KAMALIKA PIERIS
Revised 24.3.20
This essay, which
is a continuation of the previous essay, gives other reasons for the bungling
of Eelam War II and III. One reason was the attitude of the army high command
in Colombo.
The army high command
of this period was not interested in
winning Eelam war II or III. They did not know how to fight it either. The high ups in the army HQ in Colombo did
not know what was happening in the operations areas of the war, said Kamal Gunaratne. Those who knew did not care.
There was a
casual attitude at the time, he said. Soldiers were getting killed and wounded
but the authorities still wanted us to fight. When peace talks collapsed,
they wanted us to commence military operations though we were short of infantry
soldiers.
Army HQ had held an inquiry into Mankulam,
because this defeat had created a huge uproar in the country. Kamal was summoned to Colombo and asked, to
his surprise, ‘why did you abandon camp.’ Colombo did not seem to know that an
instruction had been given to do so. Joint Operations Commander Cyril
Ranatunga, had observed, during the
inquiry, that if 40,000 rounds of ammunition had been used, ‘You must have
killed at least 10,000’. Kamal was
surprised that a senior officer would make such a statement. Kamal was told that there would be a high
powered inquiry into Mankulam. This did
not happen.
The staff officers of the army, who dealt with
administrative, operational and logistical matters, were chosen not for
knowledge of battle but for knowledge of English. Officers with a wealth of
experience were overlooked if they lacked a command of stylish English. English
was the medium of correspondence in the army at higher levels.
Promotions in the army were made on seniority,
not merit or experience, said Kamal Gunaratne. Leadership also was given on
seniority. This was practiced right down the line. Officers were appointed to
command postings, based on their seniority, over more experienced, capable,
soldiers. ‘If you were senior in
service, you would be appointed a Division Commander, whether you were capable
or not.’ Battlefield achievements and fighting
capabilities were not taken into consideration. We lost battles because those
who were capable of commanding the soldiers were not given the opportunity to
do so.
Unsuitable appointments were made. A brigadier
from the Engineering Corp was appointed to command the elite 53 division during
Jaya Sikurui. He was walking around with
a broad smile and was playing games like ‘tak tik tuk’ with officers while his
troops were engaged in battle, reported Kamal Gunaratne. The CO of 10VGW had
gone on leave the day prior to the Mandativu attack o f 1995, saying he had a
family emergency. His deputy died in
the attack the next day.
It was clearly evident In July 1996 that LTTE
was planning to attack Mullaitivu. The
day before the attack the Brigade commander and senior CO of 9SLSR left camp.
According to regulations if the Brigade commander is away then all COs of all
the battalions should be on duty. Also the most senior officers should be on
site. In this case, the entire
responsibility fell on the only other senior officer, Major Aliba.
Major
Aliba was originally from the General Service Corp which handled logistics. He
lacked the required experience in actual fighting which an infantry officer
would have. The troops were left to
fight the terrorist onslaught on their own. The Brigade Commander and CO were
ordered back but left as soon as they could on the helicopter which brought
back reinforcements. Then they bragged
about themselves in Colombo, said Kamal Gunaratne.
During Jayasikurui, the forces were informed
that a battery of six pounder guns was about to be attacked and order was sent
to the CO of an infantry battalion to immediately go to its rescue and secure
it. But the CO just marked time without going forward. The artillery officer
repeatedly informed that an attack was imminent but since the cowardly CO was
not going forward he was asked to destroy the guns and retreat. Later they found that guns were intact, the
Gun Position Officer had been so anxious to run away that he did not wait to
even destroy the guns.
While making sure
that the army would not win Jaya Sikurui, government news said that army had
advanced destroying terrorist camps and that
LTTE was having heavy losses. This was
false, said Kamal Gunaratne. Government
gave much publicity to Operation Rivi Bala, but Rivi Bala had not inflicted any
harm on the LTTE.
The HQ had an
odd attitude to secret operations. We need to maintain secrecy about our
identities and what we do, announced the Navy Special Boat Squadron, the Navy’s
equivalent of commandos in the Army. We have remained in obscurity over the
years. After saying this, the squadron had a demonstration in
Trincomalee for the media in 2004. The squadron showed how they attacked a land
based target. They said that they had blasted bridges and causeways in Jaya
Sikurui.
The
army was given a novel task to carry out in the north. In 1994 army was asked
to carry out an offensive operation south of Palaly and conduct the general
election in the same area at the same time.
The plan was for army to launch an offensive operation from Thelippalai area advance about one
kilometer, and leave the ballot boxes out for a few hours then return with the ballot boxes. This was to show that elections were held in
the north while ensuring that no votes would be cast.
There were appalling battle defeats and withdrawals,
resulting in huge loss of manpower. Over 1200 soldiers were killed at
Mullaitivu (1996) and many more wounded and missing. This was one of the most painful and
humiliating defeats, said Kamal Gunaratne.
In Mutur, the navy managed to land a contingent
of commandos close to Brown Rock point, east of Muttur in the early hours of
June 14, 1990. Having allowed the commandos to come ashore, the LTTE ambushed them. Commandos lost over 40 men in this single ambush.
At Mankulam, the HQ had plenty of warning. HQ
was told many times that LTTE was getting ready to attack. There was an
increase in their radio transmissions, there was continuous training of cadres
at night and LTTE senior leaders had
come to Mankulam. LTTE was also seen
building a huge structure for launching Pasilan mortars. The army HQ sent a
measly reinforcement of 500 soldiers, reported Kamal Gunaratne. Six helicopters did leave Vavuniya for
Mankulam, with ammunition, defenses, and stores but only the first could
land. LTTE attacked and killed the gunner.
Once the attack started, the forces at
Mankulam begged for ammunition, over and over again. They also said fresh
troops were needed by nightfall. Vanni
HQ did not respond. Then when it was
obvious that Mankulam was going to fall to the LTTE, the Vanni HQ
ordered the forces to abandon Mankulam and withdraw into the
jungles, saying that Vanni HQ had no way
of helping. This was a shock to the
army. It was a painful withdrawal into the jungle. Kamal Gunaratne described
this withdrawal at length in his book ‘Road to Nandikadal’
The order given to abandon Mankulam and
withdraw into the jungle was a totally unexpected order, he said. Leaving the
camp unnoticed was difficult. It had to
be done secretly. Also they had to
destroy mortars that had helped them a lot. They were sad to do so. All left camp safely, with the more
experienced soldier going last. They did
not eat for a long while.
It was difficult to walk in the jungle in the
dark carrying the wounded on stretchers, said Kamal Gunaratne. The wounds would
get scratched by thorny bushes and their agonized cries were painful to hear. The group also had to make sure that the
rear did not get lost. They were
surrounded on 3 sides by LTTE. The
helicopter rescue had to be aborted as LTTE had got at the network and were
mocking them. They were finally rescued
by a Bell helicopter where the pilot bravely swooped down and took them in.
At Elephant Pass, it was obvious that LTTE was
preparing for a massive assault. Palaly instructed that the forces should take
Tamilamadam, to expand the area and increase security. HQ promised to send
fresh troops to guard the new territory, but did not do so. 90 soldiers died. Then came the order ‘withdraw’. They should
not give false promises like this, said Kamal.
Helicopters containing soldiers had been sent,
but when the helicopters attempted to land, they were pummeled with a new LTTE
weapon, a sort of 23mm cannon. The
helicopters gave up and returned to base. There were more than 10,000 troops
and only 5,000 LTTE at Elephant Pass, but army was a demoralized force by that
time, said Kamal Gunaratne.
LTTE
attacked Pooneryn in 1993. The army fought back and Pooneryn was saved. Those
who were wounded also fought. But the
damage was on a scale never before experienced, said Kamal. 8 officers, 225 other ranks were killed in
action. 17 officers, 544 other ranks, were wounded and 302 missing in action.
Army lost equipment worth over LKR 50 million.
A large stockpile of arms fell
in to the hands of the LTTE. They got small arms, machine guns, RPGs,
mortars, and the MBT (Main battle tank). Thecaptured MBT was used against the army till the end of the war.
Elephant pass camp was a large base which
included almost all the buildings, the salterns and school. Paranthan and Kilinochchi were thereafter
linked to Elephant Pass. Satellite camps
were established at Vettilaikerny, Kattikadu and Pullaveli and a safe supply
route by sea and land was ensured. The
Kilinochchi –Elephant Pass- Vettilaikerny base became a sprawling complex that
housed the entire 54 division. It was
considered impregnable.
But this complex fell easily to the LTTE. To win Kilinochchi, LTTE first took over the
wells at Iyakachchi, which was the army’s source of drinking water. Due to
this, the troops died a sad death from dehydration due to the extreme heat and
lack of water. At Elephant Pass too, there was a lack of drinking water and many
died due to acute dehydration. The camp had a machine for desalination of water
but it had broken down and was not repaired.
The Chandrika government was unfazed, observed Kamal Gunaratne
Army high command
was slow to obtain the modern weapons the army needed. It was only after LTTE
deployed shoulder fired heat seeking missiles that the government bought anti
missile equipment. Army was initially using obsolete 76 mm and 85 pounder guns
and 25 pounders. 122 mm howitzers were
obtained later from China.
When they did
make purchases, the government bought the wrong items. In 1998, they bought a hovercraft at a
staggering cost of Rs. 250 million. It was never used in war. The government
wanted to get rid of it in 2007, but was
unable to find a buyer.
Battle
tanks were usually bought from Russia but for Jaya Sikurui they were bought
from China. The tanks did not match the Russian guns the army was using. When the tanks were operated, the guns got
destroyed. The army purchased
unsuitable armored personnel carriers, with thin weak body. They were called
ice cream vans.
The MiG combat
aircraft the Air Force had bought in 2000 were not operational by 2003 as their
guarantees had expired and they needed to be overhauled. The government bought Chinese F7 fighter jets when they needed fighter ground aircraft. The F7 is an
interceptor, not suited to fight a ground battle.
Fighter pilots were handicapped in identifying
targets. The government
hadn’t felt the need to acquire jets, dedicated helicopter gunships or Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to facilitate a complicated operation. LTTE simply went underground and emerged
cheering when the planes had gone.
We did not use the correct tactics in Eelam
War II and III said Kamal Gunaratne. Our main objective should have been to
weaken and destroy LTTE and not capture ground. Jaya Sikurui for instance, was
capturing areas which had no LTTE. We
were taking useless ground.
In a war the army is expected to conduct ‘deep
operations’ going deep inside the enemy territory. Our ‘deep ops’ were pathetic
or non existence. Instead the army went in for ‘limited operations’ where they
advanced a few kilometers and retreated carrying their wounded and dead and
then boasted in the news about their success.
The government set up military camps without planning in
advance for reinforcements, replenishment of ammunition and evacuation well in
advance said Kamal Gunaratne. There must be plans for reinforcements and they
must also be rehearsed so that when they go, they know exactly what to do. Instead,
there were no plans in place for contingencies and there was no high level of
preparedness. We did not keep a battalion in reserve for an emergency but
deployed all battalions on ground. There
was a lack of reserve troops.
Battle plans were
calculated to lead to defeat. There was no secrecy in the battle plans
either. The decision to move northward
on A9 was clearly visible to LTTE. In
Jaya Sikurui our weaknesses were observed by LTTE, as they got ready for a
major attack. In Jaffna, LTTE had had
ample time to study and prepared a counterattack on Jaffna Fort.
We over extended ourselves, said Kamal Gunaratne.
army failed to secure the newly captured areas. It was imprudent to encircle jungles,
because we were unable to secure them. Our weak defense lines in Jaya Sikurui
and large expanses of empty jungle were easy for LTTE to penetrate.
We
always used large numbers of troops in our offensive while LTTE used their
sparingly. Also our FDLs (Forward
Defence Line) were weak. The FDL at Nagar Kovil after the ceasefire was a very
weak one with dilapidated sandbags, and deteriorating palmyrah logs. The
authorities had ignored requests to improve the fortifications. The army presence at Nagar kovil FDL was
a volunteer battalion which had been there a long time. They had no drinking
water and unsanitary toilets.
The army lacked basic information. At
Mullaitivu the rescue mission did not have enough maps, proper radio
communication or artillery support when it took off to rescue those at
Mullaitivu. There was misuse of equipment, as well, due to ignorance, and
possibly the lack of suitable weapons. The
navy had used heavy machine guns which had an effective range of 3000 meters, to
cover short ranges of around 300 meters.
The army lacked intelligence on LTTE
activities, its strength and its
fortifications. We
should have taken more serious note of the LTTE capability such as Sea Tigers
and the ability to infiltrate from the beach end for reconnaissance, and
ability to hide in scrub jungles within our camp premises.
In a war, armies were expected to set up
signboards indicating gun positions,
tanks and so on. They did so using military symbols, not words. During Jaya Sikurui,
the army had erected large name boards, using language instead of military
symbols. These boards were erected
where they could be easily seen by the enemy, indicating locations such
as division, brigade, battalion, artillery, battery, squadron etc. When the army objected, they were told the
order had come from the top.
In Eelam wars II and III there was no plans to
increase the fighting strength of the Army and also no continuous flow of
weapons and ammunition for the Army. The army had an acute shortage of
the troops it needed to conduct operations and hold ground.
The soldiers who were there, were not equipped
and trained adequately to conduct offensive operations. We did not train troops for night time
combat. We attacked only in broad day
light. In Jaya Sikurui the army would control the main road during
the day and retreat to camp at sunset leaving the road free for LTTE to
dominate at night.
In Jaya Sikurui the three forces,
army, navy, air force did not work together. There
was no co-ordination between them. Each service worked under their own chain of
command, so instructions had to go upwards within each force. Navy and air force refused to take orders from division commanders unless ratified by their own HQ.
There was a serious erosion of discipline and morale, in the army, because of the failed
campaigns and defeats in Eelam War II
and III . In Jaya Sikurui team
spirit vanished, division commanders would not look or
even speak to each other. On one occasion, there were heated word between commanders of
55 and 56 divisions.
There was very low morale among the soldiers and
desertions were extremely high.
Morale of army fell after Kokavil, said
Kamal Gunaratne for they knew that
Mankulam was next. LTTE had already
constructed bunkers around Mankulam. The situation
at Mullaitivu camp was dismal,
morale was low and they had no proper food or leave, said Kamal Gunaratne . Usually at the risk of their lives they would
try to drag back the dead and wounded after a battle. Now they did not, he
said.
There was a deliberate withdrawal of services
which benefited the soldiers. The Vanni Sevaya radio broadcast was providing a very useful service to the
police and security forces. During the ceasefire, the Ranil Wickremesinghe
government ordered the service closed.
SLBC was directed to use the
facilities to set up a Tamil commercial service.
The army retreated in great disorder in Jaya Sikurui and the scale and speed
surprised even the LTTE. Only one officer was successful in halting the retreat
in Jaya Sikurui .Col Roshan Silva of
Gajaba regiment held an FDL across Omanthai
with his air mobile brigade, This FDL
remained in the Wanni till Eelam war IV.
Roshan was never recognized for this.
There were other successes too. In 1995, there
was a surprising win at Weli oya under
Janaka Perera. The camps at Kokkuthuduwai,
Kokilai, Jayasinha pura, Janakapura and Parakramapura were all under heavy
attack. But they withstood it. Brig
Janaka Perera emerged victorious at
these battles. As a result, there was
renewed faith in the army’s ability to
win the war. This was surprise to the army
as well. They thought by then that the war was already lost, said Kamal
Gunaratne .(Continued)
