This article raises a question About the fact that many western and middles eastern has a per perception that Chinese government or Chinese company owns or holds proxy for the whole land hence may be reluctant More publicity should be given with a sovereign guarantee
Note
This article highlights an issue that receives far less attention than labour law reforms. While regulatory flexibility is important, investor perception of ownership, sovereignty, and geopolitical risk can be an even greater determinant of investment decisions.
Here is an expanded version of your argument that could form the basis of an opinion article.
Beyond Labour Reforms: Colombo Port City Must Also Address the Perception Gap
The recent Daily FT article discussing the proposal to use Colombo Port City as a regulatory sandbox for labour market reforms is a welcome development. Flexible employment regulations and policy certainty can undoubtedly improve Sri Lanka’s competitiveness in attracting foreign investment.
However, there is another issue that deserves equal attention but is seldom discussed openly—the international perception of Colombo Port City’s ownership and governance.
Many investors from Europe, North America and parts of the Middle East continue to believe that the entire Port City is effectively owned or controlled by a Chinese state entity. Whether this perception is accurate or not is less important than the fact that it exists and influences investment decisions.
Global corporations, financial institutions and sovereign wealth funds carefully assess geopolitical risks before making long-term commitments. Some investors worry that future geopolitical tensions, sanctions, or strategic competition between major powers could affect investments located in projects perceived to be under Chinese control.
The legal reality is quite different. Colombo Port City is part of the sovereign territory of Sri Lanka and is governed under Sri Lankan law through the Colombo Port City Economic Commission. Investors receive long-term leasehold rights and operate within a regulatory framework established by Parliament, not under foreign sovereignty. Recent amendments have further strengthened governance and ease of doing business.
Unfortunately, these facts are not sufficiently communicated to the international investment community.
The Government, the Colombo Port City Economic Commission and the Board of Investment should therefore undertake a comprehensive international communication campaign.
This campaign should clearly emphasise that:
Colombo Port City remains under the sovereign authority of Sri Lanka.
Property rights and investor protections are guaranteed under Sri Lankan law.
Regulatory stability is backed by legislation and internationally recognised dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Investors from every country receive equal treatment regardless of nationality.
Sri Lanka welcomes investment from East and West alike without geopolitical preference.
It may also be worthwhile for the Government to consider providing explicit sovereign assurances for strategic investments above a specified threshold. Such guarantees would reinforce confidence that contractual rights will be protected irrespective of future political or geopolitical developments.
Sri Lanka occupies a unique position in the Indian Ocean. Rather than being viewed as aligned exclusively with any one global power, Colombo Port City should be marketed as a neutral international business and financial centre where investors from China, India, the Middle East, Europe, Japan and North America can operate under a transparent legal framework with confidence.
Labour reforms may improve the ease of doing business, but overcoming the perception gap regarding sovereignty and governance may prove equally important in unlocking the next wave of global investment into Colombo Port City.
This argument complements the current discussion on labour reforms. Regulatory flexibility can attract investors, but confidence in sovereignty, legal certainty, and geopolitical neutrality is often what determines whether large multinational companies and institutional investors ultimately commit their capital.
by Sarath Wijesinghe, President’s Counsel, President, Ambassadors’ Forum in the UK, Former Ambassador for Sri Lanka to the United Arab Emirates, and Israel.
OMBUDSMAN.
Ombudsman is an institution, concept prevailing all over the world as an institution for arbitration, settlement, reconciliation and resolution of disputes among parties with least expenditure and more credibility, impartiality and impact, which is used and applied mainly in the USA, UK, Commonwealth of Nations, India, but not in Sri Lanka. The concept has arisen initially in China and incidentally in Sri Lanka under our kings with a position of Dukgannarala”.
A person or persons appointed by the king for resolution of disputes amicably that has spread all over the world today. There are ombudsmen in all states in USA in many subjects and institutions such as law, health and consumer and many other areas worldwide mainly in USA, UK, Europe and in India. In Sri Lanka Consumer Affairs Authority is established in 2003 with many hopes, aspirations and plans including redress to consumer which unfortunately is dormant and inactive. In the present context when the world is moving with modern platforms and online transactions which are not considered in Sri Lanka though being used by Sri Lankans without any regulations.
In Sri Lanka, litigation is extremely expensive. In other countries there is legal aid available and also simple processes of settlement of disputes without lawyers and by arbitration. There is a large backlog of thousands of undecided cases in Sri Lanka, to be resolved in many areas and the concept of ombudsman will be an answer which will act as an arbitrator or a consulate in resolving disputes in all the areas the government should have taken notice of. In the circumstances the Ombudsman and consumer sites have come forward to set up an institution on Ombudsman in UK and Sri Lanka in order to serve the Sri Lankan community for consumers’ grievances as well as all the other areas, in addition to other fields. Mr. Duminda Gunathillake Senior Solicitor in the UK who is the General Secretary of the Ambassadors’ Forum has come forward to set up the institution in the UK and Sri Lanka with the constitution and regulations and working arrangements with two centers in UK and Sri Lanka for implementation which is a difficult and challenging task. Finding the correct persons to be the Consumer Ombudsman and the Head of the Secretariate is equally challenging and the good news is that the Ambassadors Forum has now found two reputed learned, committed, personalities who will serve the nation. This will give an opportunity for the companies, consumers and the governance to make use of this institution for resolution of their disputes with least efforts and expenditure.
The companies seeking redress will apply to the Ombudsman for redress and the expenses are to be shared on administration and other matters with no profit. This will be operating as an arbitration process in other countries which will be effective depending on the credibility, responsibility and the recognition of the appointing institution and persons appointed on whom the citizen will have enormous trust upon.
Now that the process is initiated there will be an opportunity for those interested to discuss matters at the Organization of Professional Associations sometime in September along with the Financial Ombudsman, the Insurance Ombudsman and Consumer Ombudsman on the same platform to launch the operations of this novel and innovative concept.
This system is operating with our closest neighbour India very well, with the corporation the judiciary which is in favour of public interest litigation initiated by the former Chief Justice Bhagawathy who was the leading personality on this concept spread all over including Sri Lanka at present. Now the good news is that in Sri Lanka public litigation and fundamental rights is developing fast with new concepts, controversial case laws and with the help of Sri Lankan judiciary who fortunately are in favour of public interest litigation for the citizen. But unfortunately, Legal Aid Commission that was active sometime back is inactive today and it is time for the Bar Association and Ministry of Justice to reactivate The Legal Aid Commission that will enable citizens to have access to the law and backlog of cases.
Ombudsman system will be a great inroad to the process and it is the duty of the government, non government organizations and citizens to get together to promote it. In the circumstances the Ambassadors Forum urges the concerned citizens and organizations to rally around the concept and the process and be in touch with the administration to discuss matters at the OPA sometime in September. It is encouraging that the Association of Sri Lankan Lawyers in the UK, Sri Lankan Professionals in the UK, Bar Association of Sri Lanka and Organization of Professional Associations is a part of the process.
WhatsApp numbers are given below for you to send messages only and please note that no conversations are possible, but your views, suggestions and advice are greatly appreciated.
Trusting an individual who explicitly states an intention to change your deeply held personal or religious beliefs “by hook or by crook” is highly problematic, as true trust requires mutual respect, safety, and the freedom to choose without manipulation.
When a person approaches a relationship with an absolute mandate to alter your worldview by any means necessary, it usually signals that their ideological agenda takes precedence over your autonomy and personal well-being. Your historical parallel is highly accurate; this precise “by hook or by crook” methodology mirrors the complex and often painful legacy of colonial missionary activities in Sri Lanka. [1]
Bishop Copleston
Bishop Reginald Copleston made the famous “weak Buddhists” remark during a YMCA lecture in Calcutta around 1902. When audience members questioned why missionary resources were spent educating non-Christians, he replied that the goal was conversion; if that failed, students would still leave as “weak Buddhists”. [1]
This controversial statement was historically documented by scholars like Professor G.P. Malalasekera. It reflects the broader colonial strategy of missionary schools—like St. Thomas’ College—which aimed to undermine traditional Buddhist convictions and cultural identities even when direct conversion was unsuccessful.
https://share.google/aimode/hFymjcMpiONmRJZvj
A warning to Buddhists everywhere – look at what’s happening in India
When someone approaches you with a high-pressure, “hook or by crook” attitude toward religious conversion, it is generally a sign to be extremely cautious, as healthy personal relationships are based on mutual respect and boundaries rather than coercion.
In Northeast India, including states like Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and parts of Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, missionary activity initiated during the British colonial era heavily shaped regional identities and have led to religious clashes between majority Hindus and religious minorities.
The Missionary Track Record in Sri Lanka
The history of foreign missionary involvement in Sri Lanka spans three distinct colonial eras, leaving behind deep scars alongside structural changes.
The Portuguese Era (1505–1658): Coercion and Destruction The Portuguese period is widely considered the darkest phase of religious imposition on the island. The administration pursued an aggressive policy of top-down conversion. They systematically destroyed invaluable Buddhist and Hindu temples—including the historic Kelaniya Temple and the thousand-pillar temple of Devundara—often building churches directly over the ruins. Conversions were heavily induced by offering exemptions from severe taxes, giving preferential legal treatment to converts, and enforcing harsh penalties or violence against those who resisted.
The Dutch Era (1658–1796): Economic and Legal Coercion The Dutch shifted the strategy from physical violence to systemic and economic manipulation. To secure government employment, clear land registry rights, or civil status, locals were pressured to convert to the Dutch Reformed Church. Conversely, the Dutch actively persecuted Roman Catholics who had converted during the Portuguese era, forcing them into hiding until indigenous missionaries like Father Joseph Vaz helped them practice covertly. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
The British Era (1796–1948): Cultural and Educational Hegemony The British brought a wave of Protestant missions. While they established foundational infrastructure—such as the country’s first medical schools, modern hospitals, and elite English-medium schools—their educational system often functioned as a tool for cultural imperialism. High-ranking administrative positions and social advancement were implicitly tied to adopting Western customs and Christian denominations, which deeply alienated local Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim traditions. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
The Dynamics of “Hook or by Crook” Relationships
The historical lessons of colonialism illustrate the psychological reality of modern relationships where one partner demands conversion:
Conditional Love: Offering affection, financial security, or marriage only if you agree to convert.
Denigration of Local Beliefs
Intellectual/Moral Superiority: Dismissing your current heritage, values, or family traditions as “wrong,” “primitive,” or “sinful.”
Systemic Pressure & Isolation
Emotional Ultimatums: Separating you from your support systems or making you feel guilty for causing a rift in the relationship.
Navigating the Relationship
If you are evaluating your safety and future with this person, look closely at how they handle your boundaries.
Test for Absolute Certainty: Observe whether they display a binary worldview where they possess absolute spiritual truth and you are living in error. If there is no room for your perspective, a balanced partnership is impossible. [1]
Set an Explicit Boundary: Tell them clearly that you respect their faith but intend to keep your own. If they react with anger, persistent arguing, or emotional withdrawal, they are validating that their goal is conversion, not connection.
Assess the Hidden Cost: True love accepts a partner as a whole person. If their affection is a “bargaining tool” packaged inside an ultimatum, the foundation of the relationship is control, not love. [1]
To help me offer more specific advice, could you share what specific tactics or ultimatums he is currently using, and whether your family or community is aware of this pressure?
The emergence of allegations concerning retired Major General Suresh Sallay in relation to Sri Lanka’s 2019 Easter Sunday attacks raises important questions about evidentiary standards, attribution, and the distinction between advocacy and adjudication.
Particular attention must be paid to how allegations develop over time, how they are amplified across social media and international advocacy platforms, and whether such allegations are supported by evidence capable of establishing responsibility.
This article examines the structure of international NGO submissions and related materials that reference Major General Suresh Sallay and explores the importance of distinguishing between verified facts, allegations, and interpretive conclusions.
The submission in question: Submission A/HRC/59/NGO/128 submitted byFranciscans Internationalto the UN Human Rights Council on 25 May 2025
The UN Human Rights Council submission A/HRC/59/NGO/128 concerning Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday attacks was not filed by an individual activist but by Franciscans International, an international non-governmental organisation representing the global Franciscan family within the United Nations system.
Established in 1989 and operating from offices in Geneva and New York, Franciscans International holds General Consultative Status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), enabling it to make interventions, submit written statements, and participate directly in UN human rights processes.
Its Relationship with the Vatican and the Catholic Church
Franciscans International is not an organ of the Vatican, the Holy See, or the Roman Curia. It does not speak on behalf of the Pope or the Holy See in diplomatic matters.
However, it is closely connected to the worldwide Franciscan family of Catholic religious orders. In 1999, the Conference of the Franciscan Family formally recognised Franciscans International as the body representing the Catholic Franciscan family at the United Nations. Its leadership and governing structures have historically included members of Franciscan religious orders, including friars and clergy from various branches of the Franciscan movement.
Accordingly, while Franciscans International should not be described as “the Vatican” or as an official diplomatic arm of the Holy See, it is equally inaccurate to portray it as an entirely independent secular NGO with no ecclesiastical connection. This institutional background does not invalidate the submission, but understanding the perspective and networks of any submitting organisation forms part of normal source evaluation and evidentiary scrutiny.
Why This Matters
Understanding the identity of the organisation submitting allegations or concerns to international institutions is not an attack on the organisation itself; it is part of normal evidentiary scrutiny.
Questions that arise include:
· What information was independently verified by Franciscans International before issuing its submission?
· Which portions of the submission relied upon third-party reports or media investigations?
· Were the allegations based on direct testimony, documentary evidence, or secondary reporting?
· What methodology was used to validate the claims before presenting them to the Human Rights Council?
· Which sources were considered sufficiently reliable for inclusion and which were excluded?
These questions are particularly important when submissions contribute to international narratives involving named individuals, public officials, or security institutions.
In legal proceedings, the credibility of a conclusion depends not only on who presents it, but also on the evidentiary foundation upon which it rests.
Advocacy documents are not Judicial findings
Submissions made by NGOs to international bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council are important advocacy tools designed to raise concerns and encourage further investigation.
However, they are not:
· judicial determinations,
· criminal indictments,
· findings following cross-examination,
· or evidence tested according to the standards required in legal proceedings.
Their contents therefore cannot automatically be treated as proof of responsibility or culpability.
The Question of Source Dependence
Many allegations concerning Major General Suresh Sallay derive from a chain of references that only include:
· media reporting,
· private documentary productions,
· public statements,
· advocacy submissions,
· and subsequent institutional references.
This can be summarized as:
Allegation → Media Amplification → Advocacy Adoption → International Circulation
Where allegations originate from a limited number of original sources, repeated citation across institutions may create an appearance of independent corroboration despite relying upon substantially the same underlying material.
An important legal question follows:
· At what point in this chain does independently verified evidence emerge?
· If the answer is unclear, repeated citation risks creating an appearance of corroboration where none may exist.
The Missing Evidentiary Bridge
For allegations against any individual to carry legal weight, there must be evidence establishing:
· operational involvement,
· command responsibility,
· decision-making authority,
· or direct participation.
Accordingly, several questions arise:
· What evidence links Major General Suresh Sallay to the alleged attack?
· What official appointment, if any, did he hold on 21 April 2019 and what were the responsibilities attached to that position?
· What authority, if any, did he exercise over the individuals or operations concerned during the attacks?
· Which documentary records establish this connection?
· Have those records been independently verified and produced before a court or investigative authority?
Without answers supported by evidence, attribution risks becoming speculative rather than factual.
Retrospective Attribution and Narrative Construction
Another issue requiring examination is timing.
If allegations emerge years after the events in question and only after major media productions or advocacy campaigns, an important evidentiary question arises:
· Have investigators discovered new evidence, or are they expanding on subsequently developed narrative.
This distinction matters because legal responsibility must be established through evidence existing independently of public narratives.
Questions That Require Answers
Any organisation or individual advancing allegations should be prepared to answer several straightforward questions:
1. What is the original source of the information?
2. Is the source identifiable?
3. Was the information provided under oath?
4. Has the information been subjected to cross-examination?
5. Has the allegation been independently corroborated?
6. Is there documentary evidence supporting the claim?
7. Is the attribution based on contemporaneous records or retrospective interpretation?
8. At what point does repetition of an allegation become mistaken for independent verification?
These questions are not obstacles to accountability; they are the foundation of accountability.
Distinguishing Concern from Proof
Calls for investigation serve an important public purpose.
However:
· concern is not proof,
· suspicion is not evidence,
· repetition is not corroboration,
· and allegation is not conviction.
The distinction between these concepts lies at the heart of every fair legal system.
The appearance of Major General Suresh Sallay’s name in media reports, advocacy submissions, or international discussions does not in itself establish responsibility for the Easter Sunday attacks particularly where allegations gain prominence following private media productions relying substantially on witness testimony and claims that remain subject to investigation and verification.
A fair assessment requires evidence capable of demonstrating operational involvement, command responsibility, or direct participation.
Until such evidence is produced and tested according to recognised legal standards, it remains essential to distinguish between established facts and evolving narratives.
Timeline and Attribution
Chronology helps evaluate allegations involving public officials, military officers, and intelligence personnel.
Attribution cannot be separated from position, authority, responsibility, and timing.
Accordingly, several questions arise in relation to Major General Suresh Sallay and the Easter Sunday attacks:
Event
Date
Evidentiary Significance
Easter Sunday attacks
21 April 2019
Establishes the date of the offence .
Official position held by Suresh Sallay on 21 April 2019
To be established through official records, gazette notifications, military records, or government appointments
Determines whether he held any command, intelligence, operational or decision-making responsibility relevant to the attacks.
Earliest public allegations linking Suresh Sallay to the attacks
To be identified through public records and media archives
Establishes whether allegations were contemporaneous or emerged significantly later.
Release of major media productions and documentaries alleging involvement
To be identified and chronologically mapped
Assists in determining whether allegations followed the emergence of new evidence or followed media amplification.
First appearance of allegations in international advocacy submissions or UN processes
To be established through UN documentation and NGO submissions
Determines whether international attribution was based on independent investigation or on previously circulating allegations.
What form of Involvement is Suresh Sallay being accused of?
Before responsibility can be attributed to any individual, it is necessary to identify precisely what form of involvement is being alleged and what evidence supports that allegation.
In relation to Major General Suresh Sallay, several possible scenarios would require examination:
Before allegations can be evaluated, those making them must identify the precise legal or factual basis upon which responsibility is alleged.
Merely asserting that an individual was “involved” is insufficient.
Was the allegation one of direct participation, command responsibility, prior knowledge, facilitation, concealment, or some other form of involvement?
Each allegation requires a different evidentiary threshold and a different type of proof.
1. Direct Participation
Is it alleged that he directly participated in the planning, preparation, facilitation, financing, or execution of the Easter Sunday attacks alongside the perpetrators or those associated with them?
If so:
· What evidence establishes direct contact with the attackers?
· Are there communications records, witness testimony, financial transactions, meetings, travel records, or operational links supporting such an allegation?
· Has any participant in the attacks identified him as having played such a role?
2. Direction, Control or Coordination
Is it alleged that he directed, supervised, controlled, or coordinated those responsible for the attacks?
If so:
· What evidence establishes such authority or control?
· What command structure is being alleged?
· Through what mechanism was such direction allegedly exercised?
· Where are the documentary or testimonial records supporting this claim?
Was he involved in recruitment, facilitation or material support
· Is it alleged that he recruited, introduced, financed, protected, equipped, transported, trained or otherwise materially assisted the attackers?
· Did he provide safe houses, logistics, communications support, intelligence, travel documents, weapons or funding?
· What evidence exists of such assistance for all attacked venues?
3. Prior Knowledge and Deliberate Non-Intervention
Is it alleged that he possessed prior knowledge of the attacks and had both the legal authority and practical ability to prevent or disrupt them but intentionally failed to do so
If so:
· What evidence establishes that he received such information?
· When did he allegedly receive it?
· Through what official or unofficial channels was it communicated?
· What authority did he possess at that time to intervene or act?
· What evidence demonstrates deliberate inaction rather than absence of knowledge?
If prior knowledge is alleged, what was the source of that knowledge and can receipt of that information be independently verified?
4. Abuse of Official Authority
Is it alleged that he used his official position or authority to obstruct investigations, suppress intelligence, interfere with security responses, or facilitate the attacks?
If so:
· What official position did he occupy at the relevant time?
· What powers attached to that position?
· What specific acts or omissions are alleged?
· What documentary evidence supports those allegations?
5. Post-Event Concealment or Assistance
Is it alleged that he participated in concealing evidence, protecting perpetrators, or obstructing investigations after the attacks?
If so:
· What actions are alleged to constitute concealment or obstruction?
· What evidence supports these claims?
· What decisions are attributed to him personally rather than institutionally?
6. Any Other Form of Involvement Alleged
If some other form of involvement is being alleged, those making the allegation should clearly identify:
· the exact nature of the allegation,
· the legal basis for responsibility,
· and the evidence relied upon.
An allegation cannot be investigated or tested if its underlying theory of involvement is never clearly articulated.
These are not technicalities designed to avoid accountability.
They are the fundamental questions that every legal system asks before responsibility for a terrorist attack can be attributed to any individual.
Without identifying the precise nature of the alleged involvement and producing evidence capable of supporting that allegation, there is a risk that attribution becomes based on inference, association, or repetition rather than proof.
In matters involving terrorism, intelligence operations and national security, the standard for attribution should be evidence first and narrative second.
A search for truth begins with timelines.
Positions held after an event do not automatically establish responsibility for decisions made before the event.
If investigators believe an individual who was not in command at the relevant time was nevertheless involved, the burden is on investigators to explain the mechanism of involvement and provide supporting evidence.
From a legal perspective, courts generally focus on several questions:
1.What is the alleged act?
2.When did it occur?
3.Who had authority at that time?
4.What evidence connects the accused to that act?
If there is a disconnect between the timeline and the allegation, that naturally becomes an issue for scrutiny.
The counterargument, would argue a person does not necessarily need to occupy the formal leadership position at the time of an event to be implicated in wrongdoing.
However, where chronology appears inconsistent with an allegation, investigators would typically need to provide a clear explanation of the alleged role with strong supporting evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
Applied to the Easter context, the key question becomes:
If the allegation is not based on his position in April 2019, then what precisely is the alleged conduct, when did it occur, and what evidence supports the exact allegation being made?
That is often the question that separates a hypothesis requiring investigation from a case capable of supporting criminal responsibility.
The central question therefore remains:
· Is the case against Major General Suresh Sallay built upon primary evidence, or upon the repeated circulation of allegations originating elsewhere?
· The answer to that question will determine whether history records a proven case, or the construction of a narrative through repetition.
‘Before you study the economics, study the economists!’
e-Con e-News 28 June – 04 July 2026
Believing in the BBC, Reuters, Bloomberg and the rest of the English media gang, requires an almost total eclipsing of any brains we are supposed to possess. It requires a daily lobotomy. According to the merchant media’s imperialist masters, Sri Lanka has to blame various make-believe enemies for our current discontent. ‘Oil Crisis’, ‘Foreign Exchange Crisis’, ‘Dollar Crisis’, Export Crisis’, ‘Trade Deficit’, ‘Hormuz Closure’, ‘Iran War’, ‘Zionism’, even ‘Donald Trump’, etc. Anything but capitalism. Anything but the colonial import-export plantation system that forms the basis of the underdevelopment of the economy. Each of the headlined ‘causes’ usually carry a sliver of the truth, but it is not the whole truth.
This week, saw the media claim that the USA warned Iran about an imminent Israel attack. They wish us to believe that Israel (read: Jews) rule the USA. Israel is indeed allowed nuclear weapons but no additional Asian, or African or non-Anglo-American country is to be allowed such protection, or must be annihilated. But Israel is another white-settler satellite of England, Europe, and the USA. It could be liquidated at a moment’s notice, Rhodesia-styleee, if real politics so demands, in order to protect their real masters.
Mounting evidence suggests Sri Lanka is well on its way to becoming a white settler satellite of England, Europe, USA, Israel, India & Japan. The brains are already there, the body will follow. The rumored impending and unprecedented arrest of a former President suggests that, in the absence of any plan to secure the economic, political & military sovereignty of the country, plunging the country into further turmoil, is the standard default option.
The IMF, the World Bank, the rogue UN agencies, all coordinate their attacks on the country, that appear one after another, or simultaneously. The World Bank, the IMF, the ADB, the so-called independent thinktanks and economists are all of one accord that national resources (aka state-owned enterprises) must be handed over to Wall Street! Outside of such demands that can only weaken the country further, the merchant media, or the supposedly ruling party, cannot name what is going on.
‘In some cases the export economy was but a transitional stage
in the development of a balanced economy. In most instances,
however, it was a stage at which the country remained for decades
or even centuries, while the characteristic pattern of export economy
development blocked further advance to the stage of a balanced economy.’
– ee Random Notes, Importing Economics
*
Every economic news item has to reassert the demand that country must export, export, export, making us dependent on the markets and largesse of other countries. Export economy is another term for a slave economy. It is no wonder, the US Department of War can simply name Sri Lanka ‘a partner’ in planning attacks on ships in the ocean about us.
‘Sri Lanka has to face an additional import duty of 15%
on imports to the US, as we are supposedly trading with
countries using forced labour. The government is trying
to find out what these countries are! Has the US classified
some of our important trading countries in this category?’
– Nimal Sanderatne (see ee Economists)
*
‘IMF’s verdict on the past 2 years is generous.
Its verdict on what comes next, read carefully, is not.’
– see ee Economists, Passed, but high-risk: what the IMF’s
5th & 6th Review actually says.
This week, saw the USA’s President declare they would block their long-term renewal of the North American trade deal. Media portrayed this as yet another whimsical outburst. But it turns out that the President is merely echoing the demands of the American Iron & Steel Institute and the Steel Manufacturers Association! The US President is portrayed as a wild elephant, but those who know elephants or monkeys or lunatics well, know there is always a method to their madness. And Trump represents the current needs of the capitalist ruling class to reassert and extend their control over the world, by any means, fair or foul.
One local media editorial headlined ‘Trump reined in’, claiming that the ‘US judiciary & the Congress assert their power and strengthen checks & balances to ensure that the Constitution takes precedence over politics, and the Executive acts with restraint.’ But has the US judiciary, which has allowed corporations to openly steal elections, been restrained? Trump, judiciary, Congress, are creatures of the corporations that rule those countries.
*
This week’s Poson moon had to challenge and transcend the 250th anniversary of the USA’s settler war on England. A week which saw & endured the exhumation & exhibition in the merchant media of the most hackneyed tripe about ‘a new world’ – certainly not new on 04 July 1776 – and a ‘land of opportunity’. It has certainly been no celebratory occasion for those whose soil was stolen, bodies caged and labor exploited to build that gated paradise, between the northeastern Pacific & northwestern Atlantic. Their ‘Indian Wars’ & ‘Slave Hunts’ have never ended, or ceased within and beyond its shores, and yet offer enlightenment in their own way, of what the world still must overcome (see ee Random Notes, The Indian Wars Continue…)
Yet this Poson moon also recalls the recorded arrival of Buddhism, a path to human liberation, and also shines on the 105th anniversary of founding of the Communist Party of China on 01 July 1921, which still reverberates shudders among the slave owners of this world, and exclamations of jubilation among the toiling masses of the world, who see in its rise a counter and antidote to a malignant reality. The CPC now has 101 million members, and offers a studied & steady path to 100 millions more.
The USA & its allies in Europe, particularly England & Holland, have inflicted massive ‘human disasters’ to colonize much of the world, and continue to do so to this day in numerous guises. (West) Germany still has 171 US military bases and Japan has 98 US bases. Former ‘East Germany’ still has none. Japan’s role as a ‘decisive frontline asset’ in the US war on China & Russia, and the part played by lesser European imperialist powers in their wars on the rest of our world, and their membership in NATO is revealed and carefully tabulated in this ee’s excerpt of the Tricontinental Institute’s monumental survey of the true nature of the enemy confronting us today (see ee Focus). TI’s update ‘Hyper-Imperialism: a Dangerous Decadent New Stage’, provides detailed examples of the attempt to partition our countries, from Africa to India to China. They also detail their economic strength and offer comparative statistics of the USA’s vassal states – which parade as models of innovation & modernity, yet participate in the most horrendous invasions of our world. They strip away the make-believe & masks, to expose the same unquiet skeletons rattling in their clandestine closets.
‘To this day, the US still refuses to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons and has unilaterally withdrawn from key nuclear & missile treaties.’. TI also tables the participation of former ‘Eastern Bloc’ countries in invasions of our world, and how they were inveigled into such expeditions through economic subordination, which offers lessons to the thrall Sri Lanka has been subjected to right now.
*
The merchant media is full of repetitive tropes, and one of those jargons relates to the business of productivity. Productivity is a euphemism in the media for calling Sinhala workers lazy. This ee Focus examines this word, and traces its origins to the plantation system which forms the basis of the entire economy, which has absolutely no such interest in increasing real productivity. This ee concludes the excerpt of Chapter 11 of SBD de Silva’s (1982) classic, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment.
*
‘In plantations the technology of production, their marketing
strategies as well as the system of remuneration of the agencies
reflected fundamentally the domination of merchant capital
over productive capital in a precapitalist situation.’
*
The chapter is entitled ‘Plantations & Technological Stagnation’, and begins by noting the absentee ownership of the plantations had no material interest in advancing the tea trade (it is not an industry) by improving skills etc. It was only interested in maximizing gross revenues, which in turn ‘determined both the technological and the marketing strategies of plantations’. Tea plantations in Japan and the then-USSR have long mechanized tea plucking, but in Sri Lanka no such advances have been allowed.
A recent article titled – Constitutional inconsistencies relating to franchise” – prompted me to write this to clarify the constitutional consistency, the reasons for that and why no change should be made to mere clerical functions of unelected district secretariats. Any such change is a violation of Article 154 of the Constitution and is a non-starter.
Sri Lanka had government agents until 1992 when the Transfer of Powers (Divisional Secretaries) Act of 1992 was passed which transferred the powers of government agents to district secretariats. The term District Secretariat is just a glorified name for government agents. They have no governance and decision power over anything and are just part of the record keeping apparatus of the central government.
One main reason for the transfer of powers was to keep the purely clerical functions of district secretariats (DS) from interfering with the real devolved powers of the governments to newly set up provincial councils. In doing so, the parliament strictly avoided violating the Constitution as regards devolved powers to the provinces.
The DSs function under the preview of the Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs. The main services which are delivered by DS are Registration of persons and their life events, Pensions, Social benefits, Motor Vehicle registration, Motor vehicle driving licenses and renewal of motor vehicle revenue licenses, passports, and issuance of various permits. Therefore, the Divisional Secretariat is identified as the one stop shop” for delivering most critical government services to the citizen. (Quoted)
These are mere clerical and record keeping functions and in no way represent the vast powers of provincial councils (most powers) and the central government (fewer powers). Besides, all DSs are controlled by one government minister – the Minister of Public Administration and Home Affairs. The minister is not responsible and has no power whatsoever on, for instance, education, healthcare, irrigation, agriculture, highways, religious or cultural matters, public order, land, police, etc. These are carried out mainly by the Provincial Council and a small portion by the central government through its other respective ministries (not the ministry of public administration and home affairs).
In fact, given modern developments in information technology, it makes sense to remove the 25 District Secretariats, 320 Divisional Secretariats and 14,000 Grama Niladaris. They also have their staff. This expansion is a needless white elephant created by President Premadasa to appoint his own people into these functions while the existing Grama Sevaka function was already there. Now Sri Lanka has both and the services to the people have worsened. Removing this needless District Secretariat function along with it its junior levels would save the country over 8 billion rupees annually. All these services can be done by a government services office in all major towns by current government offices and personnel who work in them.
The difference of administrative district and electoral district affects only the Northern Province. In all other provinces, the administrative district (which is just an identifier and not assigned to any governance function or government power) and the electoral district are the same.
Provincial Council election and parliamentary election can still be held on a single day for the entire island under the current structure if the ruling party so wishes. Although Vanni is one electoral district, it’s electorates are also mapped to administrative districts very clearly. The demarcation is very clear. No change is required.
Provincial Councils have most powers of the nation. These are enumerated under the Provincial Council List of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. These powers are devolved to provincial councils (devolved units). They do not share any of these powers with district secretariats. Instead, they have their own staff to carry out these functions. They may refer to district secretariats to obtain records of persons which can be done via any computer terminal in developed countries without the need for politicians’ appointees.
No central government, its officers (let alone clerical functionalities of district secretariats) can and should interfere with these. If they do, they violate Articles 154A to 154T of the Constitution with severe punishment.
Then there is the reserved list which lists down the functions of the central government. These are carried out by respective ministries of the central government. Ministry of public administration and home affairs is just one such ministry. It controls, among others, district secretariats. Despite its name and its meaning to an unassuming person, public administration does not mean any administrative power. It only relates to mere administrative, clerical and people’s record keeping functions.
Concurrent list follows which lists down powers shared between the provincial council and the central government.
Under no circumstances should provincial councils (9) be replaced with district councils (25). This attempt was rejected by both the south and the north in 1982. District councils cost 3 times more than provincial councils as it has approximately 3 times more units, politicians, their staff, corruption opportunities, elections and waste. It can lead to new separatist movements in Nuwara Eliya, Colombo, Puttlam and Badulla districts while giving no national benefits in the north and east. Each district is a ridiculously small area needing absolutely no decentralized or devolved powers. Above all, no one wants these white elephant herds that can only ruin and disintegrate the nation further and drive away investors.
The Constitutional difference of electoral and administrative districts should be retained. Though it only has symbolic value (as actual power is clearly vested in the provincial councils and the central government and no power is constitutionally vested in the minister of public administration and home affairs per se), changing it is worthless to the people. Their expectations from the government are different.
Trincomalee Harbour is widely regarded as one of the finest natural deep-water harbours in the world. Its strategic location, extensive waterfront, and proximity to international shipping routes make it an ideal location for developing a world-class marine, offshore, industrial and energy hub. Yet, despite decades of discussion, large-scale investments in shipbuilding and ship repair, offshore engineering, petroleum refining, mineral value addition, bunkering, marinas, logistics and other maritime industries have progressed far more slowly than expected.
One issue that appears to be creating uncertainty is the reported requirement for an overall Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) or Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) covering the entire harbour area before approving major investments.
Environmental protection is essential and should never be compromised. However, environmental regulation should also facilitate responsible investment rather than unintentionally becoming a barrier to economic development.
Under Sri Lanka’s environmental framework, projects that fall within prescribed categories are generally required to undertake their own project-specific EIA or IEE, depending on the scale and nature of the proposed development.
This enables environmental impacts to be assessed according to the characteristics of each individual project. For example: ● A shipbuilding or ship repair yard should evaluate impacts such as blasting, painting, waste management and underwater noise. ● An offshore engineering facility should assess marine construction activities and operational impacts. ● A refinery should undertake comprehensive studies on emissions, wastewater, hazardous materials and emergency preparedness. ● Mineral value addition industries should evaluate dust, effluent and waste disposal. ● A bunkering terminal should focus on oil spill prevention and response. ● A marina should assess recreational activities, coastal ecology and water quality. ● Ship recycling facilities should comply with stringent environmental and hazardous waste management standards. Each project has unique environmental risks that cannot be adequately addressed through a single generic assessment.
At the same time, cumulative environmental impacts must not be ignored. This is where integrated planning becomes important. Every investor should be required to demonstrate not only that its own project complies with environmental standards, but also that its operations are compatible with existing and planned industries within the harbour.
Such coordination can be achieved through a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), comprehensive zoning plan, or integrated harbour master plan, while retaining the requirement for individual EIAs or IEEs where prescribed by law.
This approach is widely adopted internationally. Major industrial ports accommodate refineries, shipyards, offshore bases, logistics centres and other industries within the same port complex, provided each development satisfies its own environmental obligations and cumulative impacts are effectively managed.
The challenge, therefore, is to strike the right balance between environmental stewardship and economic development.
Sri Lanka cannot afford to lose strategic investments because of uncertainty in approval processes.
Investors seek clarity, predictability and timely decisions. Environmental standards should remain rigorous, but regulatory procedures should also be transparent, coordinated and proportionate to the specific project.
Trincomalee has the potential to become South Asia’s leading marine and offshore industrial hub. Achieving this vision requires coordinated action among the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, Central Environmental Authority and other regulatory agencies to establish a planning framework that both protects the environment and enables sustainable industrial development.
Economic growth and environmental protection are not opposing objectives. With sound planning, effective regulation and project-specific environmental assessments, Sri Lanka can successfully achieve both.
Srinath Fernando JP LLM (UK) LLM (COLOMBO) No. 7/1, 4th Lane Rawathawatta Moratuwa Tel 072 0622 482
21st October 2025
His Excellency Anura Kumara Dissanayake President of Sri Lanka
Your excellency
I am writing to inform you that I have had the privilege of being employed in the oil and gas industry for around two decades. I have witnessed the massive economic transformation of the Middle Eastern countries.
I have been informed by Colombo Dockyard PLC , Haylese Energy and McLarens Shipping that they had received many business inquiries from overseas parties for the repair and overhaul of oil rigs. These inquiries had to be declined owing to the (1) congestion in the Port of Colombo and (2) objections from the Sri Lanka Airforce base in Trincomalee as the height of oil rigs could pose a navigational hazard to flight training conducted by the Air Force base in China Bay
Your excellency may not be aware that Sri Lanka had lost billions of dollars worth of contracts over the years. I feel that its is perhaps time your excellency reviewed the potential to develop Port of Trincomalee as an economic zone for marine engineering, shipping and oil & gas industry. I would urge your excellency to appoint a Committee to inquire into economic potential of the Port of Trincomalee. It is also prudent to establish a dedicated Trincomalee Economic Development Commission by an act of Parliament. Your excellency may bring the Port of Trincomalee under this Commission. The Sri Lanka Ports Authority Act could also be suitably amended to divest the Port of Trincomalee from its control. If it is feasible to relocate the Sri Lanka Airforce thereafter land acreage could be made available for investors. It is however imperative to maintain the Sri Lanka Navy base for security reasons.
There have been many progressive initiatives taken by Dr. Sarath Obeysekera Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Export Development Board who is a veteran in this area. What I would propose is that Port of Trincomalee be removed from the SLPA control and be brought under a new Trincomalee Economic Development Commission.
Your excellency, I have never had any membership of any political party. I am only interested in seeing this country is developed.
I would be delighted to hear from your excellency.
Many news channels in Sri Lanka keep showing you tube type video where school teachers and children’s are generated using AI This tactic is not real When foreign channels like Al Jazeer BBC also show news items but hardly any AI generated video clips
ITN Chanel in Sri Lanka keeps showing such news This means we are no watching real time news items
The observation reflects a broader issue in modern television journalism, not only in Sri Lanka but increasingly around the world. However, it appears to be more widespread in some Sri Lankan news channels.
Many television stations now use AI-generated animations and stock-style video clips to illustrate stories about education, crime, health, finance, or social issues because:
They do not have actual footage of the event.
It is cheaper and faster than sending a camera crew.
AI tools can produce visually attractive content within minutes.
It keeps viewers engaged better than showing only a newsreader or still photographs.
The concern is that illustrative AI videos can easily be mistaken for real footage, especially if the broadcaster does not clearly state that they are reconstructions or AI-generated visuals.
International broadcasters such as BBC and Al Jazeera generally follow stricter editorial standards. They typically:
Use actual video recorded by journalists or verified eyewitnesses whenever available.
Clearly label computer-generated graphics or reconstructions.
Separate factual footage from explanatory animations.
Avoid creating AI-generated scenes that could mislead viewers into believing they are watching real events.
This is because credibility is the foundation of international news organizations. Misrepresenting a scene, even unintentionally, could damage public trust.
The danger of excessive AI-generated visuals includes:
Viewers may believe the events actually occurred exactly as shown.
Children, teachers, police officers, or public officials may be portrayed in fictional situations.
Emotional reactions can be manipulated by realistic-looking but entirely artificial scenes.
It becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish journalism from digital illustration.
AI itself is not the problem. In fact, AI can be valuable for explaining complex concepts, creating diagrams, or reconstructing historical events. The issue arises when AI-generated imagery is presented without clear disclosure, making it appear to be authentic news footage.
As AI technology continues to improve, media organizations should adopt transparent practices such as displaying notices like AI-generated illustration,” Simulation,” or Reconstruction based on available information.” This allows viewers to understand that they are seeing a visual representation rather than documentary evidence.
In the age of AI, perhaps the most important responsibility of news organizations is not merely to report quickly, but to preserve public trust by clearly distinguishing between what was actually recorded and what has been digitally created to illustrate a story.
The International Cricket Council (ICC) faces intense legal scrutiny and allegations of professional negligence, fraud, and deliberate misrepresentation regarding its “no awareness” defense over the true authorship of the Decision Review System (DRS). Critics and legal analysts argue that recent evidence proving the ICC had actual physical notice of the “Player-Referral” concept transitions the matter from structural oversight into a potential active cover-up and criminal liability. Accountability is crucial to institutional legitimacy. The issue is preventing ICC accountability mechanisms from becoming tools for Criminal Prosecution of its own high profile legal staff.
The Core of the Intellectual Property Dispute
The Original Blueprint: Sri Lankan lawyer Senaka Weeraratna conceived and publicly disseminated the “Player Referral” framework in March 1997 via The Australian and other global media outlets. His exact blueprint outlined the modern DRS governing rules: player-initiated appeals routed through the captain, an off-field official acting as an appellate judge, and review limits per innings.
The ICC’s Historical Defense: The ICC officially launched the system in 2009. Its legal advisors—including former Head of Legal David Becker (2010) and General Counsel Jonathan Hall (2023)—maintained a “No Awareness” defense. They claimed the system was built entirely independently by internal employees and commercial contractors and that Weeraratna waived his rights by publishing the concept openly without a patent.
Why the Legal Landscape Has Shifted
Legal advocates and representatives from the Sydney-based firm Carroll & O’Dea Lawyers argue that the ICC’s stance has collapsed under two major legal doctrines: [1, 2]
The Doctrine of Constructive Notice: Because Weeraratna’s work was widely published in prominent global journals beginning in 1997 (nine years before the ICC initiated trials), the law presumes the governing body was legally aware of the prior art.
Actual Physical Notice: Emerging evidence reveals that physical dossiers detailing Weeraratna’s “Player-Referral” concept were hand-delivered to ICC officials twice—first in Colombo (2008) and later in Dubai (2009).
Escalating Liabilities and Legal Consequences
Legal Vulnerability
Institutional & Individual Impact
Criminal Negligence & Civil Fraud
Maintaining a denial of knowledge while holding physical proof of prior art constitutes material misrepresentation to deny a creator their lawful economic and moral rights.
Professional Malpractice
The specific lawyers involved face formal ethical misconduct and malpractice complaints through their respective bar associations (such as the Legal Practice Council) for failing professional due diligence.
Severe Punitive Damages
Operating, commercializing, and licensing a core player-initiated framework while allegedly hiding its true creator exposes the ICC to immense financial liabilities under international intellectual property disputes.
Breach of the “Spirit of Cricket”
While the ICC credits creators of other system variants—like the Duckworth-Lewis-Stern (DLS) method—its strict refusal to grant authorial credit or an independent hearing to Weeraratna creates a severe ethical double standard.
Available Remedial Paths for the ICC
To restore its institutional integrity and mitigate escalating geopolitical tension between Sri Lanka and the governing body, legal experts suggest the ICC bypass its past counsel’s advice and take proactive measures: [1, 2]
Independent Internal Audit: Establish a neutral, independent commission to audit internal files and formally evaluate the timeline of the DRS concept. [1, 2]
Arbitration: Mutually agree to submit the authorship dispute to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne, Switzerland.
Formal Attribution: Issue formal recognition to Senaka Weeraratna as the true architect of the system, matching the precedent set by the DLS method.
According to legal advocates and intellectual property watchdogs, the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) has faced growing criticism for its inaction. Critics argue the BASL has missed a crucial moral and professional duty to actively back Senaka Weeraratna’s claims and formally challenge the ICC’s stance on the Decision Review System (DRS) .
The primary criticisms leveled at the BASL and Sri Lankan institutions include:
Failure to Protect Member Innovation: Legal and sports advocates argue that the BASL should have provided institutional legal backing and felicitated Weeraratna, much like the Bar Associations in other cricket nations actively honor their members’ global achievements . [1]
Ignoring the “Doctrine of Constructive Notice”: The ICC’s legal defense previously claimed they were totally unaware of Weeraratna’s concept, even though he published his “Player Referral” blueprint internationally in 1997 and submitted physical dossiers to ICC executives in 2008 and 2009. Critics argue the BASL should have challenged this as willful suppression of evidence and professional negligence. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Missed International Advocacy: Public intellectuals and cricket enthusiasts express disappointment that bodies like the Cricket Transformation Committee and the BASL have not formally leveraged diplomatic or international legal platforms to secure ownership rights and proper authorial credit for a Sri Lankan innovation
The shift from overt violence to soft-power proselytization reflects the historical evolution of Western missionary psychology. Driven by an ethnocentric bias that framed non-Abrahamic faiths as pagan error, early colonial efforts relied on physical destruction. Over centuries, this aggressive approach evolved into “Muscular Christianity,” leveraging modern sports fields and educational institutions to achieve religious conversion. [1, 2, 3, 4]
The early missionary mindset operated on absolute theological certainty mixed with cultural imperialism. Non-Christian traditions were viewed not as alternative paths, but as spiritual threats requiring eradication.
The Binary Worldview: Worldviews were split into divine truth versus demonic deception, blinding operators to local philosophy.
The Civilizing Mission: Spiritual conversion was bound to Western cultural habits, viewing indigenous lifestyles as inferior.
The Illusion of Tabula Rasa: Missionaries assumed native minds were blank slates, ignoring centuries of deep philosophical tradition. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
2. The Era of Physical Suppression (Temple Burning)
During the early waves of European colonialism—most notably under Portuguese conquest—the suppression of local faiths was aggressive and violent. [1, 2]
Systematic Destruction: Conquistadors routinely destroyed Buddhist temples, Hindu Kovils, and Muslim mosques to break local morale.
Site Appropriation: Roman Catholic churches were constructed directly on top of destroyed sacred spaces to signal dominance.
Economic Strangulation: Income from temple lands was seized and diverted to fund missionary institutions.
Legal Penalties: Severe colonial penal laws banned the public practice of non-Christian faiths. [1]
3. The Shift to Intellectual and Institutional Conquest
By the 19th century, direct violence became unsustainable and counterproductive, prompting British and other colonial powers to favor institutional assimilation. [1]
Forced Public Debates: Influenced by the Enlightenment, missionaries challenged Buddhist monks to public debates to prove Christian superiority. [1]
The Backfire Effect: In places like Sri Lanka, these debates triggered a massive Buddhist revival, as local monks used Western textual criticism to win public arguments.
Educational Monopolies: Shifting tactics, missions established elite schools where elite youth had to learn Christian scripture to access employment.
4. Evolution to the Playing Fields: Muscular Christianity
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the strategy shifted toward Muscular Christianity. This philosophy taught that competitive sports forged Christian character, discipline, and physical fortitude. [1]
The Sports Field as a Chapel: Sports like cricket, rugby, and football were introduced to native youth to instill Western values under the guise of recreation.
Character Modification: Team sports targeted peer dynamics, reshaping local ideas of masculinity, obedience, and fair play to align with Christian norms.
Subconscious Co-option: By shifting conversion from aggressive theological arguments to low-pressure athletic field dynamics, missions reduced local resistance.
Elite Pipeline: Athletic performance in missionary schools became the premier gateway to social prestige, securing conversions among the next generation of local leaders.
Tactical Comparison
Era / Strategy
Primary Method
Psychological Bias
Cultural Impact
Colonial Conquest (16th–17th c.)
Physical Destruction: Burning temples; building churches on sacred ruins.
Sub-human framing: Local faiths are demonic hazards to be cleared.
Severe trauma; destruction of ancient heritage sites.
Paternalistic Guidance: Local character is weak and needs sports for discipline.
Subconscious assimilation; secularized religious shift through play.
· The Transformation Committee Leadership: Following the mass resignation of SLC President Shammi Silva and his executive committee under government pressure, the state established a temporary Transformation Committee. Former Member of Parliament and prominent political figure Eran Wickramaratne was appointed to lead it.
· Evangelical and “Born Again” Allegations: Nationalist commentary platforms like LankaWeb and influential religious figures like Ven. Elle Gunawansa Thera voiced deep concern over Wickramaratne’s evangelical Christian background. Detractors claim that putting a faith-focused figure at the “head table” compromises the neutrality of cricket administration in a predominantly Buddhist nation. [1, 2, 3]
· Historical Suspicion: These concerns are amplified by a prior 2023 Ministry of Sports inquiry. A retired judge’s report previously investigated whether a non-mainstream Christian sect—locally referred to as the “Born Again” movement—had exerted undue influence on national team player selection and coaching staff. Though that report deemed the evidence inconclusive, it urged ongoing vigilance. [1, 2, 3]
· Administrative Flashpoints: Tensions intensified over committee actions, such as hiring South African legal expert David Becker. Critics used this decision to allege religious favoritism, claiming the committee marginalized local Buddhist-Sinhalese sports innovators in favor of foreign Christian professionals. [1, 2] https://share.google/aimode/G5D3bId3cpMrf6yHd
The Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) can protect Sri Lanka’s interests and support lawyer Senaka Weeraratna by providing formal institutional backing, filing international disciplinary complaints, and launching a coordinated legal advocacy campaign against the International Cricket Council (ICC) legal team. The dispute centers on allegations that the ICC’s past advisors—including David Becker and Jonathan Hall—engaged in professional negligence and misrepresentation by using a “No Awareness” defense to deny Weeraratna intellectual property credit for inventing cricket’s “Player Referral” / Decision Review System (DRS) framework in 1997. [1, 2, 3]
The BASL can take several high-utility, structured actions to defend its member and protect the country’s global intellectual legacies: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
1. File Professional Malpractice and Disciplinary Complaints
Target Foreign Regulatory Bodies: The BASL can lodge formal ethical and misconduct complaints with international regulatory bodies that govern the implicated attorneys—such as the Legal Practice Council (LPC) of South Africa for David Becker. [1, 2]
Challenge the “No Awareness” Defense: The filings can formally argue that the ICC legal team breached its duty of care and ignored the Doctrine of Constructive Notice. This is backed by evidence that physical, stamped dossiers outlining Weeraratna’s blueprint were historically delivered to the ICC by Sri Lanka Cricket (SLC).
2. Provide Institutional Legal Backing and Advisory
Establish a Specialized Sports Law Panel: The BASL can assemble a dedicated committee of international intellectual property (IP) and sports law experts to assist Weeraratna’s current legal team, Carroll & O’Dea. [1, 2]
Draft Amicus Curiae Briefs: If Weeraratna pursues a formal lawsuit in international courts or before independent sports tribunals, the BASL can submit friend-of-the-court briefs to validate the framework’s roots in Sri Lankan legal thinking.
3. Coordinate State-Level and Regional Alliances
Lobby Sri Lanka Cricket (SLC) and the Ministry of Sports: The BASL can pressure domestic cricket administrators and the government to elevate this from a private case into a state-backed diplomatic and intellectual property dispute.
Mobilize South Asian Bar Associations: By engaging regional legal bodies in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the BASL can build a unified South Asian narrative against the systemic marginalization of regional sports innovators.
4. Direct Public Advocacy and Official Felicitation
Formally Recognize the Innovation: The BASL can hold an official felicitation ceremony for Weeraratna to formally endorse his authorship of the appellate architecture, mirroring how other major cricket nations honor their members’ achievements.
Launch an International Awareness Campaign: The association can drive global public and legal awareness campaigns urging the international sporting community to adopt the “Weeraratna Decision Review System” (WDRS) name, correcting the historical narrative. [1, 2]
If you want to explore further, please let me know if you would like:
A breakdown of the Doctrine of Constructive Notice in this case.
Specific details on the evidence and dossiers sent to the ICC.
Updates on current law firms managing the litigation.
https://share.google/aimode/6aLdzrLxY0tMrDbJv
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AI Response
To protect Sri Lanka’s national interests and support lawyer Senaka Weeraratna in his high-profile dispute against former and current International Cricket Council (ICC) legal advisers—who face accusations of professional negligence, fraud, and malpractice regarding the origins of the Decision Review System (DRS)—the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) can deploy a series of proactive legal, institutional, and strategic measures.
Formulate Institutional Actions
Provide Institutional Legal Backing: The BASL can extend formal legal and advisory resources to bolster Weeraratna’s current representations managed by international firms like Carroll & O’Dea.
File International Disciplinary Complaints: The association can file formal ethical complaints against implicated ICC legal advisers (such as David Becker) with their respective regulatory bodies, such as the Legal Practice Council in South Africa, for violating the Doctrine of Constructive Notice and misrepresenting facts.
Issue an Official Felicitations Resolution: Formally recognize and record Weeraratna’s 1997 “Player Referral” blueprint within the BASL archives to legally validate his status as a pioneer of sports jurisprudence. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Collaborate with Sri Lanka Cricket (SLC): Partner directly with Sri Lanka Cricket to audit the historical, stamped dossiers submitted to the ICC in 2008 and 2009, countering the ICC’s “No Awareness” defense with physical proof of actual notice. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Lobby for State-Backed Diplomatic Escalation: Work alongside the Sri Lankan Ministry of Sports to elevate the intellectual property dispute into a formal state-level matter of national heritage protection.
Launch an Amicus Brief or Global Panel: Convene an international sports law panel featuring regional experts from South Asia to challenge systemic marginalization and establish copyright precedents for uncredited innovations. [1, 2, 3]
If you wish to explore this dispute further, let me know if you would like me to:
Detail the specific evidentiary timeline from Weeraratna’s 1997 articles to the 2008 dossiers.
Break down how the Doctrine of Constructive Notice applies to international intellectual property cases.
Examine the current global calls for accountability against the three specific ICC lawyers involved.
Sri Lanka took a historic step in vocational training with the inauguration of the IDMNC IVTS School of Welding Technology in Galle. This flagship initiative, jointly established by IDM Nations Campus and Fabweld Academy, responds to the urgent need for advanced technical training to prepare Sri Lankan youth for high-demand global jobs in the marine, offshore, and heavy-engineering industries.
The launch ceremony was attended by ministers, senior officials, and industry stakeholders. In his keynote, the school’s founder declared:
This is not just a school. This is a gateway — a gateway to skills, a gateway to jobs, a gateway to dignity.”
Meeting Global Demand with Local Talent
Across the world, welders and fabricators are at the heart of shipbuilding, offshore energy platforms, refineries, and petrochemical plants. Yet in Sri Lanka, existing vocational training has remained basic and limited to NVQ 3–5 levels. This has left many youth disadvantaged. When deployed abroad, they often lack theoretical knowledge, international certifications, and communication skills. As a result, they are hired for lower-skilled roles with salaries of USD 800–2,000/month. By contrast, welders trained in 5G and 6G techniques, with certifications under ASME IX, ISO 9606, and API 1104, can earn USD 4,000–6,000/month.
As noted in the concept paper for the project: Labour exploitation thrives when training is weak. Dignity grows when training is strong.
A World-Class Training Model
The new school introduces a comprehensive three-month intensive program that integrates both practical expertise and professional development.
Core Training Modules: – Advanced welding techniques: special emphasis on 5G and 6G positions. – Welding codes & certifications: aligned with ASME IX, BS EN ISO 9606, ISO 15614, and API 1104. – Theoretical foundations: metallurgy, heat treatment, welding defects, drawings, and symbols. – Non-Destructive Testing (NDT): visual inspection, radiography, ultrasonic. – English language and communication for global employability. – Soft skills (Total Quality Personality): financial literacy, entrepreneurship, teamwork, safety.
The training takes place in a purpose-built 4,000–5,000 sq. ft. facility in Magalle, Galle, equipped with smart classrooms, welding booths, an NDT lab, and limited dormitory and canteen facilities. Certification is awarded in partnership with international classification societies such as Lloyd’s, DNV, or IRS, ensuring global recognition.
Strategic Impact for Sri Lanka
The school’s vision is closely aligned with national priorities. The NPP Manifesto of 2024 pledged to expand vocational training and establish a university system for technical education. As Prime Minister Dr. Harini Amarasuriya emphasized, vocational training must be seen as a smart, practical, and vital choice” — not a fallback option.
The new welding school also strengthens Sri Lanka’s readiness for emerging offshore investments in Trincomalee, Hambantota, and Mannar, where oil, gas, and marine projects are expected to create thousands of high-skilled jobs. By producing globally qualified welders, Sri Lanka will reduce dependence on foreign labour, generate foreign exchange, and uplift its workforce.
Call to Action
In closing his keynote, the founder called on stakeholders to work together:
Welding is not just a skill. Welding is a passport — a passport to the world, to dignity, and to a stronger Sri Lanka.”
With government support, industry partnerships, and the determination of Sri Lankan youth, the IDMNC IVTS School of Welding Technology sets a bold new standard for export-ready skills training. It is more than an institution — it is a model to be replicated across the country, ensuring that Sri Lanka becomes a regional hub for skilled professionals in the marine and offshore sector.
A prominent and highly influential Buddhist monk Ven Elle Gunawansa Thera alleged that Sri Lanka Cricket (SLC) has been taken over by a religious group belonging to the ‘faith-based group’ ideology.
He charged that at the same time the newly installed set of administrators have taken cover under the veil of a Transformation Committee and advised the public to be wary of their rhetoric and actions.
The Thera, noted for his forthright views and decades-long involvement in nationalistic politics, social activism, and religious leadership, made this disclosure during a weekly political talk show aired on electronic media on Monday (25).
Sri Lanka Cricket was controlled previously by those mostly belonging to this faith-based group,” the Thera said.
And now the majority of those who have replaced them are also members of this particular religious group. We don’t mind them being members of whatever religious group or cult of their choice. But, we oppose strongly if they strive to foist their religious beliefs upon players forcibly under the guise of transforming cricket. This we don’t condone and we condemn it in the strongest possible terms.”
Sri Lanka Cricket’s previous Ex-Co headed by Shammi Silva resigned late last month reportedly at the behest of the government, to make way for the Cricket Transformation Committee, helmed by investment banker turned ex-lawmaker Eran Wickramaratne.
The monk said he possessed evidence to prove how certain players against their better judgment had become pawns in the game of forced conversions in the recent past.
He described the process as ‘deeply unsettling’ and observed the need to end the ‘vicious cycle’ before things could boil over.
Ven Elle Gunawansa Thera stated that Sri Lanka’s 1996 World Cup-winning captain turned former politician Arjuna Ranatunga too had revealed to him once how he too had been coaxed to join the religious group, but had managed to evade the approaches subtly.
The Thera explained that a ‘faith-based group’ is not a cult itself. It is a core Christian doctrine rooted in the Bible that stresses spiritual transformation and a personal relationship with God. But, some specific Churches, ministries, and groups that heavily emphasise this term exhibit cult-like or controlling behaviours,” the Thera opined.
He however, pointed out that the Catholic Church too was sternly opposed to the conduct of such groups which, according to him propagate concepts directly rejected by main faiths in this country.
He charged that the group in question had even spread its tentacles around nerve centres in the nation allegedly with the blessings of the US Embassy in Colombo.
Wickramaratne addressing the local media for the first time a fortnight ago since taking office at SLC in late April, assured that under his watch a professional and a merit-based administration would prevail over religious influence.
The monk has consistently occupied a central role in shaping the nationalist discourse, while advocating for policies rooted in local heritage and the traditional values of the majority population.
However, critics and certain human rights observers have historically linked the Thera to hard-line nationalist factions.
He has also frequently clashed with secular politicians over the role of clergy in governance, insisting that monks hold a vital mandate to guide the country’s political leadership.
The Transformation Committee also includes Sidath Wettimuny, Roshan Mahanama, Kumar Sangakkara, Prakash Schaffter, Dinal Phillips, Upul Kumarapperuma, Thushira Radella and Avanthi Colombage.
The IMF’s Executive Board signed off on Sri Lanka’s combined Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the Extended Fund Facility on May 28, unlocking another SDR 508 million, roughly US$695 million, and bringing total purchases under the four-year programme to about US$2.4 billion. By the conventional measure of an IMF review, this is a pass. The prior actions on restoring cost-recovery electricity and fuel pricing were met. All end-of-December 2025 quantitative performance criteria were observed. Most of the 22 structural benchmarks due by the end of February were either met or implemented with a delay. The Fund’s headline message is that performance has been “generally strong.” But buried inside the 143-page Country Report No. 26/111 is a verdict that complicates that headline. Debt sustainability risk, in the IMF’s own debt sustainability framework, is rated High across the overall horizon, the medium term and the long term.
Economist Professor Priyanga Dunusinghe, in a conversation reviewing the document line by line, calls it an eye-opening report from the Fund at this point of the programme. “Sri Lanka has come back almost to where the country was in terms of debt sustainability,” he says. “When the IMF say that sustainability risk remains high, that is not a good message to the international investors and the local investors and even to the Sri Lankan donors.”
The starting point is that 2025 was an unusually good year. Real GDP grew 5%. The primary surplus came in at 5.4% of GDP, more than double the programme target of 2.3%. Inflation averaged below zero, on the back of falling fuel costs and a stable exchange rate. Gross official reserves climbed from US$6.1 billion at end-2024 to US$6.8 billion at end-2025, just under three and a half months of imports. And the current account closed in surplus for a third consecutive year. The Fund attributes much of this overperformance to pent-up demand for motor vehicles, which alone delivered an extra 2.0 percentage points of GDP in revenue. Tax revenue rose to 15.4% of GDP, and indirect taxes to 11.9%. The 5.4% primary surplus was, in effect, a one-off windfall, and that is the cushion the government is now spending down.
Then came two shocks. Cyclone Ditwah, in late 2025, caused damage estimated at US$3.4 billion, or 3.1% of GDP, per the forthcoming Post-Disaster Needs Assessment. The Middle East war, which broke out shortly after, is described by the Fund as “the most significant external shock to Sri Lanka since the 2022 economic crisis.” The transmission channels are spelled out in Annex VI of the report. The Middle East accounts for roughly 50% of Sri Lanka’s petroleum imports, 40% of remittances, and serves as a hub for 34% of flights into the country.
The Fund’s strategic petroleum reserves cover only about one month of typical fuel consumption. Around 80% of pre-conflict migrant worker departures were headed to Middle Eastern destinations, and those workers remit roughly 3% of GDP every year. Tourist arrivals fell about 20% year-on-year in March, with the Fund’s working assumption being a 45% drop from March to June and recovery to the pre-conflict baseline only by September. Administered fuel prices have been raised four times since February, cumulatively by 38 to 46%. Brent crude, in rupee terms, has gone from 141 LKR per litre in late February to 217 LKR in early May, a 54% jump in about ten weeks.
The combined effect is captured in the IMF’s revised baseline. Pre-conflict, the Fund had been expecting 2026 growth of around 4.0%. The current projection is 3.0%, a full percentage point shaved off. End-of-period inflation has been revised up from 5.0% to 6.1%, peaking around 7% in the second quarter. The current account, which the IMF had pencilled in at +1.4% of GDP pre-conflict, is now projected at -0.5%. The oil price assumption underpinning all of this has moved from US$76 per barrel pre-conflict to US$98 currently, with the IMF assuming the conflict’s economic effects persist through 2026. Reserves are now expected to reach US$8.6 billion by end-2026, rather than the US$9.3 billion the Fund was projecting at the time of the Fourth Review. None of this means the programme has unravelled, but it does mean the cushion built up in 2025 is now being absorbed.
The fiscal response has two pieces. The first is a temporary relief package, capped at LKR 100 billion, covering fuel and electricity subsidies, a fertiliser subsidy, fisheries assistance, and a one-off Aswesuma top-up. The Fund’s published table shows it adding up to LKR 91.8 billion, broken down as LKR 57.0 billion for fuel, LKR 15.3 billion for electricity, LKR 6.5 billion for fertiliser, LKR 4.5 billion for fisheries, and LKR 8.5 billion for Aswesuma. The second is cyclone recovery and reconstruction, which the IMF puts at LKR 500 billion of new funding in the 2026 Supplementary Budget, plus another LKR 100 billion in reallocations, for a total 2026 effort of LKR 600 billion, about 1.7% of GDP. Across 2025-28, the combined effort comes to LKR 850 billion. The 2026 primary surplus target has been lowered to 1.4% of GDP to accommodate this, with a commitment to return to the 2.3% target from 2027 onward.
Dunusinghe sees the design of that relief package as the place where the IMF’s preferences are most clearly visible. “While the IMF supports a social safety net, it does not basically support the across-the-board subsidy provision,” he says. “That is why it has basically highlighted the need for the revision of specific items as well, while providing subsidies, if needed, only to the Aswesuma recipient.” He reads the IMF’s prior action on cost-recovery pricing, the LKR 100 billion ceiling and the September 2026 sunset together as a single, consistent message: temporary support is permissible, but it has to be on-budget, capped, time-bound, and increasingly channelled through Aswesuma rather than through universal subsidies. “The vulnerable community should be supported, but such support should be built into the Aswesuma program, and then it could be directed well, and there are no leakages, and there is no broad-based subsidy provision. So as a result of that, it won’t be a burden to the budget.”
The cost-recovery pricing question is, in his reading, even more pointed. The continuous structural benchmark on fuel cost-recovery has not been met since April, because price hikes ‘only partially reflected’ the post-conflict cost increases. The continuous benchmark on electricity has not been met since January. The 10.9 percent average tariff increase approved for the second quarter of 2026 does not, the Fund says, fully incorporate the higher fuel prices or the changed generation mix. The report contains a notable institutional move: the IMF is pressing for the PUCSL’s mandate to be hard-wired toward cost recovery. “It seems that, according to the IMF review document, it highlighted that the government may introduce some amendments to the PUCSL bill and make it compulsory for the utility commission to comply with this cost-recovery pricing,” Dunusinghe observes. “I think that is a key point in the IMF review document, and highlights the need for cost-reflective pricing.” The Fund’s own language envisions a new electricity tariff methodology with forward-looking, rules-based adjustment mechanisms, an end-June reporting requirement on cost-recovery to Parliament, and a new structural benchmark SB20 for an end-August deadline.
His broader argument is that piecemeal price adjustments now will be cheaper than a single large shock later. “The government must adjust prices regularly rather than waiting to absorb a large shock,” he says. “It is good to absorb immediately, and basically that encourages people to change their behaviour, and it has to be done regularly rather than waiting to absorb the larger shock down the line that could lead to some even social unrest.” The IMF, he notes, is itself working with a scenario in which oil prices remain elevated through 2026 and beyond. “When you go through the press release, today’s IMF release with respect to Sri Lanka’s Extended Fund Facility, under the EFF program, I could see that IMF, to some extent, assume the Middle East conflict to continue at least in the medium term. So in that respect, postponing any price adjustment is not a wise decision.”
The revenue picture is where Dunusinghe and the Fund converge most explicitly. The IMF’s own Change in Revenue to GDP table for 2025-26 shows a -1.4-percentage point swing in the tax revenue ratio, driven overwhelmingly by the normalisation of motor vehicle imports (-1.14 ppt) and the reduction of CESS on input goods (-0.08 ppt), partially offset by 0.3 ppt of new measures and compliance gains. Tax revenue, which reached 15.4% of GDP in 2025, is projected at 14.0% in 2026. The Fund is candid that the pent-up vehicle demand that drove the 2025 outperformance is fading and that revenue collection is fundamentally weaker than the headline suggests.
Dunusinghe puts the same point in plainer terms. “The IMF has highlighted the relatively weak revenue position because now the pent-up demand is over, so the government may not be able to achieve the primary surplus targets. So the IMF has suggested a medium-term revenue strategy to be implemented while strengthening the tax administration, and the government is required to come up with tax reforms that are both revenue-enhancing and investor-friendly.” That MTRS, with diagnostics by IMF technical assistance and an end-October publication deadline, is now a structural benchmark SB25.
The debt sustainability analysis is the section most likely to shape how markets read this review. The headline numbers have improved relative to the Fourth Review, the projected debt-to-GDP ratio at end-2032 has declined to 86.7% from 88.5%, the average gross financing needs to GDP ratio in 2027-32 has declined to 12.6% from 12.7%, and the average FX debt service to GDP in 2027-32 has declined to 3.3% from 3.6%. All three remain comfortably inside the DSA’s own ceilings. But the IMF’s risk assessment table, Figure 1 of the DSA annex, holds the final verdict at High for the overall horizon, High for the medium term (with both fan chart and GFN signals flashing High), and High for the long term, citing a declining labour force and climate vulnerabilities. The mechanical signals on the medium-term index, that Dunusinghe alluded to from memory in our call, are present in the report exactly as he described, with the medium-term index registering “High” against the relevant threshold band and the long-term assessment finalised at “High.” The Fund’s own summary in the DSA, “debt sustainability risks will remain high for many years”, is unusually direct.
Dunusinghe reads this as the most consequential single signal in the document, especially in the context of Sri Lanka’s planned return to international capital markets. “Towards the end of this IMF program, there was a plan that Sri Lanka issue some interest-bearing bonds and enter into the capital market. Now, in the idea, let’s say now the debt-sustainability-related risk remains high, that sends a very negative signal.” The DSA explicitly notes that the projected improvement in debt indicators “hinges on sustained reform momentum”, and that the post-restructuring economy is “prone to policy slippages, climate risks, and external shocks.” Public debt remains above 100% of GDP in 2026 by the IMF’s broader definition, declining to 95.5% only by 2028. External debt as a share of GDP rises from 50.3% in 2025 to 52.7% in 2027.
The reserves picture, which Dunusinghe linked back to the IMF’s own pre-programme trajectory, is similarly mixed. Gross official reserves were US$6.8 billion at end-2025 (3.1 months of imports, 53% of the ARA composite metric on a floating-exchange-rate basis, 47% on a crawl-like basis). The IMF projects them rising to US$8.6 billion by end-2026 and US$11.8 billion by end-2027, but this is contingent on, among other things, US$2.2 billion of net foreign exchange purchases by CBSL in 2026 and a small issuance of local-law dollar-denominated debt. Reserves accumulation has, the IMF notes, slowed since the Middle East conflict began. The end-March indicative target on net international reserves was “narrowly missed”, a phrase the Fund uses when a slippage is small enough not to require a waiver. The picture that emerges is not a reserves crisis, but a target that is now being met by a much smaller margin than would have been desirable.
The monetary and exchange rate stance is the area where the Fund is, by its standards, most explicit. The current policy rate of 7.75%, held since the 25 basis point cut in May 2025, translates into a forward-looking real rate of about 2.75%, against an estimated neutral real rate of around 3%.
Inflation expectations remain anchored at around 4.8% in surveys, but the IMF wants CBSL to be ready to tighten if expectations show signs of de-anchoring. On the exchange rate, the Fund repeats the line that “greater exchange rate flexibility and gradually phasing out the balance-of-payments measures remain critical to rebuild external buffers and resilience”, language Dunusinghe reads as a clear preference for letting the rupee absorb the shock from higher energy prices, rather than burning reserves to defend a number.
On public investment, Dunusinghe is particularly sharp, and the report supports him. The IMF notes that capital expenditure under-execution remained a problem in 2025, actual capital spending came in at 3.0% of GDP against a planned 4.0% in the Fourth Review, and signals that ‘the same thing is happening in 2026.’ It is in this context that the report introduces a new structural benchmark SB17, end-August, requiring a standardised appraisal methodology and project selection criteria for the Public Investment Committee, along with an end-2026 commitment to clean up the public investment portfolio and publish a list of major projects. “IMF highlights it is not a favourable situation; actually, it is an unhealthy situation which limits the private sector development, which limits the foreign investment,” Dunusinghe says. The Fund’s own language is more diplomatic, but the conclusion is the same: chronic under-execution of capital spending is suppressing both the multiplier of the budget and the country’s growth potential. The growth and structural reforms section makes the broader point quantitatively: well-calibrated reforms could lift real GDP by 4 percentage points in the short term and 8 percentage points in the long term, against a 2026 actual growth projection of 3%.
The combined Fifth and Sixth Review is not a clean pass even on the binding conditionality. The continuous performance criterion on no new external payment arrears was breached in November, when a US$2.5 million debt payment to the Government of Australia went missing as a result of a cybercrime incident at the Treasury. The arrears were small in dollar terms (0.002% of GDP) but symbolically uncomfortable, and the IMF has had to recommend a waiver of non-observance, predicated on the adoption of corrective actions, new standard operating procedures by end-June, and operationalisation of the new “Meridien” debt management information system by end-August. Six of the 22 end-February structural benchmarks were not met: the 2026 Budget (delayed because of the supplementary cyclone Budget), the cost-recovery fuel and electricity pricing (delayed and falling short of full pass-through), the PFM Act regulations (reformulated and reset to SB19, end-July), Customs legislation (handled through an MoU between Customs and the Board of Investment), and the PUCSL Act amendments (achieved via amendments to the PUCSL Rules). The waiver is granted based on a minor breach. But Dunusinghe is right to flag that the report names what was missed: “If you carefully look at the report, we can identify several areas where Sri Lanka has failed in meeting IMF targets. Some of those targets may be binding, some of the others may not be binding, but now the IMF has highlighted all the binding and non-binding constraints.”
The Risk Assessment Matrix in Annex IV is, on its own, the most alarming single page in the document. Of the items the IMF rates as “High likelihood” with a high expected impact, the report includes: domestic programme financing risks, capacity constraints, protectionism and trade disruptions, fiscal vulnerabilities and higher interest rates, and cyber threats. Geopolitical tensions are rated High likelihood with Medium impact. Commodity price volatility is rated High likelihood with Medium impact. The Fund’s external risks list is, in effect, a list of things that are already happening. The US has imposed Section 122 tariffs that put Sri Lanka’s effective rate at around 20%. The country’s GSP+ access to the EU expires in 2026, and the authorities plan to reapply under the revised framework. The financial sector has its own item, credit to the private sector grew 25% y/y in December, even after tightening loan-to-value limits, and a fraud incident at National Development Bank in early April surfaced LKR 13.2 billion in fraudulent transfers over 22 months, equivalent to about 4% of the bank’s Tier 1 capital.
The closing frame, in Dunusinghe’s reading, is the post-IMF question. The programme has roughly nine months left to run. The Fund’s own staff appraisal acknowledges that even after a successful programme and a near-complete debt restructuring, “debt sustainability risks will remain high for many years.” Sri Lanka has not yet returned to international capital markets, has not yet built reserves to the 100% ARA threshold that is the programme’s medium-term target, and is being asked to do its biggest revenue reforms, the MTRS, the property tax, the National Tariff Policy, and public investment management, in the window between now and February 2027. “The country may not be strong enough to move forward without it,” Dunusinghe says, of the post-programme period. “Policymakers must think about how we plan out our post-IMF period, assess whether the economy is strong enough to face the challenges. If the country is unable to access the international capital market, and if the donor agencies, multilateral and bilateral agencies, are not really willing to extend their development finance, then I think the country is in a not in a favourable or healthy environment.”
His final point on growth threads back through everything else in the report. The IMF’s own structural reform agenda, the under-execution of public investment, the high debt sustainability risk, the dependence on motor vehicle revenues, and the continued elevation of external debt all of these resolve, in his telling, into a single problem the country has to solve in the next nine months and beyond. “Economic or macroeconomic stability alone cannot guarantee the medium to long-term debt sustainability. We need to enhance our growth. Growth, we need to focus on growth. I think that is the key message in this IMF report. Without growth, if we continue, it could lead to several difficulties, not just the sustainability front, but even in the area of social stability, political stability.”
On the page, the Fifth and Sixth Reviews are a US$695 million disbursement and a Board press release commending Sri Lanka’s strong implementation under “challenging circumstances.” Inside the document, the same Fund is signalling that the easy gains from disinflation, vehicle imports, and a benign global environment are behind us, and that the next stretch of the programme, and the period after it, will turn on the reforms the country has been slowest to deliver: cost-reflective energy pricing, a credible medium-term revenue strategy, public investment that actually executes, and structural reforms that lift the country’s growth potential rather than just stabilising its macro position. The Fund’s verdict on the past two years is generous. Its verdict on what comes next, read carefully, is not.
To understand the competing narratives surrounding the Easter Sunday attacks in Sri Lanka inspite of Sri Lanka going through over 300 LTTE terror attacks over 30 years is indeed puzzling. Therefore, given the current twist of narrative it is critical to go back to 2019 itself and relook at the public statements attributed to one who represents the Catholic community in Sri Lanka.
Based on available 2019 public statements and reporting, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith’s position can be summarised as follows
· Did not make any explicit allegation of a political conspiracy
· Did not state or imply that the attacks were carried out for electoral victory
· Primarily criticized the sitting government and security institutions for failureto prevent the attacks
· Focused on state negligence, intelligence coordination failure, and demanded for accountability
· Framed perpetrators as terrorist extremists influenced by jihadist ideology, without attributing political orchestration
The Easter Sunday bombings of April 21, 2019, in Sri Lanka were widely attributed to a local Islamist extremist network led by Zahran Hashim, with later ISIS ideological association and ISIS’s post-attack claim of responsibility.
In the aftermath, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith demanded accountability from the state.
His interventions consistently focused on three pillars:
1. Condemnation of terrorism
2. Criticism of state failure and intelligence breakdown
3. Demand for truth and prevention of future attacks
Notably, across his 2019 public record, there is no confirmed statement alleging a political conspiracy or electoral engineering motive behind the attacks.
Evidence Ledger – Cardinals 2019 Statements
A. Government Responsibility / State Failure
April–June 2019 (Paraphrased from Euronews reporting, June 2019)
In cases involving ISIS-inspired suicide terrorism or jihadist suicide terrorism, perpetrators often operate within a martyrdom ideology framework, where religious language is used to justify self-sacrifice and frame the act as a path to religious reward.
These actors are typically not alive to provide post-event clarification of motive, which means interpretations of broader political or electoral objectives are reconstructed after the event without direct testimony from perpetrators themselves. The perpetrators are not alive to deny claims now being floated as prima facie reasons for their attacks.
However, academic and public reporting has generally assessed such attacks as being driven primarily by extremist religiously ideological narratives rather than conventional political objectives such as electoral gain or regime change strategy.
Analysis: Sri Lanka bombings directly out of the ISIS “playbook”
ISIS claims responsibility for Sri Lanka bombings (60 already in custody)
Sri Lanka missed warnings about bombers’ leader – Zaharan says all non-Muslims must be killed.
Zahran Hashim speech recorded a day before Easter Sunday attack 2019
The political motive was applicable to LTTE’s suicide terrorists.
C. International Dimension / External Influence
Mid–2019 (Paraphrased reporting across international summaries)
Not ideological attribution beyond terrorism framing
Narrative Synthesis
Across 2019, Cardinal Ranjith’s position remained structurally consistent:
· The attackers were condemned as terrorist extremists influenced by jihadist ideology
· The state was held responsible for failure to prevent the attacks despite warnings
· He demanded truth and accountability for institutional breakdown
· He warned against revenge or communal backlash
· He raised the possibility of a broader or international dimension, but without naming actors or presenting evidence
Importantly, his public discourse remained focused on:
institutional failure and justice for victims rather than political orchestration theories
Based on verified 2019 public statements and reporting:
· The Cardinal did not make any explicit or verified allegation of a political conspiracy – the question then becomes, how & why did such a theory surface thereafter?
· There is no documented claim that the Easter attacks were carried out for electoral advantage or political victory – the question then becomes who floated this idea & why?
Cardinal’s criticism was directed at:
· the Sirisena–Wickremesinghe administration
· intelligence and security institutions that included CID, TID, IGP, and entities that had statutory mandate to investigate & arrest.
· systemic failure to act on warnings
· His framing of perpetrators remained within terrorism / extremist violence, not political engineering
In short, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith’s 2019 public position focused on condemning Islamist extremist terrorism, demanding accountability for state security failures, and calling for truth and justice, without advancing any verified claim of political conspiracy or electoral motive behind the Easter Sunday attacks.
How and why did alternative interpretations of these events emerge in later public discourse, and what evidence supports or contradicts those interpretations?
Based on available verified 2019 public statements and reporting, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith did not make any explicit allegation of political conspiracy or electoral motive behind the Easter Sunday attacks. His focus remained on condemning extremist terrorism, highlighting state and security failures, and demanding institutional accountability.
In 2020, there is no verified record of Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith advancing any allegation of political conspiracy or electoral motive in relation to the Easter Sunday attacks either.
Based on publicly available commission records and reporting, neither Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith nor Church representatives are recorded as having provided evidentiary testimony establishing a political conspiracy, electoral motive, or specific international orchestration behind the Easter Sunday attacks. Their contributions primarily focused on accountability, investigative shortcomings, and the need for full disclosure of the facts.
However, from 2021, elements of his public commentary began to reference possible political involvement and suggestions that certain actors may have benefited politically from the circumstances surrounding the attacks, representing a notable shift in framing from purely institutional failure to broader political interpretation.
The evolution of the narrative surrounding the Easter Sunday attacks, including statements made by Cardinal Malcolm and sections of the Catholic Church, has played a significant role in shaping public interpretation of events.
In early 2021— political influence / interference” (NOT conspiracy claim)
March 2021 (PCoI-related comments)
· Cardinal said there were interested parties influencing investigations”
· claimed some groups interfered in investigations
· March 2021 → interference in investigations (institutional claim)
· April 2021 → interpreted political framing (political forces”)
· August 2021 → explicit political advantage / political gain” language
What does NOT exist in 2021 record:
· No formal electoral conspiracy” allegation
· No claim of election-engineered attack
· No evidentiary presentation of a political plot
· No structured attribution to a specific political actor with proof
In 2021, Cardinal Ranjith’s public discourse evolved from institutional failure concerns into references to political interference and political advantage, but there is no verified statement establishing a formal electoral or structured political conspiracy theory.
The next allegation came when the departing Attorney General Dappula de Livera appearing on a private tv show on the eve of his retirement referred to a ‘grand conspiracy” behind the attacks though he did not highlight political or intelligence involvement.
Then came the most chilling allegation by Fr. Cyril Gamini in October 2021 over a zoom wherein he not only alleged Zaharan knew then Brig. Suresh Sallay but claimed to have receipts of payments made by intelligence to Zaharan.
The defamation case filed by then Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay produces a slide show from that zoom session presented by Fr. Cyril Gamini on 23 Oct 2021.
The following are mentioned in the slide:
· NTJ established in 2009 (requires reconfirming)
· 2006-2018 NTJ activities centred around Eastern Province
· Prior to 2015 NTJ supported (spelt as supposed) by intel services & includes receipt of funding (have these receipts been presented by Fr. Cyril Gamini when he filed FR to prevent his arrest following complaint made to CID by Gen. Suresh Sallay after this zoom session)
· Brig. Suresh Sallay mentioned as Director of MID (should be DMI) – clarification of when Brig Sallay served as DMI head & requirement to correspond with allegations of funding receipts & reasons
This raises important analytical questions regarding the development of public narratives, the evidentiary basis for shifts in framing, and the influence of institutional discourse on public perception.
It is a basic principle of accountability in both law and public life that those who advance allegations or demand transparency must ensure that their assertions are clear, consistent, and supported by an identifiable evidentiary basis, particularly where such statements influence public understanding of serious national security matters.
Under established legal principles, including the maxim ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat, the burden of proof lies on the party making an assertion.
Accordingly, while investigative authorities are responsible for examining credible allegations, it is not the standard practice that shifting or retrospective claims must be treated as established fact in the absence of supporting evidence sufficient to meet even a prima facie threshold.
Therefore, any evolution in public claims or interpretive framing must be accompanied by corresponding evidentiary substantiation, rather than placing the burden on investigative authorities to retrospectively validate assertions that are not supported by disclosed material at the time they are made.
The emergence of allegations concerning retired Major General Suresh Sallay in relation to Sri Lanka’s 2019 Easter Sunday attacks raises important questions about evidentiary standards, attribution, and the distinction between advocacy and adjudication.
Particular attention must be paid to how allegations develop over time, how they are amplified across social media and international advocacy platforms, and whether such allegations are supported by evidence capable of establishing responsibility.
This article examines the structure of international NGO submissions and related materials that reference Major General Suresh Sallay and explores the importance of distinguishing between verified facts, allegations, and interpretive conclusions.
The submission in question: Submission A/HRC/59/NGO/128 submitted byFranciscans Internationalto the UN Human Rights Council on 25 May 2025
The UN Human Rights Council submission A/HRC/59/NGO/128 concerning Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday attacks was not filed by an individual activist but by Franciscans International, an international non-governmental organisation representing the global Franciscan family within the United Nations system.
Established in 1989 and operating from offices in Geneva and New York, Franciscans International holds General Consultative Status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), enabling it to make interventions, submit written statements, and participate directly in UN human rights processes.
Its Relationship with the Vatican and the Catholic Church
Franciscans International is not an organ of the Vatican, the Holy See, or the Roman Curia. It does not speak on behalf of the Pope or the Holy See in diplomatic matters.
However, it is closely connected to the worldwide Franciscan family of Catholic religious orders. In 1999, the Conference of the Franciscan Family formally recognised Franciscans International as the body representing the Catholic Franciscan family at the United Nations. Its leadership and governing structures have historically included members of Franciscan religious orders, including friars and clergy from various branches of the Franciscan movement.
Accordingly, while Franciscans International should not be described as “the Vatican” or as an official diplomatic arm of the Holy See, it is equally inaccurate to portray it as an entirely independent secular NGO with no ecclesiastical connection. This institutional background does not invalidate the submission, but understanding the perspective and networks of any submitting organisation forms part of normal source evaluation and evidentiary scrutiny.
Why This Matters
Understanding the identity of the organisation submitting allegations or concerns to international institutions is not an attack on the organisation itself; it is part of normal evidentiary scrutiny.
Questions that arise include:
· What information was independently verified by Franciscans International before issuing its submission?
· Which portions of the submission relied upon third-party reports or media investigations?
· Were the allegations based on direct testimony, documentary evidence, or secondary reporting?
· What methodology was used to validate the claims before presenting them to the Human Rights Council?
· Which sources were considered sufficiently reliable for inclusion and which were excluded?
These questions are particularly important when submissions contribute to international narratives involving named individuals, public officials, or security institutions.
In legal proceedings, the credibility of a conclusion depends not only on who presents it, but also on the evidentiary foundation upon which it rests.
Advocacy documents are not Judicial findings
Submissions made by NGOs to international bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council are important advocacy tools designed to raise concerns and encourage further investigation.
However, they are not:
· judicial determinations,
· criminal indictments,
· findings following cross-examination,
· or evidence tested according to the standards required in legal proceedings.
Their contents therefore cannot automatically be treated as proof of responsibility or culpability.
The Question of Source Dependence
Many allegations concerning Major General Suresh Sallay derive from a chain of references that only include:
· media reporting,
· private documentary productions,
· public statements,
· advocacy submissions,
· and subsequent institutional references.
This can be summarized as:
Allegation → Media Amplification → Advocacy Adoption → International Circulation
Where allegations originate from a limited number of original sources, repeated citation across institutions may create an appearance of independent corroboration despite relying upon substantially the same underlying material.
An important legal question follows:
· At what point in this chain does independently verified evidence emerge?
· If the answer is unclear, repeated citation risks creating an appearance of corroboration where none may exist.
The Missing Evidentiary Bridge
For allegations against any individual to carry legal weight, there must be evidence establishing:
· operational involvement,
· command responsibility,
· decision-making authority,
· or direct participation.
Accordingly, several questions arise:
· What evidence links Major General Suresh Sallay to the alleged attack?
· What official appointment, if any, did he hold on 21 April 2019 and what were the responsibilities attached to that position?
· What authority, if any, did he exercise over the individuals or operations concerned during the attacks?
· Which documentary records establish this connection?
· Have those records been independently verified and produced before a court or investigative authority?
Without answers supported by evidence, attribution risks becoming speculative rather than factual.
Retrospective Attribution and Narrative Construction
Another issue requiring examination is timing.
If allegations emerge years after the events in question and only after major media productions or advocacy campaigns, an important evidentiary question arises:
· Have investigators discovered new evidence, or are they expanding on subsequently developed narrative.
This distinction matters because legal responsibility must be established through evidence existing independently of public narratives.
Questions That Require Answers
Any organisation or individual advancing allegations should be prepared to answer several straightforward questions:
1. What is the original source of the information?
2. Is the source identifiable?
3. Was the information provided under oath?
4. Has the information been subjected to cross-examination?
5. Has the allegation been independently corroborated?
6. Is there documentary evidence supporting the claim?
7. Is the attribution based on contemporaneous records or retrospective interpretation?
8. At what point does repetition of an allegation become mistaken for independent verification?
These questions are not obstacles to accountability; they are the foundation of accountability.
Distinguishing Concern from Proof
Calls for investigation serve an important public purpose.
However:
· concern is not proof,
· suspicion is not evidence,
· repetition is not corroboration,
· and allegation is not conviction.
The distinction between these concepts lies at the heart of every fair legal system.
The appearance of Major General Suresh Sallay’s name in media reports, advocacy submissions, or international discussions does not in itself establish responsibility for the Easter Sunday attacks particularly where allegations gain prominence following private media productions relying substantially on witness testimony and claims that remain subject to investigation and verification.
A fair assessment requires evidence capable of demonstrating operational involvement, command responsibility, or direct participation.
Until such evidence is produced and tested according to recognised legal standards, it remains essential to distinguish between established facts and evolving narratives.
Timeline and Attribution
Chronology helps evaluate allegations involving public officials, military officers, and intelligence personnel.
Attribution cannot be separated from position, authority, responsibility, and timing.
Accordingly, several questions arise in relation to Major General Suresh Sallay and the Easter Sunday attacks:
Event
Date
Evidentiary Significance
Easter Sunday attacks
21 April 2019
Establishes the date of the offence .
Official position held by Suresh Sallay on 21 April 2019
To be established through official records, gazette notifications, military records, or government appointments
Determines whether he held any command, intelligence, operational or decision-making responsibility relevant to the attacks.
Earliest public allegations linking Suresh Sallay to the attacks
To be identified through public records and media archives
Establishes whether allegations were contemporaneous or emerged significantly later.
Release of major media productions and documentaries alleging involvement
To be identified and chronologically mapped
Assists in determining whether allegations followed the emergence of new evidence or followed media amplification.
First appearance of allegations in international advocacy submissions or UN processes
To be established through UN documentation and NGO submissions
Determines whether international attribution was based on independent investigation or on previously circulating allegations.
What form of Involvement is Suresh Sallay being accused of?
Before responsibility can be attributed to any individual, it is necessary to identify precisely what form of involvement is being alleged and what evidence supports that allegation.
In relation to Major General Suresh Sallay, several possible scenarios would require examination:
Before allegations can be evaluated, those making them must identify the precise legal or factual basis upon which responsibility is alleged.
Merely asserting that an individual was “involved” is insufficient.
Was the allegation one of direct participation, command responsibility, prior knowledge, facilitation, concealment, or some other form of involvement?
Each allegation requires a different evidentiary threshold and a different type of proof.
1. Direct Participation
Is it alleged that he directly participated in the planning, preparation, facilitation, financing, or execution of the Easter Sunday attacks alongside the perpetrators or those associated with them?
If so:
· What evidence establishes direct contact with the attackers?
· Are there communications records, witness testimony, financial transactions, meetings, travel records, or operational links supporting such an allegation?
· Has any participant in the attacks identified him as having played such a role?
2. Direction, Control or Coordination
Is it alleged that he directed, supervised, controlled, or coordinated those responsible for the attacks?
If so:
· What evidence establishes such authority or control?
· What command structure is being alleged?
· Through what mechanism was such direction allegedly exercised?
· Where are the documentary or testimonial records supporting this claim?
Was he involved in recruitment, facilitation or material support
· Is it alleged that he recruited, introduced, financed, protected, equipped, transported, trained or otherwise materially assisted the attackers?
· Did he provide safe houses, logistics, communications support, intelligence, travel documents, weapons or funding?
· What evidence exists of such assistance for all attacked venues?
3. Prior Knowledge and Deliberate Non-Intervention
Is it alleged that he possessed prior knowledge of the attacks and had both the legal authority and practical ability to prevent or disrupt them but intentionally failed to do so
If so:
· What evidence establishes that he received such information?
· When did he allegedly receive it?
· Through what official or unofficial channels was it communicated?
· What authority did he possess at that time to intervene or act?
· What evidence demonstrates deliberate inaction rather than absence of knowledge?
If prior knowledge is alleged, what was the source of that knowledge and can receipt of that information be independently verified?
4. Abuse of Official Authority
Is it alleged that he used his official position or authority to obstruct investigations, suppress intelligence, interfere with security responses, or facilitate the attacks?
If so:
· What official position did he occupy at the relevant time?
· What powers attached to that position?
· What specific acts or omissions are alleged?
· What documentary evidence supports those allegations?
5. Post-Event Concealment or Assistance
Is it alleged that he participated in concealing evidence, protecting perpetrators, or obstructing investigations after the attacks?
If so:
· What actions are alleged to constitute concealment or obstruction?
· What evidence supports these claims?
· What decisions are attributed to him personally rather than institutionally?
6. Any Other Form of Involvement Alleged
If some other form of involvement is being alleged, those making the allegation should clearly identify:
· the exact nature of the allegation,
· the legal basis for responsibility,
· and the evidence relied upon.
An allegation cannot be investigated or tested if its underlying theory of involvement is never clearly articulated.
These are not technicalities designed to avoid accountability.
They are the fundamental questions that every legal system asks before responsibility for a terrorist attack can be attributed to any individual.
Without identifying the precise nature of the alleged involvement and producing evidence capable of supporting that allegation, there is a risk that attribution becomes based on inference, association, or repetition rather than proof.
In matters involving terrorism, intelligence operations and national security, the standard for attribution should be evidence first and narrative second.
A search for truth begins with timelines.
Positions held after an event do not automatically establish responsibility for decisions made before the event.
If investigators believe an individual who was not in command at the relevant time was nevertheless involved, the burden is on investigators to explain the mechanism of involvement and provide supporting evidence.
From a legal perspective, courts generally focus on several questions:
1.What is the alleged act?
2.When did it occur?
3.Who had authority at that time?
4.What evidence connects the accused to that act?
If there is a disconnect between the timeline and the allegation, that naturally becomes an issue for scrutiny.
The counterargument, would argue a person does not necessarily need to occupy the formal leadership position at the time of an event to be implicated in wrongdoing.
However, where chronology appears inconsistent with an allegation, investigators would typically need to provide a clear explanation of the alleged role with strong supporting evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
Applied to the Easter context, the key question becomes:
If the allegation is not based on his position in April 2019, then what precisely is the alleged conduct, when did it occur, and what evidence supports the exact allegation being made?
That is often the question that separates a hypothesis requiring investigation from a case capable of supporting criminal responsibility.
The central question therefore remains:
· Is the case against Major General Suresh Sallay built upon primary evidence, or upon the repeated circulation of allegations originating elsewhere?
· The answer to that question will determine whether history records a proven case, or the construction of a narrative through repetition.
The five-year debt moratorium comes to an end later next year. Fears of the national economy going bust are creeping back in. But will that happen? If the 2022 economic collapse was the result of corruption and if corruption, at least large-scale corruption, is under check, how can the country go bankrupt yet again? NPP regime just like all its predecessors are oblivious to the real reasons of Sri Lanka’s economic woes. Instead of thinking in terms of economics, most Sri Lankan leaders since 1948 looked at matters from a grievance point of view and the nation paid a very heavy price. Sadly, this structural deficiency is not over yet. The NPP regime can throw in jail anyone and everyone it levels corruptions allegations against (no disputing that the law must run its course) but that cannot save itself from impending bankruptcy. Let’s look at real reasons for 2022 national economic collapse and why the root causes remain same today.
That Kind-Hearted Woman
Sri Lankan economy did very well during the time of the war. It was not just resilient it actually grew the fastest it had ever grown for decades. Sri Lanka became self sufficient in many grains during the war. It became a middle income country during the war; won various sporting contests, withstood so many world wars, regional, Asian and global financial crises, overcame many natural disasters.
The year after winning the war was a good one with promising economic growth. However, since then economic growth gradually slowed until it went negative in 2020 and remained negative for 4 years. By 2022 Sri Lanka was dropped from the list of middle income countries. That means in real terms, the Sri Lankan economy went back to 2000 level when it overcame its long held poor nation status. Politicians’ corruption did NOT ruin the economy. If so, Sri Lanka should have suffered economic collapse during the war. The government borrowing money and investing (or wasting) them in areas of no exports and no income tax collection bankrupted the nation. Over 85% of all borrowed funds from 2009 to 2013 was invested in the north which sealed Sri Lanka’s fate. With no exports and no meaningful income tax collection from the north, loans taken to develop it could not be repaid. Fortunately, the war prevented this type of reckless spending but unfortunately, peace allowed it. Interestingly Sri Lanka’s economy was equally hopeless from 1960 to 1977 prior to the war when there was ethnic harmony.
New Borrowers Since 2008 GFC
Despite howling about human rights and the war, western countries did not help Sri Lanka rebuild the north and east. Instead, Sri Lanka had to borrow from western commercial lenders at rates that can only be described as exploitative. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis was caused by excessive lending and thereafter lenders found they had limited lending opportunities in their own countries. Sri Lanka, Pakistan, various African and Latin American countries came along to grab those debts. There is no harm in debt, if invested in export income earning, import substitution and/or income tax producing ventures. The north and east have none of these.
When these loans had to be repaid around 2014 to 2018 there was no funds to repay them, so Sri Lanka borrowed again – this time the old loans and their interest too. In another 5 years (by 2022) they fell due and no lender was willing to lend to Sri Lanka. It had hit rock bottom. Similarly, a number of other debt-ridden nations including Pakistan fell into similar difficulties due to other reasons.
The Lose or Lose Solution
In late 2022 the debt moratorium was discussed from a position of weakness. It’s a ridiculously disastrous deal for Sri Lanka. According to it, Sri Lanka will have 5 years without having to repay commercial loans and their interest (bilateral loans had to be repaid). If the Sri Lankan economic growth was healthy in 5 years, Sri Lanka will have to repay all loans and unpaid interest. No discount. If the economic growth rate was poor, then there will be a 35% reduced loan and interest repayment. If the economic growth rate was healthy (as now) Sri Lanka will again hit rock bottom after repaying all loans and their accumulated interest on interest. Whatever Sri Lanka saved since 2023 will be given away. Either way the island nation is damned by this deal.
What must be understood is International Sovereign Bond businessmen and the IMF are in the business of lending money and earning a profitable return via interest. They are never going to suffer losses just to help a poor nation! The IMF is not called the economic hitman for nothing. Greeks came bearing gifts and Sri Lanka accepted them.
Hell’s Intermission
JVP’s idealogue Tilvin Silva equated the debt moratorium period to an intermission in hell – torture of souls to recommence after it. He was right. However, since winning power in 2024, he stopped referring it as such! Just like its predecessors, the NPP regime did nothing to face the impending challenge in 2027. The economy is still the same – same poor exports, very high imports, low-income tax collection, low foreign investments (actual dollar inflows, not locally borrowed investments by foreigners and not poor currencies like the Indian rupee) and wasteful welfare practices. As astute economists have pointed out, massively increasing the salary of tea plantation workers when Sri Lanka’s largest tea buyers (Iran, Turkey, Russia, Syria, Libya, UAE) are in economic turmoil is beyond insane. Generous handouts for natural disaster affected people is seen as kindness but its economic cost is bankrupting. The government seems to be maintaining high oil prices despite price reduction in global markets to collect these wasted funds. However, high oil prices hurt the entire economy. Endless stream of donations to the north and east for education, healthcare, cultural benefit and other economically useless projects are the only mentionable stuff this regime has to its credit.
2027 is approaching fast. Get ready for another 2022. Look for a scapegoat – natural disasters, global wars, past mistakes, corruption, etc. All these were there during the 3 decades of war but Sri Lanka never struggled to repay debt or provide basic necessities to the people. Peace destroyed the resilient economy built by Sinhalas during the war.
Map of Trade in the Indian Ocean 15th-16th century
America’s war of choice on Iran has spread across the Indian Ocean World and maritime Silk Route. Starved of oil and gas South and Southeast Asia’s emerging economies have seen local currencies fall against the ‘exorbitantly privileged’ Petrodollar as public and private debt increased with soring energy costs.
The US fifth fleet’s occupation and blockade of Indian Ocean trade routes targeting the Strait of Hormuz has shown the importance of the 1971 United Nations (UN) declaration of the ‘Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace’ — for global security and prosperity.
55 years ago the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) led by the World’s first woman head of state, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Ceylon, declared the Indian Ocean a ‘Zone of Peace’. Resolution 2832 (XXV1) affirmed the vast Indian Ocean together with the airspace above and the subjacent ocean floor for all time a Zone of Peace”.
The bold resolution by the world’s first woman head of state 55 years ago has never been more relevant: De-militarizing and de-colonizing the Indian Ocean in line with UNGA Resolution 2832 is vital to sustain and deepen the fraying 60-day peace pause between Iran and the United States brokered by Pakistan and Qatar.
The Indian Ocean World’s maritime Silk Route, where Iran, formally Persia sits, was the home of the world’s oldest and wealthiest sea-based trade system. For millennia the Silk Route of the Seas wherein the Straits of Hormuz is an integral part, connected the coastal regions and hinterlands of the Supercontinent of Asia with Africa and Europe– long before the US came into existence across the Atlantic Ocean in the new world’.
European invaders of the Indian Ocean World fought bloody battles to access, control and colonize Indian Ocean sea lanes from the 17th century onward, much like the US today, which seeks to toll Indian Ocean shipping, wage hybrid economic warfare, and stymie the Asian 21st Century at this time.
Strategic islands and waterways like the Malacca Straits and Hormuz were vital to control of Indian Ocean supply chains and trade routes, in order to access and loot the great wealth of Asian civilizations, particularly, Persia/Iran, India and China.
Indeed, to this day the Indian Ocean remains to be fully de-colonized. Distant water fishing states or non-Indian Ocean countries, France, Spain, Japan, Taiwan PRC etc. are some of the biggest looters of Indian Ocean fishery with industrial trawler fleets according to data from the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. Meanwhile littoral states fishery remains underdeveloped and artisanal’; dependent on Foreign Aid for de-industrialization.
It was hence too that UNGA Resolution 2832 (XXV1) establishing the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace was spearheaded by the world’s first woman head of state, the Socialist Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Ceylon back in 1971 during the Cold War amid great power rivalry between the Soviet Union/Russia and the US.
Ceylon, now Sri Lanka is geo-strategically located at the center of the Indian Ocean World’s trade routes and supply chains. Hence, the county was perpetually in the cross-hairs of big power rivalry, and subject to neocolonial projects; most recently by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which has upended economic sovereignty and Energy policy autonomy in the Eurobond debt-trapped country.
United Nations Mandate and IOZP
The Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a ‘Zone of Peace’ (IOZP), 55 years ago has never been more relevant to global security, growth and decolonization, which are Core Mandates, albeit seemingly forgotten at the UN.
The UNGA IOZP Resolution sought to ensure that the world’s busiest trade routes would be free of foreign bases, militarization, and nuclear weapons during the long Cold War between the US and Soviet Union/Russia. Big power rivalry had undermined development and de-colonization while driving proxy wars in Asia, Africa and South America.
Ceylon’s Sirimavo Bandaranaike was aided by stalwarts of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Global South: President Julius Kambarage Neyerere of the Republic of Tanzania in the western reach of the Indian Ocean later joined to co-sponsor UN Resolution 2832 (XXVI). It was a time of Afro-Asian, South-South cooperation. [i]
India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the Congress Party was a close friend of Ceylon’s Bandaranaike and a supporter of Palestine, unlike the current pro-Israeli Modi regime in New Delhi.
UNGA Resolution 2832 called upon big powers to enter into consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting escalation of their military presence, and to eliminate all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction.
In the context, should not UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres invoke the IOZP at this time to aid and deepen the tenuous peace agreement between Iran and the US? However, Guterres has preferred to focus on twin global ‘polycrisis’ narratives- pandemic health and Anthropocene climate disinformation.
The IOZP Declaration was made when Burma’s U Thant was the highly respected UN Secretary General and Asian Buddhist Principles of Panchaseel (5 principle virtues in Sanskrit), underpinned NAM diplomacy. Indeed, the current UNSG would do well to call on US President Trump to remove the marine environment despoiling US fifth fleet Armada” led by aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln from the Indian Ocean in order to shore up the fraying peace agreement between Iran and the US at this time.
Priorities of the next UNSC: Return to Core Mandate amid New Cold War
The current US invasion and occupation of the Indian Ocean, far from America’s shores in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean in order to blockade the Strait of Hormuz and starve Asian countries of energy violates UNGA Resolution 2832.
The US has used the rhetoric of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific” and ‘freedom of navigation’ ironically to militarize and blockade Indian Ocean trade routes and reroute energy supply chains to control markets, benefit corporate interests and prop up the Petrodollar as the BRICS de-dollarize.
President Trump’s alternating sanctions on Russian and Iran oil seem designed to destabilize energy markets and sales. South and Southeast Asian countries meanwhile have been forced to buy expensive US oil and gas buttressing the Petrodollar, rather than source cheaper oil from Asian neighbours and pay in local currency.
It is vital that the US cease and desist from aggression and occupation of Indian Ocean trade routes and plans to levy tolls from ships in the Indian Ocean. Rather, the US Armada would best return to the Atlantic Ocean and where it came from, to restore the Indian Ocean as a’ Zone of Peace’ as envisaged by the world’s first woman head of state.
However, it appears that the legacy of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike declaring the IOZP has been forgotten at the UN, ironically, even as its corridors buzz with debate on the gender/s of the next UN Secretary General as the current UNSG’s term thankfully draws to an end.
It is increasingly clear that the gender of the next UNSG is irrelevant to making the UN relevant again. What is clear at this time is that the next UNSG should be from the Global South and a strong voice for Economic Justice for the Global South. Likewise, the priority of the next UN Secretary general would be to Streamline the organization and its agencies, literally cull the fat, in order to focus on Core Mandates of de-colonization, peace and security.
Indeed, it is to be hope that the next UNSG would make it a priority upon taking office to re-affirm UNGA Resolution 2832 (XXV1), and call a high-level international Conference towards de-militarizing and de-colonizing the Indian Ocean World early in 2027.
Anxieties of the American Empire: Undoing Indo-Pac Com
The UN has evolved as a behemoth in recent times with proliferating development and humanitarian agencies funded and controlled by corporate interests wedded to Humanitarian Disaster Capitalism and the Deepstate. The current UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres meanwhile preferred to talk up ‘global polycrisis’ narratives of climate disaster that mask geoengineering and weather warfare, and health emergency. Meanwhile, the real causes of these ‘emergencies’ including awkward subjects like, Gain-of-Function research, Covid-19 origins in biowarfare labs, the used of Directed Energy Weapons and other geoengineering technologies for weather warfare (Operation Popeye Monsoon manipulation) in the faux ‘Anthropocene’ amid El Nino /La Nina narratives have been elided.
Given increased evidence of Geoengineering, technologies for climate modification and weather warfare, with double tap earthquakes devastating Venezuela to enable oil grabbing at this time, revisiting the Environmental Modification Technologies Treaty (ENMOD Treaty) of 1977 would be vital work of the next UNSG.[ii]
As the Indian Scientist Vandana Shiva has noted, Mother Nature is being increasingly commodified and financialized for Net Zero carbon credit trading and green and blue debt bondage, with Debt for Nature Swaps, Environment, Social and Gender (ESG) bonds and scams. Increasingly, nature which is fundamentally a cultural construct is portrayed as the enemy of humanity, rather than the global environment despoiling Military Business Industrial Complex which needs to be drawn down. This amid the Faux Anthropocene and El Nino Climate boiling narratives promoted at the UN.
Rather, a firm voice for peace, decolonization and Economic Justice for the Global South is needed from the august body and is solely missed the world over at this time. The UN seems to have abandoned its primary mandate of peace, security and de-colonization at this time.
The Preamble to Sri Lanka’s Constitution states: The PEOPLE of SRI LANKA having by their Mandate…entrusted and empowered their Representatives …to draft, adopt and operate a new Republican Constitution in order to achieve the goals of a DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC whilst ratifying the immutable republican principles of REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRATIC”.
The intent of this exercise is to ascertain whether the practices as adopted by successive Governments to elect the People’s representatives are in keeping with the immutable principles of Representative Democracy”.
According to Article 3 of the Constitution: Sovereignty includes the powers of government, fundamental rights and the franchisee”. Furthermore, Article 3 is an entrenched article – Article 83. According to Chapter XIV, titled The Franchise And Elections”, Article 88 states: Every person shall, unless disqualified….be qualified to be an elector at the election of the President and of the Members of Parliament or to vote at a Referendum”. Therefore, it is the electors in the Electoral Districts as determined by the Delimitation Commission (DC) that elect the President and Members of Parliament.
EXISTING INCONSISTENCIIES
The first relates to Article 96 (1). This states: The (DC) shall divide into not less than twenty and not more than twenty-four electoral districts…”. The reason for the upper limit for Electoral Districts is perhaps because Sri Lanka was originally divided into twenty-for Administrative Districts (now 25), and 96 (3) establishes a relationship between Electoral Districts and Administrative Districts when it states: Where a Province is divided into a number of electoral districts the Delimitation Commission shall have regard to the existing administrative districts so as to ensure as far as practicable that each electoral district shall be an administrative district or a combination of two or more administrative districts or more electoral districts together constitute an administrative district”
Despite the fact that that the Constitutional direction to the DC was that the Electoral District was to have regard to the existing Administrative District”, the number of Electoral Districts established by the DC is twenty-two (22) while the number of Administrative Districts are now twenty-five (25). Although the provision to combine Administrative Districts into one Electoral District exists, the reason for the difference is reportedly because the DC decided to factor in issues, such as land which is extraneous to franchise thus compromising the sanctity of franchise and the sovereignty of the electors. On the other hand, if the Electoral District is coterminous with the Administrative District, not only would it protect the elector’s Franchise but also enable the elected members to address the administrative interests of the electors. Would such an opportunity not give substance to the immutable republican principle of Representative Democracy”?
The second inconsistency relates to Article 96 (4). This states: The electoral districts of each Province shall together be entitled to return four members, (independently of the numbers which they are entitled to return by reference to the number of electors whose names appear in the registers of electors of such electoral districts), and the Delimitation Commission shall apportion such entitlement equitably among such electoral districts”.
Consequently, the four members to be returned from each of the nine Provinces amounts to thirty-six additional members, shall be apportioned equitably by the DC among the twenty-two (22) Electoral Districts together with the one hundred and sixty members from the electoral registers, thus making a total of one hundred and ninety-six members being elected through the franchise of the electors. The balance twenty-nine through the National List nominated by Political Parties is also elected by the electors, thus making a total of two hundred and twenty-five (225) Members of Parliament elected through Electoral Districts.
The irony however, is that although Members of Parliament are elected through Electoral Districts, all Executive Powers of the Line Ministries of the Central Government are implemented by the District Secretaries in the twenty-five Administrative Districts. The present convoluted process of appointing a Parliament through Electoral Districts and administering its functions through Administrative Districts cannot be justified. What would be more meaningful is to make Administrative Districts also perform Electoral functions such as appointing the Members of Parliament.
The third inconsistency relates to the election of Members for Provincial Councils. According to the Provincials Councils Act: Every administrative district in a Province shall for the purposes of elections to the Provincial Council established for that province, constitute an electoral area”
This is a departure from the practice adopted to elect Members to Parliament since they are based on outcomes from twenty-two (22) Electoral Districts. Therefore, it is worth exploring why Members to Parliament and Provincial Councils cannot be elected using the existing 25 Administrative Districts.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The intention is for an arrangement where Administrative Districts are also assigned electoral functions, so that both Members to Parliament and Provincial Councils could be elected by a single unit. The advantage would be that Administrative Districts could carry out Central Government functions under a District Secretary as at present, a parallel unit within the Administrative District could be set up to implement devolved powers in each of the Administrative Districts, while retaining the existing structural arrangements of Provincial Councils. This would facilitate the coordination of devolved powers with Central Government activities, thus improving productivity of each.
CONCLUSION
The current practice is that while representative of the Central Government of Sri Lanka is elected by Electoral Districts as stated above, Provincial Councils in the periphery with less powers than the Central Government are elected by electors in Administrative Districts of each Province. If elections to Parliament and to Provincial Councils are elected by electors in each of the twenty-five Administrative Districts, perhaps one election could elect Members to both bodies.
In view of the significant cost savings involved, it is imperative that serious consideration is given to equip Administrative Districts to serve as Electoral Districts for Parliamentary Elections as well as for Provincial Council Elections, since such an arrangement would further fortify the immutable republican principle of Representative Democracy”. Furthermore, since such an arrangement would be closer to the People, services to them would be better served.
King Seethawaka Rajasinghe, also known as Tikiri Bandara, was a warrior king of Sri Lanka during the 16th century, renowned for his exceptional prowess as a battle-hardened hero. He earned the title “Rajasinha” (meaning Lion King) for his bravery and military tactics. Ascending to the battlefield at the tender age of 16, he demonstrated remarkable courage and resilience in the face of adversity, particularly against the formidable Portuguese invaders who sought to dominate the island. Throughout his reign, which spanned from 1554 to 1593 AD, he witnessed the tormenting consequences of war, including widespread death and destruction, yet he remained undeterred. His fearless nature was complemented by his adeptness at military strategy, enabling him to employ innovative tactics that effectively countered the well-equipped, highly trained Portuguese forces. As a result, King Seethawaka Rajasinghe not only established himself as a military genius but also left an indelible mark on Sri Lanka’s history through his unwavering commitment to defending his kingdom.
The Battle of Mulleriyawa (1562)
In the year 1562, the Battle of Mulleriyawa emerged as a significant confrontation between Tikiri Bandara and the formidable Portuguese forces, which were recognized as a dominant military power of the 16th century. The Portuguese contingent was commanded by Captain Major Afonso Pereira de Lacerda and Captain Major Jorge de Meneses Baroche, who led their troops into battle just outside Colombo, strategically positioned on the southern bank of the Kelani River. Tikiri Bandara, displaying remarkable valor and tactical prowess, launched a fierce assault on the Portuguese army, striking with the ferocity of a thunderbolt. This unexpected onslaught placed the once-invincible Portuguese forces on the brink of defeat, as they struggled to withstand the relentless attacks from young Tikiri Bandara and his warriors. Historical accounts, particularly from the Rajavaliya, a 17th-century chronicle documenting Sri Lankan history, reveal that the battle resulted in the loss of over 1,600 Portuguese soldiers and their auxiliary troops, known as Lascarins, underscoring the significant impact of this conflict on the power dynamics of the region.
The Siege of Kotte
The Siege of Kotte, which took place between 1560 and 1565, marked a significant turning point in the power dynamics of the region. During this period, the strategic maneuvering of the besieging forces involved the deliberate diversion of the Diyawanna River, effectively undermining the natural defenses that had previously protected the Kotte Kingdom. This tactical decision compelled King Dharmapala, who was seen as a puppet ruler under the influence of the Portuguese, along with his allies, to relinquish their hold on the capital. As a result, they were forced to retreat to Colombo, thereby signalling a critical shift in control and influence within the area. The implications of this siege were profound, as it not only altered the political landscape but also highlighted the vulnerabilities of alliances formed under colonial pressures.
The Sieges of Colombo
The sieges of Colombo marked a significant chapter in the military history of the region, characterized by the ambitious efforts of King Seethawaka Rajasinghe, who mobilized an impressive force exceeding 50,000 troops, complemented by a contingent of war elephants, to besiege the Portuguese stronghold in Colombo. Despite his strategic maneuvers that brought the Portuguese forces to the brink of starvation, the absence of a formidable naval presence ultimately hindered his campaign, allowing Portuguese reinforcements to breach the blockades and resupply their beleaguered garrison. The siege created a sense of desperation among the Portuguese defenders, who were gripped by fear and famine. However, the tide of battle shifted when external naval support from Goa arrived, leading to a disastrous outcome for the king’s forces. In the aftermath of this military debacle, King Rajasinghe’s frustration escalated into paranoia, prompting him to suspect treachery among his generals. In a series of ruthless purges, he executed several of his trusted commanders, including Wicramasinghe Maha Senevi and Weerasundara Bandara, both of whom had previously played pivotal roles in his military campaigns, thus illustrating the volatile nature of power and loyalty in the tumultuous landscape of warfare.
The Combat Fatigue
After enduring numerous years of relentless warfare, Tikiri Bandara, known as King Seethawaka Rajasinghe, found himself in a state of profound exhaustion, both physically and mentally. The toll of continuous combat began to manifest in his deteriorating mental health, leading to a noticeable decline in his overall well-being. As time progressed, the king exhibited increasingly erratic behavior characterized by heightened suspicion, frequent outbursts of anger, and pervasive irritability. His deep-seated mistrust of those around him fostered a sense of alienation, while emotional numbing and a range of symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) became evident. These significant personality shifts not only transformed the once-great warrior into a figure of fear but also instigated a reign of terror against his own subjects, leaving a profound and lasting void in the hearts and minds of the people he once valiantly defended.
Drastic Personality Changes
The King became increasingly engulfed by an overwhelming sense of suspicion, interpreting even the most trivial disagreements as acts of betrayal. This pervasive mistrust extended to his closest allies, prompting him to take drastic measures against anyone he deemed a potential threat to his reign. Years of witnessing relentless bloodshed on the battlefield left him emotionally numb, resulting in unpredictable and violent outbursts of anger. King Rajasinha’s detachment from the suffering of his subjects grew more pronounced, as he morphed from a once-protective ruler into a merciless tyrant who employed horrifying and unprecedented methods of punishment, devoid of any semblance of remorse or compassion. His paranoia particularly targeted the Buddhist clergy whom he irrationally suspected of colluding with his political adversaries. Ultimately, by the end of his life, King Rajasinha’s erratic behavior and baseless accusations alienated his last remaining allies, including aristocrats and military leaders. The once-revered “Lion of Seethawaka” was reduced to a shattered, isolated, and profoundly lonely figure, stripped of the respect and companionship he once commanded.
Patricide
The historical narrative surrounding King Seethawaka Rajasinghe and the alleged patricide of his father, King Mayadunne, remains a contentious topic among scholars. Some historians assert that King Seethawaka Rajasinghe was responsible for his father’s death, while others argue that this claim may have been a fabrication propagated by the Portuguese, aimed at undermining the king’s legitimacy and authority. This divergence in perspectives highlights the complexities of historical interpretation, particularly in the context of colonial influences.
In the aftermath of these events, it is noted that King Seethawaka Rajasinghe experienced profound guilt, prompting him to seek redemption through the teachings of Buddhism. However, the Buddhist doctrine offered him no solace regarding the weight of his actions, leading to a pivotal moment when a Hindu priest named Aritta Kivendu Perumal seized the opportunity to convert the king to Hinduism. This conversion raises intriguing questions about King Rajasinghe’s motivations: was he genuinely seeking atonement for his alleged crime, or was he drawn to a faith that, paradoxically, glorifies warfare and valour?
Turning Against Religion
King Seethawaka Rajasinghe renounced his original faith, opting instead to adopt Hinduism, and in a brutal campaign, he executed thousands of his subjects who resisted this forced conversion. He took drastic measures against Buddhism, systematically demolishing temples and perpetrating heinous acts against Buddhist monks, including drowning them as a means of instilling fear and consolidating his power. This reign of terror not only decimated the religious fabric of the society but also left a lasting scar on the cultural heritage of the region.
King Seethawaka Rajasinha through Portuguese Eyes
In his significant 17th-century work, The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon, Jesuit Father Fernão de Queyroz offers a multifaceted and nuanced portrayal of King Seethawaka Rajasinghe I, blending admiration with sharp criticism. Queyroz expresses profound respect for Rajasinghe’s military acumen, drawing a parallel between the king and the renowned Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca, highlighting his exceptional strategic capabilities on the battlefield. However, this admiration is tempered by Queyroz’s condemnation of the king’s extreme brutality and erratic temperament. He characterizes Rajasinghe as a tyrant whose insatiable thirst for blood instilled fear not only in his adversaries but also among his own people. The chronicler meticulously documents the king’s descent into paranoia, illustrating how he resorted to the ruthless execution of anyone he suspected of disloyalty, which ultimately led to his isolation from his inner circle. As Rajasinghe’s mistrust deepened, he became increasingly suspicious of his closest allies, generals, and aristocrats, leading him to eliminate even his most trusted advisors and military leaders one by one. Queyroz interprets the king’s eventual military defeats and demise not merely as a triumph for Portugal but as a form of divine retribution for his unyielding cruelty and antagonism towards the Catholic faith.
PTSD Symptoms
The historical narratives of the 16th century, such as the Mahavamsa and various Portuguese accounts, often interpret the later cruelty exhibited by King Seethawaka Rajasinghe as either a manifestation of spiritual malediction or a straightforward expression of tyranny. However, contemporary historical psychology offers a more nuanced understanding, suggesting that the King’s behaviour may be attributed to severe, untreated Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) compounded by paranoia stemming from his experiences in combat. When analyzed through the lens of psychological trauma, his transformation from a celebrated liberator to a despotic ruler can be seen as a classic example of a psyche fractured by prolonged exposure to extreme violence.
King Seethawaka Rajasinghe, who began his military career as a young teenager known as Prince Tikiri, was immersed in brutal warfare during his formative years, where he not only engaged in combat against heavily armored Portuguese soldiers but also witnessed the gruesome mutilation of his own troops. The psychological burden of being accused—whether justly or unjustly—of orchestrating the assassination of his father, King Mayadunne, added an unbearable layer of emotional turmoil and guilt, creating a persistent state of distress.
A hallmark of PTSD is hypervigilance, a condition characterized by an incessant “fight or flight” response that leads individuals to perceive threats in every environment, even among those they consider allies. In King Rajasinha’s case, this hypervigilance manifested in a drastic and tragic decision to eliminate perceived threats, including the execution of his most trusted general, Weerasundara Bandara.
The individuals suffering from severe PTSD often find themselves alienating long-term friends while becoming overly reliant on manipulative outsiders who exploit their vulnerabilities, as seen in King Rajasinha’s relationship with Aritta Ki Vendu, who exacerbated his anxieties while providing a deceptive sense of security. The emotional landscape of King Seethawaka Rajasinghe ‘s reign was marked by profound alienation, as noted by Queyroz, who observed that he became increasingly estranged from his inner circle. His growing mistrust led him to suspect conspiracies against his rule, prompting him to execute many of his closest advisors and military leaders, including the poisoning of his right-hand man, Wicramasinghe Maha Senevi. This pattern of behavior illustrates not only the intense paranoia that gripped Rajasinha but also the sudden outbursts of rage and emotional instability that characterized his later years, painting a complex portrait of a ruler whose mind was deeply affected by the traumas of his past.
The narrative illustrates the king’s descent into a state of emotional turmoil characterized by sudden and violent outbursts of rage, which became increasingly unpredictable over time. His responses to relatively minor political challenges or military stalemates were often disproportionate, leading to immediate and harsh repercussions for those in his vicinity. This pattern of behavior not only instilled fear among his subjects but also created an atmosphere of tension and anxiety within his court. Furthermore, Queyroz emphasized a disturbing trend of emotional numbing and a complete absence of remorse in the king’s actions, which manifested in a reign of terror against his own people. This chilling lack of empathy, coupled with a willingness to execute thousands, has been interpreted by contemporary psychologists as a form of “emotional anesthesia,” a psychological defense mechanism developed after enduring years of gruesome warfare. As the king’s mental health deteriorated, he became increasingly isolated, effectively exiling himself from the very society he ruled. Queyroz portrayed him as a profoundly lonely figure, abandoned by loyal friends and court nobles because of his erratic behaviour and unfounded accusations. Ultimately, the relentless demands of warfare took a significant toll on his physical and mental well-being, leading to what can be described as “battle fatigue.” Having been engaged in continuous, brutal combat since the tender age of sixteen, the cumulative effects of this relentless violence contributed to his later erratic conduct, underscoring the profound impact of prolonged exposure to the horrors of war on his psyche.
The Final Battle and Death
King Seethawaka Rajasinghe’s final battle took place in Kandy, where he faced off against Konappu Bandara, also known as King Wimaladharmasurya, the son of the once-loyal Weerasundara Bandara. Weerasundara Bandara had previously been a staunch ally of King Seethawaka Rajasinghe, assisting him in the struggle against the Portuguese invaders. However, a tragic turn of events led King Seethawaka Rajasinghe to harbour unfounded suspicions about Weerasundara Bandara, culminating in the latter’s untimely death at the hands of the king he had once served faithfully. This betrayal ignited a fierce desire for vengeance in King Wimaladharmasurya, who vowed to avenge his father’s death.
The ensuing battle was marked by brutality and chaos, ultimately resulting in King Seethawaka Rajasinghe’s defeat. In the midst of his retreat, he suffered a grave injury after falling from his horse, with a bamboo splinter piercing his leg. This injury would prove fatal, as he succumbed to complications, possibly due to tetanus or septicemia, just days later. (Some historians suggest that after King Seethawaka Rajasinghe suffered a severe injury, the royal physician, harbouring a profound animosity towards the king, exacerbated the situation by introducing poison into the wound, thereby worsening the infection). Thus, the saga of a formidable warrior came to a close.
Revered as the Lion of Seethawaka, he instilled fear in the hearts of Portuguese colonizers, earning a reputation as a liberator. Yet, as time passed, he became an enigmatic figure, with the psychological scars of war potentially altering his aspirations and character. Had he not experienced such profound changes, he might have been celebrated as one of the great heroes in the annals of Sri Lankan history.
The Historical Significance of the Diagnosis
The historical analysis of King Seethawaka Rajasinghe through the lens of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) significantly reshapes the traditional view of his rule. Instead of being seen solely as a tyrant or a straightforward villain, he is revealed as a multifaceted leader and skilled military strategist whose mental state was severely affected by the continuous violence he enacted to protect his kingdom. This interpretation fosters a more nuanced understanding of his tragic psychological decline, demonstrating that the very warfare meant to defend his territory also led to his mental disintegration. His narrative serves as a powerful reminder of the often-ignored psychological consequences of conflict, emphasizing the profound and invisible wounds that war inflicts on those who participate in it. Additionally, the writings of Jesuit Father Fernão de Queyroz from the 17th century are significant in this context, as they document a prominent figure who lived from 1532 to 1593 and displayed symptoms of PTSD. Notably, while Western literature attributes the first comprehensive accounts of PTSD to Samuel Pepys’ diaries in 1666, following the Great Fire of London, Queyroz’s observations predate these records, highlighting the historical depth of this psychological condition.
In accordance with the special instructions of His Excellency the President and under the direct supervision of the Defence Secretary, Air Vice Marshal Sampath Thuyacontha (Retd), a special dengue prevention programme with particular focus on the high-risk areas of the Western Province commenced this morning (04 July).
The large-scale public health initiative is being implemented across institutions and surrounding localities throughout the Western Province as part of a coordinated national effort to curb the spread of dengue and safeguard public health.
A considerable number of personnel from the Sri Lanka Army, Sri Lanka Navy and Sri Lanka Air Force have been deployed to support the programme in close coordination with health authorities, local government institutions and community-based organisations.
As part of the operation, Tri-Forces personnel are engaged in extensive cleaning campaigns, identifying and eliminating potential mosquito breeding sites, clearing blocked drainage systems and conducting community awareness programmes to educate residents in high-risk areas on effective dengue prevention measures.
In line with the directives of His Excellency the President, the Ministry of Defence, together with the Tri-Forces, continues to play a significant role in supporting the national mechanism aimed at controlling the spread of dengue and protecting public health through this community welfare initiative.
The recent reports that the proposed US$3.7 billion Sinopec refinery project in Hambantota has stalled over disagreements regarding the company’s access to the local fuel market should concern every Sri Lankan.
At a time when the country is desperately seeking foreign direct investment, employment opportunities and export earnings, we must ask ourselves a difficult question:
Can Sri Lanka afford to lose another strategic investment because of rigid negotiations?
There is an old saying: Beggars cannot be choosers.” While no sovereign nation should surrender its national interests, a country emerging from its worst economic crisis must also recognize the realities of the global investment climate.
This is not the first time Sri Lanka has faced such a dilemma.
Many years ago, a proposal by Star Tank of Jebel Ali to establish a one-million-ton petroleum tank farm in Hambantota encountered similar obstacles. One of the key issues then, as now, was the proportion of refined petroleum products that could be sold in the domestic market. The project never materialised. Eventually, Chinese interests became the dominant investors in Hambantota.
Today history appears to be repeating itself.
Sinopec proposes to build a modern refinery capable of processing 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day—one of the largest foreign investments ever proposed for Sri Lanka. The original understanding reportedly allowed only 20 percent of production to be marketed locally, with the balance exported. Understandably, Sinopec now seeks a larger domestic market share, especially considering its expanding retail fuel network in Sri Lanka.
From a commercial standpoint, this request is hardly surprising. No investor committing nearly four billion dollars would ignore opportunities to integrate refining, storage, distribution and retail operations. Such vertical integration is standard practice throughout the global petroleum industry.
The Government understandably has obligations under the IMF programme to maintain a level playing field and avoid granting excessive concessions to individual investors. Those commitments should be respected. However, there should still be room for commercially sensible negotiations that satisfy both national policy and investor confidence.
The world energy landscape is becoming increasingly uncertain. Geopolitical tensions in the Middle East continue to threaten crude oil supplies and refining capacity. Countries that possess modern refining facilities and strategic petroleum storage will enjoy greater energy security and become regional trading hubs.
Sri Lanka’s location along one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes gives us a natural competitive advantage. Hambantota has the potential to evolve into a major petroleum logistics and bunkering centre serving the Indian Ocean. A refinery, supported by expanded storage terminals and associated infrastructure, could transform the region into an energy hub while generating valuable foreign exchange.
If additional land is required for future expansion, tank farms or supporting petrochemical industries, such requests should be evaluated objectively based on national benefit rather than rejected outright.
Equally important is the employment potential.
Thousands of Sri Lankan young men and women currently leave the country each year to work on construction projects in the Middle East under difficult conditions. A project of this magnitude would create opportunities for engineers, technicians, welders, fabricators, electricians, mechanics, heavy equipment operators and numerous support industries within Sri Lanka itself.
Beyond the construction phase, long-term employment would be created in refinery operations, maintenance, logistics, shipping, port services and engineering support. Local universities and technical institutes could also benefit through specialised training programmes aligned with the industry’s needs.
Major investments of this scale are rare. Investors compare countries constantly. If Sri Lanka develops a reputation for prolonged negotiations, policy uncertainty and delayed implementation, future investors may simply choose alternative destinations where approvals are faster and commercial terms are more predictable.
Negotiation is necessary. Protecting national interests is essential. But negotiations should aim to reach workable solutions rather than create deadlock.
Sri Lanka needs investment, technology transfer, export growth and quality employment. The Sinopec refinery offers the potential to deliver all four.
This is therefore a moment for pragmatism rather than rigidity.
The Government and Sinopec should continue discussions in good faith and seek a balanced agreement that protects Sri Lanka’s long-term interests while giving the investor sufficient commercial confidence to proceed.
Opportunities of this magnitude do not come often. When they do, we must ensure they become engines of national development rather than missed opportunities that future generations will regret.
A nation faces the risk of destruction not only from natural disasters but also from an ineffective judicial system, Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena warned during an event in Colombo yesterday (July 2).
Stressing the importance of judicial accountability, the Chief Justice explained that sovereignty is divided into four main pillars: legislative power, executive power, judicial power, and the franchise.
He noted that as members of the judiciary, judges exercise the judicial power of the people.
This power is not derived from one’s home, nor is it granted by the Judicial Service Commission, he stated.
Rather, it is entrusted by the people, for the benefit of the people, and this purpose must remain a constant priority.
Addressing the concept of independence, he emphasised that the independence of the judiciary belongs to the people.
It must be protected on their behalf rather than for the narrow, personal interests of individual judges.
He dismissed the notion that being a judge grants an unfettered licence to act without constraint, highlighting the inherent difficulty and responsibility of the role.
He concluded by warning that a poor judicial system can ruin a country in a very short period.
If such a collapse were to occur, he cautioned that no amount of international aid or external support would be sufficient to rebuild the nation.
The Government of India and various socio-religious organizations manage, monitor, and restrict missionary activities through a combination of strict federal laws, state-level legislation, and grassroots cultural campaigns.
The strategy focuses heavily on blocking the financial pipelines of religious organizations and restricting the legal rights of foreign citizens to evangelize on Indian soil.
1. Tightening Foreign Funding (FCRA Regulations)
The most potent tool against foreign-supported missionary activities is the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA). Run by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the rules are frequently updated to block conversions:
Proselytization Ban: Sweeping rules mandate that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and charities are explicitly barred from using foreign funds for proselytizing or religious conversion.
Narrow Approved Purposes: NGOs must select their activities from a highly specific, government-prescribed schedule of 105 permissible purposes. While building and maintaining churches or mosques is allowed, conversion-oriented work is completely excluded. [1, 2, 3]
Mass License Cancellations: The government has canceled or refused to renew the licenses of tens of thousands of NGOs—including high-profile Christian social groups and global philanthropic networks—disrupting their financial capability.
Asset Seizure Rules: Tightened regulations empower designated authorities to take control of or manage properties and institutions (like schools and hospitals) built with foreign funds if an organization’s FCRA license is revoked.
2. Strict Visa Restraints for Foreigners
The Indian government enforces a zero-tolerance policy regarding foreign nationals engaging in religious dissemination.
Missionary Visas: The government rarely issues official Missionary Visas. Those granted are heavily vetted and limited to specific regions.
Misuse of Tourist/Business Visas: Foreigners entering India on tourist or business visas who are caught preaching, distributing religious literature, or organizing mass baptisms are routinely arrested, fined, and deported for violating visa conditions.
Exclusion of Foreign Leadership: New rules dictate that organizations employing foreign nationals as “key functionaries” (directors or trustees) will ordinarily not qualify for FCRA registration, removing foreign decision-makers from domestic charity boards. [1]
3. State-Level Anti-Conversion Laws
Several Indian states have passed individual laws, colloquially known as “Freedom of Religion Acts.” These laws aim to stop forced or fraudulent conversions: [1, 2, 3, 4]
Prohibition of Inducement: They criminalize religious conversions achieved through force, allurement, misrepresentation, or fraudulent means. Critics note that “allurement” is often interpreted broadly to include providing free education, healthcare, or community aid. [1, 2, 3]
Mandatory Notice: In many states, individuals wishing to change their religion—and the priests performing the conversion ceremony—must formally notify local district magistrates weeks in advance for official evaluation.
4. Grassroots Mobilization and “Ghar Wapsi”
Apart from legal and legislative state machinery, right-wing Hindu nationalist organizations—such as the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)—actively counter missionary work through societal campaigns: [1, 2, 3]
Ghar Wapsi (Homecoming): These groups conduct mass ceremony campaigns aimed at converting Christian and Muslim communities back to Hinduism, which they argue was the original faith of their ancestors.
Tribal and Rural Outreach: To counter the historical presence of Christian missions in remote tribal and impoverished pockets, nationalist groups build competing schools, hospitals, and temples to provide social services without a change of faith.
Local Vigilance: Activists frequently monitor rural villages and complain to local police regarding unauthorized religious gatherings or alleged illegal conversion camps.
If you would like, I can provide more details on specific states that have active anti-conversion laws or share information on how the Supreme Court of India views the right to propagate religion. Let me know how you want to proceed.
Recent events have once again brought Iran into the international spotlight. Much of what the world sees today is shaped by geopolitics, sanctions and military tensions. Yet my memories of Iran are quite different.
They are the memories of a shipbuilder and businessman who had the privilege of working closely with the Iranian shipping industry during a significant period in Sri Lanka’s maritime history. During my tenure as Chief Executive Officer of one of Sri Lanka’s leading shipyards, Iranian vessels—including tankers operated by the national Iranian fleet and joint Iranian-Indian ventures such as IRESL were regular visitors to Colombo. Tankers of up to approximately 125,000 tonnes frequently called at our yard for periodic surveys, repairs and maintenance. Each docking represented a contract worth close to one million US dollars, making Iran an important customer for our ship repair industry. Negotiating these contracts required frequent visits to Tehran. Those trips offered an insight into a country that was often misunderstood by outsiders.
Arrival in Tehran was always an experience. Immigration officers were polite but cautious, reflecting the atmosphere of a nation living under international scrutiny. Waiting outside was our local agent, a retired Admiral from the Shah’s era who had married a British lady. Despite the political changes around him, he remained sophisticated, cosmopolitan and exceptionally well connected. Before taking us to the hotel, he invariably insisted we visit his luxurious apartment. One feature that fascinated me was his living room curtains, cleverly designed to conceal satellite dishes that enabled him to receive foreign television broadcasts despite official restrictions. It was a small but telling reminder that people often find practical ways to stay connected with the outside world.
His British wife prepared wonderful meals. I still remember the traditional Persian rice with its prized golden crust, together with generous servings of beef and lamb. Equally surprising was his well-stocked bar filled with expensive imported liquor—something few foreigners would have expected to find in post-revolutionary Iran. Only afterwards would he drive us to our hotel. The hotel itself was comfortable rather than luxurious, but one detail left a lasting impression. At the entrance, the tiled floor displayed the American flag together with the slogan Down with America.” Every guest entering the hotel walked across it, symbolising the political rhetoric of the time. Yet beyond these public displays, everyday life often painted a more nuanced picture.
One of the Iranian superintendents whose vessels we serviced invited us to his home. Outside, his young wife and daughters strictly observed the dress code, wearing long black coverings whenever they appeared in public. Once inside their home, however, the atmosphere changed completely. The women exchanged their outdoor clothing for fashionable Western-style dresses, wore makeup and entertained guests with warmth and confidence. It was a vivid illustration of the distinction between public conformity and private life in Iran.
I also came to know senior executives of the Iranian shipping industry. One influential chairman invited me to a beautiful café high in the hills overlooking Tehran. During the Shah’s time it had been an elegant liquor lounge; after the revolution it had become a traditional tea house. The transformation of the building itself mirrored the transformation of the country. During one conversation, this senior executive quietly confided that he wished to accumulate foreign currency outside Iran. He mentioned that his brother, who lived in Switzerland, would contact me. Some time later the brother visited Sri Lanka, and we reached a mutually acceptable commercial arrangement connected with the ship repair business. Such informal financial mechanisms were perhaps an inevitable consequence of the international sanctions and banking restrictions that affected Iran during that era.
Years later, after I had moved to the United Kingdom, I learnt that this powerful shipping executive had been arrested on corruption charges. I was told that under Iranian law at the time, those found guilty of financial misconduct could, in certain cases, avoid harsher punishment by repaying the misappropriated funds together with an equivalent financial penalty. Whether entirely accurate or not, it reflected a legal approach that differed considerably from many other jurisdictions.
Today, when I watch television coverage from Tehran, I notice another striking change. Many younger Iranian women appear dressed in modern fashions, with colourful clothing and stylish makeup, often wearing their head coverings more loosely than in decades past. Society has clearly evolved, even while remaining within the framework of the Islamic Republic. Iran is a nation of remarkable contrasts. It possesses immense natural resources, an ancient civilisation stretching back thousands of years, highly educated people and a strategic maritime position connecting the Persian Gulf with global trade routes. Its history is rich, its culture sophisticated and its people remarkably resilient. Those of us who dealt with Iran professionally discovered that beneath the political slogans was a society of capable engineers, experienced mariners, hospitable families and pragmatic businesspeople. The friendships formed through maritime commerce demonstrated that trade often builds bridges where politics erects barriers. As Sri Lanka looks to strengthen its maritime economy once again, it is worth remembering that shipping has always been more than ships and cargo. It is about relationships, trust and mutual respect between people from different nations. My memories of Iran remain not those of headlines and conflict, but of negotiations in Tehran, friendships forged over Persian hospitality and the enduring lesson that every nation has two stories—the one told by politics, and the one lived by its people.
Public concern regarding religious influence in Sri Lanka Cricket (SLC) heightened following the appointment of Eran Wickramaratne, a prominent political figure known for his evangelical Christian background, to lead the newly formed SLC Transformation Committee.
The unease among Buddhist Sinhalese cricket fans stems from fear of religious favoritism and the historical context of evangelical movements intersecting with national sports. [1, 2]
Core Factors Driving the Concern
Leadership Background: Eran Wickramaratne, whose family historically pioneered Pentecostal-style Christian worship in Sri Lanka, was tasked with guiding cricket reforms. Nationalist commentary and platforms like LankaWeb criticized having an evangelical figure “at the head table” of a sport overwhelmingly supported by a predominantly Buddhist population. [1, 2]
The “Born Again” Controversy: Suspicions are rooted in a 2023 Ministry of Sports inquiry. A retired Supreme Court judge’s report previously investigated allegations that a non-mainstream Christian cult (often locally referred to as “Born Again”) exerted undue influence over national team selections and player alignments. [1, 2, 3]
Administrative Decisions: Public pushback intensified over the committee’s decision to hire South African legal expert David Becker—who had a past intellectual property clash over Decision Review System (DRS) authorship—while allegedly ignoring the claims of a local Buddhist Sinhalese inventor. [1]
Official Response and Clarifications
Commitment to Merit: Addressing the media at the SLC offices, Eran Wickramaratne explicitly countered the religious anxieties. He emphasized that his public track record in banking and state ministries was entirely secular, stating that Sri Lanka Cricket operations would remain devoid of religious animosity and that selections will strictly rely on player merit.
Secular Governance: Fact-checking entities dismantled early social media rumors claiming the committee sought to introduce ethnic or religious quotas for team selections, confirming no such changes were made.
If you want to look closer into this topic, let me know if you would like me to:
Summarize the findings of the 2023 Sports Ministry inquiry regarding religious cults in cricket.
Detail the mandate and current members of the SLC Transformation Committee.
Free Lawyers Sri Lanka expresses deep concern over the Government’s continued delay in filling vacancies in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, alongside reported moves to extend the retirement age of judges in these courts by two years. These actions risk undermining judicial independence, exacerbating case backlogs, and eroding public trust in the justice system.
Delaying Appointments to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal
On Delaying Appointments to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal
The Government argues for a bottom-up” strategy, prioritising recruitment of magistrates and lower court judges before addressing the four vacancies in each of the superior courts. It claims this is essential for systemic sustainability and denies that vacancies are being used as leverage. 
While lower court vacancies must be addressed, prolonged understaffing of the apex courts cannot be justified. Over six months of vacancies have already caused serious delays in justice delivery, increased pressure on sitting judges, and affected high-stakes constitutional and appellate matters. The Constitution demands timely appointments to superior courts; using lower court needs as an excuse for inaction at the highest levels weakens the entire judicial hierarchy rather than strengthening it.
On Workload and Cadre Claims
The Government suggests the Supreme Court cadre does not require all positions to be filled simultaneously and that current workloads do not warrant urgency. 
This view underestimates the real impact on the administration of justice. Even a few vacancies at the apex level create bottlenecks, delay precedent-setting decisions, and diminish public access to timely remedies. Normalising understaffing sets a dangerous precedent and cannot substitute for prompt, transparent appointments.
On Extending Retirement Age of Supreme Court and Court of Appeal Judges
The Government contends that raising the retirement age (Supreme Court from 65 to 67 years; Court of Appeal from 63 to 65 years) will retain experienced judges longer and allow them to serve in higher courts, addressing promotion gaps for career judicial officers. 
This proposal fails on its own terms. Judges nearing promotion who currently miss out due to vacancies will face the identical situation if retirement ages are extended across the board. They will merely serve two additional years without gaining promotion. The net effect is not improved succession or experience utilisation but a blanket prolongation of tenure that offers no structural solution. More critically, such an extension — requiring constitutional amendment — is likely to be perceived as an inducement to sitting judges, compromising their independence and public confidence. It contradicts the principles of judicial tenure and the system change” commitments made by the Government. 
Free Lawyers Sri Lanka warns that these moves, taken together, create a concerning pattern that threatens the separation of powers. ‘Free Lawyers Sri Lanka’ urges the Government to:
• Immediately commence transparent processes to fill all vacancies in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.
• Abandon the proposed constitutional amendment to extend retirement ages.
• Engage constructively with the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, the judiciary, and civil society for genuine reforms that enhance efficiency while safeguarding independence.
The independence of the judiciary is non-negotiable. Delays in appointments and politically timed tenure changes undermine the rule of law and the public’s fundamental right to justice.
Free Lawyers Sri Lanka calls upon all stakeholders to defend these democratic safeguards.
Free Lawyers Sri Lanka
Colombo
Rajith Keerthi Tennakoon
CEO/Free Lawyers
Former Governor of Uva, Southern and Central Provinces
Former Executive Director of Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (CaFFE) and Center for Human Rights and Research – CHR Sri Lanka
