make inquiries. He used this information in his speech.
Nadesan’s speech on the 1971
insurrection in the Ceylon Senate, was
the first forthright objective assessment made in public on the matter, said
Suriya. The speech was used as an appendix in the report
made by Lord Avebury, who came in
September, on behalf of Amnesty International, to report on the 15,000 people
in detention without trial.The Senate however did not show similar respect.
There were interruptions to Senator Nadesan’s speech. Nadesan said, at one
point, ‘this is not an occasion for
laughter,’ and again, ‘this is not a
time for levity.
In his speech, Nadesan attributes the
rise of the JVP to population growth, higher education and unemployment. The insurgents were mainly poor
undergraduates, staying in hovels, seven
or eight in a room, for their undergraduate studies and exploited by the landlord in Peradeniya and Colombo.
These students saw no future for
themselves, said Nadesan. There were no jobs awaiting them. They were studying because there was nothing
else to do. They did not go to the campus gymnasium or playground, instead they were seated discussing jobs, their futures, and socialist politics.
Politics was the principal diet of the students. The voting age had been reduced to 18 years,
so they were very much a part of the electorate too.
Nadesan says JVP campaigned for the United Front government of
1971. The JVP youth stopped their work and organized house to house campaigns
in support of the United Front. The UF victory was the victory of the youth vote. A study of the voting patterns will show that
it was the youth who defeated the UNP, said Nadesan.
But once this new government came
into power there was an unprecedented outburst of lawlessness throughout
the country. JVP had infiltrated government industrial concerns and had
intimidated the workers. There were work
stoppages. ‘ I do not know why that
happened,‘ said Nadesan.
Nadesan agreed that the armed uprising had attacked a duly established,
democratically elected, popular government. But he
listed several weaknesses in the government , such as nepotism,
favoritism when it came to jobs. Also said Nadesan, there was unemployment.
People were thrown out of jobs.
MPs gave themselves pensions,
enhanced allowances and wanted to import
Peugeot cars for official travel. The
JVP has also complained that the MPs took the Rs 50 allowance per day and
vanished without staying for the Constituent Assembly meetings. The Senators listening to Nadesan,
helpfully added at this point,
‘there were also objections to MPs
foreign travel and safaris’. Nadesan said he did not know of those and was speaking only
of what he did know.
One of the first items referred to at
the JVP rally held at Hyde Park in Feb 1971
continued Nadesan was the fact that the government had introduced compulsory
retirement of those over 55. Very violent speeches were made by the sons of
these dependants, observed Nadesan. JVP had also objected to the fact that the government had gone to the agents of
American imperialism such as World Bank, IDB
for loans like the previous government.
The government had failed to
nationalize banks as promised, and put a ceiling on land ownership. So their only hope lay , JVPers said, in establishing by themselves a
socialist society in this country. They proposed to give the government a
little time and then take matters into their hands. These were the type of
speeches made, said Nadesan.
The JVP leaders, instead of advising
these youth that the government should be given a reasonable time and chance of
redeeming its promise, instead started
propaganda against the government and
organized discontented youth to attack. The youth were impatient for radical
measures, they had been prepared for warfare. They wanted results.
The youth were either misled or were foolish enough to think that
immediate solutions were possible. The
Youth may have thought that if they deferred their actions and make
preparations quietly over the years, they would miss the bus, because by that time the security forces would
have hunted them down . That is my analysis. I am looking at this objectively,
said Nadesan.
Government declared a state of
emergency to wipe put this movement and the security forces ‘went round to a number of places and sometimes
through good fortune and luck were able
to find bombs, ammunitions and arms collected at various places and they
started hot on the trail of this movement, continued Nadesan.
The significant part of Nadesan’s
speech comes after this. Nadesan draws
attention to the weaknesses of the
Emergency Regulations enacted at the time, particularly Regulations 19
and 20 which deal with arrest,
detention, cremation and burial. These Regulations say that any police officer
may arrest without a warrant a person suspected of an offence under the
Emergency Regulations. The earlier
safeguards that such a person must be produced before a magistrate within 24
hours and also that police must report to magistrate if they arrest a person
without a warrant were removed.
Further, nothing need be done in any
part of the country in respect not only
of person shot dead while in combat between security forces and insurgents but
also of person who dies while in detention after they have been taken into
custody, said Nadesan. Any ASP of
officer in charge of a police station can bury or cremate any dead body without
inquest, or death certificate. And the
burials needed not be recorded anywhere.
In the case of those who die in combat, it is
well known all over the world that a count is taken of the people who die and
their identities established if they can be
ascertained. a list is given of
the wounded and the dead, so that people from the other countries can know
whether somebody is a prisoner, dead or wounded. These are dispensed with here
in Sri Lanka.
Nadesan observed that the police have
many honorable capable people but ‘ there are also a number of persons who oppress the public’. In
certain police stations people are frightened that they will be assaulted, even in normal times. When police are attacked some of them, not
particularly educated, may think of
revenge. Some members of the police when their lives are not in danger have been
guilty of cowardly attacks. One can just imagine what they will do at a
time of civil strife when they can
without giving account to anybody, be a
law unto themselves.
The bulk of the police will not take advantage
of ht regulations to abuse their powers,
but in any society, particularly
in a country like ours there are
bound to be certain people who will utilize the safeguards provided by these
regulations to carry out some private
vendetta or misuse the power granted to them, said Nadesan.
Nadesan then listed a series of
allegations regarding criminal behavior on the part of the armed forces
while dealing with the insurgency. Allegations have reached my ears
from reputable sources whose names I will not disclose here, that
insurgents who surrendered or were captured were shot in a large number on the
ground that there was no way of keeping them in prison and there were no
faculties for transporting them or for accommodating them. Whether this
allegation is true or not is a different matter.
Allegations have been made that in areas far
away from the place of actual confrontation between security forces and
insurgents, a number of youth were arrested on suspicion, some were shot
summarily, others assaulted, tortured, taken away and shot. Suspects were asked to run away from the
police station and then shot when running.
Allegations have been made that in some police stations torture and sadisms
have been indulged in by some police officers, they were deprived of their
wrist watches and then sent off. Nadesan had been able to verify one such case.
Allegations have been made that the
houses of parents of a large number of young persons who were suspected of
being insurgents have had their houses burnt down. Allegations have been made
that some members of the police force and army have in broad daylight gone to
shops, markets and other places and helped themselves to goods and in some
cases they have indulged in looting of shops and boutiques, taking away
jewellery.
Nadesan repeated this a second time. Allegations have
been made that after curfew house in places close to Colombo like Nugegoda and
in faraway places like Badulla members
of security forces have gone into boutiques and shops and carried away
jewellery and cash to the extent of Rs 5,000, 6000 and 7000. Allegations have
been made that people’s residences, shops and boutiques with all valuables have
been burnt down.
There were interruptions while
Nadesan was narrating this list of ‘allegations’. Senator Kumarasuriar had
interrupted Nadesan to say these allegations are false. Senator Somaratne asked
to whom these allegations have been made. Nadesan’s
reply was people dare not complain, so
they don’t. In any case the police will deny.”
I do not say the armed force and the police are
lawless. What I say is that there are certain allegations of lawlessness made
against them which it is not possible in the present climate to investigate. government should take up the position that
it will investigate these when the time is suitable and every respondent who
has a genuine complaint to make will be
given the opportunity.
Senator Nadesan then moved on to the
main thrust of his speech, the need to tell the ‘truth ‘ about of what the security forces had done during the insurgency and after. The first
casualty in civil war is truth” he said. In a
civil war, to ensure the security of the state, propagandists prefer to
utter an untruth or give a
garbled version to the people, than to state the truth and run the risk of more trouble.
‘I do not expect the government at a
time like this, to come out with the truth, and to state the whole truth in
respect of all that has happened. the
time is not yet ripe for that. But eventually, it is necessary to report
excesses committed by some members of the police and security forces.
I implore the government in
respect of these allegations not to say whether they are true or false. I ask
them not commit themselves one way or the other when they do not have the
facilities’ for the purpose of investigating and arriving at the truth. Better take the position. well there are these allegations, we cannot
say anything one way or other, at
present but later we will inquire into them.
In the process of combating the
insurgents and putting down the movement with a firm hand we should not give
the impression that we are at any
time prepared to tolerate
indiscipline or lawlessness on the part of the
armed forces or the police. Once
matters have settled, the
government must promise to investigate. Nadesan then called for economic reform and
the speech ended with a statement on banning the import of potatoes and chillies. ( continued)
APPENDIX
The following report appeared in Island 6.4.19
p 9 sent in by Janaka Perera, former
chief of staff of the Sri Lanka
army.
Towards the end of March, 1971, the
Trincomalee Naval Base received a letter from the Peradeniya University
requesting to arrange a football match between university students and Navy
personnel on the naval base grounds on April 5. The letter also requested the
Navy to arrange for the university team to spend the night at the base, since
it was difficult for them to return to Peradeniya the same day after the match.
The naval authorities were reluctant. eventauly the Navy decided it was not safe to allow a
football match between the Navy and University team. the university authorities
were informed that the naval base grounds could not be given for the match on
the scheduled date.
If the match was held as planned, one of the
Navy men who would have participated was Able Seaman H.M. Tillekeratne, one of
the Navy’s best football players. He had also been selected as an all-island
hockey champion. A strong well-built man, Tillekeratne was serving at the
Navy’s Elara Camp in Karainagar at the time. Tillekeratne was the ‘Coordinating
Officer’ between the Navy and the JVP, which was planning to appoint him as
North-East commander if they seized power. He was in
the habit of regularly travelling between the Elara Camp and the Trincomalee Naval Base. he was conducting political
classes for some Navy personnel.
On April 4, the date on which the Navy decided
not to have the football match, Tillekeratne was on duty at the Elara
Camp. In the early hours of the following day the JVP insurrection began,
with an attack on the Wellawaya Police Station, killing a policeman at his
desk. Fighting then commenced country-wide with attacks on 92 police
stations. By this time the CID had got wind of Tillekeratne’s strong connection
with the JVP.
Within 48 hours of the JVP uprising, and the
government declaring an island-wide curfew, the then Superintendent of Police
Jaffna, Ramachandra Sunderalingam, received a message from Colombo of a
suspected move by Tillekeratne to put sleeping tablets into the water
filters at the Elara Camp’s officers mess. The police took immediate action.
Tillekeratne was ordered to go to Chunnakam
and thereafter proceed to Palaly Airport for the flight to Colombo. He
knew the game was up. There was no question he would be arrested as soon
as he arrived in Colombo. Tillekeratne headed for Chunnakam in a Navy jeep What
happened next was like a scene from a gangster movie.
Upon
reaching the power station Tillekeratne got off the jeep, instructing the
driver to keep the engine running. Tillekeratne then walked nonchalantly
towards the power station, which was guarded by a detachment from the Elara
Camp. They knew him well. When he entered the power station the Naval guards
who had completed their duty the previous night were relaxing. They had kept
their submachine guns aside. Suddenly, Tillekeratne picked up one of the guns
ordered the other Navy men to raise their hands.
All obeyed Tillekeratne, except Petty Officers
Cecil Gunasekera, N.J.T. Costa and another. Since the three men were his close
friends they thought he was joking. He then repeated his order. “This is
my last warning. Are you putting up your hands or not?” But the
three men ignored him.
Then Tillekeratne opened fire, killing two of
them –Gunasekera and Costa – on the spot. several others were Seriously
injured , among them a Navy PT instructor, T.M.N. Abdul, who was crippled for
life as a result. He was the father of five children. His mother had
fallen ill and died following the shock she had on hearing her son’s cruel
fate. According to Abdul, whom this writer met eight years later in 1979,
Tillekeratne had shot him because he wanted to ‘settle’ a score. Abdul was the
man earlier detailed to escort him to Colombo for the CID interrogation.
Following the shooting Tillekeratne, according
to Abdul, had forced two other Navy men at gun point to load the jeep with all
the weapons and ammunition he had seized from his colleagues, and accompany him
in the vehicle. Tillekeratne’s aim was to join the insurgents waging
guerilla war against the State to usher in ‘socialism’.
Suspecting that he would try to flee Jaffna,
the SP Sunderalingam,promptly telephoned ASP Mendis, manning the Elephant Pass
Police check point to be on the alert for the jeep carrying Tillekeratne.
As soon as the message was received, the policemen at the check point
along with army personnel waited for the vehicle to appear. A short while later
they saw the jeep at a distance. They waited until it came close and then
ordered the driver to stop. Their guns were aimed at the jeep. At first
it appeared the vehicle was going to slow down. Suddenly Tillekeratne tried to
grab the submachine gun on his seat. But those manning the check point were
faster. Their shots killed Tillekeratne and the driver on the spot. Everything
happened within a matter of three minutes, according to Sunderalingam.
After Tillekeratne’s death, police searched
his personal belongings and found secret documents, and several bottles of
sleeping tablets which were to be put into the water filters of the Elara
Camp’s officers’ mess. His plan was to seize all weapons and ammunition
from camp’s magazine, before joining his JVP comrades after making naval
officers unconscious. JANAKA PERERA”
